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PART ONE: 
 
 
 
BACKGROUND AND BASIC ISSUES 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER ONE 
 
NEW ZEALAND IN THE SOUTH PACIFIC 
 
 
"It is as a South Pacific power that we will be judged.” (Senior 
Official, Ministry of Foreign Affairs) 
 
"If we can establish ourselves as a beneficent centre of the South 
Pacific region, I believe that we shall be closer to finding our place 
in the world, and that we shall be able to look to our international 
relations with more realism and hence more confidence.” (F.M. 
Corner) 
 
"If we don't get our policies in the South Pacific right we are hardly 
likely to get anything right.” (Senior Official, Ministry of  
Foreign Affairs). 
 
 
1.1  Introduction 
 
It is just over 20 years since Frank Corner published his landmark paper "New 
Zealand and the South Pacific”.  The paper succinctly presents much of the new, and 
generally enlightened, thinking of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs at the time, coming 
during a period of intense introspection over our role in the South Pacific, our policies 
of decolonisation in Western Samoa and the Cook Islands, and concern for our 
standing at the United Nations. Corner argued persuasively for a major new basis and 
direction for New Zealand foreign policy. In this policy, he said the South Pacific 
should be the centre piece:- 
 
"What I put forward for your consideration is that New Zealand 
is primarily a Pacific power (by which I mean specifically a 
South Pacific power - not an Asian power or even a South East 
Asian power); that New Zealand will be affected increasingly by 
developments in the area to which it naturally belongs; and that 
if we do not accept the implications of our geographic and 
historical situation and of the dual racial origin of our people, 
our foreign policy can not be fully realistic, consistent or 
effective. I shall argue that the conditions for such a New 
Zealand policy now exist, as unfortunately they did not in the 
19th century; and that the hard experience, still incomplete, of 
working out a relationship between New Zealand and 
Polynesian peoples in the Pacific, as well as between Maori and 
Pakeha at home, is increasing both our capacity and our moral 
right to play a unique and necessary role in our own area......"1 
 
Corner does not argue for a foreign policy of parochialism, for one that concentrates 
"exclusively on our own parish would be as ill balanced as one that assigns no place to 
it at all”.  We must indeed pursue trade opportunities throughout the world, for 
economic health is the surest foundation for a stable and vigorous foreign policy. New 
Zealand has very limited ability to influence the politics of the greater part of the world. 
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While problems in the South Pacific rarely compare in gravity or complexity with those 
of Africa and Asia, they are, nonetheless "uniquely our problems” and we must "beware 
of spending all our energies, ability and money on problems we can do very little about 
while ignoring those which we can and should deal with. I hold it vital that we should 
develop our relationship with the peoples of our own South Pacific area, with Australia 
and with much of the Atlantic Community".2  Twenty years later these still appear to be 
the priority areas, though there has been perhaps some increased recognition of the 
importance of Pacific rim countries, including East Asian and Asean nations, of trade 
with the Middle East and of global defence strategy. But it is clear that the South Pacific 
should be one of the principal regions in the world requiring consistent in depth analysis 
by New Zealand. 
  
The authors of this report, a review of New Zealand policies to the small states of the 
South Pacific, fully agree with these sentiments and goals. In the mid 1980s they are 
every bit as vital as they were in the early 1960s and the requirements are now even 
more pressing. At the outset of this study we should declare our assumptions. These are: 
 
(1) That policies of mutual respect, friendship and understanding should exist 
between New Zealand and the island states. 
 
(2) That New Zealand’s policies should be realistic yet liberal and humane. 
 
(3) That New Zealand should recognise that we are a part of the South Pacific. 
 
(4) Within New Zealand it is essential to develop policies designed to develop a 
harmonious multicultural society; the integration of different yet separate culture 
adds to the overall richness of our total society. 
 
These assumptions and aims are identical or consistent with those of Corner. 
Widespread agreement no doubt exists for them but it is important consistently to strive 
to fulfil these aims and work through the implications. In 1984 it is clear, as we argue 
below, that we still fall somewhat short of achieving these goals. Moreover, important 
differences are likely to occur over interpretations of "realistic”, "humane” etc. While 
Corner emphasises that our policies should be tailored to take account of our limited 
resources as a nation, which clearly impose a major constraint on what can be achieved, 
"realism” also has other implications. 
 
Realism implies that planning the constitutional and political development of island 
nations should not be done in a vacuum, or as an autonomous exercise carried on 
largely separately from the economic and social basis of island life (see Chapters 3, 6, 7 
and 8). Thus it came as no surprise to discover during the study that a political elite has 
evolved in the island nations and to recognise that this was a sociological factor of 
profound importance as far as the likely future direction and type of government are 
concerned. 
 
Realism also suggests, for example, that one should consider the possibility of feedback 
influences from one aspect of the economy on other aspects and on the way the 
economy as a whole functions. Thus the effect of massive aid inflows may not simply 
be the addition of scarce capital to islands' revenue on top of existing resources, 
enabling more productive activity to occur as well as sustaining comfortable living 
standards; the aid inflow may in fact "crowd out” productive activity (Chapters 5, 6, 7). 
Of course these examples of "realism” imply nothing more than the need to carry out a 
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careful empirical study to collect the data, to gather the facts as the basis of the whole 
approach. When this is done, as has been attempted in this study, the importance of the 
interconnectedness of things becomes apparent. 
 
"Realism” does however also have two further connotations. The gathering of up to 
date, relevant data reveals that it is no longer adequate to analyse the contemporary 
societies and economies of the Pacific by the use of yesterday's models. The use of out 
of date models or standardised doctrines (e.g. "viability”, "development”, "dependence” 
etc.) could only  produce misleading results when applied to these unique contemporary 
societies. Tools adequate to the new situation must be designed, so we have no apology 
to make for introducing a new approach in an attempt to deal with a new social 
formation based on the migration process, the massive flow of aid, remittances and 
other invisibles and the dominant role of government. We use the word "MIRAB” to 
describe this new model, with the individual letters standing for the factors that shape 
the new economy and society (MI = migration process, R = remittances, A = aid 
dependent, B = bureaucracy in the place of a private sector). 
 
Secondly, "realism” also warns us of the perils of ideology. The peculiarities of time, 
place and process are of great importance in planning the future of Pacific peoples; what 
might be perfectly good doctrine in East Africa, say, in the 1950s, leading to the 
evolution of a self governing and then independent nation state, might be dangerous 
doctrine when applied to a tiny South Pacific community in which economic and social 
forces are at work binding it ever more closely to New Zealand. We need to keep a 
basic value position (for without it there are no goals to aim for) without becoming 
excessively ideological or doctrinaire. Indeed it can be asserted that the considerable 
measure of success that New Zealand has enjoyed in its South Pacific policies in the 
past has been due to a considerable measure of pragmatism.3 
 
With respect to our fourth assumption above, it is clear that 20 years after Corner wrote 
we still have a very long way to go in "the hard experience” of "working out a 
relationship” both between Maori, Pacific Islanders and Pakeha at home and with 
Pacific Island peoples of the South Pacific. Not only is it imperative that we build a 
harmonious multi cultural society within New Zealand for the sake of all members of 
that society, it is also clear that events and trends within New Zealand cast a long 
shadow beyond our shores   a shadow that falls across the South Pacific and which is 
noticed in distant lands.4  Internal events have external consequences. The attitude of 
Pacific Islanders and of others overseas, are affected by many issues: our migration 
policy, Treaty of Waitangi controversies, attitude to overstayers, our view on a nuclear 
free South Pacific, Anzus and the Western Alliance, our response to natural hazard 
disasters in the region, and many other issues. Again this illustrates the 
"interconnectedness of things”.  And New Zealand's handling of such issues critically 
affects its "capacity” and "moral right” to play a major role in the South Pacific. 
 
Before we consider New Zealand's current policies to the South Pacific we need to 
review international and regional trends that have influenced New Zealand thinking. 
 
1.2  International and Regional Background 
 
New Zealand, itself an island nation, belongs in the "world of islands” which makes up 
the South Pacific. Geographically and historically our links with the peoples of the 
South Pacific are clear, just as their links with us are equally clear, though culturally our 
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destiny has at times been seen to lie elsewhere. Indeed, New Zealand has often been 
ambivalent about the South Pacific and our foreign policy has swung somewhat like a 
pendulum, sometimes towards the Pacific, sometimes towards Asia, and almost always 
moving in a way affected by Europe. 
 
As Corner has remarked, it is not without significance that the first flowering of New 
Zealand nationalism, occurring when New Zealand was still a small dependent colony, 
was expressed in terms of New Zealand's place in the South Pacific. In the 19th century 
New Zealand colonists and leaders such as Grey, Vogel and Seddon knew their own 
interests and assumed rightly that those interests lay in their own part of the world.5  
Even if their attitudes to the South Pacific were crudely expansionist, sometimes racist, 
and blatantly imperialistic and they saw their country as a "Britain of the South”, they 
did at least have a clear view of New Zealand's role in the world. Later, from the turn of 
the century to almost World War II, New Zealand seemed to lose her earlier robust self 
confidence. Brushed aside by Britain in Seddon's day and singularly unsuccessful in 
keeping out the disastrous influenza epidemic from Western Samoa in 1918, our brash 
attempts at modernisation, whether under Colonel Gudgeon in the Cooks or Sir G.S. 
Richardson in Samoa, achieved little success, leading in the latter case only to the 
passive disobedience of the Mau campaign, the disastrous riot of 1929 and shelling of 
innocent villages which destroyed much Samoan faith in our trusteeship as well as 
undermining our self confidence for two decades. New Zealanders ceased, for over a 
generation, to believe that we had any purposive role to play in the world save that of a 
faithful mindless child of the mother country or as a junior sibling of Australia. Our 
"sense of littleness” and passive policies followed naturally from the aimless drifting of 
our foreign policy up until World War II. 
 
It is obvious that in the period since the War, New Zealand has rediscovered her 19th 
century view of her position in the world and accepted the necessity of playing a South 
Pacific role. The founding of the United Nations, the transition to nationhood of the 
colonies of Africa and Asia, and the inevitable extension of the decolonisation process 
into the South Pacific meant that New Zealand was bound to be called to account for 
her stewardship of dependent peoples. Thus, New Zealand was required to consider in 
depth her current and future policies toward Western Samoa, Niue and the Tokelaus. 
The policies of the time seem to have been greatly affected by the prevailing mood at 
international levels. The defeat of Fascism in World War II, the accompanying 
liberation of conquered peoples and the end of empire emphasised the importance of 
social justice, and the need to free societies from colonialism or exploitation. The 
founding of the great United Nations specialised agencies (the F.A.O., UNESCO, 
I.L.O., W.H.O. etc.) saw the beginnings of large scale, ambitious aid programmes 
designed to assist the less developed countries, employing huge sums of money 
(compared to what had been available hitherto) and many international "experts”, in a 
task that essentially involved a massive transfer of Western technology. Accompanying 
these developments there was a great resurgence of confidence in the West in the 1950s 
that the developed world really could conquer within one or two decades the poverty of 
the underdeveloped world, could easily banish archaic institutions and so lay the basis 
for liberal, capitalist democracies to emerge in a new age of growing freedom and 
prosperity. Viewed from the 1980s the euphoria of the late 1940s and 1950s can be 
viewed with some cynicism, reflecting the uncritical optimism of the Allied victors who 
had set Western Europe on its feet again by means of the hugely successful Marshall 
Plan. In the thinking of the time, following the birth of major new independent nations 
such as India, Nigeria and Indonesia, it seemed possible that new countries could 
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advance equally rapidly on all fronts at the same time   politically, economically and 
socially.6 In this thinking, the problems of underdevelopment belonged overwhelmingly 
"out there” in the developing country and did not involve the world economy or 
relationships between economies. Diagnoses did not distinguish the many varied 
economic causes of backwardness, did not adequately recognise the massive importance 
of sociological factors, or attribute sufficient weight to the role of new political elites 
who were not behaving in the ways they were expected to according to the textbooks on 
constitutional and political development. Although this "modernisation” theory had 
existed long before this time, the theory was greatly boosted and given widespread 
credibility in this period of decolonisation. New Zealand politicians, planners, public 
servants (who played a critically important role) and academics, subscribed to the 
conventional wisdom of modernisation theory and applied it to the South Pacific 
territories. Buoyed by our own experience as a former colony that had achieved self 
respect by means of evolution under the Westminster system to reach Dominion status, 
we planned to apply the same process to the territories over the course of two or three 
decades.7 
 
Throughout the period of the 1950s to the 1970s the pace of decolonisation in the South 
Pacific was greatly accelerated by the speed and completeness with which colonies in 
Africa and Asia moved to Independence8 - a speed which is now regretted by many 
former administrators who believe that more time and resources were needed. A major 
factor too was the growing influence of former colonies at the United Nations as their 
number grew and the demands of the United Nations Committee on Decolonisation (the 
"Committee of Twenty Four”) that dependent territories should move rapidly and 
progressively to self government and independence. As J.W. Davidson states, the year 
1960 when the issue of Samoan independence was considered was  
 
"a climactic one in the history of colonial liberation. During the 
course of it, seventeen newly independent states had been 
admitted to the United Nations, and the issue of terminating 
colonial rule wherever it remained had been taken up with 
passion in ... the General Assembly".9 
 
New Zealand was acutely conscious of this international pressure and very concerned 
that its image at the United Nations should remain good. 
 
It is argued in this report that these factors have been a major determinant of New 
Zealand policies to the South Pacific in the last 30 years  - even more important in some 
instances than the internal conditions within the territories - and that the predetermined 
unlineal course of political evolution ordained in United Nations circles, whereby a 
colony moved progressively toward self government and then to independence, 
occurred without adequate study of the actual situation in the South Pacific region as a 
whole, the internal political, economic and social conditions in each territory, and the 
particular relationships between each territory and New Zealand. It is suggested that in 
conformity with United Nations expectations, the process and direction of political 
evolution that was chosen as one of the main options put to each territory - and the 
relatively slight emphasis given to one or two alternative options10 -  largely denied the 
territory the possibility of exploring some other kind of constitutional relationship that 
might have served the needs of its people much more adequately (see Chapters 3 and 7).  
It is probably true too that the view that international law has few concepts available to 
accommodate the unique needs of each country and each special relationship acted as a 
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limitation, rather than stimulation, on attempts to work out the best relationship and 
make constitutional law adjust to fit these needs. Responsibility for this clearly lies with 
the New Zealand administrators of the day. However, with the exception of Western 
Samoa, it is not too late in the day  - since relationships between the island countries 
and New Zealand remain very good and they are linked in the "Special Relationship” - 
to review the constitutional relationship if either or both parties feels another kind of 
relationship might prove to be more advantageous. 
 
1.3  Review of the Trends over the last Thirty Years 
 
The main events of the period can be quickly sketched.11   The New Zealand Prime 
Minister, Peter Fraser returned from the United Nations in 1945 fully aware of the 
necessity that rapid development must occur12 in the South Pacific territories. Dr Beeby 
was despatched to report on the educational situation in the islands and to draw up plans 
for designing new school curricula. Fraser himself decided to initiate a scholarship 
scheme for further education of islanders in New Zealand.  Following a visit to Samoa 
late in 1944, Peter Fraser became aware of the Samoans' desire to be more fully 
involved in their government and the need to promote Samoans in the public service. In 
1949 Fraser passed the Samoan Amendment Bill which was designed to set the country 
on the road to self government, through it was realised that it would be a long and 
difficult route. Throughout the next two decades the various steps taken in Samoa, and 
thinking about decolonisation in Samoa, were with some exceptions, to strongly affect 
approaches taken to other countries in the region. 
 
1.4  Cook Islands 
 
In 1954 J.B. Wright, Secretary for Island Territories, reported on the unsatisfactory 
political consequences of the rapid growth of a large impersonal public service in the 
Cook Islands, a public service that was largely insensitive to the local Maori people. 
The Minister of Island Territories, Clifton Webb, visited with a mission. The Minister 
stated that New Zealand's objective in the Cook Islands was completely different from 
her objectives in Western Samoa and he predicted correctly that the Cook Islands would 
never want complete independence. The political relationship between the Cook Islands 
and New Zealand could not remain static and he stated prophetically that even more 
changes would occur in the next decade.13 In 10 years the group was to attain full 
internal self government with free association with New Zealand. In 1955 the Minister 
of Island Territories invited V.D. Stace and Professor H Belshaw to survey conditions 
in the Cook Islands and to make recommendations for a development programme. The 
Belshaw Stace Report of 1955 is a major document for New Zealand policy in the South 
Pacific for it saw "development problems as social, administrative and political, as well 
as economic...". 
 
The main thrust of the Belshaw Stace Report was that New Zealand policy should help 
Cook Islanders to help themselves. This would involve a new scheme of community 
organisation as a basis for local government and economic activity. It was hoped that 
constructive local leadership could be re created and the trend in economic and in 
political affairs should be towards increasing self determination, with islanders 
increasingly managing their own affairs. Yet the task of political development was 
particularly difficult in the Cook Islands, for unlike Western Samoa, society had been 
greatly affected by the force of Western impact and many traditional institutions no 
longer existed. The aim for New Zealand, the authors declared, paraphrasing R.P. 
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Gilson, must be "to transform a society without a stable authority structure, which 
largely as a consequence is elusive, unreal, difficult to understand and often politically 
dangerous in its reactions, into one in which such a structure exists, and which can be 
expressive of the will of the people organised in broad stable communities of economic 
and social interest".14  In spite of producing a major report analysing the problem in 
depth, it can be said with hindsight that the period of 10 years devoted to building a 
more stable structure  was too short - though there were good reasons why self 
government should not be further delayed - and that New Zealand did not commit 
sufficient resources to the task. Indeed it can be strongly argued that despite some able 
and committed officers in the Department of Island Territories, New Zealand lacked 
sufficient numbers of appropriate personnel (in terms of experience, interest and 
personality) for the large task required. 
 
While the Belshaw Stace Report did urge autonomous, "boot strap” development for the 
Cook Islands it was quite far sighted for the time in recognising that the group was a 
"part of New Zealand” and that their economy was already closely tied with New 
Zealand's. They also noticed the beginnings of the large scale process of migration to 
New Zealand, a social process that was increasingly to vitiate the chances of success for 
autonomous development. Yet it might indeed already have been too late for 
autonomous development. As the Rev. R.L. Challis observed: 
 
"...in a sense here is boldness. Turn back the clock and 
concentrate more on the individual island, and from those to the 
group and then from the Group to new Zealand: a process that 
will take much time, boldness of conception and practice."15 
 
The small and politically weak Department of Island Territories did work hard to 
implement many of the Belshaw Stace recommendations (Wilson, 1969). Shipping to 
the Cook Islands was improved considerably and Greggs were persuaded to open a 
canning factory on Rarotonga in 1961. 
 
1.5  Social and Constitutional Development 
 
Educational advisors helped to improve the quality of schooling in all territories and 
various schemes for overseas training were established.16  And attention was directed 
immediately to the requirements for orderly and progressive political and constitutional 
development. Professor C.C. Aikman was engaged by the New Zealand Government as 
constitutional adviser; he visited the Cook Islands in 1956 and 1957, played a part in the 
examination of citizenship and constitutional planning in Western Samoa in the early 
1950s and later acted as the New Zealand Government's adviser in drawing up a 
constitution for an independent Western Samoa, with Professor J.W. Davidson acting as 
the Samoan representative. Later in the 1960s Aikman worked on the constitutional 
relationship of Niue with New Zealand before Professor R. Quentin Baxter helped that 
island to draw up the Niuean constitution. Throughout the 1950s the High 
Commissioner Guy Powles worked patiently to restore good relations and better trust in 
New Zealand intentions in Western Samoa, building on the Act of 1947; the promise to 
return the New Zealand Reparations Estates to Samoan ownership and control under a 
public corporation contributed greatly to growing Samoan faith in New Zealand's 
intentions. 
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1.6  Western Samoa 
 
New Zealand did not, however, address the economic problems of Western Samoa till 
well into the 1950s, in spite of the exceptionally high rate of population growth and 
narrow economic base.17  V.D. Stace’s very competent work on the economy18 and the 
steps needed to be taken to diversify and strengthen it, though undertaken in 1953, was 
not released until 1955. Aerial surveys, soil and geological surveys were carried out, a 
comprehensive population census held and in 1957 a compromise was worked out with 
the Bank of New Zealand which enabled the planning of a Bank of Western Samoa, 
which was to combine (after independence) the functions of development banking as 
well as commercial and central banking roles. More seriously in the 1950s the practice 
of full Samoan participation in economic planning begun in two select committees was 
dealt a series of disabling blows. As Davidson remarks19: 
 
"Because of the initial resistance to planning, which stemmed 
from traditional thinking among the Samoans and from the 
conservatism of the business community, the loss of ground that 
had been gained was particularly unfortunate. As a result of it, 
Samoa went forward towards independence with the minds of its 
leaders less fully engaged in the attempt to solve some of the 
country's most serious problems than need have been the case." 
 
In spite of the able and imaginative efforts of Guy Powles in the 1950s, it is abundantly 
clear with hindsight that in this most conservative society in the South Pacific, the 
leaders did not gain sufficient experience or appreciate the necessity of the many hard 
political decisions that would be needed to set the economy on a sounder footing. Two 
decades after independence copra production had shown no long term growth; the 
production of cacao had dropped by half and banana output had fallen to only 5 percent 
of its peak volume of the late 1950s.20  By 1983 the country was in a state of economic 
crisis. Autonomous development of course was also becoming more difficult to achieve 
in this much larger country as it became more closely integrated into the New Zealand 
economy over the period. Although it lies outside the scope of this study, the hypothesis 
is suggested that Samoa has an aid and remittance led economy like the five small states 
studied, with these new trends undermining the basis of the old colonial export 
economy. 
 
At Samoan independence, Corner's assessment of New Zealand's record was that, with 
some major qualifications (referred to below), New Zealand had done well as a colonial 
power:21 
 
"It is handing over a prosperous and politically mature country 
to what will surely be a stable independence; it has established a 
healthy body politic with well rooted institutions of law and 
government which can confidently be expected to cope with 
future stresses". 
 
With the benefit of hindsight this assessment can be seen to be basically sound. New 
Zealand's record in the 15 years preceding independence was impressive in the political 
and social fields; the great deficiency as noted above was the belated and ad hoc 
attention given to the economy and the inadequate training provided to Samoan leaders 
in economic management. 
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1.7  Niue 
 
New Zealand's record in Niue was broadly comparable with that in the Cook Islands. 
The Niue Island Assembly was set up in 1960 and in 1962 at the same time as similar 
action was taken in the Cook Islands: the Assembly was given financial control over the 
New Zealand subsidy as well as over local revenue. In 1963, after drawing attention to 
the 1960 U.N. Declaration on Colonialism and emphasising the New Zealand view that 
the island territories should exercise their right to determine their own future, the 
Resident Commissioner presented the Assembly with a paper setting out a timetable by 
which self government might be realised. The Assembly expressed considerable 
concern at the pace at which the changes were to be implemented, stating they were not 
confident of their ability at that stage of running their own affairs.22  They also feared 
that the granting of internal self government involved an attempt by New Zealand to 
free herself of responsibilities towards Niue. Aikman and McEwen recommended a 
slower pace of evolution and the Minister, Hon. J.R. Hanan assured them that New 
Zealand would continue to give financial and other assistance to a self governing Niue. 
The island received instalments of self government represented by the establishment of 
the Assembly, the conferment on it of substantial legislative and financial powers and 
the setting up of an executive committee. The whole process is admirably analysed by 
Chapman.23 
 
1.8 Tokelau 
 
With respect to the tiny, remote Tokelau Islands, their administration did not begin to be 
disentangled from that of Western Samoa until the late 1940s. In 1948 the Tokelau 
Islands Act transferred formal sovereignty from Great Britain to New Zealand and 
conferred New Zealand citizenship on the people. In the 1950s and 1960s a small public 
service was established and began to grow and new hospitals, schools, radio facilities 
and other innovations were introduced to the atolls. Ad hoc decisions were made in the 
absence of wider policy decisions but it became clear in the 1960s that Tokelau as well 
as Niue must also come under the direct scrutiny of the United Nations Committee on 
Colonialism. In 1964 the Minister of Island Territories proposed that representatives of 
each of the three islands should choose between affiliation with either Western Samoa 
or the Cook Islands. A delegation visited these two countries but then requested that 
Tokelau should remain directly affiliated with New Zealand, as they felt New Zealand 
"had sufficient funds to continue to look after us”.  Although there was no clear 
indication of what the ultimate goals might be, Tokelau enthusiasm for a small 
sponsored migration programme from 1963 1965 led to the view that the whole 
population might perhaps be resettled in New Zealand, opening the possibility that the 
atolls might be developed as commercial copra plantations. The Tokelau Islands 
Resettlement Scheme was approved in late 1965 with the aim of moving 200 people per 
year over five years. While it fell far short of this goal it did stimulate private, non 
assisted migration of Tokelauans from the atolls and from Western Samoa. By 1972 
there were some 1600 Tokelauans and part Tokelauans in New Zealand, while the 
population in the islands was still over 1600. By 1971 the Tokelauan community 
requested that the assisted resettlement scheme be suspended, expressing a clear 
determination to continue to live in the islands in the future. By this time, with F.H. 
Corner now Secretary of Foreign Affairs, Niue was taking its last steps towards full 
internal self government and official planning of the direction and pace of 
decolonisation received new impetus. Although society remained traditional and 
conservative and felt needs expanded only slowly, a very great expansion in the public 
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service occurred over the span of a few years, creating a foreign devised and foreign 
controlled structure that was not responsible to the Fono and whose European methods 
of operation by passed and largely ignored the traditional institutions for solving 
problems or undertaking work activities.24  Although this problem was worse on 
Fakaofo than on the other two atolls, the bureaucratic, rigid pattern of development 
appears to have been largely imposed from without, without achieving a close 
relationship based on two way communication between New Zealand representatives 
and the Tokelau people. And again as in the case of Niue, there have been repeated 
requests for a slower pace of political evolution to enable full stock taking and careful 
consideration of alternative options, including continuation of the status quo. 
 
 
1.9  Regional Developments 
 
Throughout the 1960s greater attention was focussed on the problems that Pacific Island 
producers experienced in marketing their produce in New Zealand. This led to Fiji and 
Western Samoa joining in the Pacific Islands Producers Association (PIPA) to promote 
closer cooperation as a step towards bringing greater pressure to bear on New Zealand 
to improve conditions affecting the marketing of bananas in that country. Tonga, the 
Cook Islands and Niue joined too, and later the Gilbert and Ellice Islands Colony, while 
the scope of PIPA was broadened to include the production and marketing problems of 
other rural industries. One  
manifestation of Island Governments' concern over marketing was expressed in Albert 
Henry's request to the New Zealand Government in 1973 for an enquiry into the fruit 
trade which led to the Shand Report.25  Marketing problems and the need to rationalise 
potential competition (as in the case of Niuean passionfruit, see pp. below) led to 
mounting concern, and at the political level a real step forward was finally achieved in 
July 1980 when the Rt. Hon. R. Muldoon announced the launching of SPARTECA at 
the Tarawa South Pacific Forum Meeting. SPARTECA was intended to provide an 
impetus to the export trade of island countries by providing on the part of Australia and 
New Zealand, duty free and unrestricted access for most of the products exported by 
Forum countries on a non reciprocal basis. The operation of SPARTECA is reviewed 
below, Chapter 13. 
 
New Zealand has continued to play the major role in education in the South Pacific 
region since almost all countries have chosen the New Zealand School Certificate 
syllabus, and assistance with curriculum development as well as the provision of 
teachers when needed have illustrated this significant and continuing role in the region. 
The importance of education in both equipping would be migrants of the various 
MIRAB societies (see Chapter 15) for employment and life in New Zealand, as well as 
in retaining traditional knowledge, skills, pride and a sense of identity can hardly be 
over estimated. In 1968 New Zealand played a large role in helping to establish the 
University of the South Pacific as the first regional university. 
 
The primary institution for regional development and consultation had been the South 
Pacific Commission and its South Pacific Conference, set up by the colonial powers 
under the Treaty of Canberra in 1947. In spite of its very great contribution to the region 
in many social, health, agronomic and scientific fields, the fact that the organisation was 
precluded by its constitution from discussing political matters gravely weakened its 
potential usefulness. Moreover, as a "colonial club” set up by the metropolitan powers, 
it became increasingly anachronistic, and since the members attending the Conference 
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were mostly public servants and younger politicians, it was patently obvious that the 
body lacked real "political clout”.  In his celebrated Lae speech at the South Pacific 
Conference in 1965, Ratu Sir Kamasese Mara made the first outspoken criticism of the 
paternalistic relationship between metropolitan and territorial governments, and 
demanded for the latter, not merely equality but primacy in the organisation.26  The 
work of the Commission should be what they, the territories, wanted. A further crisis 
occurred over the issue of nuclear testing. Although S.M. Koya, the Fiji Chairman of 
the South Pacific Conference in 1970, permitted discussion of French nuclear testing in 
the Pacific, which led to the French delegate walking out of the meeting, it became 
obvious, as the Hon. Duncan McIntyre, Minister of Island Territories stated, that 
continued political discussion would lead to the destruction of the Conference and of 
the Commission. 
 
At the same time the fact that the self governing Cook Islands could not become a 
member of the South Pacific Conference until it was fully independent led to the 
spawning of sub regional associations, such as PIPA.  In 1971 the larger four members 
of PIPA (Fiji, Western Samoa, Tonga and Cook Islands) requested New Zealand to 
convene a meeting of heads of government of the four plus New Zealand and Australia. 
 
The need for a larger stage at which the increasing number of thorny regional questions 
could be thrashed out at the top political level, and in which all member countries would 
sit as equals, was obvious and this proposal, put forward27 in 1971, led to the founding 
of the South Pacific Forum. In 1972 the South Pacific Bureau for Economic 
Cooperation (SPEC) was established as the secretariat for the Forum (see Piddington, 
1973). A primary objective of SPEC was to endeavour to alter the pattern whereby 
dependent territories played the classic role of under developed countries of supplying 
raw materials to metropolitan countries, but were unable to manufacture many of the 
good they required. Hence SPEC investigated ways of breaking down existing trade 
barriers to island products, and growing recognition of the problem by political leaders 
such as Hon. B. Talboys, Minister of Foreign Affairs, led to the SPARTECA proposals 
liberalising market access and to the Pacific Islands Industrial Development Scheme 
(PIIDS) of 1976 which encouraged investment in industrial development in the island 
states (see Chapter 13). 
 
While the Forum and the South Pacific Commission have continued since the early 
1970s in complementary rather than competing fashion, the growing success of the 
former, involving as it does the Heads of State of the respective countries, has recently 
made the future of the latter increasingly problematic.28 
 
Throughout the later 1960s and especially the 1970s, island nations have increasingly 
spoken out on issues of concern to them. When Nauru became independent in 1968 a 
new, more equal phosphate agreement could be worked out and the New Zealand 
farmer was for the first time forced to pay the world price for phosphate. The attainment 
of independence  by Fiji and Tonga in 1970 added impetus to the evolving mood that 
the South Pacific must become a community of equal nations concerned with their 
identity of interests.  As early as 1972 island governments resolved to act together to set 
up a common disaster fund, donating $500,000 over 12 years for this purpose. This was 
an early indication of a growing sense of regionalism. Growing awareness of the 
dangers of nuclear testing, directed primarily at anti French protests, and later over 
dumping nuclear wastes, was expressed in the 1980s in a growing popular movement 
for a nuclear free Pacific. Throughout the 1970s regional co operation as enhanced too 
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by the international discussions on the law of the sea, which finally were resolved by 
the declaration of 200 mile economic zones which had the effect of transforming tiny 
island archipelagoes into large territorial entities if the vast oceanic waters were now to 
be considered included within their sovereign territories. Although the United States did 
not recognise the 200 mile EEZs, and events such as the arrest of the Danica in Papua 
New Guinea in 1982 for trespassing in the EEZ reinforced the point that changes in 
international law do not resolve basic power relationships, the island states have entered 
into new regional groupings designed to protect and lobby for their interests such as the 
Nauru Agreement (see Chapter 14 on Fishing). The problems of providing adequate 
surveillance and enforcement over these greatly enlarged territorial waters where 
valuable tuna stocks can sometimes be found, remains a very great problem 
(surveillance flights by Royal New Zealand Air Force Orions are greatly appreciated). 
Formation of the Forum Fisheries Agency also recognises the need for a regional 
approach on fisheries research and many of these essentially political problems. 
 
Continuing dissatisfaction with the inadequacies of shipping services in the region has 
led to mounting concern. While the basic problem of the dispersion of large numbers of 
tiny islands occupied by small numbers of occupants make the provision of a profitable 
shipping service a planner's nightmare, the imposition on the region of technological 
change and of externally devised scale economies has compounded the problem. Thus 
with containerisation and rapidly rising fuel and other costs, more and more shipping 
lines have decided that it is uneconomic to operate on certain routes or to call at certain 
ports, or to call as frequently, for both the size of imported quantities of merchandise 
and more particularly the volume of exported produce are near or below the minimum 
level required (SPAS 1980). The decline in quality of internal shipping services has 
often compounded the problem at a national level. New Zealand has played a major role 
in supporting islander concern in this area and in founding the Forum Shipping Line to 
service some member countries. Although the Forum Shipping Line has experienced 
major financial problems, and its future prospects are unclear, in 1983 the New Zealand 
Government resolved, in contrast to Australia, to renew its financial support to the Line. 
 
Transport has of course been an area of considerable dispute, as well as agreement, at 
the regional level. The proliferation of very small national airlines at a time of 
massively increasing costs and intense competition between carriers has caused friction 
and some countries have experienced very heavy losses. Air Pacific has experienced 
considerable difficulties and the suspension of some services, whether internal or 
external (see the case of Tuvalu, Chapter 10) has caused hardship as well as 
inconvenience. 
 
Internal issues in a metropolitan country can become matters of great concern in the 
islands as immigration of islanders to both New Zealand and Australia illustrates. The 
various policies initiated by the New Zealand Government from 1976 onward to reduce 
the number of overstayers has had considerable reverberations in the region and 
especially in Western Samoa. Legal debate has even extended to the Privy Council over 
whether some Samoans possess New Zealand citizenship. While the immigration issue 
is highly relevant to the problems of developing an harmonious multi racial society in 
New Zealand and in providing jobs at a time of mounting unemployment, it is equally 
important for the functioning of a new kind of multi national society - the MIRAB 
society - with a new kind of economy, based on the flow of remittance income both 
ways between the dispersed members of kindred groups. Immigration policies must 
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recognise the reality of such new phenomena that are now intrinsic features of the new 
South Pacific. 
 
Recently the independence movement in New Caledonia has become an important issue 
at Forum meetings, with its association with the earlier Jimmy Stevens secession 
movement in Vanuatu and the current unrest along the Papua New Guinea border with 
West Irian. The New Caledonian issue raises basic questions about Melanesian 
freedom, rights and representation, as well as future stability on the island and moreover 
along with the nuclear free movement, Law of the Sea and Tuna fishing, immigration, 
transport and other issues, it raises the fear of a division between island states and their 
former colonial masters. Thus, especially since the decline of consensus and the 
weakening of internationalism throughout the world since 1980, the potential for 
friction in the South Pacific has perhaps been as great as the potential for improved co 
operation. 
 
Thus, while there have been some solid successes achieved in regionalism, it is true to 
say that many sources of friction remain (such as contributing to the cost of a regional 
shipping line or a regional university). While some sense of a regional identity does 
exist, some island countries appear to value their links with metropolitan countries more 
than with one another. National integration and unity are very important as recent 
events in Vanuatu and Papua New Guinea illustrate. Of course the pursuit of nationalist 
aims, if conceived of in a narrow parochial way (such as the establishment of a Samoan 
University) might weaken regionalism, itself a fragile thing, and some balancing of 
national and regional interests is required. But the achievement of national unity and the 
establishment of stable and contented island societies must be the primary aim and 
while some progress has been made over the last 30 years the attainment of these goals 
is still by no means certain. Furthermore a fundamental factor in the attainment of these 
goals remains the relationship with New Zealand (which involves both their constitution 
and a compact between them and New Zealand) since this affects their stability, their 
employment prospects, their social and economic standards and indeed the level of 
viability that can be attained. Thus it is essential for this report to reopen the matter of 
their constitutions and of the compact that each state has with New Zealand. 
 
The greatest achievement of all in the last 40 years has, of course, been the 
establishment of the South Pacific Forum which marks a breakthrough in relationships 
that had often been distorted by inequalities. At the annual meetings the Prime Ministers 
of Australia and New Zealand deliberately take a back seat, with the initiative usually 
coming from Island leaders. The Forum has increased understanding of South Pacific 
affairs and engendered a better level of goodwill. Sometimes, as at the 1977 Port 
Moresby meeting when Forum members decided to claim the 200 mile exclusion 
economic and fishing zones, decisions taken have had a major impact on other parts of 
the world. This institution remains the best hope for effective regional action in the 
years ahead. 
 
1.10  Assessment of New Zealand's Policies 
 
In his 1962 paper on New Zealand foreign policy referred to at the beginning of this 
chapter, F.H. Corner described New Zealand's administering attitude in Western Samoa 
over many years as being "a muddled one": "On the one hand a weak, unconsidered but 
well intentioned liberalism; on the other, an equally unconsidered and ... an equally 
weak and ineffective desire for colonial prestige.”  The two strands which were largely 
incompatible created a dualism which can be traced throughout the New Zealand 
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administration of Western Samoa until the rapid movement towards self government in 
the 1950s ensured that the humanitarian, liberal strand prevailed. 
 
Indeed New Zealand's policy in various countries of the South Pacific region in the past 
appears to have been "muddled”.  In the 20 years since Corner made his assessment can 
we assert with confidence, that policy is no longer "muddled”, no longer 
"unconsidered"? Certainly some improvement has occurred and it is still characterised 
by a "well meaning liberalism” but has that been based on a rigorous, considered 
analysis of South Pacific economies and how they function, on an analysis of the whole 
South Pacific economy, conceived as an entity? If this is done and our policies become 
informed, it is likely that our aid policies for example might change, cease to be largely 
passive, and become much more active, since we would be joining the small states in 
examining the role and the effects of external injections of capital in the actual 
functioning of their economies (see Chapter 16). Given that some worrying trends are 
underway, is the relationship with the small states one "for all seasons” in view of 
possible troubles in economic and perhaps constitutional areas?  
(Chapters 7 and 11). 
 
In his predominantly favourable assessment of New Zealand's record in Samoa, Corner 
made a number of qualifications, pointing to five basic weaknesses. It is salutary to 
examine these: 
 
(1) A failure to co ordinate in Wellington the New Zealand government resources 
to bring them to bear on Samoan problems. The small Department of Island 
Territories had little influence over larger and more powerful departments. 
 
(2) There was a lack of continuity among officers seconded from New Zealand, 
and there has never been a large enough group of officers with experience or 
adequate knowledge of Samoa. Public servants were despatched to Samoa for a 
three year term much as they might be "transferred to Invercargill or 
Taumarunui” with no training and often little interest in the unique country of 
Samoa or of its specialised problems. After a three year term officers would be 
transferred back to New Zealand. 
 
(3) There was a failure to make the service in Western Samoa attractive to the best 
civil servants and teachers. 
 
(4) There was a lack of analysis and long term planning, resulting from the failure 
to recruit the best officials. 
 
(5) But the chief defect of the New Zealand Administration was "the suburban 
mind” with which Samoan problems have been viewed, which Corner aptly 
terms "the Lower Hutt syndrome”.  New Zealand's administration must stand 
indicted because of its "unimaginativeness, rigidity of mind, lack of foresight." 
 
Do these basic weaknesses still characterise New Zealand policy 20 years after Corner 
made this assessment? Some improvements have undoubtedly occurred, but the answer 
must, on the whole, still be "yes". 
 
It is still difficult to co ordinate policies in Wellington and work in the islands has a 
lower status which has to be fitted in when more pressing matters on the mainland 
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involving departmental attention have been attended to. The transfer of island matters 
from the Department of Island Territories to Foreign Affairs in 1974 was seen by many 
of the officers of the latter as marking a new era in which New Zealand and island 
countries would not only deal with each other as equals (a very worthy gain) in the 
place of the earlier paternalistic relationship, but a new "purposive” development thrust 
would for the first time be provided. However the situation in recent years has not really 
called for a "new purposive development thrust” but for somewhat different policies 
(see Chapters 6, 7 and 8). Certainly nine years after an important aid mission visited 
Rarotonga in 1975, autonomous development has achieved no progress and while the 
relationship with the islands has changed somewhat, they are every bit as dependent on 
New Zealand support as ever before. Moreover in the anti colonial mood of the 1960s 
some at least of the criticism of the "paternalism” of the Department of Island 
Territories was misplaced. Later the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was to discover (e.g. 
for Tokelau) that the problems of economic, social or political "development”, 
involving as they do the acquisition of new skills and new knowledge, necessarily 
requires a benevolent external leadership and friendly guidance of the sort often 
described as "paternal”.  As we discuss in Chapter 9, the Kiribati Government has also 
had to "reinvent the wheel": the previously rejected system of district administration has 
had to be re established recently under a new guise in an attempt to improve the quality 
of local government and the relationship between local and central government. These 
examples of somewhat petty inter departmental jealousy or of doctrinaire approaches 
show that at times policy makers are in danger of "throwing out the baby with the bath 
water". 
 
Secondly, there has been no improvement in continuity. While Foreign Affairs officials 
are people of considerable ability and diplomatic skill in contrast to some earlier Island 
Territories' staff, they spend only a few years in a posting, show little long term 
commitment to South Pacific affairs or desire to acquire a deep knowledge or linguistic 
ability, and rapidly pass on to "higher things” in more attractive postings in Europe or 
elsewhere. This hardly meets the need of Corner's plea to "get our policies right". 
 
It must be the aim of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to build an able, experienced cadre 
of South Pacific specialists (involving a combination perhaps of those with a long term 
commitment, and a through put of young, fresh minds) as part of its objective of 
maintaining a high level of professionalism. The through put of fresh viewpoints is an 
antidote to entrenched attitudes of long serving officers. While there is no compensation 
for experience, there is a danger of fixed views and "chip on the shoulder” attitudes that 
would have to be guarded against. But in general many officers of the appropriate 
quality should be able to serve for 10 or 20 years or more in Pacific postings, 
interspersed with postings in Wellington. A similar emphasis on professionalism and 
continuity should concern other Departments such as Treasury, Education, Agriculture 
and Fisheries and Forestry with on going involvements in the South Pacific. 
 
The usual Foreign Affairs response to the above proposal is dismissive: how can 
officers be expected to serve for so long in such tiny, remote, confining islands? And 
what about the problem of educating one's children in the islands? Persistence of such 
attitudes suggests that Foreign Affairs equates smallness with insignificance; it suggests 
that even today the Ministry does not fully accept that New Zealand is a part of the 
South Pacific or fully accept the requirements of its role in the region. It illustrates that 
we still have a good way to go "in working out a relationship” in an effective way with 
South Pacific peoples. 
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Thirdly, while overseas aid appointments are sufficiently attractive to encourage a 
number of competent New Zealanders to fill important positions in the islands (and 
Volunteer Service Abroad has sent a number of very competent and some dedicated 
people to Western Samoa, Tonga etc.) it could still be asserted that levels of ability in 
some crucial positions (such as economic planning, financial control) are inadequate.  
 
Most of New Zealand's best civil servants never serve in the Islands. In the Department 
of Education, Islands Education is considered to be something of a "blind alley” that 
doesn't attract many of the most able officers. In the State Services Commission staff 
may be moved on to, or off Niuean or Tokelauan matters without much concern for the 
build up of professional expertise and understanding over the longer term and it is not 
apparent whether planning career structures in the public service in New Zealand has 
considered the administration of island affairs in other than a rather ad hoc or desultory 
way. 
 
Fourthly, although the Ministry of Foreign Affairs maintains a high level of 
professionalism in its service and the quality of its officers is generally to be admired, 
the level of its political analysis is vastly superior to its economic analysis. Short term 
analysis dominates thinking and middle and long term trends receive slight attention. 
There is also a lack of thorough economic analysis on the nature of Pacific Island 
economies, their trends over time and the economic role of aid in general, viewed in the 
context of the political economy. 
 
With reference to Corner's fifth criticism and also to our list of assumptions (p. 2 
above), the record revealed from official files and other sources over the last 10 to 15 
years is good. Official policy shows respect for island governments and displays a 
considerable measure of understanding. In general, apart from one or two notable 
exceptions, our policies have been liberal and humane. But in terms of our national 
attitudes in general, can we confidently assert that the New Zealand "suburban mind” is 
no longer with us, that the "Lower Hutt syndrome” has gone for good? Recently the 
political scientist Dr Rod Alley remarked that although decolonisation has occurred in 
the South Pacific with respect to constitutional and political changes in most countries, 
an "attitudinal decolonisation” still has to occur in the minds of many New 
Zealanders.29 
 
1.11  The Objectives of New Zealand Policy in the South Pacific 
 
In the period at least since World War II, currently, and in the foreseeable future, New 
Zealand's interests as perceived by policy makers may be identified as follows: 
 
(1) The  stability of the island states of the South Pacific. This stability would arise 
from: 
(a) internal peace and harmony achieved by local governments; 
(b) external events and policies which also critically affect peace and harmony 
in the small states. Thus free entry of migrants to the New Zealand labour 
market is an example of one major policy which contributes to this 
harmony; favourable market conditions in New Zealand for island produce 
is another. 
(c) reasonable political unity and stability of Island governments. Such 
stability would of course depend on their acceptability to their electorates, 
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implying a considerable degree of responsibility and a reasonable measure 
of competence. 
 
(2) The  maintenance of an international system of security and defence protecting 
the region from possible aggressors and ensuring the security of the region. In 
former times, the island states such as the Solomons, Fiji, Tonga and the Cook 
Islands were part of New Zealand's "forward defence” system, providing a 
buffer zone through which any enemy from the north would first have to 
penetrate before reaching New Zealand. In such a war it would be essential that 
the island states were on our side to provide strategic bases for allied forces; in 
such a scenario, Niue, for example, could be seen to be an "unsinkable aircraft 
carrier”.  Essentially this policy is one of strategic denial (Chapter 12). 
 
In an era of inter continental ballistic missiles, such a rationale might have lost 
some of its force, although the frequent occurrence of relatively small scale 
conventional wars such as the Falklands War warn against the danger of too 
readily dismissing such a viewpoint. 
 
(3) The economic growth and development of the island states has always been 
judged to be important: 
(a) in its own right; 
(b) because such development and economic growth would play an important 
part in maintaining internal peace and harmony and hence the stability of 
island governments (Goals 1a, b and c above); 
(c) because it would enable a grater degree of local autonomy and self 
reliance to be achieved - economically, socially and politically - if 
economic growth and "development” could be sustained over a period of 
time. Greater local autonomy and self reliance would also provide a solid 
basis for the maintenance of a society's national identity, pride and culture. 
(d) Finally, increased economic self reliance has been seen as a means of 
limiting in the long run the need for New Zealand aid and subsidies, and 
possibly even permitting some reduction in New Zealand's financial 
commitment in the region over the longer term. 
 
(4) The maintenance and improvement of reasonable conditions of social welfare 
in the islands. At least since Maui Pomare was Minister of Island Territories in 
the 1920s, New Zealand has been concerned that reasonable living conditions 
should be enjoyed by islanders and that they should have access to an array of 
social services of which health and education are especially important. New 
Zealand does not want to have a "slum in our own back yard". 
 
It is argued in this report that New Zealand has been conspicuously successful 
in the area of social welfare -  more so than any other colonial power in the 
South Pacific   - and that the social conditions established by New Zealand in 
the Cook Islands and Niue are unrivalled in the South Pacific, bearing in mind 
other relevant factors. 
 
(5) The availability of a relatively cheap source of labour, both unskilled and semi 
skilled, that could be drawn upon in periods of substantial economic growth or 
industrial expansion to fill jobs not adequately filled by mainland New 
Zealanders. The 1950s was the period in which labour shortage was most 
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evident but also in the 1960s and even in the early 1970s it was convenient for 
many firms to employ islanders as a substantial or major part of their 
workforce in a number of particular industries. 
 
(6) The provision of fruit and vegetables to the New Zealand market from time to 
time when it suited the New Zealand consumer and marketing firms. This 
involved tropical produce that could not be produced on the New Zealand 
mainland (e.g. Cook Island pineapples or pawpaw) or could not be produced in 
large enough volumes (e.g. Niue passionfruit production, see pp. ), or winter 
vegetables for sale in the off season when no competition would occur with 
New Zealand producers (e.g. beans or melons in the Cook Islands). 
 
(7) New Zealand's defence and strategic role as one of the member countries of 
Anzus. New Zealand's role in this defence treaty is to have responsibility for 
the defence of the Southwest Pacific area, covering the islands of Fiji, Western 
Samoa, Tonga, Tokelau, Niue and Cook Islands. 
 
(8) New Zealand's image at United Nations and at world forums. 
(a) New Zealand has been concerned that its image should be that of an 
enlightened nation properly discharging its remaining responsibilities as a 
colonial power, rapidly preparing its dependent territories for self 
government or independence. 
(b) New Zealand has been concerned to create and then to maintain an 
international reputation both as a happy and successful multi racial society 
in which Maori and Pakeha and other groups live and work together in an 
harmonious way. New Zealand has been concerned to extend this internal 
image of a multi cultural New Zealand to the South Pacific region as a 
whole in which it is hoped that friendly and harmonious relations can be 
maintained among the multicultural member states. 
 
(9) Insofar as New Zealand politicians concerned themselves with major 
international questions such as the North South relationship, the Third World 
debt crisis, its threat to the Western or international economy, the South Pacific 
could be seen to be something of a microcosm of the larger world scene. If 
New Zealand's policies aren't "right” in the South Pacific region some 
credibility would be lost when New Zealand's views on the international arena 
are expressed. 
 
The importance of most of the above nine objectives of New Zealand policy is obvious. 
1b remains an ever present concern where New Zealand's policies on Islander 
overstayers for example, can critically affect friendship, harmony and perhaps stability. 
There are some grounds of concern over some aspects of 1c, but careful attention to this 
and friendly assistance by New Zealand (see Chapter 11) perhaps through a Select 
Committee arrangement to deal with difficult areas could be a major contribution. 
 
With respect to (2), much depends on whether there is a continuation in the overall 
decline of internationalism at the world level and specifically a deterioration in United 
States Soviet relations, or whether there is an amelioration. Much too depends on 
whether there is a substantial progress toward a nuclear free Pacific or not. If present 
attitudes continue to prevail, in which a host of agreements and understandings which 
were never part of the actual ANZUS Treaty but which are currently held to be an 
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integral part of the defence relationship continue to be treated as vital, then the South 
Pacific as a whole will continue to be part of the Western Alliance, required to play an 
appropriate role and will accordingly be affected by the arms race. While the political 
question "Who threatens New Zealand?” (or  the Pacific island states) can be easily 
answered with "no one”, this is not the relevant question to pose. That relates to the 
place of the South Pacific in world power politics and its degree of strategic importance 
in the Pacific Basin as a whole. While that may not seem to be great, it would be a route 
through which the United States and its allies might wish to pass rapidly to a potential 
Indian Ocean trouble spot if the Timor Sea or Strait of Malacca are closed. Nor would 
the United States view lightly the denial of passageway or rights to berth of nuclear 
powered or armed vessels, even if South Pacific states protest that this does not weaken 
their commitment to ANZUS. There are signs that the nuclear free Pacific movement 
will be seen in American eyes as a dangerous precedent, rejecting the United States led 
international system of security and defence. As one of the first chinks in the armour of 
the Western Alliance it would be seen as perhaps triggering off similar movements 
elsewhere and potentially weakening the whole Western Alliance. 
 
The issue has hardened significantly with the election of the Fourth Labour Government 
and firm resolve shown by Mr Lange to reaffirm the Party's position on no admission of 
nuclear powered or armed vessels. The new Labour Government still has to show that it 
is prepared to pay the price of such a policy (the potential loss of valuable markets in 
the United States and the possible loss of other forms of American assistance). The 
Australian Labour Party was committed to a similar policy, but once in office and after 
the H.M.S. Invincible incident, it reversed its position. 
 
Objective (3) above is one of the most important of all and the one addressed in detail in 
this report, since it forms the basis of much of New Zealand policy to the five small 
states as well as to other South Pacific countries. The Team argues that this goal is quite 
unrealistic, given current conditions in four of the five small states and the desire of 
three of them to maintain the special relationship with New Zealand. The only possible 
exception to this view would appear to be the fortuitous find of some large unexpected 
mineral resource within one of the island states” exclusive economic zone. 
 
Hence little improvement in local autonomy and self reliance can reasonably be 
expected. It is important however to attain what degree of autonomy is feasible at 
acceptable cost and to encourage local production or enterprise by appropriate policies. 
 
The reduction of New Zealand subsidies, 3(d), is not attainable in the foreseeable future, 
for  as E.K. Fisk stated with respect to Niue30, a drop in the level of aid is likely to lead 
to an escalation in out migration, since the existing levels of aid contribute greatly to the 
current living standards. Islanders not only expect this, they require it if they are to 
continue to live in the islands. 
 
In the case of (4), the continued maintenance of good social conditions and concern for 
human welfare (as well as whatever degree of economic autonomy is feasible) will slow 
down the outflow of migrants. 
 
Goal (5) was important in the 1950s and 1960s but in times of recession and 
unemployment is obviously much less important. 
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Objective (6), the promotion of trade between New Zealand and the islands on the basis 
of classical "comparative advantage” with the islands exporting tropical agricultural 
produce and importing New Zealand manufactures, has been diluted considerably in the 
past decade in response to pressure in the Forum for greater access to the New Zealand 
and Australian markets for island manufacturers.31 The foundation of SPEC, the 
negotiation of the SPARTECA agreement, and the setting up of the Pacific Islands 
Industrial Development Scheme, reflect a shift in New Zealand attitudes, based partly 
upon the generally agreed limitations of agricultural exports as the primary motor of 
economic growth in the islands. However, we argue (Chapters 5 and 13) that under 
prevailing conditions in the MIRAB societies, industrial development does not offer a 
realistic alternative economic "motor”.  The recent policy initiatives in that direction are 
likely to prove significant for the regional political goodwill they generate rather than 
for any dramatic impact on the economic situation. 
 
Arguments for agricultural development on the basis of comparative advantage continue 
to provide the underpinning for a number of aid projects, and for a good deal of policy 
advice to island governments. The market access problem, however, has been a real 
one; the problems of Cook Island tomato growers in competing with the New Zealand 
glasshouse producers; of Cook Islands citrus competing with Kerikeri or Bay of Plenty 
growers; and of Niue kumaras in competition with New Zealand growing interests, have 
illustrated the balancing act which New Zealand governments have had perform 
between their commitment to support island development, and the pressure of domestic 
political interests. 
 
With respect to goal (8) New Zealand's image at United Nations and in world forums 
has at times seemed to take precedence over internal conditions and needs in the island 
states. Thus some policies on decolonisation have been as much concerned with New 
Zealand's likely image at the United Nations as with the internal conditions of the small 
territories and their desire and preparedness for a further step in their "political 
evolution”.  Close study of these internal conditions, and above all genuine 
communication with the islanders, is imperative. New Zealand has been acutely 
sensitive to its image, partly because of its own "sense of littleness” and lack of self 
confidence   considerations in short, that colour our foreign policy as a whole. 
Moreover, the character of New Zealand's foreign policy as a whole is heavily 
concerned with trade and with improving access to overseas markets. New Zealand's 
international interests and trade prospects in general can only be enhanced by a 
reputation as a small nation with enlightened policies toward the small states of the 
South Pacific, encouraging stable conditions and friendly relations with the various 
Polynesian, Melanesian and Micronesian states of the region. At the same time New 
Zealanders can hardly deny the small states policies (such as access to the New Zealand 
market) that we have fought so strenuously to achieve for ourselves. 
 
This report can be seen as another step in the argument that New Zealand should accept 
its destiny as a South Pacific nation. If we can truly accept that position, we must 
logically accept the appropriate role that follows from it. Then we will be able to 
continue the tasks which, 20 years after Corner wrote, are far from complete: of 
"working out a relationship” with the peoples of the South Pacific, of increasing our 
"capacity” and our "moral right” to play a beneficient role in the region. And then - but 
only then - are we likely to "get our policies right” in the South Pacific region. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
 
THE ISLAND STATES: POPULATION, AREA AND SOCIETY 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
This report covers five small states, whose total population in the island groups is just under 
91,000 people, or 125,000 if the islanders residing in New Zealand are also included. 
Individually they are all very small states: even the largest, Kiribati, with just under 60,000, 
corresponds to a medium sized New Zealand city like Palmerston North. The Cook Islands 
has 17,754 people, or about the same as Tokoroa, while Tuvalu, with a population of 8,364 
corresponds to a town like Greymouth. At the lower end of the scale is Niue which had in 
1981, 3,278 people and was still subject to considerable out migration (equivalent in size 
with Picton) and Tokelau with 1,572 is slightly smaller than Greytown. 
 
It is argued strongly in this report that a viewpoint which isolates the islands' society and 
economy and ignores the strong economic and social links tying them to New Zealand can 
lead to false assumptions and to unsound policies seeking to promote separate development 
that have little hope of success. It is important to recognise the substantial portion of the total 
island population which now resides in New Zealand. Over 8,000 or 71 percent of the total 
Niuean community now lives on the mainland, nearly 24,000 Cook Islanders (57 percent of 
the total) and a remarkably similar 59 percent (2,274 people) of the Tokelau community also 
live in New Zealand. A total of 34,233 from the three groups in 1981 lived in the mainland. 
 
The report argues that the process of social change that has evolved especially in the period 
since World War II has been one in which New Zealand's economic influence has become 
steadily more dominant in the central area of the South Pacific1.  Islanders have responded 
to this situation and the concomitant weakening of the economic autonomy of each island 
group by migrating in large numbers to the economic "growth pole” on the mainland. Thus 
migrant societies have come into being, binary in nature, with over half living on the 
mainland. Furthermore, the links that bind the two halves together remain strong, with 
money, food, other forms of reciprocity, as well as people, flowing both ways between the 
islands and the mainland. The living strength of the social bonds that tie the two parts 
together in the islander communities is illustrated with respect to Tokelau on pp.212-215 
below, and the migration process and the importance of the corporation of kin in maintaining 
long distance relationships is described for the Cook Islands on p.139. Thus Table 2.1, which 
sets out the population of each island group also gives the size of the New Zealand 
component as well as the total figures. 
 
2.2  Size of the Island States 
 
The area and population density of each of the five small states are also given in Table 2.1. 
Kiribati is the largest in area with just over 750 km2 made up of 42 atolls and reef islands 
scattered over an enormous ocean expanse of 3,550,000 km2 - surely the most widely 
dispersed country in the world. If Christmas Island (the largest atoll in the world) and the 
very sparsely settled Line Islands and uninhabited Phoenix Group are excluded, the great 
bulk of the population live in the remaining 16 atolls of the Gilbert Islands and Banaba 
(Ocean Island). The mean population density is 80 persons per km (1.2 hectares per capita), 
although very high densities occur on Tamana and several other small islands. (See Table 
2.4).
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TABLE 2.1 
POPULATION, AREA AND POPULATION DENSITY OF THE FIVE SMALL  STATES, AND POPULATION RESIDENT IN NEW ZEALAND 
 
  Population 
1981 
Percent of 
total 
Area1 (km2) Sea Area1 
(km2) 
Population 
density 
(persons/km2) 
Hectares per 
capita 
Rate of 
Population 
change 
1971-1981 
(percent) 
 Cook Islands        
    Island population 17,754 43 237.0 1,830,000 75 1.34 -1.84 
   Cook Islanders in New Zealand 23,880 57      
Total 41,634 100      
        
Niue Island Population 3,278 29 259.0 390,000 13 7.9 -35.8 
    Niueans in N.Z. 8,079 71      
    Total 11,357 100      
        
Tokelau Island Population 1,572 41 12.2 290,000 129 0.8 -1.7 
   Tokelauans in N.Z. 2,274 59      
   Total 3,846 100      
        
Kiribati 59,8252  750.4 3,550,000 80 1.25  +16.23 
        
Tuvalu 8,3644  245 900,000 348 0.29 +42.16 
        
TOTAL 125,026   1,284.6         
Notes:  1.  SPC (1981) South Pacific Economies 1979: Statistical Summary 
  2.  Dec. 1982 Estimate. 
  3.  Increase 1973 1982. 
  4.  1983 Estimate. 
  5.  Tuvalu Third Development Plan 1984 87. 
  6.  1973-81 Influx from Kiribati on separation and from Banaba after cessation of phosphate. 
Sources:  Escap (1983); S.P.C. (1981); Tuvalu Third Development Plan 1984-87; ADB (1983); Niue Census, 1981; Niue National 
Development Plan 1980-85; Tokelau Census, 1981. 
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Niue is next largest in size. This country of 259 km2 is a single island of upraised coral, and 
is slightly larger than all 15 of the Cook Islands (237 km2) put together. Niue, with its low 
resident population of 3,278 in 1981, had a population density of only 13 persons per km2 
(7.9 ha/capita).  
 
The Cook Islands is also a group of far flung islands in the vast ocean, covering 1,830,000 
km2. The group comprises the southern group of Rarotonga (67.1 km2) and five other "high” 
volcanic islands plus two atolls, and the northern group of seven "low islands” or atolls (see 
Table 2.2). The group has a mean population density of 75 persons per km2 (1.34 ha. per 
capita). 
 
Tuvalu comprises nine islands dispersed over a sea area of 900,000 km2. The total land area 
is 24 km2, and the mean density of population on the islands is high at 348 persons per km2, 
being lifted considerably by the high population of the country's town of Funafuti (1,110 per 
km2). The detailed figures are given in Table 2.5. 
 
Tokelau is by far the smallest political entity among the five countries studied. At 12.2 km2 
it is half the size of the next smallest island group, Tuvalu. However, it has a relatively high 
population density of 129 persons per km2 (0.8 ha. per capita). The total populations of the 
three atolls in Tokelau   Nukunonu, Fakaofo and Atafu   are given in Table 2.3. 
 
The tables show that three of the five small states (Tuvalu, Tokelau and Kiribati) have very 
high population densities by world standards, with about 1 hectare of land per capita or less. 
While the plight of Tokelau is not serious in view of the migration outlet that exists to New 
Zealand and the considerable flow of aid moneys from New Zealand, population pressure is 
much more serious in the other two states which lack both migration outlets and the certainty 
of long term aid from any metropolitan country. Indeed the Government in the United 
Kingdom in early 1984 was proposing to cease all aid to the two Pacific dependencies after 
1986. The plight of the two ex British colonies is thus far more critical than the three 
associated with New Zealand. The case of Kiribati however is a good deal more critical than 
that of Tuvalu, for in 1979 the country experienced a regression probably unequalled by any 
other country when exports of phosphate from Banaba Island finally ceased and the country 
lost 84% of its total exports. 
 
Table 2.1, column 7, also shows the rate of population change for the five states over the 
period of 1971-81. The three linked to New Zealand declined in population, but Tuvalu grew 
by 42 percent (1973-81) and this country faces an extremely difficult and problematic future. 
Kiribati also increased by over 8700 or 16 percent. The pressure of population on extremely 
limited resources, and the likely retreat into subsistence exacerbates an extremely ominous 
situation in Kiribati unless urgent steps are taken, including external assistance (Chapter 9). 
 
In Table 2.6 we present the figures on Pacific Island Polynesians residing in New Zealand in 
1981. The total of almost 90,000 is made up of over 42,000 Samoans, about 6,900 Tongans, 
34,233 from the Cook Islands, Niue and Tokelau, and the balance of about 6,500 from other 
Polynesian or mixed Polynesian groups. The residence of 90,000 Pacific Island Polynesians 
(or 3 percent of New Zealand's total population), almost all of whom would regard their stay 
in New Zealand as permanent, together with the population of 279,000 Maoris (9 percent of 
the total) make major contributions to New Zealand's multi racial society. As the second 
most numerous minority group in the total society, the Pacific Island Polynesians are a 
significant group in contemporary New Zealand whose importance can only grow in the 
future.
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TABLE 2.2 
COOK ISLANDS, POPULATION, LAND AREA AND PERSON/LAND RATIOS,  1981 
 
          Class 1 landa Class 2 landb Total arable 
Island/region Population 1981 
Total area 
km2 Persons / ha 
Hectares 
per capita Hectares ha/capita Hectares ha/capita Hectares ha/capita 
Rarotonga 9,530 67.1 141 0.69 1,497 0.16 619 0.07 2,116 0.22 
Aitutaki 2,335 18.3 128 0.74 928 0.39 471 0.20 1,399 0.60 
Atiu 1,225 26.9 46 2.05 469 0.38 1,370 1.19 1,839 1.50 
Mangaia 1,364 51.8 26 3.38 422 0.30 2,129 1.56 2,551 1.87 
Manuae 12 6.2     622  622  
Mauke 681 18.4 37 2.59 427 0.62 1,159 1.69 1,586 2.31 
Mitiaro 256 22.3 11 7.29 110 0.42 913 3.57 1,023 3.99 
Takutea  1.3     130  130  
Southern outer islands 5,873 145.2 41 2.47 2,536 0.43 6,797 1.15 9,333 1.58 
           
Southern groupc 15,403 212.3 72 1.38 4,033 0.26 7,416 0.48 11,449 0.74 
           
Manihiki 405 5.4 75 2.05   544 1.34 544 1.34 
Pukapuka/Nassau 930 2.6 358 0.29   260 0.27 260 0.27 
Palmerston 51 2.1 24 3.61   207 4.05 207 4.05 
Rakahanga 272 4.1 66 1.46   414 1.53 414 1.53 
Tongareva 608 9.8 62 1.85   984 1.61 984 1.61 
           
Northern outer islands 2,266 24.5e 92 1.08   2,461 1.08 2,461 1.08 
          
Total Cook Islands 17,754d 237.0e 75 1.34 4,033 0.23 9,877 0.56 13,910 0.79 
   
Notes: a  Suitable for cash and subsistence crops. 
b Suitable mainly for tree crops. 
c  Southern outer islands and Rarotonga. 
d  Includes 85 persons "at sea". 
e  Includes the uninhabited atoll of Suwarrow (0.5 km)
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TABLE 2.3 
 
TOKELAU ISLANDS : LAND AREA AND POPULATION BY ISLAND 
 
 
Island 
Land 
area 
(km2) 
  1961 1966 1972 1976 1981 Intercensal change 1976-81 
                Number Percent 
     
Nukunonu 4.7 Male 251 265 163 169 188 19 11.2
  Female 262 286 205 194 180 14 7.2
  Total 513 551 368 363 368 5 1.4
          
          
Fakaofo 4 Male 358 336 302 314 316 2 0.6
  Female 425 397 352 352 334 18 5.1
  Total 783 733 654 666 650 16 2.4
          
          
Atafu 3.5 Male 265 291 272 264 273 9 3.4
  Female 309 325 305 282 281 1 0.4
  Total 574 616 577 546 554 8 1.5
          
          
TOTALS 12.2 Male 874 892 737 747 777 30 4
  Female 996 1,008 862 828 795 33 4
    Total 1,870 1,900 1,599 1,575 1,572 3 0.2
     
 
Source: Tokelau Islands 1981 Census, Provisional Result, 1982. 
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TABLE 2.4 
 
KIRIBATI: POPULATION, LAND AREA, AND POPULATION DENSITY, 1982 
 
Island 
Population 
Dec. 1982 
Estimate 
Estimated 
Area (km2) 
1982 
Population 
Density 
(Persons/km2) 
Gilberts Group 57,545 285.5 201.6    
     
 Banaba 72 6.2 11.6 
 Makin 1,538 7.9 194.7 
 Butaritari 3,440 13.5 254.8 
 Marakei 2,560 14.1 181.6 
 Abaiang 3,740 17.5 213.7 
 Tarawa Rural 2,425 15.3 158.5 
 Tarawa Urban 19,900 15.8 1,259.5 
 Maiana 1,880 16.7 112.6 
 Abemama 2,690 27.4 98.2 
 Kuria 890 15.5 57.4 
 Aranuka 1,000 11.6 86.2 
 Nonouti 2,690 19.9 135.2 
 Tabiteuea North 3,290 25.8 127.5 
 Tabiteuea South 1,310 11.8 111.0 
 Beru 2,455 17.6 139.5 
 Nikunau 2,075 19.1 108.6 
 Onotoa 2,295 15.6 147.1 
 Tamana 1,580 4.7 336.2 
 Arorae 1,715 9.5 180.5 
     
Line Group 2,280 436.2 5.2    
     
 Tabuaeran   (Washington) 450 14.1 31.9 
 Teraina (Fanning) 470 33.7 14 
 Christmas 1,360 388.4 3.5 
     
Phoenix Group - 28.7 - 
     
 Total 59,825 750.4 79.7 
 Ships - - - 
     
     
 TOTAL 59,825 750.4 79.7 
     
 
Source: Statistics Office, Ministry of Finance 
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TABLE 2.5 
 
TUVALU: POPULATION, AREA AND POPULATION DENSITY  
 
 
 
Island Population mid 1983 
Land 
Area 
(km2) 
Population 
Density 
(persons/km2) 
    
Nanumea 906 3.57 254 
Nanumaga 762 2.59 294 
Niutao 917 2.12 432 
Nui 650 3.29 198 
Vaitupu 1,320 4.90 269 
Nukufetau 739 3.06 241 
Funafuti 2,620 2.36 1,110 
Nukulaelae 355 1.66 214 
Niulakita 95 0.41 232 
    
TOTALS 8,364 23.96 349 
 
 
Source: Tuvalu Third Development Plan 1984-87. 
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TABLE 2.6 
PACIFIC ISLAND POLYNESIANS IN NEW ZEALAND, 1981:  TYPE OF RESIDENT BY ETHNIC ORIGIN 
 
Ethnic Origin Usually Resident in New Zealand Usually Resident Overseas Total Population 
  Male Female Total Male Female Total Male Female Total 
Cook Island Maori          
Full Cook Island Maori 9,747 9,480 19,227       
Total Cook Island Maori 12,060 11,820 23,880 72 90 1651 12,132 11,910 24,042 
          
Niuean          
Full Niuean 3,420 3,411 6,831       
Total Niuean 4,071 4,005 8,0791 21 21 42 4,095 4,026 8,121 
          
Tokelauan          
Full Tokelauan 1,002 945 1,9501 9 9 18 1,011 957 1,9651 
Total Tokelauan 1,164 1,110 2,274 9 9 211 1,176 1,119 2,295 
          
Samoan          
Full Samoan 16,866 16,722 33,5851 138 174 312 17,004 16,896 33,900 
Total Samoan 21,204 20,874 42,078 156 219 375 21,360 21,096 42,4531 
          
Other Polynesian          
Total Tongan 3,615 3,282 6,9001 75 81 1531 3,687 3,363 7,0531 
Total Tahitian 78 90 168 21 33 54 96 126 222 
Total Hawaiian 12 27 39 12 6 18 24 30 54 
Total Other Polynesian 237 258 495 3 3 91 240 261 5041 
          
Mixed Polynesian, 2 or 3 Races 2,490 2,427 4,914 15 24 421 2,499 2,451 4,953 
TOTAL 44,9281 43,896 88,8271 384 486 8731 45,315 44,382 89,697 
Notes:  1. There appears to be an error in additions. 
Source:  New Zealand Census of Population and Dwellings 1981, Vol. 8B: Pacific Islands Polynesians, Table 2.
2.3 Societies 
 
The five small states studied are all very different. Although four of the five are Polynesian 
(Cook Islands, Niue, Tokelau, Tuvalu), Tuvalu belongs to a different sub cultural area 
defined by Burrows (1940) in comparison to the Central Polynesian culture area represented 
by the first two. Tokelau, lying to the north of Samoa, also belongs to a different sub culture   
- that of the West Polynesian culture area - and culturally shows many similarities to Samoa. 
Moreover there are considerable differences even between the Cook Islands and Niue. Niue 
shows strong Tongan influence (a result of early invasions) and is more markedly 
individualistic in its social structure. Kiribati is Micronesian ethnically and culturally, 
although traditional evidence points to early links with Samoa. 
 
Cultural evolution under conditions of considerable isolation have however led to notable 
differences between neighbouring groups or even between neighbouring islands. Thus Te 
Rangi Hiroa (Sir Peter Buck) distinguished Mangaian culture from that of the other southern 
Cook Islands group. The result has been to emphasise over time particularism and local 
identity (even although the sense of territoriality did not develop to the extent of leading to  a 
tribal organisation of society as with the New Zealand Maori). Thus the three atolls of 
Tokelau all preserve a considerable degree of local identity that hampers to some extent 
modern needs for a sense of "national” unity. Geography as well as history therefore have  
led to the evolution over time of "cultures of isolation” which have resulted in tight knit 
kinship structures. The phrase is perhaps most true of the relatively conservative and 
traditional Tokelau and Kiribati and least true of Cook Islanders and Niue who increasingly 
since the 19th century have seen the sea as a highway rather than as a barrier. 
 
All five societies are primarily organised around the principles of descent. Genealogy, 
position within the hierarchy of the descent group structure and seniority are usually 
important aspects, though kinship based on co-residence has also become important, as in 
Kiribati or the evolving village structure of Niue. A major contrast also exists between the 
proud Tuvalu where chiefly status and authority largely remain intact (Chambers 1984) and 
the Cook Islands, where Western impact had drastically disorganised society in the 19th 
century. 
 
The impact of colonialism has also been important. "Indirect rule” as practised by Britain in 
the former Gilbert and Ellice Islands at least partially respected and buttressed the power of 
the chiefs of Tuvalu or the authority of the gerontocracy in the maneaba (meeting house) of 
the more egalitarian Kiribati islands. In contrast the already weakened ariki of the Cook 
Islands were made even more powerless and irrelevant by the direct rule policies practised 
early this century by Colonel Gudgeon, creating something of a social vacuum that led to the 
conditions deplored by the Belshaw Stace Report 40 years later. 
 
The "fatal impact” of the West on the South Pacific in the 19th century not only drastically 
reworked island societies through the effects of the notorious labour trade and introduced 
diseases. It opened new horizons and introduced mobility. Though the profound 
"missionisation” process enabled the disorganised societies to be reorganised under a neo 
Victorian culture and a new religion that brought reintegration, mobility affected more and 
more islanders. In the twentieth century young men went to work on copra plantations, 
phosphate islands or for various European enterprises and "proletarianisation” persuaded 
more and more that life in the village growing a few cash crops for distant, uncertain 
markets was less attractive than a regular and sizeable pay packet that could be gained by 
regular employment in New Zealand cities. The expansion of capitalism in the South Pacific 
and the dominance of its regional metropoles such as Auckland in the period of accelerated 
social change after World War II became more pronounced, undermining the autonomy of 
island economies and drawing them more fully into the sphere of influence of the growth 
poles. Islanders gradually came to see that their old island no longer confined them; their 
new "island” was the whole South Pacific. The new meccas were Auckland -  destined to 
become the largest Polynesian city of all - Wellington, Tokoroa and other centres. Although 
perceptions are slow to change and many New Zealanders would still persist in believing 
their country to be "Britain in the Antipodes”, New Zealand was forging important new links 
and relationships in the region; it was changing from being a country located, more or less 
fortuitously, in the South Pacific, to a country of the South Pacific. It is time that full 
recognition be accorded to the new position and the new role of New Zealand in the South 
Pacific so that new and appropriate policies can be designed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
NOTES TO CHAPTER TWO 
                                                 
1  In the western South Pacific (Papua New Guinea, Solomons, Vanuatu, Fiji, Kiribati and Tuvalu) 
Australia is much more influential than New Zealand. New Zealand influence is strong in Western 
Samoa, Cook islands, Niue, Tokelau and Tonga.  To the east, of course, lies French Polynesia. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
 
DECOLONISATION AND NATIONHOOD 
 
 
“The aim is to bring these territories to self-government within the next 
two or three years. The challenge is to embody this aim in institutions 
which have direct relevance to the needs of the islands. Doctrinaire 
schemes are not always useful. Institutions borrowed from other 
countries, including New Zealand, though excellent in themselves, may 
not be workable in 19 Pacific Islands. The only reliable guide is a kind 
of constitutional pragmatism.”  (Statement to the United Nations 
Committee on Non Self Governing Territories by the New Zealand 
Representative, on the Political, Constitutional, Economic and Social 
Development of the Cook Islands. New York, April 1963). 
 
“Size, history, or geographical situation make no difference to the goals 
of political progress.”  (Ibid). 
 
“New Zealand has, over the years, built up a complex series of links 
with its Pacific neighbours. With some these are very intimate indeed, 
based on the settlement in New Zealand of permanent communities and 
in continuing constitutional relationships ... The web of relationships is 
so all pervading that to ignore them would be to ignore important areas 
of New Zealand's domestic life.”  (Ministry of Foreign Affairs Annual 
Report, AJHR 1982 Al, p.5.) 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
Keynes, in a famous passage1, once suggested that ideas taken out of context can acquire a 
pernicious life of their own as political dogma, guiding policymakers in directions which 
common sense would have avoided. The history of the past three decades in the Pacific 
provides a case in point: ideas and institutions devised in other times and other places, to 
answer other people's needs, have been unloaded indiscriminately across the region in 
accordance with the priorities and interests of outside powers. This is as true of the recent 
pursuit of “decolonisation” and nation building as it was of the preceding eras of social 
engineering. 
 
The small island societies of the Pacific have three times in the past century been subjected 
to a European conceived and executed process of partial demolition and rebuilding of their 
social and political order. The missionaries of the nineteenth century constructed 
“neotraditional” village society on the rubble of the pre Christian order; the colonial rulers 
of the first half of the twentieth century added bureaucracy and some of the trappings of the 
welfare state; and the decolonisers of the 1960s and 1970s squeezed the resulting amalgam 
into the constraining mould of written national constitutions and technocratic “development 
plans”. 
 
All three of these waves of ideological evangelism have been backed by an “international 
consensus of opinion” supporting the imposed changes. All three have claimed legitimacy 
on the basis either of Islanders' acquiescence (“the wishes of the people”) or (failing this) 
the evangelists' perceptions of “the Islanders' own best interests”.  All three, finally, have 
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had to come to terms with Island realities - which is to say that the end product has not 
always been quite what the original architects had in mind. 
 
For those who take comfort in dialectical models of social change, the Pacific offers 
excellent case study material. Outside institutions are superimposed upon pre-existing 
Island society; as the dust settles, a new order emerges, with the latest set of palagi rituals 
and institutions digested into a revised version of the local social system. What is striking 
about this process is that it has generally been initiated and driven by forces far away from 
the Islands themselves in space and time: the after-math of European Reformation and the 
rise of industrial capitalism in Western Europe; the inter imperial rivalries among the 
European powers (including the USA) in the late nineteenth century, and the consequent 
construction of spheres of influence in the Pacific as elsewhere in the colonial world; and 
finally the driving force of African and Asian anti-colonial nationalism, supported by social 
democratic anticolonialism within the colonial powers as the economic, military and 
political fruits of empire waned and the costs rose. 
 
There is a curious divorce, in the Pacific Islands, between the political fallout from global 
forces of social and economic change, and the ongoing economic and social reality of the 
region itself.  
 
Pacific “superstructures” have generally been constructed without “bases”, or in defiance of 
such “bases” as existed. Colonial administration was instituted largely to curb, rather than 
reinforce, the operation of the main manifestations of capitalist advance in the Pacific in the 
nineteenth century - namely the missionaries and the labour market. Similarly, post colonial 
institutions - especially the “nation state” -  have been constructed on the basis of supposed 
national “identities” which are cultural and geographic, rather than economic or social. The 
anomalies which result - “countries”, many of whose people live elsewhere, whose onshore 
economies are conspicuously incapable of generating the economic surplus required to 
support a nation state superstructure, whose “national identities” have to be “constructed” 
as an ex-post validation of decolonisation  -  reflect the fact that constitutional and political 
change in the Islands since the Second World War has not sprung primarily from domestic, 
social and economic forces. 
 
There are two important reasons for this. The first is that the Island societies are tiny in 
relation to the forces sweeping in from the surrounding world, so that economic and social 
forces generated locally are too weak to prevail. Of all the much discussed problems of 
smallness, this is probably the most important  - sheer lack of “mass” in any contest or 
competition against the driving self interest of larger countries, or international agencies, or 
missionary organisations of one sort or another. The second is that the imported institutions 
and rituals demanded by the outside world are seldom lethal to the key elements of the 
economic and social “base”, while at the same time they generally bring tangible rewards in 
the form of increased possibilities of material consumption and provision of desired 
services for the local population. 
 
Precisely because of the importance attached by evangelists to “outward and visible signs” 
of progress, they have usually been prepared to leave untouched the more solidly resistant 
elements of the local society. During decolonisation the really basic issues  - land tenure, 
citizenship, access to established niches in the Pacific Basin labour market, externally 
subsidised provision of welfare services - have been readily conceded by outside reformers 
whose brief was merely to bring local political institutions into an internationally 
recognised form, and then to prop them up with so called “development aid”. 
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The result may be schizophrenic, but the “dual society” is a far less pathological system in 
the Pacific than in many continental areas of the “peripheral” world. Nevertheless, dualism 
throws up familiar issues, in the Pacific as elsewhere, and most of the perceived “policy 
problems” in Pacific ministates arise along the interface between the two sectors, or 
personalities, or whatever we choose to call them. “Economic development” in the 
(outsiders') sense of the rise of an autonomous, geographically localised capitalist economy, 
is by definition unachievable so long as Island economies remain closely integrated into 
offshore capitalisms. Where the latter integration is protected by a social contract 
negotiated during “decolonisation”, an awkward contradiction arises: the new political 
institutions (particularly the large bureaucracies) are legitimised as being necessary for 
“development”, yet the type of “development” sought is outside the feasible set for “states” 
such as Niue or the Cook Islands2. To make the pursuit of “development” so conceived at 
all realistic, it is necessary to subvert the social contract by a direct attack on one or more 
elements of the socioeconomic “base” - at which point the national political institutions 
lose the other side of their legitimacy, namely democratic accountability. 
 
Or again, the question of “independence” as distinct from “free association” or “political 
integration” brings up the clash between the interests of the political bureaucratic elites 
who inhabit the postcolonial state superstructure and find international diplomacy entirely 
congenial, and the diametrically opposed centripetal logic of economic and social forces 
which bind small island societies into close integration (so called “dependence”) with other 
parts of the Pacific regional economy. 
 
We turn now to survey the events of the post 1945 era in the three mini societies of New 
Zealand's Pacific sphere of influence  - Niue, Cook Islands and Tokelau. The conceptual 
and policy issues which emerge in the course of the discussion will be pulled together at the 
conclusion of the chapter. 
 
3.2 Decolonisation 
 
Strictly speaking, the word “decolonisation” means simply the ending of a colonial state of 
affairs, without any necessary implication of what is to follow. In practice, however, 
“decolonisation” has come to mean the colonial powers' response to the anti-colonialist and 
nationalistic ideologies developed in Asia and Africa from the 1920s on, and especially 
after the Second World War3. The indigenous leaders of countries such as India, Indonesia, 
Algeria, Vietnam, Ghana and Kenya organised their anti-colonial campaigns around a 
specific vision of what was to replace the great colonial empires. Central to their ideas was 
the call for sovereign independent nationhood, and linked with this was the assumption that 
once the political framework had been secured, autonomous national economic 
development could be achieved by planning and aid. (Latin American leaders and 
commentators, after a century and a half of political independence, were understandably 
more cautious on this last point, and it is not surprising that “dependency models” derive 
from that source). 
 
As newly independent nations were admitted in growing numbers to the United Nations at 
the end of the 1950s, a situation emerged where they, together with the Socialist Bloc 
countries, commanded a voting majority in the General Assembly and could therefore 
enforce a change in UN policy on the colonial question. The UN thereupon became the 
agency for a rapid demolition of the old colonial empires - a crusade which was 
accompanied by a great deal of revolutionary rhetoric and the declaration of a number of 
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principles which all nation states should be bound to observe in relation to dependent 
territories and peoples. 
 
When, therefore, “decolonisation” gathered momentum in the Pacific during the 1960s and 
1970s, it was easy for observers to suppose that what was occurring was a reproduction, 
with UN support, of the processes which had carried Asian and African colonies to national 
independence. The standard historical model was one in which non-European peoples were 
originally colonised against their will, and eventually decolonised as the culmination of a 
popular liberation struggle, asserting the subject people's emergent national interests 
against those of the colonial power. Decolonisation was thus a “victory” for the subject 
people, and a “defeat” for the colonialists, and the legitimacy of the post colonial state 
rested firmly upon a revolutionary foundation. 
 
Whatever the merits or demerits of this model in its original setting, it is quite misleading 
when transferred to discussion of the small Pacific societies. Colonial rule in the Pacific 
had certainly generated dissatisfaction over the behaviour of some administrators, but it had 
not generally sparked off local revolutionary nationalism or any very strong pressures for 
the ending of colonialism as such4. At the same time, by the 1960s disengagement had 
become the main goal of the UK, Australia and New Zealand. (France and the USA lie 
outside the scope of the present study). As Herlihy suggests5,  by the 1960s the so called 
“struggle for independence” had become “more rhetorical than real”.  “After UN 
Resolution 1514 demanded the bringing to a speedy and unconditional end colonialism in 
all its forms and manifestations, most colonial powers saw little political advantage in 
delaying independence until a country was politically and economically ready for it, or 
until it was demanded by a majority”.  Thus “for small countries like the small Pacific 
nations, most of which reached independence in the final years of the era, the struggle 
usually was against being left, unprepared and ill equipped, to build a viable nation”. 
 
In the five societies covered by our study, decolonisation was initiated and directed by the 
colonial powers, encouraged by the United Nations, via a set of processes which paid little 
attention to actual local wishes or conditions. The result has been the emergence of a set of 
small political units whose status is profoundly ambiguous and whose future is genuinely 
unsettled. What has officially been described as “political development” has consisted of 
the grafting on of institutions which were originally evolved to meet radically different 
needs in the nation states of Europe and the British Dominions; the real political 
development of the past two decades has lain in the ways in which each island society has 
adjusted to the impact of those institutions, and in the various subtle (and not so subtle) 
changes which island leaders have been able to make in the grand designs of the 
decolonisers. 
 
In December 1960 the UN General Assembly adopted the Declaration on Colonialism, 
Resolution No. 1514. The resolution stated that “all peoples have an inalienable right to 
complete freedom, the exercise of their sovereignty and the integrity of their national 
territory”, and called for strenuous efforts by the UN to put an end to colonialism 
everywhere, through the agency of a new Committee on Decolonisation (later the 
Committee of Twenty Four). This resolution, for which New Zealand (still under the 
policies of the outgoing Second Labour Government) voted, imposed an international moral 
obligation on colonial powers to offer independence to their colonies, but left the door open 
for the peoples of these territories to choose some other political status if they wished. 
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The following day - December 15 - the General Assembly approved Resolution 1541, 
which was ostensibly addressed to the issue of “whether or not an obligation exists to 
transmit information under Article 73e of the Charter”.  (This section set out the obligation 
of colonial administering powers to account annually to the UN Fourth Committee for their 
“stewardship”). The Resolution stated that the obligation to report to the UN would cease 
once territories attained “a full measure of self- government”, and it laid down the 
principle6 that 
 
“A non self governing territory can be said to have reached a 
fullmeasure of self government by  
(a) emergence as a sovereign independent State; 
(b) free association with an independent State; or 
(c) integration with an independent State.” 
 
Read in conjunction with Resolution 1514, this principle made it possible for colonial 
administering powers to meet their obligations to decolonise their dependent territories  by 
giving the inhabitants a free choice amongst independence, integration, or free association. 
(It should be noted that Resolution 1514 did not explicitly rule out the possibility that a 
colonial people might wish to retain the colonial status quo. It simply proceeded on the 
assumption that this would not happen; and the colonial powers generally lacked the 
courage to include the status quo in the list of options presented to their subject peoples. 
This point becomes highly relevant when we turn to the case of Tokelau, below). 
 
The category “free association” had been apparently tailor-made for cases such as the small 
island territories of the Pacific, where links such as citizenship and preferential market 
access to the metropolitan countries were highly valued, and where the pre conditions for 
viable sovereign nationhood seemed to be lacking.7  The idea was that links between a 
dependent territory and a more powerful or wealthier state could be acceptable so long as 
there was no trace of coercion of the weaker party by the stronger. The association had, 
therefore, to be sought and defined by the weaker party, and merely agreed to be the 
stronger; and there should be no legislation passed by the stronger party to bind the weaker 
party into the relationship. “Free association” was thus designed to provide positive 
discrimination in favour of the small and the weak, enabling them to benefit if they wished 
from the benevolence of their former colonial power, without incurring any binding 
reciprocal obligation. 
 
While the intention of this provision was irreproachable, its drafters overlooked (or were 
unable to make allowance for) the fact that in the real world, power is power and weakness 
is weakness. There therefore existed the possibility that colonial powers might push their 
territories into “free association” in order to avoid the problems posed by integration. 
 
In the Cook Islands, Niue, and Tokelau, New Zealand policy is open to this interpretation. 
In promoting a process of “political development” and “decolonisation”, New Zealand 
sought to secure a declaration from the local people that full independence was not desired, 
while at the same time acting to sidetrack any local pressure in favour of political 
integration with New Zealand, and then to urge the dependent territory concerned forward 
along the “corridor” thus created, leading to the status of “self government in free 
association with New Zealand”.  There is no doubt that the motives of most of the 
policymakers at the New Zealand end were genuinely to achieve a result which would be 
“best for the island peoples” as Wellington saw it. There can equally be no doubt that New 
Zealand assiduously cooperated with every United Nations requirement along the way, and 
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that New Zealand's actions have consistently been ratified by both the Fourth Committee 
and the Committee of Twenty Four.  None of this alters the fact that New Zealand's 
dependent territories were not really offered the free choice which both the letter and the 
spirit of Resolutions 1514 and 1541 required. They have instead been led through a set of 
procedures designed to satisfy the United Nations while keeping the island territories at full 
arm's length from New Zealand. The present situation is one in which the options between 
free association and total integration have never been seriously discussed in the Islands. We 
begin, therefore, by looking at the options in principle. 
 
 
3.3  The Alternatives 
 
It may be helpful to set up a simplified model of the alternative possible courses which 
could be followed, starting from colonial or “dependent territory” status. The diagram 
below should be read as a map or compass dial, divided into “zones” each of which 
contains a distinct political “future”.  From the colonial starting point, a community may 
move in any of three directions. To the “north” lies full sovereign independence   a state of 
affairs in which all formal ties with the previous colonial power are cut, and in which the 
relationships between the territory and the former administering power are thereafter 
mediated through the normal channels of international relations. In other words, the two 
parties become nominally equals, dealing with each other government to government, and 
with all powers of national government held, without restriction, by the newly independent 
state.  Citizens of the former colony become citizens of the new nation state, and retain 
“rights” in the former colonial power only insofar as such rights may be unilaterally 
conferred by the government of that nation. (Thus rights of free entry, for example, arise 
from the willingness of the former colonial power to accommodate its former subjects, and 
may be restricted or withdrawn at its sole discretion  - as occurred with New Zealanders' 
access to the UK in the 1960s, and with Western Samoans' access to New Zealand in the 
1970s). 
 
To the “south” lies political integration with the former colonial power, to form a single 
national unit in which the former colony and its inhabitants enjoy all the rights and 
privileges of other citizens, including the right to elect representatives to the national 
parliament or congress and the right to benefit from social security and other state-run 
schemes. The most important point to note about the integration quadrant of our com-pass 
diagram is that we have drawn it as a full quadrant - in other words, “integration” covers a 
range of possible outcomes. Directly to the “south” (that is, diametrically opposite the 
fullest of full independence) is total integration, an option in which the separate identity of 
the colonial territory, and all its distinctively local institutions, are submerged in the larger 
nation of which it forms a part, so that there is literally no distinction nor discrimination 
between inhabitants of the former colony and those of the former colonial power. 
 
Moving around the integration quadrant to the right, we pass through a series of options 
involving progressively greater degrees of local identity and autonomy within the 
integrated nation - that is, we move from the centralised unitary nation state of due “south”, 
to the form of a decentralised federation by the time the “boundary” of the integration 
quadrant is reached (“southeast” from our starting point).  Federal arrangements are 
characterised by a large degree of local identity and autonomy – they are  
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a type of constitution designed to deal with precisely the sort of differences which would 
need to be into account in any serious proposal for integration of the Islands with mainland 
New Zealand. The options at the SE boundary of our integration quadrant, thus, combine 
the two key elements of local autonomy over local affairs, and formal (voting) membership 
of the wider national unit.  (Historically, it is noteworthy that in the days when New 
Zealand was seriously interested in integration with the Islands, the proposed constitutional 
form was a federal one8.) 
 
In contrast to the state of affairs with full independence, relationships between the two 
parties under integration are intra-national, not international. International relations with 
the rest of the world are conducted by the single national unit through its foreign affairs 
machinery, on the basis of a perceived “national interest” which includes all members of 
the nation. From an international point of view, in other words, the nation has a single 
shared international “personality”, although local “personalities” may continue to exist 
within the polity. Another way of putting this is to say that of all the departments of  State, 
the only one with which the former colonial territory would not have any direct contact 
under integration would be the foreign affairs ministry. Under independence, in contrast, 
the only department of State in the former colonial power with which the former colony 
would have dealings would be the foreign affairs ministry. 
 
“East” from colonial status lies a quadrant labelled “self government in free association”.  
This comprises a set of options which are, in one way or another, compromises among the 
three adjacent sets. (Thus, thinking in terms of formal set theory, this quadrant is a zone of 
overlap among the three clearly defined sets “colony”, “nation state”, and “province”.)  Not 
surprisingly, therefore, this set is the most difficult to define clearly; ambiguity is the 
keynote. (As the New Zealand representative at the United Nations put it in 1965, 
describing the new Cook Islands constitution, “the end result may not appeal to the 
legalistically minded or to the purist. It is neither fish nor fowl, neither sovereign 
independence nor dependence”9).  A community located in this quadrant is not integrated 
politically with the former colonial power, since its inhabitants do not have voting rights in 
the latter's political system. On the other hand, the community is not classifiable as a fully 
independent sovereign state, since it continues to share in the international personality of 
the former colonial power, and its inhabitants retain certain rights, such as citizenship and 
access10. For individuals, the ambiguity of the situation lies in their being politically 
members of one “country” but juridically members of another. For the ruling group in the 
territory, an informal balancing act is required, since they are not subject to the direct 
authority of the nation with which they are “associated”, yet they cannot afford to act in 
ways which would render the association null and void. 
 
This last point captures the essence of the distinction between colonial status and free 
association. As a colonial territory, a community is legally subjected to the dictates of the 
suzerain power; under free association it is voluntarily so subjected. In either state of affairs 
the suzerain power may choose to use its power with a light or a heavy hand; but in neither 
is that power extinguished. In neither state of affairs, furthermore, does there exist any 
direct means (such as the election of representatives to a central parliament) by which the 
inhabitants of the dependent territory can, as of right, influence policy in the suzerain state; 
their influence on the policies of the suzerain state must be via representations by the 
dependent community to the executive (rather than the legislature) of that State. Such 
representations have the form of international relations; yet the substance (the issues at 
stake) consists mainly of the sort of matters which more normally belong to the intra- 
national category   for example, the determination of the rights and duties of citizens, and 
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the definition of the “shared personality” which is to be jointly presented to the outside 
world in the field of international relations. 
 
Ambiguity extends to the ways in which the status of “self government in free association” 
can be interpreted by outside observers. From one point of view, this can be seen as the 
quintessence of neocolonialism: the colonial power relinquishes formal control (and sheds 
the burdensome duties of nuts and bolts local administration) while retaining real control 
over the areas which affect its vital national interests - namely, foreign affairs alignments, 
and the general outlook of the local government. From another point of view, the situation 
can be interpreted as an alternative to neocolonialism: a community which could not have 
sustained a genuinely- independent stance in the real world has parlayed its weakness into 
concrete advantage, and has exercised its free choice in the selection of a protector. Both 
interpretations have grains of truth in them; neither on its own captures the full complexity 
of the social contracts between, for example, New Zealand and its former dependencies. 
 
What is clear about this ambiguous constitutional arrangement is that in practice it is what 
the parties make of it. It takes two to define a “special relationship”, and the relationship 
can persist on a genuinely voluntary basis only so long as the two parties have substantially 
overlapping interests. At the same time, the shape and limits of the relationship will tend to 
be formed by the tensions between the interests of the two parties, and by tensions within 
each of them among various interest groups. Self government in free association is a non-
colonial, non-integrated, and non-independent status. It can persist as a stable state of 
affairs, therefore, only so long as there is no dominant interest pressing for one of the 
alternatives. By “dominant” here, we mean both strong enough to determine policy, and 
pursuing a policy which lies in the feasible set. Thus, a strong pro-independence lobby 
coming to power in the dependent territory is in a position to realise its objectives, by 
unilaterally cutting the ties of the special relationship. (It would then remain to be seen 
whether the dominant partner resorted to extra legal means to restore the status quo ante). 
On the other hand, a pro-integration lobby coming to power in the dependent territory 
would have no such ability unilaterally to realise its policies, since a move to integrated 
status would require bilateral agreement11. Similarly, a pro-colonial lobby coming to power 
in the dominant country would not be in a position to carry out its wishes without either 
securing the acquiescence of the dependent territory, or using force to impose its will. On 
the other hand, a pro-independence government in the dominant country could go far 
towards pushing the dependent territory towards full sovereign nationhood - for example, 
by formalising all links as government to government contacts via the foreign affairs 
machinery, by declining to take responsibility for the conduct of the dependent territory's 
international relations, and by withdrawing some or all of the benefits which had made free 
association attractive to the dependent party. 
 
In terms of our diagram, the five mini-societies covered by this study are dispersed among 
three of the four regions. Tuvalu and Kiribati are fully independent nation states, having 
been moved by Britain through a swift progression first “north east” (to full internal self 
government) and then, after minimal delay, “north” to their present status, with the political 
separation to be underpinned in the near future by the phasing out of British financial 
support. Tokelau remains a colony, firmly opposed to independence and finding formal 
colonial status preferable to the looseness of free association; any movement from the 
status quo is as likely to be “south” as “east”.  Niue moved “east” in 1974, with strong New 
Zealand encouragement, and has since followed a wavering course which seems likely to 
settle eventually against the “southern” boundary of the free association quadrant (i.e. as a 
candidate for possible political integration). The Cook Islands, in contrast, having moved 
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initially “southeast” into free association in 1965, have since drifted steadily (again with 
New Zealand encouragement) towards the “northern” boundary of “free association”, with 
the emergence of an embryonic “international personality” of their own, and a very careful 
balancing act required to avoid inadvertent crossing of the boundary into full independence. 
 
What is striking is the absence to date of any case of integration between New Zealand and 
its former dependencies. This immediately raises the question of whether the option was 
unattractive to the dependencies, or to New Zealand, or both. The short answer (to be 
elaborated below) appears to be that integration has been ruled out by New Zealand's 
domestic political considerations. The Islands have been offered (and have unanimously 
rejected) the option of moving due “south” to the extreme version of integration. They have 
not been offered (but have all at various times nibbled at) the option of moving southeast, 
into some sort of loose federation with New Zealand. The constitutional advisers appointed 
in the cases of the Cook Islands and Niue advanced proposals which would have involved 
moving the territories into the self government quadrant, but “throwing a line” over the 
fence to the south. These proposals have all come to nothing. There appear to be grounds 
for suggesting that, had federal style integration been offered at the time of decolonisation, 
it might well have been accepted in preference to free association12. From the standpoint of 
1984, however, matters are less clear; much water has flowed under the constitutional and 
historical bridges since 1960. On the one hand, experience with self government has 
created some centrifugal tendencies within New Zealand's sphere of influence which makes 
full independence for, say, the Cook Islands, a more credible option than may have been the 
case two decades ago. On the other hand, the international and regional climate has altered 
from the strong anti-colonialism and pro-nationalism of the 1960s to a much greater 
sympathy for integration on both the economic and the political levels. 
 
3.4  Why Not Integration? 
 
The debate, such as it has been, on integration as an option for New Zealand's dependent 
territories, has taken place at two levels: theoretical and political. To illuminate the 
theoretical debate, it is useful to begin with Principle VIII of UN Resolution 1541, passed 
in December 1960. This Principle states that integration between a formerly non self 
governing territory and its administering power must be on the basis of 
 
“complete equality ... equal status and rights of citizenship and equal 
guarantees of fundamental rights and freedoms without any distinction 
or discrimination; both [peoples] should have equal rights and 
opportunities for representation and effective participation at all levels 
in executive, legislative and judicial organs of government.” 
 
Principle IX of the same Resolution makes it clear that the dependent territory's choice of 
integration must be a genuinely free and informed one: 
 
“the integrating territory should have attained an advanced stage of self 
government with free political institutions, so that its peoples would 
have the capacity to make a responsible choice through informed and 
democratic processes.” 
 
These two provisions clearly reflect an underlying scepticism about the motives of the 
colonial powers, and an anxiety to protect the peoples of dependent territories from being 
dragooned into integration on unfavourable terms. They can also be read, however, in quite 
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a different sense, to suggest firstly that positive discrimination (the recognition and 
protection of specific local interests or characteristics) is inconsistent with UN principles of 
integration, and secondly that colonial peoples should not become integrated with a 
colonial power until they have reached an advanced stage of political maturity (that is, until 
they are “ready”). 
 
New Zealand's official position since the Second World War has tended towards the latter 
pair of arguments, and UN Resolution 1541 of 1960 was thus easily incorporated into a 
continuing policy stance. In 1945 46 the Cook Islands Progressive Association had 
proposed that the Group should have representation in the New Zealand Parliament; the 
Minister of Island Territories refused, “saying that all New Zealand taxes, including the 20 
percent sales tax, would have to apply to the islands, and parliamentary representation 
would not be compatible with the type of local government which the islanders wanted”.13  
In 1955 the Belshaw/Stace report, on the basis of what appears to have been a clear 
consensus of official thinking at the time14, claimed that it would not be in the islanders' 
best interests to be fully integrated with New Zealand, since the simultaneous application of 
New Zealand taxation and social security laws might15 
 
“not only ... enormously increase the New Zealand subsidy, but also 
enable a substantial body of the population to retire comfortably on the 
proceeds from child allowances and other benefits ... (the integration 
proposal) is hardly calculated to develop satisfying and self reliant 
communities in the Islands, and is in conflict with the legitimate desires 
of other groups and their leaders for greater measures of self 
government. Hence we believe leaders who press such claims are 
unwittingly doing a disservice to their people ... The people must be 
given some alternative to the current political programme of one or two 
leaders whose main theme appears to be to glean the fullest advantages 
from being a part of New Zealand, at the expense of the New Zealand 
taxpayer, rather than promote organisation of the Maori people to 
obtain better conditions of life by their own efforts ...” 
 
Belshaw and Stace went on to address the question of parliamentary representation:16 
 
“... Representation in the New Zealand Parliament: We understand that 
a move is afoot to obtain Cook Island representation in the New 
Zealand Parliament. We do not regard this as desirable in the present 
stage for several reasons, and would aim at offering the alternative of 
more active programmes, and fuller scope for participation in them. 
The reasons why we do not regard any form of participation in the New 
Zealand Parliament as desirable at present are: 
(a) While representing the separate islands has meaning, representing 
the Cook Islands as yet has no meaning... 
(b) Representation in the New Zealand Parliament would therefore be 
largely fictitious ... what would be represented would be the 
interests of a section, or more probably of the manipulative leaders 
of that section. 
(c) Cook Islands problems would be thrown more fully into the arena 
of party politics ... (T)his might greatly embarrass the patient and 
persistent pursuit of policies which take time to come to fruition. 
At some future time the position may change, and a stronger case 
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can then be established for some form of representation in the New 
Zealand Parliament.” 
 
Belshaw and Stace thus set out most of the standard official case against political 
integration: firstly, that it would unavoidably involve the submergence of local identity and 
institutions (i.e. would rule out local self government); secondly, that local self government 
was necessary for the achievement of New Zealand prescriptions for the economic and 
social development of the Islands; and thirdly that the Cook Islands  lacked sufficiently 
clearly defined interests to give meaning to representation at that time (and hence would 
become merely the plaything of “manipulative leaders” and “party politics”). 
 
Of these three lines of attack, it was the first two which were, and have remained, the 
central proposition of conventional thinking. Conditions in the Cook Islands differ from 
those in New Zealand, and special allowance for those differences needed to be made. Such 
special allowance for local conditions, in the view of a long series of New Zealand 
commentators, simply could not be made within the framework of an integrated political 
unit. As Belshaw and Stace insisted (in a sentence which subsequently became a standard 
cliche in public discussion), “in the present and foreseeable future, the Cook Islands cannot 
be a part of New Zealand in the same sense as Taranaki or Napier ...: not politically, 
administratively, socially, or economically”.17 The following year, the same theme was 
taken up by Professor Colin Aikman in his constitutional report:18 
 
“Superficially attractive as proposals for Cook Islands representation in 
the New Zealand Parliament may be, they have little relation to 
existing circumstances and needs. If it were practicable and desirable 
that the territory should be administered as an integral part of New 
Zealand, it would be appropriate that the local population should be 
given a direct voice in the New Zealand Parliament; but if, as is 
recommended in this report, immediate political development should 
be in the direction of giving greater autonomy and responsibility to 
representative institutions in the territory itself, it would be unreal and 
incompatible to give the territory direct representation in the New 
Zealand Parliament.” 
 
By 1962, when the New Zealand Government unveiled its plans for full internal self 
government in its territories, the official line of argument against integration had been 
bolstered by a narrow reading of Principle VIII of US Resolution 1541, quoted earlier. 
Announcing New Zealand's plans to the Cook Islands Legislative Assembly in July 1962 
the Minister of Island Territories, Leon J Gotz, dealt with the integration option in the 
following terms:19 
 
“[Integration] would mean that you would receive the same treatment 
as, say, the province of Taranaki. All the laws of New Zealand would 
apply here - not only some which you would like, but also a number 
which you would probably not like. Under this system you would, in 
place of a Legislative Assembly of your own, have representation in 
the New Zealand Parliament. But what would that representation 
amount to? The Cook Islands on their own would not be big enough to 
have even one Member of Parliament   - you would have to share one 
member with Niue and the Tokelaus. I think this one member would 
have a very difficult job trying to please nineteen separate islands so 
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different from one another. I think, too, that his voice would sound very 
small in a Parliament of eighty members ... If you have a representative 
in the New Zealand Parliament and come completely under New 
Zealand law, you will immediately go back to the system we have just 
abandoned where all major decisions were made, not in Rarotonga, but 
in Wellington. I wonder if you would like that to happen.” 
 
The outside observer reading this is left bemused. Why would integration have been 
incompatible with the survival of autonomous local government? Why should 
representation in the New Zealand Parliament have been on a basis that would effectively 
prevent Cook Island (or Niuean, or Tokelauan) concerns from being clearly presented and 
heard? Why could no restriction be placed upon the application of New Zealand laws to the 
Cook Islands  -  or alternatively, why could New Zealand laws not be adjusted to take 
account of conditions in the Islands, if these became part of an integrated unit? Why, in 
summary, did the New Zealand Government adhere to an interpretation of “integration” so 
strict and total as to render this option indistinguishable from a form of colonial rule more 
draconian and insensitive than anything New Zealand had ever contemplated as an actual 
colonial power? 
 
The answer lies in New Zealand's own constitutional evolution, and in the implicit 
assumption that integration of (say) the Cook Islands would have been on the basis of the 
pre-existing New Zealand constitutional order, with no concessions whatever to the 
conditions or needs of the Islands. New Zealand had abandoned provincial government 
nearly a century before and settled for a strongly centralised state. The concept and 
institutions of regional autonomy were therefore foreign to New Zealand minds, and there 
is no trace of irony in Belshaw/Stace's suggestion that the Cook Islands “cannot be a part of 
New Zealand in the same sense as Taranaki”.  Taranaki, it should be recalled, had never 
been a province in the era of provincial government, and its identity in the 1950s was 
cultural rather than constitutional. Taranaki had a rugby team, but institutions such as the 
Taranaki United Council lay twenty years in the future; and that Council today has less real 
local autonomy than the Cook Islands Legislative Assembly possessed by 1962. The 
Taranaki analogy was relevant only as an indication of the inappropriateness of full 
integration of the Cook Islands into the New Zealand polity as the latter was constituted in 
1962, and it was in this sense that Mr Gotz used the analogy in his speech. 
 
It was, in other words, the absence of a vital tradition of local and regional autonomy in 
New Zealand that rendered unacceptable a constitutional arrangement which would  have 
conceded internal self government to the Island territories while binding them explicitly 
into the New Zealand nation. Reinforcing this was the fact that New Zealand  in 1949 had 
abandoned its upper house of Parliament (which had never functioned as a means of giving 
weight to specific minority or regional interests, as upper houses in federal states are 
designed to do).  One obvious means of providing the Island territories with a clear voice in 
the New Zealand legislature, by appointments to the upper house, was therefore lacking by 
the time decolonisation options came forward for public debate in the 1960s. 
 
Had New Zealand politicians and public been willing, however, there is no doubt that an 
arrangement could have been worked out corresponding to the “southeast” segment of our 
diagram (Figure 1) - that is, granting substantial local autonomy to Island legislatures, 
while providing for Islander representation in the New Zealand Parliament. In this 
connection, it is interesting to turn to the reports written by constitutional advisers for first 
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the Cook Islands, and then the Niue, Legislative Assemblies during the period when these 
were considering proposals for a shift to full self government. 
 
In September 1963 a group of New Zealand advisers presented a report to the Cook Islands 
Assembly.20  Most of this report was taken up with the detail of the proposed  new 
Constitution, which set up in miniature the entire apparatus of a nation state, with Cabinet 
government, Head of State and independent judiciary. In a section entitled “Relations with 
New Zealand”, however, the report addressed the problem of defining  the special 
relationship under which New Zealand would remain responsible for international relations, 
would continue to provide budgetary support and audit services, and would deal on a 
government to government basis with the Cook Islands Government. Alongside these 
elements, the report pointed out, it would be necessary to work out some set of relations 
with the New Zealand Parliament, as distinct from the executive branch of government. “In 
view of the position of Cook Islanders as New Zealand citizens and of Cook Islands 
dependence on New Zealand grants and on trade with New Zealand, it is obviously 
desirable that there should be some relationship between the Cook Islands and the New 
Zealand Parliament”, the report stated.21 
 
“It might seem that the obvious way of achieving this objective would 
be through provision for a Cook Islands member in the New Zealand 
Parliament. Such an arrangement would be a logical one, 
constitutionally; and there are ample precedents for it. It would ensure 
that full discussion of Cook Islands matters could take place publicly 
and with the participation of representatives of both New Zealand and 
the Cook Islands.” 
 
The report continued “There are, however, a number of difficulties”, which it set out as 
follows:22 
 
“... On the New Zealand side, there would obviously be a reluctance to 
concede full voting rights to a Cook Islands member, since the 
residents of the Cook Islands do not pay New Zealand taxes and since 
the population of the territory is somewhat less than that of an ordinary 
New Zealand electorate. There might be less objection to having a 
member with the right to vote only on matters relating exclusively to 
the Cook Islands. ...  Either proposal would represent an innovation 
from the New Zealand point of view; and one could not predict the 
reception that would be accorded by the New Zealand Parliament. 
 
If the New Zealand Parliament favoured Cook Islands representation, it 
might consider that the Cook Islands member should, like all other 
members, be directly elected by the people. A member so elected 
would not necessarily share the view of the Government of the Cook 
Islands. ... From the Cook Islands point of view, there would be some 
advantage in having a member nominated either by the Cabinet or by 
the Legislative Assembly. Parliament might, however, find difficulty in 
agreeing to a system of nomination, as the direct election of members 
by the people is basic to its constitutional and political role.  
 
… A Cook islands member would, presumably, receive the same salary 
and allowances as other Members of Parliament. These emoluments 
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might well be higher than those which the Cook Islands felt able to 
grant its own Ministers ...” 
 
The report then turned its back on the possibility of parliamentary representation by 
proposing an alternative:23 
   
“It seems to us that many of the advantages of such representation 
might be gained by other, and less controversial, means. Parliament 
might be asked to establish a Select Committee on Cook Islands Affairs 
that would meet each year with representatives of the Government of 
the Cook Islands. ... We believe that a possible solution along these 
lines merits your most serious consideration.” 
 
The important point to emerge from the foregoing is one of principle. For a community 
moving into the status of “self government in free association”, it was important to strike 
the right constitutional balance, and in particular not to be restricted solely to government-
to-government contacts at executive level. Direct access to the New Zealand legislature was 
one of the central planks of the 1963 advisers' report, and it is clear that they saw no 
overriding objection in principle to having members elected or appointed to the New 
Zealand Parliament from the Cook Islands (in other words, it would have been possible to 
“throw a line” over the “southern” boundary of the self government quadrant in Figure 1, 
even if more formal federal status were not accorded). The objection to such an 
arrangement lay in its “controversial” nature in the New Zealand political scene. 
 
Similar points emerge when we turn to the case of Niue, which moved to self government 
in free association a decade later than the Cook Islands, but after a similar process of 
consultation and advice. In 1970 Professor Quentin Baxter was asked to advise the Niue 
Assembly on constitutional options. His report makes it clear that there was no reason in 
principle why a substantial degree of local autonomy for Niue could not have been made 
compatible with a form of political integration with New Zealand. He makes clear also that 
New Zealand had effectively ruled out integration as an option:24 
 
“In 1962, when the late Sir Leon Gotz, then Minister of Island 
Territories, consulted the Niue Assembly about constitutional 
development, it was taken for granted by the Minister and the 
Assembly that integration could only mean the disappearance of Niue 
as a separate unit of government. This was so obviously not acceptable 
that the question of integration was not pursued ... 
 
What, then, is the distinction between integration and self government? 
... To bring to an end Niue's dependent status, one of two things must 
happen: either the inhabitants of Niue must become enfranchised as 
New Zealand voters, or the New Zealand Parliament must assign to the 
Niue Island Assembly all powers to make laws for Niue. The first 
alternative is integration; the second alternative is self government. 
 
As self government was the objective chosen* in 1962, the New 
Zealand Government did not have to consider the alternative of 
integration ... Integration need not, however, be incompatible with 
Niue's need to keep its own political institutions. At the present stage of 
constitutional development, the New Zealand Parliament has unlimited 
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legal power to make laws for Niue; but in practice it deals only with a 
small range of Niuean matters   and then only with full regard to the 
wishes of the Government and people of Niue. There is in principle no 
reason why such an arrangement should not continue on some mutually 
acceptable basis after Niue has ceased to be a dependent territory ...” 
 
* It should be pointed out that the choice referred to was New Zealand's, not Niue's, 
although Gotz managed to persuade the Niue Assembly, like that of the Cook 
Islands, to acquiesce in his proposed strategy. Cf. Chapman, T., The Decolonisation 
of Niue, (VUW 1976), P. 12. 
 
Political leaders interviewed in the Cook Islands, Niue and Tokelau during April-May 1984 
made it clear that New Zealand's unwillingness to entertain political integration on realistic 
terms was well understood, and to some extent sympathised with, in the Islands. To a 
question about the possibility of formally making Tokelau part of the New Zealand political 
system, the elders of Nukunonu responded25 (as relayed by our interpreter): 
 
“Before any change in politics came to Tokelau, Nukunonu always 
thought that Tokelau was part of New Zealand. The present situation is 
confused ... If they decide to put into an agreement with New Zealand 
that Tokelau becomes part of New Zealand, what difficulties could 
arise in the future? It is a difficult question to answer ... If they say no, 
New Zealand may start to forget about Tokelau. If they say yes, the 
name 'Tokelau' may disappear.” 
 
To a follow up question on the possibility of extending New Zealand voting rights to 
Tokelau, Nukunonu responded that Tokelauans could not meaningfully vote on New 
Zealand issues and personalities, and that if Tokelauans voted in New Zealand elections 
“the question is: would there still be a need for Tokelau to have its own authority in their 
own affairs and be treated as a separate country”? Atafu in general supported Nukunonu's 
line; Fakaofo took a more radical stance in favour of voting rights. 
 
In Niue, political leaders made it clear26 that integration as an option had never been 
presented or discussed in any depth. This reflected partly the fact that a closer relationship 
would have been possible only with New Zealand acquiescence, which was known to be 
not forthcoming; and partly the fact that, as one senior Niuean expressed it, “all that the 
people wanted to say in the 1960s was that they did not want independence; they weren't 
asking for anything”.  So long as citizenship was preserved, Niueans were prepared to 
acquiesce in New Zealand's plans in 1970-1974, but there was “never anything like a two 
thirds majority for self government”27. Another leading politician confirmed that the real 
choice in the early 1970s was between independence and self government; the self 
government constitution was welcomed more as a safeguard against the threat of full 
independence, than as a positive step towards an actual desired goal. Another leading figure 
agreed that “self government was the only choice we could see at the time”, that integration 
as an option “was not discussed in any depth at all”, and that an arrangement something 
like the Chatham Islands (taking due account of special circumstances of size and distance) 
might well have been acceptable if offered. Another Assembly member suggested that Niue 
might have become “a borough of Auckland”; and yet another spoke of a possible “Swiss 
solution” in which Niue would be an autonomous canton in a federal arrangement with 
New Zealand. 
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In the Cook Islands, New Zealand's position had been adopted by Albert Henry at the 
outset of the 1964 emergence of the Cook Islands Party. At a large public meeting in the 
Victory Theatre on Rarotonga on July 6, 1964, Henry dealt as follows with the pros and 
cons of integration:28 
   
“The advantages included award wages, child benefits and old age 
pensions, and New Zealand electoral residential qualifications, but he 
pointed out that the first three would come but slowly, quoting Mr 
Hanan as indicating at least ten to fifteen years. On the other hand, as 
part of New Zealand, the Territory would be entitled to no more than 
one representative in the New Zealand Parliament and might even be 
merged with another electorate. But even with a separate member, one 
in a Parliament of eighty would mean that they would be back where 
they were before - “voiceless”.  They would have to pay New Zealand 
taxes, especially income tax, whereas most of them paid only small 
indirect taxes in the Cooks and were unable to cope with more. New 
Zealand laws would be introduced into the Territory and they would 
soon start selling their lands. He concluded that with integration “the 
good things will come, slowly but the bad things will come quickly”. 
 
The integration option had its proponents in 1964, but they lacked the charisma and 
organisational strength of Henry's CIP. The Ingram family's Cook Islands Unity Party, for 
example, was formed to promote integration but seems never to have done its homework on 
the structure of New Zealand local government and the modifications that would have been 
required for the Cook Islands.29  Other strong statements in favour of integration came 
from the minority group in the Assembly elected in the 1965 general election. (This 
election, incidentally, was subsequently and quite incorrectly, claimed by New Zealand to 
have been a “referendum” on the self government constitution)30.  During the debate on the 
new constitution in May 1965 an amendment was tabled to defer consideration until 
alternatives to self government had been “properly investigated and explained, and the 
wishes of the people determined by a referendum”, and speeches made during the debate on 
this motion31 revealed strong support for integration from some of the outer islands, 
especially in the Northern Group. (Tangaroa Tangaroa, for example, the member for 
Penrhyn, spoke of joining the Tokelaus in continued administration by New Zealand, and 
eventually voted against the Constitution). 
 
Among the Cook Islands community in New Zealand, also, there was considerable pro-
integration feeling in 1964, which resulted in the submission (and rejection by the New 
Zealand Government) of a series of petitions32. In the Cook Islands as in Niue, however, it 
seems clear in retrospect that the acceptance of self government on the basis proposed by 
New Zealand was a conservative response: given that New Zealand had declared the 
“colonial” status quo to be untenable, self government in free association seemed the 
closest available option to that status quo. As has already been argued in this chapter, such 
a judgement rested, perhaps crucially, on the extremist caricature of integration which was 
presented by New Zealand officials. 
 
The Cook Islands political elite of 1984, insofar as we were able to explore their views 
during a brief visit to Rarotonga and Aitutaki, remain open to discussion of integration as a 
political option, but are (not unexpectedly) hard nosed in their approach. One of the top 
priorities for any Government in the Cook Islands is to secure an increased level of external 
funding, and after a decade of static or falling New Zealand Government grants 
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(accompanied by numerous policy statements favouring the phasing out of New Zealand's 
budgetary assistance) most hopes are pinned on other donors in the international arena. 
Albert Henry's judgement in 1964 (quoted above) that the material benefits of integration 
were uncertain and might be slow in coming, whereas the disadvantages of integrating on 
the terms then offered by New Zealand were obvious, still appears appropriate in 1984; but 
were the balance of costs and benefits to change in the eyes of Cook Islanders, there would 
be no overwhelming political obstacle to a move back towards New Zealand. At present, 
however, the Cook Islands elite is exploring on a bipartisan basis (Cook Islands Party and 
Dr Davis' Democrats) the limits of what one prominent Democrat describes as 
“independence in free association”33.  Many political leaders, especially those of the 1960s 
generation, express the belief that the Cook Islands must “stand on their own feet” and 
move progressively away from financial dependence on New Zealand - echoing, again, the 
line taken by Albert Henry in 1964 (but without Henry's subsequent image of the 
relationship with New Zealand as a marriage rather than a parent-child situation34; the 
parent-child image remains strong in Cook Islands minds, and underpins the pursuit by 
local politicians of what is presented as greater independence).  It is still safe to say, 
however, that full independence (with abandonment of New Zealand citizenship) remains 
politically unacceptable in the Cook Islands, so that a unilateral abandonment of the special 
relationship is unlikely. 
 
3.5  Why Not Independence? 
 
This question is easier to answer than the integration one. Full independence∗ for the New 
Zealand territories was and is politically unsaleable in Niue, Tokelau and the Cook Islands; 
no credible “act of self determination” leading to sovereign independence as generally 
understood could have been staged in those territories, whatever New Zealand wanted.  In 
1962, when New Zealand canvassed the various United Nations options  (plus some Pacific 
federation schemes of its own) in the territories, the feeling against full independence was 
virtually unanimous.35  In both the Cook Islands and Niue, unanimous resolutions passed 
the assemblies; in Tokelau the village councils never contemplated independence as a 
serious possibility (though some covert discussions were held with American Samoa as to 
the possibility of switching patrons; these came to nothing). United Nations Missions to the 
Cook Islands in 1965, to Niue in 1972, and to Tokelau in 1976, were unequivocally 
informed that full independence was unacceptable to the peoples of the territories. 
Professor Quentin Baxter's report to the Niue Assembly in 1971 emphasized that36 
 
“In the minds of the ... adult inhabitants of Niue, there are three issues 
of overriding importance. They wish to retain their New Zealand 
citizenship; for this signifies a guaranteed right of access to New 
Zealand ... They also want absolute assurance that New Zealand will 
keep up its financial and administrative aid to the island; for that alone 
makes possible an acceptable standard of living. 
 
“Yet the people of Niue are equally concerned to keep their own 
identity, their own patterns of living, and substantial control over their 
own affairs ... Every question of constitutional development in Niue 
concerns the interplay of these three factors.” 
 
                                                 
∗  That is, separate statehood, citizenship, and national “personality”. 
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Under the circumstances, where the desire of the Island peoples to share in New Zealand's 
international personality, and the benefits deriving from it, remains strong, the full 
independence option has had as little attraction as the extreme integration one. 
 
As with integration, however, “independence” encompasses a range of possible states, 
which at some point (Figure 1) shade over into the non independent status of “self 
government in free association”.  The version of “independence” which islanders 
unanimously rejected was one in which New Zealand citizenship and shared “personality” 
would be lost, and financial support from New Zealand would be available only on the 
same basis as applied to international “aid” in general. On the other hand, it is only to be 
expected that over time some of the ruling political elites in the Islands should wish to 
exercise as much real autonomy as they felt to be consistent with the maintenance of the 
special relationship with New Zealand. This raises immediately an awkward issue of 
political dynamics. Self governing countries “in free association” can maintain that status 
only by voluntarily remaining within the implicitly understood limits of New Zealand 
tolerance. In Tokelau and Niue this has to date posed no great problem; in neither case has 
the elite or the population at large wished to push their luck in the international arena. In 
the Cook Islands, however, brinksmanship has been a persistent characteristic, in periods of 
both Cook Island Party and Democratic Party rule. As Chapman has remarked37    
 
“Inherent in a relationship of this kind are areas of high sensitivity 
where the slightest suggestion of misunderstanding could lead to an 
undesirable decline in the respect and confidence each party ought to 
have for each other. Although self government in free association for 
Niue will vary in some slight detail from that of the Cook Islands, the 
delicate nature of inter governmental relationships will be equally 
demanding ... (T)he Cook Islands experience has exposed one 
important area ... where misunderstanding could easily lead to a 
breakdown.” 
 
The area identified by Chapman was financial management, and the problem was the 
contradiction between the Cook Islands Government's nominal freedom of action to 
determine its own expenditure policies on the one hand, and the reality that a large part of 
that Government's finances were provided by New Zealand, on the other. Under these 
circumstances, independence can never be total: constitutional freedom of action does  not 
translate automatically into real freedom. Since Chapman wrote, another area of potential 
friction has emerged, involving the freedom of the Cook Islands Government  to enter into 
international agreements on its own behalf. As in the field of public finance, the limits of 
the special relationship with New Zealand are set not by any explicit rule, but by the de 
facto limits of New Zealand Government tolerance, and those limits may shift as the New 
Zealand political winds change. 
 
Under these circumstances, a great deal hangs upon New Zealand as the dominant partner 
in the relationship, to give signals which will not be open to misinterpretation as to where 
the limits of free association may lie. One major difficulty which Island elites have faced 
during the past two decades is the reluctance of New Zealand to set any such apparent 
limits in advance, so that the real limits become known only ex post, as the result of 
experimental testing of the limits of tolerance. The key feature of New Zealand policy 
during the decolonisation period has been an almost obsessive fear of being seen to do 
anything that might be construed internationally as constraining the freedom of the Island 
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territories to opt for full independence at any time they might choose. As the then Minister, 
Leon Gotz, put it in a speech in Rarotonga in 196338, 
 
“We have opened the door to Independence ... It is for you to walk 
through it as slowly or as quickly as you please.” 
 
The difficulty has been that, as one of the prominent New Zealand critics of the 
decolonisation strategy argued in 196539, 
  
“It is ... demonstrable by reference to Commonwealth experience that 
self government leads to independence; this is the road upon which 
New Zealand has chosen to set the Cook Islanders.” 
 
The stages through which New Zealand coaxed local institutions in both the Cook Islands 
and Niue were indeed the familiar British colonial stages of representative and then 
responsible government; the usual destination of this progression was independence, and 
the institutions installed at each stage were designed to form the infrastructure for operating 
as a fully independent nation state. The natural dynamics of the sequence of changes 
introduced by New Zealand in its dependent territories were therefore always liable to carry 
those territories beyond the domain of “free association”.  What is especially significant in 
the constitutions of both the Cook Islands and Niue is the absence of any provisions 
recognising the constitutional advisers' suggestions that formal relationships with the New 
Zealand legislature should be retained in the self government period, precisely for the 
purpose of ensuring that misunderstandings did not arise as to the limits of New Zealand's 
political tolerance. 
 
New Zealand's policy on the issue of independence for the Island territories has always 
given an impression of ambivalence. This ambivalence arose partly from the differing 
perceptions and interests of different Departments of the New Zealand Government 
(particularly the former Departments of Island Territories and External Affairs), and partly 
from the inherent contradiction between the strong United Nations pressure for full 
independence of colonies, and New Zealand officials' recognition that in the territories 
themselves such an outcome was unacceptable. In presenting the concept of “self 
government in free association” to Island audiences, therefore, New Zealand officials 
tended (and tend) to emphasise the aspect of continuing links with New Zealand; but in 
presenting the idea to international audiences, the tendency has been rather to stress the 
closeness of self government to full independence.40 
 
Most importantly, the underlying ambivalence of New Zealand policy has been manifest in 
the ways the political wind has changed on the independence issue over time; the result of 
these changes of emphasis has been unsettling for the Island peoples and elites. In the 
1960s, when the Department of the Island Territories still had strong influence on policy 
and the Department of External Affairs was anxious above all to see “constitutional 
progress”, and willing to defend “self government in free association” as something clearly 
distinct from sovereign independence, the Islands were given strong assurances that New 
Zealand was not contemplating “putting them away”, and that the arrival of self 
government would not in any way undermine the existing relationships between New 
Zealand and the Islands. These assurances were particularly important in the long process 
of coaxing Niue into an “act of self determination” in the early 1970s, and the Niueans 
(assisted by their advisers) went to considerable lengths in the negotiations over their new 
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Constitution to ensure that the links with New Zealand were protected as strongly as 
possible. 
 
No sooner, however, had Niue finally embarked upon the move to self government (1970-
1972) than the New Zealand position shifted markedly towards treating self governing 
states in free association  as though they were independent. In 1970, the New Zealand 
official position had been that41 
  
“The New Zealand Government ... has no intention of forcing upon the 
People of its island territories a pace of political development which 
runs counter to their freely expressed wishes.” 
 
The incoming Labour Government of 1973, however, brought a determination, as Prime 
Minister Kirk put it, “to find and hold to a firm moral basis for its foreign policy”42, and his 
1973 Exchange of Letters with Albert Henry was explicitly presented by New Zealand as 
moving the Cook Islands away from the status of having a special relationship with New 
Zealand, and towards being treated the same as any fully independent state43: 
 
“New Zealand will deal with the Cook Islands Government in the same 
way as with other South Pacific countries ... It is envisaged that in the 
course of the next two or three years responsibility for the conduct of 
New Zealand's relations with the Cooks will be transferred to the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs.” 
 
The following year, the report of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs spelt out even more 
clearly the New Zealand expectation that the Cooks would move out from under the New 
Zealand umbrella in foreign policy matters, and begin to acquire a distinct international 
“personality” of its own44: 
 
“... the May exchange of letters ... made it clear that self government in 
free association with New Zealand should not be interpreted as 
restricting the Cook Islands' powers of self government, including the 
right of the Cook Islands to ... pursue its own policies and interests in 
the field of external relations.” 
 
In June 1974 Sir Albert Henry attended the Law of the Sea Conference in Caracas, and was 
again present at the Geneva Law of the Sea Conference in March 1975; on both occasions 
his participation in his own right as head of the Government of a small island state was 
encouraged and facilitated by New Zealand. 
 
This shift in policy arose from the combination of Albert Henry's desire for more freedom 
of action in the wake of his 1971 confrontation with Wellington over government finance, 
and the change in outlook on the decolonisation question following the election of a Labour 
Government in New Zealand. It could, thus, be said that the initiative for the change came 
from the Cook Islands Government, and that New Zealand was responding to the expressed 
wishes of that Government. In October 1971 Albert Henry had written to the New Zealand 
Minister of Island Affairs asking that the two functions of the New Zealand High 
Commissioner - as “head of state” and as representative of the New Zealand Government - 
should be separated; the point of this separation was to have a New Zealand representative 
whose functions resembled those of a diplomatic representative rather than of a colonial 
governor. 
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It appears also to have been Henry, in discussions with Prime Minister Kirk in May 1973, 
who suggested that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs should become the direct channel of 
communication between the two governments. The obvious advantage from Henry's point 
of view was that the Minister of Foreign Affairs was a senior figure in the New Zealand 
Government whereas the Minister of Island Affairs was a junior figure. Henry evidently 
contemplated a move to full independence; in November 1973 he spoke with Prime 
Minister Kirk of “breaking down the last vestiges of colonialism”, and again received a 
sympathetic response from the New Zealand end; Kirk proposed that the Cook Islands 
proceed to full independence. However, domestic political realities in the Cook Islands put 
paid to any further moves in that direction; independence was a guaranteed loser in 
electoral terms.45 
 
Premier Henry's suggestion that Cook Islands affairs be handled by Foreign Affairs rather 
than Island Affairs, however, was very much in tune with the trend in interdepartmental 
politicking in Wellington, and with the thinking of Government politicians. On the basis of 
the 1973-74 discussions with the Cook Islands Government the New Zealand Government 
proceeded with its plans for abolition of the Department of Island Affairs, without (so far as 
we are aware) consulting with the other two island territories affected by the move: Niue 
and Tokelau. In Wellington's eyes, what went for one associated territory went for all, 
despite the obvious differences among the three cases. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
annual report for 1974 recorded as follows a change which had revolutionary implications 
for the constitutional status of the communities affected:46 
 
“In New Zealand a significant change was the assumption of full 
responsibility for New Zealand's dealings with the Cook Islands, Niue 
and the Tokelaus by the Minister of Foreign Affairs. This changed New 
Zealand's dealings with the authorities in its former island territories 
from a basis of dependence to one of full inter governmental 
partnership. It is the natural culmination of the process of constitutional 
development which has taken place in recent years.” 
 
The new policy stance thus announced suffered from a number of serious defects. In the 
first place, it amounted to a unilateral abrogation of the repeated assurances given by New 
Zealand spokesmen during the preceding fifteen years, that the relationship between New 
Zealand and its former and actual Island territories was to remain special in clearly defined 
ways. The constitutional draftsmen had already, by 1974, provided both the Cook Islands 
and Niue with political systems which lacked any formal channels of communication 
between the Island authorities and the New Zealand legislature, so that the relationship with 
New Zealand was mediated entirely through the Departments of  the New Zealand 
Government's executive arm (see preceding section). The New Zealand Government was 
now abolishing the one Department of State which had had a specific and exclusive focus 
upon that relationship. In the process New Zealand was putting an end to an era of 
flexibility in the definition of “Island Affairs” which had enabled the old Department 
(virtually combined with Maori Affairs in the early 1970s) to deal simultaneously, and in a 
coordinated fashion, with communities of Islanders resident both in the Islands and in New 
Zealand. Under the new dispensation, the New Zealand Government ceased to have any 
institutional channel through which it could deal directly with the locally resident migrant 
community as such; “Island affairs” were narrowed down to a purely offshore focus on the 
Islands themselves as geographic units. Much of what had been understood to be “special” 
about the “special relationship” was thereby thrown overboard, at precisely the time when 
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relations within New Zealand between the Pacific Islanders and other groups were running 
into difficulties. (The toothless Pacific Affairs Coordinating Committee set up in 1976 after 
the “overstayers affair” was a poor substitute for a Department charged with handling 
Pacific Island problems on their own). 
 
In the second place, the new policy was incoherent in its claim to have shifted New 
Zealand's relations with the Islands “from a basis of dependence to one of full inter 
governmental partnership”.  For the previous decade New Zealand had been claiming that 
“self government in free association” represented just such a shift47, and the Niueans in 
particular had been persuaded to adopt that system on the basis of an assurance that it 
would not involve them in being treated as an independent nation by New Zealand. It was 
by no means clear, therefore, what was meant by “a basis of dependence”.  If the phrase 
was interpreted to mean that the Department of Island Territories had been acting in ways 
which rendered the Islands more “dependent” than was desirable, then this in itself gave no 
warrant for the total abolition of the Department. If, on the other hand, the phrase is 
interpreted to signify that the previous constitutional situation had been one of undesirable 
“dependence”, then the new policy must be open to the interpretation that New Zealand 
was abandoning its earlier assurances that the pace and direction of political/constitutional 
change would not be forced against the Island peoples' wishes. The Island peoples, after all, 
had been explicit on their desire for close ties with New Zealand to be retained; and in the 
case of Tokelau those wishes had extended also to rejection of all proposals for Tokelau to 
change its political status to one where “full inter governmental partnership” applied. The 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in fact, was being given the task of administering three quite 
separate and distinct “special relationships” none of which, for various reasons, could 
satisfactorily be reduced to “inter governmental partnership” of the sort familiar in normal 
foreign relations dealings among sovereign states. 
 
In the third place, the statement that the new order was “the natural culmination of the 
process of constitutional development” provided retrospective justification for those who 
(like Northey in 1965) had claimed that the logic of New Zealand's constitutional plans led 
to independence, and that assurances to the contrary were hollow. There was a fundamental 
difference between saying (as Gotz had done in 1962) that “the door to Independence was 
open”, and treating the Islands as though they had already chosen to walk through that 
door. The fine balance of nuance and mutual trust on which the concept of “free 
association” had been erected was now threatened. This was most immediately obvious in 
the case of Niue. 
 
As already noted, the Niuean people had taken ten years to come around to New Zealand's 
desire for a change in their formal constitutional status to ratify the increased level of local 
autonomy which had been steadily introduced on a de facto basis during the 1960s. 
Throughout their constitutional discussions of 1970-74, all segments of Niuean society had 
expressed alarm at the possibility that once they made the move to self- government, New 
Zealand might then cut them off to fend for themselves. Of the statements made then and 
since by Niueans about their wishes, the most forceful and consistent was that they did not 
wish to be fully independent. In the event, Niue's  move to self government in October 
1974 was followed within a couple of weeks by the abolition of the Island Affairs portfolio 
and the transfer of New Zealand's relations with the new Niuean Government to the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In a telegram to Robert Rex, the Niuean Premier, New Zealand 
Prime Minister Rowling explained the change as follows48: 
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“The reason for the change is that it is appropriate for New Zealand's 
relations with independent and self governing states to be conducted by 
one minister. Niue's change to self government made this change 
particularly timely.” 
 
Both the act and the explanation could most charitably be described as clumsy and 
insensitive. Niueans not unnaturally felt betrayed, and distrust of New Zealand's future 
intentions probably speeded the flow of out migration from Niue in 1974-76. Foreign 
Affairs officials encountered this distrust; one described after a visit in November 197449 
 
“the diplomatic reticence which must perforce be shown in any 
discussions in Niue  - the present stage is one of reassurance and we 
have to allow for the apprehension felt in many quarters over the 
Foreign Affairs machinery.” 
 
The New Zealand Representative equally encountered a strong reaction by Niueans to what 
they saw as New Zealand pressure towards their eventual independence (compounded by 
the evident misunderstanding by many Foreign Affairs staff of the nuances of the special 
relationship). He reported50: 
 
“Generally members of the Cabinet and senior public servants are 
apprehensive and consider that the Ministry is more attuned to the New 
York scene rather than the needs and attitudes of a small Pacific Island. 
A Minister who visited Wellington recently was alarmed at the number 
of times the word 'independence' was used during discussions with 
Ministry staff. He said he felt that the officers of the Ministry were 'too 
pushy'.” 
 
The administrative change from Island Affairs to Foreign Affairs brought other changes 
which reinforced the shift of constitutional emphasis described above. Most importantly, 
the basis on which New Zealand continued to provide budgetary assistance to the Island 
administrations was switched from the category of “subsidies” to the category of 
“development aid”.  This change was fundamental from the point of view of the “special 
relationship”; but the Ministry of Foreign Affairs seemed impervious to the implications, or 
else saw the change as an entirely positive step forward. 
 
Subsidies, of course, are by their nature an intra-national transfer. A particular sector, or 
region, of the nation has its income supplemented by transfers of purchasing power from 
other, surplus producing, sectors or regions, in what are regarded as the greater interests of 
society at large. By their nature, subsidies are aimed to bring into existence, or keep in 
being, activities which would otherwise be unsustainable in the prevailing climate of 
economic and social forces; they therefore can be expected to be permanent so long as the 
subsidised activity or group continues to command support. Subsidies are thus essentially 
static. 
 
“Development aid”, on the contrary, is characteristically an international transfer of 
resources, and in theory is supposed to be a transitory boost to a dynamic process of 
expansion which in principle should become self sustaining. The switch in nomenclature 
for New Zealand's budgetary support therefore had far more than merely semantic 
significance. Subsidies may legitimately be consumption oriented; development aid is 
expected to be investment focussed. Subsidies may legitimately be designed on the 
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assumption of permanence; development aid is usually thought of as temporary and self 
limiting. Subsidies are aimed to maintain or sustain a particular level of activity; 
development aid is supposed to trigger dynamic changes in the level of activity over time. 
It is, therefore, not surprising that the application of “aid criteria” to a financial system 
designed originally to subsidise real standards of living in the Islands should produce 
results which were subversive of the original social contract of the decolonisation era. In 
ceasing to think of budgetary assistance in terms of subsidy, and instead thinking of it as 
development aid, New Zealand officials and politicians deprived themselves of key 
analytical tools for policy formation; at the same time they imposed upon Island elites a set 
of intrinsically unrealisable goals, and hence the long run burden of what would be 
perceived as “economic failure”. (See Chapter 5). 
 
It is, of course, important not to overstate the extent of the change in economic policy. 
Expert advisers since Belshaw and Stace in 1955 had been pushing the notion that 
economic self reliance was a desirable goal for the island territories, and that investment 
assistance could usefully be devoted to promoting an expansion of productive activity. 
There had always been lip service paid (though seldom with much conviction) to the hope 
that one day Island governments might become self supporting through the taxation of 
increased productive incomes generated in the Islands. At the level of policy design  in the 
Islands, thus, the 1975 change was one of emphasis rather than of fundamental principle: 
“development” as conceived of in Wellington had moved up the pecking order, and 
“welfare” had moved down a bit. Since the bureaucratic machinery constructed by New 
Zealand in all its territories was designed and trained for the delivery of welfare, and poorly 
equipped for the pursuit of commercial development, the shift in priorities amounted to 
downgrading the activities in which local government was most likely to deliver, and 
upgrading those in which it was most likely to “fail”.  But this was a relative, not an 
absolute, change of course. 
 
In Wellington, however, the re orientation of 1975 was the culmination of a process by 
which New Zealand abdicated fiscal responsibility in its former territories, again in the 
name of “authentic local autonomy”.  Belshaw and Stace and Aikman had agreed that so 
long as Cook Islands budgets were financed substantially by New Zealand, the obvious 
ability of the piper's paymaster to call the tune should be formalised in some procedure for 
monitoring and consultation in fiscal matters. Self government certainly involved Island 
authorities in setting priorities for expenditure and for operating the administration 
machinery, but it was not originally envisaged that New Zealand would entirely wash its 
hands of financial management. In the event, however, the new Governments in Niue and 
the Cook Islands (and eventually, it is still envisaged, Tokelau) were turned loose to run 
their own financial ship, with New Zealand intervening only at the aggregate level via its 
ability to impose cash limits on expenditure (a power which became especially effective in 
pinching real expenditure once inflation began to run in double digits in the late 1970s). 
 
The difficulty which naturally arose was that major decisions on the allocation of a 
substantial slice of the total resources available to Island societies were passed across to 
local elites whose criteria, inevitably, were not always those of New Zealand. In small 
societies with strong clan and community loyalties, and with Governments committed to 
uneconomic “development” programmes to suit the whims of aid donors, it was natural that 
the “financial personality” of the Islands should begin to diverge from New Zealand's 
image of its own “personality”.  In the absence of formal mechanisms linking the 
legislatures of the Islands to that of New Zealand, intervention in Island governments' 
financial policies became a government to government matter, which in turn made it easy 
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for Island elites to perceive (and portray) it as neocolonial coercion. The pretence that the 
money was “development aid” served merely to confuse the issue. 
 
This brings us, after a long excursion, to a second answer to the question, why not 
independence? The first answer, it will be recalled, was that there existed no major interest 
group in the Islands willing to press for full independence (although the Cook Islands elite 
has been willing to experiment at the boundary with the idea of “independence in free 
association”). The second answer is that New Zealand, for all the ostentatious “hands off” 
approach, has not been willing to allow Island elites to cash in without limit their collection 
of apparently blank cheques. The underlying reality is that the “special relationship” rests 
upon three elements which the Islands communities remain unwilling to lose: New Zealand 
citizenship, New Zealand financial support, and membership of the New Zealand currency 
area (i.e. free transferability of funds between New Zealand and the Islands). New Zealand 
threats to withdraw any or all of these remain credible and effective as deterrents to 
unfettered independence of action by the Island ministates. 
 
What this amounts to is that New Zealand can afford to hold the door to independence 
ostentatiously open, and indeed can provide verbal encouragement to Island elites to step 
through, without any fear of losing effective control, since all the forces of the social and 
economic “base” are operating to pull the territories closer to New Zealand, and the local 
political leadership cannot go far in subverting those links in the absence of an alternative 
powerful patron willing to face down New Zealand. (It is sometimes suggested, for 
example, that the fall of Albert Henry's government in 1978 was precipitated by popular 
fear that exasperated New Zealand politicians might actually abolish the special 
relationship). 
 
3.6  The Concept of Free Association 
 
It has already been suggested in this chapter that the notion of “self government in free 
association” is inherently ambiguous, and that it is the ambiguity which renders the system 
workable (since partners in such an association can muddle through indefinitely so long as 
neither has an overriding interest in ending the relationship). It is nevertheless important to 
have some general rules of thumb laid down and clearly understood by all participants, if 
misunderstandings and irreconcilable conflicts are to be avoided in the long run. There has 
to date been a tendency towards self congratulation in New Zealand official circles on the 
Constitutions provided for the Cook Islands and Niue, it being felt that in general, 
experience to date confirms those documents as workable and in accordance with principles 
of international law. The theme of this section is that matters are not so simple. 
 
The substance of both Constitutions is reasonably straight forward. A Westminster system 
of national government, with elected legislature, Cabinet style executive with a public 
service modelled on New Zealand, and independent judiciary, is set up, and full powers to 
make laws are given, without reservation, to the legislature. The Head of State in each case 
is declared to be “the Queen in right of New Zealand”, and in Niue's case the Governor 
General of New Zealand “is accordingly the representative of Her Majesty the Queen in 
Niue” (Niue Constitution Act 1974 Second Schedule Section 1). In the Cook Islands this 
formula, with its clear cut embodiment of the principle of continuing association with New 
Zealand, was not adopted; instead the original 1965 Constitution provided for a High 
Commissioner to perform simultaneously as Queen's Representative and New Zealand 
Representative   a schizophrenic recipe for conflict of interest51 which was eventually (in 
1982) replaced by the equally problematic device of having the Queen appoint a separate 
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Representative in the Cook Islands (the meaning of the term “the Queen in right of New 
Zealand” thus being rendered rather unclear)52. 
 
Both Constitutions, as originally drafted, retained certain legal ties between the self 
governing territories and New Zealand in matters such as appeals from local to New 
Zealand courts, continuing control of the Niue public service by the New Zealand State 
Services Commission, auditing of the Government accounts by the New Zealand Auditor 
General, and the retention of New Zealand citizenship under the 1948 British Nationality 
and New Zealand Citizenship Act. With the exception of the last, these provisions 
amounted merely to relying upon New Zealand to provide a backstop to the new 
political/administrative system, and carried no implication of control over policy as such. 
However, in practice it is difficult to see how New Zealand agencies could properly provide 
such a backstop without intervening in what are effectively policy matters. 
 
An example arises in the case of financial management systems in Niue. Since the move to 
self government in the mid 1970s, the annual reports of the New Zealand Auditor General 
have sounded a steady note of alarm at the lack of controls on both revenues and 
expenditure, the failure to follow up apparent cases of misappropriation of public moneys, 
and the growing resort of the Niue Government to creative devices (such as draining funds 
out of special “development” accounts53, or delaying the remittance to New Zealand of 
funds held by the Niue Post Office54) to avoid being crippled by cash flow problems. The 
New Zealand Government, despite some grumbling, has to date always been ready to step 
in at the end of each financial year to make up the cash deficit, as (on the face of it) it is 
bound to do by Section 7 of the Niue Constitution Act 1974 which provides: 
 
“7. Economic and administrative assistance   It shall be a continuing 
responsibility of the Government of New Zealand to provide necessary 
economic and administrative assistance to Niue.” 
 
Section 8 of the same Act provides for consultation between the Prime Minister of New 
Zealand and the Premier of Niue in order to promote “positive cooperation”, but clearly 
lays down that 
 
“... if it appears desirable that any provision be made in the law of Niue 
to carry out these policies, that provision may be made in the manner 
prescribed in the Constitution, but not otherwise.” 
 
New Zealand's ability to oblige the Government of Niue to take heed of the Auditor's 
Reports is therefore limited, since the buck has been entirely passed to the Niue Assembly 
to hold its Government to account. On the other hand New Zealand, as the dominant source 
of revenue for the Niue Government, is not unnaturally anxious to see a high standard of 
financial management. The difficulty is that, since the issue was not confronted and dealt 
with at the time of decolonisation, resort must now be had to mechanisms which, while 
partially effective in the long run, are not conducive to harmony. At the most public level, 
the New Zealand Government can and does maintain a steady (almost hectoring) flow of 
criticism at the Niue Government over financial matters. Such criticism, however, being 
seen by both sides as lacking any muscle to back it up, is easily deflected or ignored. At a 
more discreet level, the New Zealand Government can and does resist requests for an 
increase in the level of assistance -  which during the inflation of 1977-82 permitted a 
steady squeeze on the real value of that assistance - but any overt move to reduce assistance 
would require the New Zealand Government to grasp the nettle and argue that the existing 
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level of subsidy is not “necessary” in terms of Section 7 of the Niue Constitution Act. 
(Such an argument would probably be politically unwinnable). 
 
This leaves, in effect, only administrative mechanisms of control. Since the New Zealand 
State Services Commission (through the Niue Public Service Commission) controls 
appointments to the Niue public service, it is in a position to install selected individuals 
with the task of straightening up the management of government finance. The Commission, 
after considerable delay, and under strong pressure from within the New Zealand 
Government, has now appointed senior staff to the Niue Treasury with the task of 
establishing effective financial controls. These personnel, however, operate from the outset 
with one hand tied behind their backs, since Government Departments are bound to 
implement the policies of the Government of Niue. Financial controls which really bite, 
therefore, are as likely to precipitate confrontation between the New Zealand and Niuean 
Governments over the level of subsidy and the policies pursued by the Niuean Government, 
as they are to solve the perceived problems. 
 
In any such confrontation, the New Zealand Government would of course be at liberty to 
threaten ending or amending of the special relationship. Again, however, the political 
difficulties would be substantial, since the move to self government in Niue was 
accomplished only by the giving of very explicit and morally binding assurances that aid 
would not be terminated. 
 
The situation highlights the difficulties posed by the absence of any formal channel of 
communication between New Zealand and Niue other than at the government to 
government level. As in the Cook Islands, no provision was made at the time of 
decolonisation for any formal relationship between the Niuean and New Zealand 
legislatures; as a result, New Zealand taxpayers/voters have no means of holding the 
Niuean legislature to account for any failure on its part properly to oversee the Niue 
Government's spending of grant moneys. This is, of course, the standard position with 
international “development aid”: its expenditure by recipients is subject to few, if any, 
effective checks and balances. It is not clear, however, that the waste and corruption which 
are routine characteristics of the international aid industry can be allowed to be reproduced 
in a freely associated territory without poisoning the basis of the special relationship. New 
Zealand's problem with Niue appears to be that in the haste to decolonise the territory, its 
inhabitants were in fact given a set of blank cheques; and the incentives to use them with 
discretion are of uncertain effectiveness. Sovereign independent states have a clear right to 
use and misuse funds subject only to the limits of their domestic political systems. Self 
governing states in free association arguably do not (or should not) have that right unless 
and until all their revenue is raised from their own “nationals”.  In the design of its special 
relationships with its former territories, however, the New Zealand Government has to date 
failed to develop any satisfactory formula or mechanism for setting the limits to the 
territories' financial autonomy. It is particularly surprising that the issue was not more 
clearly perceived and taken account of in the case of Niue, since during 1970-1971 there 
had occurred a major confrontation between the Governments of New Zealand and the 
Cook Islands over the cash needs of the Henry regime. As Chapman points out in 
discussing this incident, it is unrealistic to transfer to local elites apparently complete 
autonomy to run their affairs and “develop” their countries, and then to expect to be able to 
dictate financial policy at a distance and by informal means55: 
 
“Government leadership in newly emerged states is endowed with the 
power to make things happen, a power most of them have never before 
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experienced. A situation of this nature often leads to an over 
concentration, by the executive leadership, on achieving visible results 
without an objective regard for available resources ... The object lesson 
to be learnt is that executive politicians, in situations such as the Cook 
Islands and Niue, have to acquire and maintain the responsibility for 
restricting their aspirations within the limits of resources immediately 
at their disposal.” 
 
Chapman does not go on to explore the consequences if this “lesson” is not “learnt”.  From 
the point of view of the wider experience of “newly emerged states”, however, it is obvious 
enough that the normal tendency for government of resource poor states has been to embark 
on substantial programmes of overseas borrowing when domestically available revenue 
sources proved inadequate to support their expenditure policies. The striking characteristic 
of both the Cook Islands and Niue, in the context of “new states”, is that neither has yet 
acquired substantial overseas public debts (although in the past eighteen months the Cook 
Islands Government's borrowing programme has begun to gather momentum). These states, 
consequently, have not been embroiled in the debt crises which afflict much of the world 
“periphery”.  New Zealand has in general encouraged the Cook Islands and Niue 
(particularly the former) to diversify their sources of financial assistance. As with the case 
of treaty negotiations (see below) this policy stance is arguably subversive of the “special 
relationship” as originally understood. The disadvantages of muddling through, pretending 
meantime that nothing has changed, is that Island political elites are no less likely than their 
counterparts elsewhere in the world to run up unmanageable levels of indebtedness in order 
to finance unproductive expenditures at home (including so called “development projects”). 
If at that stage New Zealand remains ready to underwrite the servicing of the debts, then the 
special relationship may survive unscathed. If, however, New Zealand is not prepared to act 
as underwriter, then this needs to be clearly understood in advance. 
 
To summarise the problem: New Zealand's social contract with its freely associated 
territories is profoundly ambiguous on the key question of those territories' entitlement to 
financial support. No Constitutional provision was made for the working out of mutually 
agreed levels of subsidy or standards of financial management. Resort was had, in public 
declarations at the time of decolonisation, to statements of non-operational principle   such 
as that New Zealand guaranteed to continue to provide aid (without spelling out the ceiling, 
if any, and without laying down any terms to be met by the recipients); or that 
“development” was expected to lead to “self reliance” so that the problem would quietly 
wither away. 
 
In the tension between these two last statements can be detected again the nature of the 
“balance” which New Zealand politicians and officials hoped to strike in Niue and the 
Cook Islands. The commitment to provide financial support could be left ill defined 
precisely because “development” was expected to yield enough local revenue to keep the 
financial burden on New Zealand within bounds. At the same time, since it was clearly 
understood that complete self-reliance was unlikely to be attainable even if “development” 
were to succeed, the continuing need for financial support would ensure the continuation of 
the special relationship. 
 
In recent years, as the poor record of “development” has been assimilated in Wellington, 
there has been growing enthusiasm in New Zealand Government circles for some 
diversification of donors to the self governing territories; in the case of the Cook Islands in 
particular, New Zealand has given clear encouragement for Cook Island approaches to 
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multilateral and bilateral sources of finance apart from New Zealand. On New Zealand's 
side, the calculation appears to be that a rising level of aid from other sources would make 
possible some lessening of New Zealand's own financial commitment. By maintaining cash 
limits on its own aid to the Cook Islands, while helping the Cook Islands elite in their 
wooing of other donors, New Zealand obtains the best of both worlds in the short run. 
 
In the longer run, however, the basic problem is not averted (unless, improbably, 
“development” suddenly leaps forward, enabling the Cook Islands to repay the loans  now 
being raised). By relying on international financial markets to supplement New Zealand 
grants, the New Zealand and Cook Islands Governments are merely deferring the question 
of the limits and terms of New Zealand assistance. As growing debt servicing commitments 
eat up a growing proportion of the New Zealand grant, that question will eventually have to 
be faced. 
 
This issue of the Cook Islands' pursuit of donors brings to the fore another important aspect 
of the concept of “free association”, namely the control of external affairs. In both the Cook 
Islands and the Niue Constitutions, an identical provision appears: 
 
“Nothing in this Act or in the Constitution shall affect the 
responsibilities of Her Majesty the Queen in right of New Zealand for 
the external affairs and defence of [the Cook Islands/Niue].” 
 
At the time of drafting of the Cook Islands Constitution in 1964, it was apparently taken for 
granted56 that external affairs would remain the province of the New Zealand Government -  
that is, New Zealand would act not merely as an agent of the Cook Islands in its external 
relations, but would have responsibility for formulating foreign and defence policy. The 
wording adopted, however, as cited above, did not clearly embody this principle. The 
Queen, in terms of the Cook Islands Constitution, was bound to act on the advice of her 
Cook Island Ministers, in foreign affairs as in other matters. It was thus up to the Cook 
Islands Government to determine whether any particular foreign affairs issue should be 
handled by New Zealand (after consultation between the two governments) or by the Cook 
Islands Government directly. The 1973 Exchange of Letters confirmed that the Cook 
Islands Government was fully empowered to act on its own account in foreign affairs; and 
New Zealand has since actively promoted an interpretation of the Cook Islands 
Constitution in this sense, with the proviso that preservation of the special relationship 
requires that the Cook Islands act in consultation with New Zealand. A recent Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs statement on the subject puts it as follows57: 
 
“The evolution of the relationship has been in the direction of the 
exercise of greater authority by the Cook Islands Government over its 
own affairs. This objective is completely acceptable to New Zealand. 
One of the useful attributes of the New Zealand/ Cook Islands 
relationship is the flexibility that has allowed it to remain the close and 
special association we now enjoy while at the same time developing 
and progressing in new directions. Formally, New Zealand retains 
responsibility for the conduct of the external relations and defence of 
the Cook Islands, in consultation with the government of the day. Some 
countries and international organisations continue to regard the Cook 
Islands as less than sovereign and insist on communicating through the 
New Zealand Government. In practice, it is the Cook Islands which 
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makes the decisions, consultation takes place only when there is a 
possibility of a conflict of interests.” 
 
Commentators have differed on the issue of whether New Zealand has any formal power 
over Cook Islands or Niue external affairs, under the Constitutions as they were worded. 
Recent authoritative interpretations, however, indicate that it does not. Quentin Baxter, for 
example, notes58 
 
“Although some legislators apparently believed [in 1964] that [section 
5 of the Cook Islands Constitution Act] did impose unspecified 
limitations on the authority of the Cook Islands a careful analysis 
indicates that it did not have that effect. In relation to Niue, ... section 6 
was a reminder that the New Zealand Government would still have the 
constitutional authority to act for the realm as a whole, including Niue, 
in matters of foreign affairs and defence ... Its main objective is to give 
an assurance to the Government of Niue of New Zealand assistance in 
the fields mentioned ... 
 
At the time when the concept of free association was first evolving, the 
expectation was that New Zealand and its associated States would 
constitute a single international personality which might sometimes 
need to be engaged in the interests and on behalf of an associated State. 
In this idea lies the real impact of section 6.  On the other hand, the fact 
that New Zealand would still be able to act internationally for Niue was 
not seen as presenting any impediment to the development of Niue's 
own international personality. Niue is free to have dealings with other 
members of the international community to the full extent that they are 
willing to have dealings with Niue. Section 6 does not impose any 
constitutional limitation on the executive and legislative powers 
conferred on Niue by its own Constitution in the fields of external 
affairs and defence.” 
 
Similarly, Aikman records that59  
 
“So far as bilateral international obligations are concerned, the legal 
position is relatively straightforward. The CI Government has the legal 
competence to enter into relations with other states as international 
entities that recognise that competence. There is, however, the 
overriding obligation, flowing from the special relationship, to consult 
New Zealand in the first instance, and to have regard to her policies 
and interests. That is the price of maintenance of the special 
relationship.” 
 
The view of the present Queen's Representative in the Cook Islands is the same: in terms of 
a literal reading of the Constitution, the Cook Islands has all the formal powers of a 
sovereign independent state60. There is thus nothing written into the Constitution which 
would serve to define the boundary between “free association” and “sovereign 
independence”. 
 
The essence of the problem, therefore, is the extent to which the Cook Islands or Niue 
unilaterally exercise the powers which they possess in terms of their Constitutions; and the 
 - 61 -
extent to which New Zealand for its part exercises the powers which, while not provided 
for in the Constitutions, are fundamental to the extra Constitutional concept of the special 
relationship. There has been a tendency in recent years for NewZealand officials to hide 
behind the letter of the Constitutions, in the pretence that they have no power over the 
decisions of self governing states. This is self-evidently false so long as the special 
relationship continues to be accepted by the Cook Islands and Niue; but the absence of an 
explicit social contract setting out New Zealand's rights and powers appears to suit New 
Zealand Government interests quite well, and enables New Zealand politicians and officials 
to deny any accountability for developments in the Islands. 
 
The truth of the matter is, however, that the New Zealand Government has at times stepped 
in to “draw the line” beyond which the Cook Islands would not be permitted to proceed 
with certain foreign policy initiatives. It is of interest, therefore, to consider where that line 
has been drawn. 
 
1. Taiwan. 
 
Probably the best known case involved attempts by the Davis Government between 1979 
and 1981 to negotiate at official level a fishing treaty with Taiwan. While New Zealand had 
no objection to the Cook Island trading with Taiwan, there was a strong objection to any act 
by the Cook Islands Government which might imply recognition of the Taipei regime. New 
Zealand official efforts were therefore directed to an attempt to persuade the Cook Islands 
Government to conduct its fisheries negotiations with Taiwan through non-governmental 
channels. The Cook Islands Government, with some reason, took the view that a better deal 
was likely to be forthcoming from official contacts, since Taiwan would be prepared to pay 
for what it might be able to present as quasi-recognition. (Tuvalu at that time was engaged 
in negotiating such a government-to-government fishing deal with Taiwan). As the Cook 
Islands have no significant trade with Communist China, but do trade with Taiwan (the 
local clothing factories in Rarotonga, for example, work with imported Taiwanese cloth), 
the situation was one of a clear clash of interests between New Zealand (which placed its 
relationship with Communist China at the top of its priorities) and the Cook Islands 
Government. 
 
The issues were debated at some length in a meeting in Wellington in November 1979, and 
the Cook Islands representative, Hon Iaveta Short, was told in the usual language of the 
“special relationship” that the Cook Islands were of course free to do as they wished, but 
that in doing so they would be acting against the wishes of New Zealand, and consequently 
putting at risk the relationship with New Zealand61.  The same points were made by the 
New Zealand Prime Minister, Mr Muldoon, in a letter to the Cook Islands Government. A 
statement by Mr Muldoon set out the position as follows:62 
 
“It is true that I wrote some time ago to the Premier of the Cook Islands 
about Taiwanese access to the Cook Islands 200-mile economic zone. I 
fully support the Premier's objective of seeking the best possible return 
from his zone, and I certainly do not oppose his making arrangements 
with regard to Taiwanese fishing vessels there. The only question is 
how this should be done, given that our countries maintain relations 
with the People's Republic of China and therefore have a policy of non- 
recognition of Taiwan. Because of the close constitutional relationship 
between us, it is important that New Zealand and the Cooks consult 
frequently and in depth on foreign policy issues. This consultation 
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often takes place on Prime Ministerial level and my letter to Mr Davis 
was part of this process.” 
 
The Cook Islands Cabinet appears to have been split fairly evenly on the question of 
whether to take the risk of proceeding despite New Zealand objections, but in the event 
they drew back (a decision possibly assisted by the reflection that without New Zealand 
help it would be impossible to arrange maritime surveillance of the Cook Islands EEZ63). 
After some delays, contacts at unofficial level were established and negotiations with 
Taiwan proceeded during the second half of 1980, and by early 1981 a draft had been 
prepared. The Premier, Tom Davis, then decided to visit Taipei himself, and was dissuaded 
only by strong pressure from Wellington backed up by members of his Cabinet. A further 
letter from Mr Muldoon to Dr Davis, on 4 March 1981, reiterated that while a fisheries 
agreement might bring financial advantages for the Cook Islands, it would substantially 
damage New Zealand's national interests and would therefore rebound upon the special 
relationship. Dr Davis, while outraged by what he saw as undue New Zealand interference, 
again backed off; again the New Zealand pressure was effective mainly because of the 
presence in the Cook Islands Cabinet of individuals who felt that $100,000 from Taiwan 
was not enough to compensate for possible loss of New Zealand citizenship. 
 
These events need to be seen in the context of the period. They overlap with other areas of 
negotiation between the two Governments over a variety of issues   New Zealand's 
reluctance to fund the growing cash deficit of the Cook Islands Government in 1980; the 
Cook Islands Government's wish to close or reorganise the Rarotongan Hotel (their plans 
being blocked in that case by New Zealand threats to cut the Air New Zealand service); and 
the application by the Cook Islands, with New Zealand support, to join the ACP Lomé 
Convention and thereby obtain access to new sources of international assistance64. On all 
of these issues, New Zealand exercised its extra-Constitutional powers to “steer”  
Cook Islands policy by the selective use of what amounted to a veto on actions which went 
beyond the bounds of what New Zealand considered acceptable, while at the same time 
encouraging the Cook Islands Government to accept growing international responsibilities 
in areas such as the negotiation of bilateral aid, and the delineation of maritime boundaries 
when such negotiations were with recognised nations (notably, in the case of a recent 
maritime treaty, with USA). 
 
2.  The International Coffee Agreement. 
 
This agreement, relating to the stabilisation of world coffee prices, had been ratified by 
New Zealand in November 1976, and included a “territorial application clause” (Article 64) 
by which New Zealand could extend its own accession to the agreement to cover the Cook 
Islands as well. The question of such an extension arose in 1981, when the Cook Islands 
Government indicated that it was unwilling simply to have New Zealand extend the 
provisions of the agreement to cover them as well, and proposed to draft an instrument of 
accession to the treaty which would “pay due respect to the Cook Islands' sovereign 
status”65. The New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs took the view that there was no 
justification for the extra phrase that Gosselin (the Cook Islands Minister of External 
Affairs) was pressing for, because it would be entering into a multilateral relationship 
without reference to New Zealand and thus inconsistent with the special relationship 
between the two countries66. 
 
In the event, the Cook Islands Government was persuaded to accept a “compromise 
formula”67 which mentioned the special relationship and the fact that the Cook Islands “has 
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executive competence to implement treaties in the Cook Islands (and) has requested that the 
Agreement should apply in the Cook Islands”.  The point which was, apparently, 
established in this minor confrontation was that New Zealand did not at that time accept 
without reservation the Cook Islands' freedom to negotiate on their own behalf their 
accession to multilateral agreements to which New Zealand was also a party. 
 
It should be noted that in opposing the Cook Islands' proposed instrument of accession, the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs did not appeal to explicit Constitutional provisions, but rather 
to the (implicit) understanding under the special relationship that the Cook Islands should 
enter into international agreements only after “reference to New Zealand”. 
 
3.  ACP Lomé.  
 
In contrast to the two preceding cases, the current debates over Cook Islands accession to 
the Lomé Convention point up the fact that the Cook Islands' freedom of action in making 
international agreements is constrained by other countries' perceptions of the special 
relationship, those perceptions being formed, of course, by past New Zealand declarations 
on the extent to which “self government in free association” has the effect of limiting the 
Cook Islands' sovereignty over their own international affairs. Having so firmly told the 
United Nations in the 1960s that “free association” was different from sovereign 
independence, New Zealand has been faced in recent years with situations where 
Wellington is regarded, by other countries, as the conduit through which relations with the 
Cook Islands should be conducted. While not too upset about this in cases such as the 
International Coffee Agreement just cited, Wellington has been prepared to acquiesce in the 
Cook Islands' attempt to acquire and deploy a separate international personality so far as 
those agreements to which New Zealand  could not be a party are concerned.  The key 
point about Lomé II is that it is an arrangement set up for the exclusive benefit of so called 
“less developed countries”; in order to benefit from it, therefore, the Cook Islands must 
present itself not merely as a separate sovereign state (which amounts to denying what was 
originally the essence of the special relationship), but also as a less developed, or 
“developing” society   an issue on which substantial doubt exists, although the ACP Lomé 
partners would probably not wish to push the issue. Accession to Lomé thus requires that 
the Cook Islands project an image which is quite separate from that of New Zealand. Nor, 
in making its approaches to the Lomé parties, and in deciding whether to sign any 
particular agreement reached, can the Cook Islands be seen as bound to act only after 
“reference to New Zealand”. 
 
The concept of “free association”, in other words, is evolving with increasing momentum 
towards a situation where the status of the Cook Islands is indistinguishable from that of 
any sovereign independent state whose powerful neighbours retain de facto veto rights on 
any international initiative, but do not insist upon a consistently “shared personality”.  
Parallels with Central America, or with the “frontier states” adjoining South Africa, are 
becoming increasingly pertinent. This process appears to represent a drift away from what 
was originally hoped for by all concerned in the decolonisation debates, when (as noted 
earlier) the concept of “free association” was welcomed specifically as an alternative to 
sovereign independence. 
 
Reviewing the above cases, it is evident that there does not exist any clearly articulated 
statement of principle about the boundary of free association. In the case of the Coffee 
Agreement it was suggested by Foreign Affairs officials that the freedom to enter into 
treaties on their own terms was not open to the Cook Islands under the special relationship; 
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but in other cases (such as the maritime boundary treaty with the USA) that freedom has 
been readily conceded. It is not so much the issue of entering or not entering into treaties 
which defines the boundary, as the distinction between those treaty making activities of 
which New Zealand approves, and those of which it does not approve. This is still more 
evident in the case of the Taiwan fisheries negotiations. Since 1974 New Zealand has 
increasingly conceded to the Cook Islands the right to acquire a separate “international 
personality” in its international relations; but when that personality began to manifest itself 
in ways which New Zealand found inconvenient (i.e. by attempting to open government to 
government contracts with Taipei) the veto power was exercised. It was not the existence or 
otherwise of a separate personality that mattered   it was the character of the Cook Islands 
personality, as distinct from its separateness, that worried New Zealand. 
 
3.7   Rethinking Free Association 
 
The foregoing discussion has indicated that the main weakness of “free association” as 
designed and implemented in the former New Zealand territories has been the lack of any 
formalised distinction between free association and full independence. This lacuna is 
something which suits New Zealand interests, since it has always been important to New 
Zealand to be able to demonstrate to the rest of the world community that nothing in the 
letter of its constitutional relations with the dependent territories prevents them from 
attaining full independence. By the same token, the lack of any formal social contract 
setting out the rules of the game presents Island elites with a difficult political balancing 
act, and places at risk the entire spirit of the original idea of free association. If nothing 
prevents the Cook Islands Government from reaping the benefits which are perceived to 
flow from “independence”, they are required to observe a self denying ordinance which is 
difficult to maintain. By placing upon Island governments the full burden of maintaining 
the special relationship, while reserving to itself the right unilaterally to abrogate it, the 
New Zealand Government obtains the best of both worlds: it retains effective means of 
imposing its will by private, informal means (which by their nature are unlikely to be fully 
canvassed or debated in public), while unloading onto Island Governments the 
responsibility for all policy outcomes. The design of the system makes it especially difficult 
for conflicts between Island Governments and New Zealand to be handled constructively, 
because a fundamentally unequal relationship has to be operated through mechanisms 
ostensibly set up to mediate an equal partnership. Of all the rights which self governing 
countries in free association need to have securely established, the most important is the 
right to disagree radically, and publicly, with the dominant power without thereby 
automatically jeopardising the special relationship on which they depend. Among other 
things, this requires more channels of communication and debate than merely the present 
bottleneck of the New Zealand Representative and the New Zealand Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs.68 
 
Island countries in free association need the chance to have constructive input into the 
decision making process within the dominant power. This means above all some line of 
communication to the New Zealand legislature. 
 
By the same token, the dominant power in a relationship of free association needs to have 
clear rights to ensure that the governing elite in the self governing partner is properly held 
to account for its policies and actions. The belief that an adversarial Westminster style 
relationship between local legislature and executive would suffice to ensure that policy 
problems were fully ventilated was always a naive one. In an aid-receiving society where 
all parties have a clear interest in maintenance of the status quo, and where the patronage 
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powers of the executive are vastly more influential than in larger, more diversified 
societies, detailed legislative scrutiny of public financial management is likely to prove the 
exception rather than the rule. It is the legislature of the donor country which has the 
strongest interest in seeing the expenditure of budgetary support grants properly accounted 
for, and it is not at all inappropriate that the recipient country's legislature should be to 
some extent accountable to the donor legislature, for its role in overseeing the financial 
performance of the local executive government. 
 
Similarly, in foreign-policy initiatives it is important for the elite of the self-governing 
community to operate in an environment where the limits to its freedom of action are 
publicly known and understood - especially when those limits are set unilaterally and ad 
hoc by the dominant partner in the relationship. The legislatures of self governing states are 
entitled to know the policy parameters within which particular decisions are made; and this 
involves far more operational statements of principle than those contained in, for example, 
the 1973 Exchange of Letters with the Cook Islands. 
 
In all of these areas, the appropriate mechanism for communication, debate, and 
accountability appears to be some sort of select committee arrangement linking the Islands 
legislatures to the New Zealand Parliament. Whether or not this implies provision for 
Island representatives to be formally incorporated into the New Zealand parliamentary 
structure is an issue deserving fuller discussion than can be undertaken here. Certainly it is 
the case that any reform of the New Zealand Parliamentary system, and its select committee 
structure, should give high priority to changes designed to give Island countries in free 
association some clear formal status in the formation of New Zealand policy on relevant 
issues, and equally to give New Zealand legislators clear rights to enquire into events in 
those associated states. 
 
In any such set of reforms, it will be necessary to resolve the issue of which Island 
“countries” are part of New Zealand, and which are not. Tokelau, for example, cannot be 
treated identically to the Cook Islands unless the means of access to the New Zealand 
legislature can be designed to take account of their different situations. The time seems 
appropriate for some bold creative thinking on the boundary between “integration” and 
“free association” in Figure 1. The time is also fast approaching when New Zealand will 
confront the possibility of taking “on board” other Pacific micro societies, most importantly 
Tuvalu, on the same basis as the former New Zealand territories. If indeed any decision is 
made to bring Tuvalu within the range of a “special relationship” with budgetary support, 
migration access, and all, then the constitutional underpinnings should be clearly 
understood before aid policy presents a fait accompli. 
 
Some of the shortcomings to date in the prescriptions for “free association” in the New 
Zealand sphere of influence clearly arose from the problems of conducting the first 
experiment in this constitutional response to the problem of decolonisation. Earlier models 
from which lessons could be drawn were few; the most important was Tonga, where local 
self government had been accompanied by British responsibility for foreign affairs and 
defence over several decades. But the Tongan model was not an appropriate one for New 
Zealand to copy with its dependent territories, because of the extreme distance from the 
“protecting” power and the lack of any close integration with the U.K. either economically 
or socially. 
 
Other problems have to do with inflexible and uncreative attitudes in New Zealand itself. 
While New Zealand spokesmen at the United Nations recognised the need for 
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“constitutional pragmatism” and the possibility that transplanted institutions might prove 
inappropriate69, the policy technicians seem to have been trapped in a narrow and inflexible 
set of legal dogmas which prevented lateral thinking. It is instructive to compare New 
Zealand's approach to constitutional prescription with that of the United States in its Pacific 
territories. In drafting constitutions for those territories, United States officials have taken 
the view that constitution-building may well involve the invention of new categories, and 
the unconventional use of familiar ones. They have, thus, arranged congressional 
representation for the Northern Marianas and American Samoa without incorporating those 
territories totally into the mainstream federal electoral system; and they have negotiated 
fifteen year compacts with territories moving into “free association” in which the 
obligations of freely associated states are spelt out (albeit inadequately). Similarly 
Australia, with the precedent of the Northern Territories' constitutional evolution, is now in 
a position to arrange the integration of the Cocos Islands by “tacking them on” to Northern 
Territories. New Zealand, however, has been unwilling to contemplate either the creation of 
a special category of representation in the New Zealand Parliament for Island territories, or 
the development of federal type arrangements. Far from starting with the position that “the 
wishes of the Islands people were paramount”, and building from scratch a constitutional 
structure to accommodate those wishes, New Zealand has presented Island elites and voters 
with a restrictive set of options on a take it or leave it basis, and has been unwilling to 
depart from “the New Zealand way of doing things” in the design of government systems. 
 
In all three territories, this has led to unsatisfactory compromises when New Zealand 
preconceptions came up against local Island priorities. In Tokelau, for example, the elders 
have held on to “dependent territory” status largely because the alternatives on offer are so 
unappealing, rather than because they find the status quo to be the best of all possible 
worlds. Tokelauans wish to retain their local autonomy and their very non-New Zealand 
style of representative institutions (village councils of elders, general Fono of delegates 
appointed by the Councils, elected faipules - a post with no New Zealand equivalent -  and 
a tradition of consensus rather than adversarial decision making). They also wish to retain 
New Zealand citizenship and financial support. They do not wish to be legally cut free from 
New Zealand, which is what “self government in free association” is now known to 
involve. They do not wish to be reduced to the status of a New Zealand suburb or county, 
which is the only sort of integration that has ever been offered. They do not wish to be 
subjected to direct rule from Wellington, which is one direction in which colonial status 
could have moved. They wish their public service to be at the service of Tokelau and 
subject to the elders' leadership and direction - but are aware that in practice this cannot be 
achieved under the present system of SSC/Foreign Affairs control of the TPS. 
 
All of these desires appear to be well known and recognised in Wellington; yet 
political/constitutional prescription for Tokelau continues as it has done for two decades 
now, on the assumption that what the future holds is “self government in free association”, 
via a mechanistic application of the Cook Islands/Niue formula. Problems with the public 
service are still interpreted in terms of Westminster doctrines of the separation of powers, 
and sidelined by Wellington's clear anticipation that a future shift to self government will 
remove the problem of policy control over the TPS. Tokelauan suggestions for reorganising 
the public service within the present constitutional framework tend to fall on deaf ears, for 
the New Zealand Government evidently feels unable to establish innovative precedents in 
Tokelau which might flow on to New Zealand's own public service. Yet abolition of the 
existing constitutional framework does not address the real concerns of Tokelauans. 
Informally, Tokelauans are beginning to take matters into their own hands, with 
encouragement from individual New Zealand officials. The community services levy is an 
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attempt to “share out” some of the public service's large salary and wage bill, and to shift 
the incentive structure in the Tokelau economy away from the unproductive to the 
productive activities on the atolls. Current proposals for democratic policy committees to 
be integrated with the top levels of public service departments represent an opening out of 
the hierarchical and autocratic traditions of the New Zealand public service. And 
inevitably, in a community as small and tight knit as Tokelau, the New Zealand crusade to 
prevent public servants from contributing directly to policy debates in the Islands will 
prove futile. Of the various imported dogmas associated with New Zealand management of 
the TPS, the separation of powers is probably the silliest - though the insistence on 
permanent full time staff with New Zealand related salary and wage scales has probably 
been the most directly damaging. 
 
Tokelauans would clearly like to be sure of their status as part of New Zealand, and assured 
that local autonomy and identity will remain compatible with that status. Wellington would 
evidently prefer to consolidate a new status for Tokelau which would render it no longer 
part of New Zealand in any unequivocal sense, thus avoiding the thorny question of how to 
integrate the territory into the New Zealand political system without setting a major 
precedent for regional autonomy, and hence local government reform in the New Zealand 
mainland. The evident parallels between the issue of Tokelau and the domestic question of 
separate Maori representation, land law, and quangos, are resisted by New Zealand 
policymakers, probably because a sympathetic settlement with Tokelau could provide 
powerful impetus for Maori claims on the mainland. (In addition, obviously, the terms of 
any Tokelauan integration with New Zealand would be likely to flow on to Niue at least). 
 
Influential Tokelauans made it clear to us that the present dual role of the Official Secretary 
(as representative of the New Zealand Government and head of the Tokelau Public Service) 
is regarded locally as untenable in the long run, since in any dispute between Tokelau and 
New Zealand the Fono would wish to have the TPS's skills and knowledge at its disposal, 
rather than tied to the New Zealand side. As matters now stand, the TPS members are 
obliged to promote the official line (which in the final analysis is dictated from Wellington, 
whether by acquiescence or intervention). In the Olosega debates of 1979-80, for example, 
the Fono had no independent source of advice other than the New Zealand Official 
Secretary and Foreign Affairs officials, and this fact was arguably instrumental in obtaining 
the result desired by Wellington (namely Tokelauan agreement formally to renounce their 
claim to Olosega). 
 
Turning to Niue, the 1974 Constitution embodies what was clearly a second best means of 
responding to Niuean priorities. Throughout the constitutional debates from 1962 to 1974, 
Niueans of all sorts made clear their opposition to any weakening of the New Zealand 
connection, and their insistence that “self government in free association” should not be 
allowed to slide across into full independence. Since New Zealand's target was a self 
government constitution for Niue, with no barriers to Niuean independence, Niueans were 
able to embody their desire for permanent links only by having included in the Constitution 
a series of provisions which tied New Zealand into legally binding commitments of 
support.  
 
“Necessary” economic assistance was guaranteed, New Zealand citizenship retained 
(though only under the now insecure 1948 citizenship law) and the perpetuation of secure 
employment for virtually all Niuean males in the New Zealand model public service was 
made constitutionally binding. Thus, unable to make an impact on the New Zealand 
designed superstructure, Niueans opted to obtain constitutional status for the economic 
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“base” of their MIRAB society - something which now substantially ties the hands of 
policymakers on economic and social matters. The key point in the Niuean constitution is 
that New Zealand can escape from its aid commitment only by a two thirds vote of 
Niueans, which is a sort of second-best to their being enfranchised in New Zealand 
elections. 
 
In the Cook Islands, finally, the clash between New Zealand and local interests which is 
now emerging is one which has been foreseeable for the past two decades. In a process 
begun by Albert Henry and continued by Tom Davis and Geoffrey Henry, the Cook Islands 
elite have identified and occupied a niche in the murky zone between “self government in 
free association” and full sovereign independence. The description “independence in free 
association” accurately captures the nature of the present status quo, and the decisive point 
in the drift from self government to independence seems to have been the 1973 Exchange 
of Letters, in which the New Zealand Government confirmed that pursuit of a separate 
Cook Islands “personality” in international affairs was viewed as compatible with the 
special relationship between the two countries. Given the latent, but real, tension between 
the aspirations of many of the Cook Islands political elite to operate as independent 
statesmen on the world stage, and the unwavering interest of a solid majority of Cook 
Islanders in maintaining the close links of citizenship and financial subsidies with New 
Zealand, the 1973 Exchange of Letters was a means of providing Albert Henry with 
domestic room for manoeuvre in promoting his campaign for greater independence in 
external affairs. The Exchange remains the only attempt to date to put in writing any 
compact between New Zealand and a freely associated country, and its main characteristic 
is the vagueness with which Cook Islands obligations under the special relationship were 
set out, and the clarity with which Cook Islands independence of action was confirmed. (As 
already noted, this was in line with the Third Labour Government's policy of shifting all 
Pacific Island matters into the Foreign Affairs realm). 
 
The 1973 Exchange is silent, in particular, on two key operational issues which threaten to 
produce growing tension between the two partners over the next decade. The first is the 
issue of whether or not any overseas nation which wishes to do so is entitled to open a 
diplomatic post in Rarotonga. The second is the issue of whether the incurring of 
unsustainable overseas indebtedness by the Cook Islands Government is compatible with 
the “shared values” on which the special relationship rests. 
 
So far as the letter of the law goes, it appears clear that the Cook Islands are entitled to 
open diplomatic relations on their own account with any willing foreign government. So far 
as the special relationship goes, New Zealand has encouraged the Cook Islands to deal 
directly with the US Government, but vetoed direct dealings with Taiwan. The issue has yet 
to be confronted, however, of whether New Zealand is prepared to accept diplomatic 
representatives other than that of New Zealand itself in Rarotonga. In discouraging foreign 
powers from dealing with the Cook Islands via the New Zealand Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs in Wellington, New Zealand appears to have opened the way for the establishment 
of such posts in the future. On the other hand, New Zealand's strategic view of its sphere of 
interest in the Cook Islands (the concept of strategic denial) amounts virtually to an 
unstated Monroe Doctrine for the area. There appears to have been no “thinking through” 
of the diplomatic post issue in Wellington to date, but it seems probable that it will shortly 
have to be confronted. 
 
On the issue of indebtedness, New Zealand seems unwilling to go beyond informal 
intimations to the Cook Islands Government that New Zealand cannot be expected to 
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underwrite major blunders in economic policy. While perfectly defensible in terms of the 
letter of the Constitution and the Exchange of Letters, this approach is short sighted and 
ultimately unworkable. The special relationship assures the Cook Islands of long term New 
Zealand support, and includes explicit guarantees given in the early 1960s that this support 
would include a willingness to bail the Islands out if they failed to “swim in the lagoon” of 
self government70. Any abandonment by New Zealand of the guarantees given during the 
decolonisation period should be clearly, explicitly, and publicly set out; informal and 
confidential government to government communications do not meet this requirement. As 
already noted, the Cook Islands political elite has been more willing to place the special 
relationship at risk than have the Cook Islands electorate; the indebtedness issue is not one 
on which New Zealand should rely on private dealings with that elite. Again the absence of 
any channel of communication between the legislatures of the two countries turns out to be 
unfortunate. 
 
It may well be that promises made by past New Zealand Governments were ill-considered 
and ultimately unworkable, but this does not justify their covert abandonment. This is 
especially true of promises which made sense, and would have been relatively easy to keep, 
within the system of “self government in free association” as originally conceived; but 
which have become potentially very costly as the result of an evolution of the special 
relationship in which New Zealand Governments have explicitly acquiesced. There appear 
to be strong grounds for insisting that the Gotz promise of 1962, to underwrite Cook 
Islands failure, is contingent upon the willingness of the Cook Islands Government to 
consult fully with New Zealand before entering into major foreign borrowing programmes; 
and for placing on the open record (possibly through a new Exchange of Letters) the limits 
of New Zealand's redefined underwriter role. 
 
3.8   Some Final Policy Notes 
 
This chapter has dwelt more on the negative than on the positive aspects of New Zealand's 
record vis-a-vis its former colonies. In embarking upon a final set of comments, therefore, 
it is appropriate to begin by making the point that in general, things have turned out quite 
well, and the long run record of New Zealand is one in which a certain amount of pride is 
in order. The trends which, we have suggested, threaten the relations between New Zealand 
and the Islands, are all recognised in official circles in Wellington, although they do not 
appear to have been the subject of much attention in the New Zealand Parliament (where 
long run solutions will eventually have to be decided upon). These trends do not yet 
amount to any inevitable or irremediable crisis; in the meantime, there is a solid foundation 
of shared values and mutual trust on which to build or rebuild. Conditions of life (social, 
economic and political) in the former New Zealand territories remain superior to those in 
most other parts of the Pacific. The most fundamental New Zealand promises   on 
citizenship, access, and financial assistance   have been honoured, albeit grudgingly on 
occasion. And although New Zealand officials have frequently promoted concepts and 
institutions which ran counter to Island realities, they have generally been prepared to back 
off when local opposition became explicit and firm. 
 
The chapter, thus, is to a considerable extent about missed opportunities, and about 
unnecessary lapses in New Zealand's record. To some extent also it is about a real 
confusion amongst New Zealand policymakers over the goals to which their policies have 
been directed. The Pacific mini societies, by their very nature, have been peripheral to the 
mainstream of New Zealand policy, a situation aggravated by the 1974 transfer of 
responsibility for Pacific matters from the Island Affairs portfolio to that of Foreign Affairs. 
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In order to give coherence to policy decisions, there has been a tendency to rely upon 
supposedly universal doctrines - ranging from “self determination” to “strategic denial” -  
rather than to commit resources to the quest for appropriate policy packages for the special 
case. There can be no doubt that one important motivation behind New Zealand policy has 
been national self interest -  both the strategic interest in maintaining a sphere of influence, 
and economic interest in securing a cheap and highly productive labour supply during the 
years of the long postwar boom. Neither of these, however, has posed much threat to the 
interests or wishes of the peoples of the territories concerned, who have remained New 
Zealanders and are undismayed either by New Zealand regional influence or by the 
prospect of employment in New Zealand factories. As is suggested in Chapter 5, so called 
“dependence” in the case of the Pacific mini societies is far from being a pathological 
condition; and it is policies supposedly aimed to reduce “dependence” which have posed 
the most immediate threat to the interests of the peoples of these societies. 
 
Where, then, should attention be focussed in any rethinking of New Zealand policies on the 
political evolution of the mini societies? The top priority seems to be a careful 
reconsideration  by New Zealand of the possibility of some form of political integration 
between the former dependent territories and mainland New Zealand. In any future 
recontracting of the special relationship between New Zealand and any of the three 
territories, it will be necessary for New Zealand's political position on integration to be 
known in advance, since Island leaders are unlikely to press proposals which they believe 
to be unacceptable to New Zealand. The question of New Zealand's willingness to 
contemplate new political and constitutional links, designed on flexible terms adapted to 
Island realities, provides an acid test of the oft-declared New Zealand desire to act in 
accordance with the wishes of the Island people. If integration and related options are to be 
foreclosed  by New Zealand in a future recontracting with the Islands (as was the case in 
the earlier decolonisation phase) then this should be done on the basis of a clear and 
properly debated political decision. 
 
In both Tokelau and Niue, the experience of the past two decades seems to suggest that the 
objective conditions for autonomous local government exist, but not the preconditions for 
establishment of viable nation states. Territories with populations of 3,000 or less are not 
well placed to support and staff a complete reproduction in miniature of the Westminster 
system of national government, and past New Zealand promotion of balkanisation in the 
region has been ill-advised. The case for some degree of constitutional integration of these 
two societies with New Zealand is strong, and need involve relatively little change in the 
status quo. In the case of the Cook Islands, both objective and subjective conditions for 
survival as a small nation state appear to exist; the issue there is one not of feasibility, but 
of desirability, and the case for some degree of constitutional integration rests upon the 
view that the chances of survival for the special relationship with New Zealand would 
benefit from the installation of some more formal checks and balances. 
 
Central to any attempt to give new shape to “self government in free association” is our 
proposal for establishment of a select committee or similar mechanism in the New Zealand 
Parliament to deal with Islands issues and to oversee the working of the relationship 
between New Zealand and the Islands. If, as we propose, the provision of budgetary 
support and other subsidies for the Islands is separated from the development aid vote and 
made subject to some explicit provision by the New Zealand Parliament (as was the case in 
the 1960s) then such a select committee arrangement would be responsible for monitoring 
expenditure policies in the islands. Provision would need to be made for some form of 
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Island representation, and for an obligation for the relevant authority in the islands to report 
to the committee and to respond fully to its queries. 
 
It is important to emphasise that under the Constitutions of Niue and the Cook Islands, New 
Zealand has no legal rights to initiate constitutional changes, or even discussion of such 
changes. The absence from these documents of any provision for a constitutional review 
(with New Zealand participation) after some specified period of experience with self 
government, is another of their shortcomings. (It was, after all, always claimed at the time 
of decolonisation that future options were not being foreclosed; a constitutional provision 
for the parties to review the operation of the constitution, say every ten years, would not 
have been out of place). The political reality, obviously, is that Island leaders would 
respond positively to a declared New Zealand interest in reviewing the social contract of 
free association, provided that New Zealand was not seeking unilaterally to abolish the 
contract. 
 
3.9 Postscript: Tuvaluan Independence. 
 
Although the focus in this chapter has been on the decolonisation process in the former 
New Zealand dependencies, we believe that many of our conclusions could be extended to 
the case of United Kingdom decolonisation of Tuvalu. The Tuvaluans' insistence on their 
distinct cultural identity, and their desire to avoid domination by the Gilbertese majority in 
the former Gilbert and Ellice Islands Colony, led naturally to the separatist pressures 
culminating in the 1974 Ellice referendum on secession from the Gilbert and Ellice Islands 
colony. The British administration seemed not to realise the depth of feeling between the 
Tuvaluan and Gilbertese communities, and tried to deter separatist sentiment by offering 
very ungenerous financial terms for the Ellice component of the GEIC in the event of 
separation - one ship, no claim on phosphate revenues or reserve funds, and no scope for 
negotiation. It was made clear by UK officials that Tuvaluan living standards would be 
adversely affected by separation. The referendum nevertheless attracted a 92% majority in 
favour of separation.71 
 
Comparisons are obvious with New Zealand efforts in the early 1960s to persuade Tokelau 
to join either Western Samoa or the Cook Islands, and with earlier discussion of combining 
Niue with the Cook Islands. In those cases, local feeling ran strongly in favour of separate 
identity, but with each entity retaining its own links with New Zealand. The desire for 
recognition of identity, and for considerable autonomous control over local affairs, should 
not however be confused with a desire for sovereign independence per se. This is one of the 
important points in relation to Tuvalu's decision to separate from the GEIC. Macdonald, 
writing in 1975, pointed out that the Tuvaluans did not “seek independent statehood but 
only, at least for the forseeable future, separate colonial status which recognises their 
national identity”.72 
 
The subsequent precipitate move to full independence in 1978 arose from three main 
sources. First, and most basic, was the long standing British policy thrust towards 
decolonisation - the desire, as Macdonald puts it, to “usher the Colony into 
independence”.73 British officials clearly took it for granted from at least the 1960s on that 
the decolonisation process already familiar from British colonies elsewhere would be 
reproduced in due course in the Gilbert and Ellice Islands Colony, and there was therefore 
considerable momentum already established toward independence by the time of formal 
separation of Tuvalu from the GEIC in 1975. The second force pushing in the direction of 
independence was the international community of aid donors and political agencies. The 
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climate in the Pacific in the mid late 1970s was one of competitive bidding between Soviet 
and Western governments, in the course of which the impression was given that 
independent small states were in a favoured position to lay claim to large volumes of aid 
from various donors. Set against the very severe financial constraints imposed upon Tuvalu 
by Britain as part of the separation arrangements (conditions which most Tuvaluans viewed 
as punitive and unjust) the attractions of independence were artificially, and temporarily, 
enhanced in the minds of Tuvaluans.  
 
The third force behind independence, and one which again rouses echoes of the Cook 
Islands situation, was the emergence of a strong, though small, elite of Tuvaluan politicians 
with a vested interest in independence. In the Cook Islands, as we have seen, the pro-
independence leanings of ambitious politicians have always been held in check by the basic 
realities of economic and social ties to New Zealand.  
 
In Tuvalu, similar links to the UK were nothing like as strong, while the early years after 
separation were a period both of stringent limits on British financial assistance, and 
growing local confidence in the possibility of long run financial self reliance on the basis of 
philately and fisheries. Under these circumstances, Toaripi Lauti's strong personal thrust 
towards independence encountered no effective opposition. As Macdonald describes the 
decision:74 
 
“The preparation for independence began almost as soon as separation 
was complete. While most Tuvaluans were emphatic in their desire to 
seek a separate destiny from the Gilbertese, there was still 
bewilderment at the notion of decolonisation, at the idea that Britain 
should want to forsake its colonial trust. Yet they accepted that it was 
their politicians who had achieved the first, essential goal, and they had 
no desire to be left behind other Pacific nations. From that point, the 
leadership of Toaripi Lauti was sufficiently persuasive for the goal of 
independence to win widespread acceptance.” 
 
Six years on from independence, the realities of financial stringency have become more 
evident, especially during the Tuvalu Government's cash flow crisis of 1980-81 
(coinciding, not only with the Sidney Gross affair, but also with the Cook Islands and Niue 
Government's difficulties as double digit inflation wreaked havoc on previously agreed 
levels of financial assistance).75 Early hopes of economic self sufficiency and some long 
run growth in living standards have also faded (see Chapter 10). The climate now appears 
to be one in which the increased security provided by a “special relationship” of some kind 
with a stronger and friendly country (not Kiribati, obviously) could be quite welcome. One 
prominent member of the present Tuvalu government expressed to us his interest in a 
possible “free association” arrangement with New Zealand similar to that currently enjoyed 
by the Cook Islands and Niue, and we feel that this possibility merits consideration. 
 
It may be worth pointing out that there is a historical precedent of sorts for this suggestion 
in the case of Tuvalu:76 
 
“In the immediate postwar years, (UK) High Commission staff saw 
separation (of the Ellice Islands) as inevitable and in 1945 they held 
information talks with their New Zealand counterparts to consider the 
possibility of either New Zealand taking over the Ellice Islands or of 
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Britain resuming responsibility for the Tokelaus to make a more viable 
unit when the time came. Nothing came of the proposals.”    
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CHAPTER FOUR 
 
AGRICULTURE AND THE VILLAGE MODE OF PRODUCTION 
 
4.1  Introduction 
 
The actual performance of agriculture in the whole South Pacific region in the last two 
decades is typical of aid and remittance led economies. Per capita agricultural exports for 
most countries have been stagnating or even declining, while the range of products 
produced has narrowed rather than diversified. The record of agricultural production for 
the five small states of this study is examined in the country chapters (Chapters 6-10), 
reflecting the stagnation or falling output of the South Pacific region as a whole. 
 
It is of course well known that to the World Bank, Asian Development Bank, United 
Nations agencies and other donors, almost all countries in the region (outside Papua New 
Guinea and perhaps Fiji) are too small and their development prospects too paltry in 
normal economic terms to warrant much aid or investment. Since this is the case, projects 
in the five small states are even less “bankable”.  In spite of this however, a good deal of 
external aid has been forthcoming from these and other donors, with considerable inputs 
in terms of skilled technical personnel, in the range of agricultural training and extension 
facilities provided, and in financial and other resources devoted to agriculture. The 
results however have been minimal and not commensurate with the expectations, inputs, 
development plan targets and promises or hopes of politicians and external advisers. 
Why is this so? 
 
4.2   Is Agriculture to blame? 
 
This report argues that the frequently noted rising level of food imports (often 
representing from 20 to 40 percent of total imports) and the declining value of 
agricultural exports in the South Pacific are symptoms rather than causes of fundamental 
changes in the island economies. Rather than blaming such trends on the failure of 
agriculture1 which is seen as creating a balance of payments problem, reducing capital 
available for development, and emphasising dependency in general, it is necessary to 
view agriculture and indeed rural development in general as part of a much broader 
economic structure. 
 
Consider an illustration from Western Samoa. A New Zealand diplomat who had held a 
posting in Western Samoa recounted this anecdote: 
 
“I visited Alafua Agricultural Experimental Farm and was 
impressed with the profusion of excellent tropical fruits and 
vegetables that had been successfully cultivated. Many eggplant 
however had not been picked and lay rotting on the ground. I 
asked my Samoan companion, ‘Why had the fruit not been 
harvested and sold?’  My companion replied, “Why should we 
Samoans have to work like dogs?”2 
 
Of course any tourist visiting South Pacific countries hears such stories of a lack of effort 
by islanders. Even prime ministers and other senior figures in the region complain from 
time to time of lack of sustained “drive” or “determination” by rural producers.3 The 
simplistic, ethnocentric interpretation that “the Islander is lazy” is untrue and unfair, for 
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there are numerous examples of impressive achievements by village workers (e.g. see p. 
below). The problem is rather one of motivation, given the alternative choices facing the 
villager and the broad economic environment in which he now lives. 
 
Until very recently however (and still to a degree with some other countries of the 
region) overseas agronomists visiting the islands have persisted in seeing the failure of 
agriculture as an agronomic problem. Yet as at Alafua in Western Samoa, the wide range 
of plants grown successfully at Titikavika Research Station on Rarotonga illustrates that 
the problem is not primarily one of how to grow appropriate fruits or vegetables. Nor is it 
primarily a marketing problem, though it is true that major costs and difficulties in 
shipping services, providing access to islands such as Aitutaki which lacks a harbour, and 
of price on the New Zealand market are important contributory factors, as is the need for 
consistent, fair marketing policies from New Zealand (Bellam, 1980 and 1981). It 
remains primarily a production problem (as the small volumes produced in the islands 
indicate) and to date policy makers in both the islands and New Zealand have failed 
adequately to analyse and understand the formidable economic and socio cultural factors 
involved. And in the main the production problem is not agronomic but economic. 
 
 
4.3   Subsistence Affluence 
 
A basic reason for the low labour input characteristic of the South Pacific is the 
considerable degree of subsistence affluence that islanders enjoy. In marked contrast to 
the land hungry peasant societies of Asia, the non peasant societies of the Pacific have 
(except on some atolls) always had access to abundant land and labour resources. As Fisk 
has outlined in his model (Fisk 1973) they are able to produce from their own resources 
as much as they can consume of the normal staple foods (plus a surplus needed for 
reciprocity or insurance against natural hazards) with the employment of only a small 
part of the total labour and land available to them. Thus within this non monetary system, 
the productivity of their labour is very high and throughout the Pacific it is common to 
find substantial groups of people able to sustain this level of consumption from their own 
resources at the cost of an average labour input of about three hours per man day or less 
(Fisk, 1973:59). With the addition of a cash crop or two such as copra or bananas, to the 
subsistence system, only a few more hours of labour per week are required.4 Today cash 
cropping is usually grafted on to the subsistence system in a supplementary way, and 
other sources of income outside agriculture are also usually available, but the level of 
subsistence affluence is such that village producers will give up production of a cash 
crop (such as banana growing at Utua'li'i in Western Samoa5) if the market price falls 
below a level deemed to be the minimum acceptable. Even although no other cash crop 
or money earning option might be available as an alternative, villagers frequently choose 
to give up production at such an uneconomic level, preferring to spend the time saved in 
other meaningful village activities. Thus motivation and alternative choices of action 
arise from the socio economic and cultural environment that we term the “village mode 
of production”. 
 
 
4.4  Agricultural Enterprise 
 
To understand enterprise in the South Pacific it is important to identify the necessary 
elements on which it depends. As Fisk and Honeybone (1972)6 have noted, these 
include: 
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 (1) A market for the goods or services they produce. 
) Motivation to succeed. 
(3) l resources, such as land for agriculture, minerals for mining, or a 
special skill. 
) Labour. 
) Capital. 
) Leadership. 
(7) inclusive can be effectively 
combined to provide goods and services to element 1. 
eparate elements listed above and the effectiveness with which they can be 
ombined. 
.5  The South Pacific Agricultural Survey
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An institutional framework in which elements 2 to 6 
 
With respect to agricultural enterprise, this set of factors can be organised in a variety of 
institutional structures such as various smallholder structures (the village mode of 
production, settler schemes of smallholders coloniterprise depends both on the quality of 
the seven s
c
 
4  
cropping 
stem” (our “village mode of production”) in many parts of the region is now: 
 
rovide a promising 
basis for continued growth ...”  (pp. 479 80). 
y motivation to 
roduce more goods within the village system of production is not great. 
.6  The Village Mode of Production
 
Recently a major survey by the Asian Development Bank, the South Pacific Agricultural 
Survey (SPAS, 1980) studied in depth the problems of agriculture in seven countries of 
the region (two of which are covered in this report). They concluded that the dominant 
agricultural production mode which they call the “mixed subsistence cash 
sy
 
“... at a point where major changes may be required if both 
national needs for growth in commercial output ... and individual 
aspirations for higher cash incomes are to be met. The mixed 
subsistence cash cropping mode does not p
 
The SPAS study suggests some of the reasons for the inadequacy of the village mode of 
production, including poor quality management, but does not analyse it in any depth. It 
has however been analysed in depth by a number of fieldworkers (see footnote 4 above) 
who have examined how the social organisation, values and institutions such as 
reciprocity impinge upon the production system. An excellent illustration for Western 
Samoa has been provided by Ala'ilima and Ala'ilima (1969)7. We have suggested above 
that the “subsistence affluence” of islanders is one important reason wh
p
 
4  
communities, almost all rural dwellers (apart from a small number in settler schemes, and 
 
In Table 4.1 the characteristics of the village mode of production are summarised. Since 
the overwhelming majority of the rural population in the South Pacific lives in village 
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TABLE 4.1 
Problems of “Modernising” the Village Mode of Production 
 
1. The goals of production are diverse and competitive. Maximising output is not usually 
important. 
Goals are  
-  subsistence for the household (usually the main consumption unit) 
-  reciprocity (gift exchanges) 
- redistribution (in “big man” or chiefly systems) 
- market sale. 
 
2. Social insurance, security, community well being, are the prime concerns  
-  sharing and reciprocity 
(These are admirable principles but conflict with maximising production). 
 
3. Land use system consists of  
- groves of tree crops 
- shifting gardens 
- gathering, hunting. 
 
Under rotational bush fallow, perhaps over 100 scattered gardens in a village. 
Characteristics: 
- inter cropping 
- difficult and costly to achieve a transition to permanent cropping 
- impossible to achieve scale economies 
- difficult to apply modern techniques and not greatly needed with bush fallowing. 
e.g.   artificial fertilisers 
- disease control 
- weed control. 
 
4. Adapted to a demand ceiling  
- subsistence affluence and “limited needs” 
- labour input 10 20 hours per week sufficient to obtain requirements 
- agricultural tasks merely part of whole socio economic field of activity 
 
5. Production techniques adapted to non monetary capital inputs. 
 
6. Customary land tenure system a disincentive: 
 - multiple or clan “ownership” 
 - “land” not “farm” tenure 
 - fragmented small plots 
 - absentee owners with out migration 
 - land or boundary disputes 
 - often a poor basis for gaining a bank loan. 
 
7. Innovations, new crops often “contextualised” in crop assemblage very difficult to 
mechanise. 
 
8. Alternative sources of income are often important. (e.g. remittance income from 
migrant relatives; wage labour; fishing). 
 
9. Sometimes traditional (rather than modernistic) leadership. 
 
10. Absence, due to out migration of would be entrepreneurs, most skilled and educated 
people and a considerable proportion of the younger labour force. 
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 some living on plantations) are involved in the village mode of production. The 
importance of the village mode of production, its resilience in hard times, and its survival 
are not in doubt. The main concern of the village mode of production as a whole however 
is security, and market production is only one of a number of competing goals. As an 
ongoing system providing continuity between the generations, community well being and 
social insurance, the value of the village mode of production cannot be doubted. But the 
production system is enmeshed in many socio-cultural factors in this environment, 
inhibiting efforts to lift production. Consideration of Table 4.1 suggests that many of the 
characteristics of the system pose great difficulties with respect to promoting agricultural 
growth or innovation designed to increase marketable output. In view of the widespread 
persistence of the village mode of production as the dominant production mode in the 
five countries of this survey (except where it has been partially transformed as in 
Aitutaki and Rarotonga) and the accompanying phenomenon of subsistence affluence of 
the villager, it is hardly surprising that agricultural output has stagnated or fallen in the 
last two decades. 
 
 
4.7    Evolution of the Mirab Economy 
 
This report does however suggest one other line of argument - indeed an even more 
pervasive, more powerful set of factors - that explain agricultural stagnation or failure. 
With respect to the Cook Islands, Niue and to a lesser extent Tokelau, it is argued that the 
direction of economic evolution that has occurred over several decades has been to 
integrate the islands ever more closely into the economy of the New Zealand mainland. 
In this steady, inexorable process there have been substantial flows of capital, labour, 
skill and enterprise between the two component parts and within the changing economic 
environment, the promotion of autonomous separate development has become steadily 
more difficult. With the evolution of MIRAB societies, local agricultural development 
has had to take second place as greater priority was attached to the flow of aid moneys 
and remittances and the pole of economic growth has been seen ever more clearly as 
lying not in the islands but on the mainland of Australia or New Zealand. 
 
Although the MIRAB economy is less well developed in some of the seven countries 
studied by SPAS, some of which are denied a migration outlet, SPAS has failed to 
identify the MIRAB economy at work, casting most of the blame on the mixed 
subsistence cash cropping system, together with transport problems and geographic 
difficulties of isolation and small size. Although the inadequacies of the village mode of 
production cannot be denied, it is worth noting that even under this system, much larger 
volumes of copra and bananas were produced per capita in the Cook Islands in the 
1920s8 compared to recent levels or larger exports of bananas in Western Samoa in the 
mid 1950s or of cacao in the early 1960s9. In 1950 boom conditions encouraged 
exceptionally high copra production in Tokelau (see p.217). 
 
Thus it is not true to say that the system of organisation itself has always been an 
insuperable barrier, as occasional very high prices indicate. Indeed motivation (and 
probably the impact of other elements as well) appears to have waned within the village 
mode of production in recent years, probably as the influence of the MIRAB economy 
and of economic integration have become more pronounced.  
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4.8  An Emerging “Smallholder Plantation” Mode? 
 
If this line of argument can be accepted, do any policy suggestions follow? SPAS (1980) 
recommends that higher priority be given to promoting the plantation mode of production 
(which can include under a “plantation” or large scale system of management 
smallholders as in an estate run by a public corporation, such as WSTEC in Western 
Samoa, or in a nucleus estate, as well as group or joint ownership plantations). At least in 
a plantation mode labour can be directed to undertake the tasks required at every point in 
the production process. A high standard of management would be required and 
economies of scale depending on the crop, can often be achieved. Thus the problem of 
low motivation of individual producing households in the village mode of production can 
be avoided. Large production units are also recommended by Castle for the Cook Islands 
in SPAS (1980) in the hope of providing larger and more reliable production that could 
make it worthwhile to operate a fruit processing factory, as well as ensuring reasonable 
grower incomes.  Ideally an “emerging smallholder plantation mode” as recommended 
by Ward and Proctor (SPAS 1980: 151) that could provide modern management to 
groups of smallholders in units of say 50 hectares would be a promising development in 
places like Rarotonga for fruit and vegetable production for the air freight market. 
However, the persistent and chronic land tenure problems - which successive Cook 
Islands Governments have regarded as insuperable - probably make this impracticable. 
Again the plantation mode aggregating small plots possessed by multiple owners, and 
managed like the better Maori Land Incorporations10, remains a possibility for the future. 
Provided the plantation can be shorn of its colonial origins and ownership and other 
benefits can be made available to smallholders, this mode offers more promise for the 
future of local production than the village mode of production. 
 
 
4.9  Interests of Government and Individuals are Different 
 
With respect to agricultural policy we do however need to remind ourselves that the 
interests of governments and of individual households are usually quite different in the 
region. The former wish to expand agricultural exports, earn overseas exchange, produce 
more import substituting foods and improve the balance of payments. The latter are 
interested in agriculture primarily as a matter of security, or (in a MIRAB society) as 
discretionary income, if their main livelihood comes from aid financed public service 
jobs, remittances or both. And in open MIRAB economies the success of governments in 
carrying out an agreed “development” policy - even if the political will exists - is very 
slight indeed. There remains a big difference between development policy and the 
“development” process as it actually occurs in the islands. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
 
DEVELOPMENT, DEPENDENCE AND VIABILITY 
 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter examines the underpinnings of economic policy in our five small Pacific 
communities, and of New Zealand's prescriptions for "economic development” and aid 
evaluation in those territories. The points made are not new ones  - on the contrary, they 
are commonsense propositions which have been reiterated time and again by several 
generations of people familiar with the Islands. What is difficult is not the ideas 
themselves, but the fact that they run counter to several solidly entrenched 
preconceptions which still have an iron grip on the international community of aid 
donors, "development” consultants, and international agencies. Just as New Zealand, in 
designing political institutions for the era of decolonisation, felt bound to work within 
the limits of the international diplomatic consensus on decolonisation and nationhood 
(see Chapter 3) so in the area of economic policy New Zealand has paid consistent lip 
service to two propositions which are to be attacked in this paper, namely: 
 
1) that economic analysis of the island territories must be confined to the 
geographically bounded units (in other words, economic analysis must 
conform to political demarcations rather than economic reality); and 
 
2) that "economic development”, understood to mean growth and 
diversification of GDP by the promotion of "viable” projects, is the correct 
objective for economic policy. 
 
As hypotheses for investigation, both of the above propositions are unexceptionable. 
There  is no doubt that over most of the so called "Third World”, national economic 
analysis has proved fruitful, and the expansion of production has been a necessary 
precondition for the attainment of long run social, economic and political goals, so that 
"economic development” (as commonly interpreted by the international agencies) 
makes good sense as a policy target. The point to be made here is that neither of the 
propositions is a universal truth. Immense damage can be done by the unthinking, 
mechanistic application of fashionable dogmas to areas where they do not apply. The 
thesis of this chapter will be that the mini-economies of the Pacific are sufficiently 
different from the stereotype model of "developing countries” to render the customary 
international development doctrines redundant. 
 
The outstanding features of these economies, on which our analysis will be based, are 
simply summarised, as follows: 
 
1) They start from a position of subsistence affluence, with a floor on real income 
provided by the operation of an integrated, non-capitalist form of natural 
economy. This economy is based upon kin and household units, with production 
organised according to the "village mode” (see Chapter 4), and it incorporates 
within it control over the great bulk of productive resources. Land, thus, is 
bound up in neo-traditional forms of tenure; commercial agricultural production 
consists of the surplus generated to meet the cash needs of the village economy1, 
with the exception of a very few entrepreneurs who have secured access to 
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medium sized leasehold blocks. People resident in the islands nearly all retain 
their membership, based on descent, in functioning segments of the subsistent 
economy, so that no large "proletariat”, separated from the means of production, 
exists as the basis for capitalist wage labour enterprises. Wage labour can indeed 
be recruited from the village economy, but does not thereby become separated 
from it. Population pressure on subsistence resources is low by "underdeveloped 
country” standards, with none of the environmental degradation associated with 
rural destitution in the continental "Third World”.  (Environmental damage in 
the Islands arises mainly from attempts to push commercial activity beyond 
prudent limits). 
 
2) The non-capitalist family enterprises which dominate the economic structure are 
diversified on a transnational basis, mainly through the operation of the Pacific 
Basin labour market. Labour migration (both circular and permanent), with the 
associated remittances in cash and kind from one part of the family to another, 
render the small Pacific Island economies fully open, to a degree which is 
irreconcilable with any textbook model of "economic development” in a 
bounded national economy. The surplus labour on which mainstream models of 
dualist modernisation rely2 simply is not found in the Cook Islands and Niue; 
their reserves of labour for recruitment into wage employment are a supplement 
to labour supply in the metropolitan economies (New Zealand, Australia, USA) 
rather than a low-wage labour supply for capitalist enterprise in the local 
economies. Local cash employment outside the village economy is primarily in 
skilled positions for civil servants. Only in those small island societies where out 
migration has been firmly curtailed by restrictions on access to the wider labour 
market (most notably Kiribati and Tuvalu) do current trends promise to throw up 
anything resembling a local reserve army of labour. 
 
3) During the past three decades all five economies have moved from so-called 
"self sufficiency” to so-called "import dependence”.  What this means is that 
prior to the Second World War local consumption was limited by domestic 
product (that is, subsistence production plus export earnings), but since then 
consumption has progressively become more and more divorced from 
production. The cash economies of all five are now driven not by productive 
income but by rent. In the terminology of national income accounting, Gross 
National Product (on which disposable incomes and hence consumption 
spending rest) bears no relation to Gross Domestic Product. The "normal” 
incentives to drive a process of growth of GDP are therefore inoperative, since 
there is no clear linkage between production gains and welfare improvements for 
the local population. Indeed, under present policies there are two strong sets of 
disincentives to increasing commercially-oriented production: firstly the fact 
that increases in productive income tend to "drive out” rent income (since 
current aid donor policy is to reduce the level of financial support for Island 
economies which exhibit productive growth, and relatives send less remittances 
to kin who have jobs or incomes in the islands); and secondly that the prevailing 
relative-price regime renders onshore commercial productive activity in the 
islands unprofitable, and hence unattractive to private sector entrepreneurs. This 
is the normal state of affairs in rent led economies3. 
 
4) Size, openness, the strength of the natural economy, and the relative-price 
situation, render the Islands an unsuitable seedbed for capitalism. The private 
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sector has long recognised this, and capitalist productive enterprise has remained 
confined to a very few specialised niches. (Examples are the clothing factories 
of Rarotonga, and Gary Cooper’s ventures into coconut cream and footballs in 
Niue  - all reliant upon female labour, often part-time, drawn from within the 
local village economy). The promotion of large-scale commercial ventures is 
now undertaken by bureaucrats in pursuit of political or social targets - not by 
capitalists in quest of profits4. Where administrators have succeeded in 
persuading capitalist firms to participate, the resulting economic activities have 
relied for their profitability upon high levels of government subsidy and 
intervention, and have failed when official support was not sustained. (The 
Greggs citrus processing venture in Rarotonga is the best known case; the 
history of attempts to run the Tokelau trading venture through WSTEC and 
Burns Philp is another; the Grico pineapple cannery on Mangaia currently 
promises to reproduce familiar patterns). 
 
5) None of the above should be read as suggesting in any way that Island peoples 
are unresponsive to economic opportunities; the contrary is the case. Economic 
agents in the Islands exhibit quite extraordinary flexibility, adaptability and 
responsiveness in adjusting to changes in their economic environment. Copra 
producers respond immediately to changes in the realised price for copra 
(including both changes in world prices, and changes in the terms of local 
payments   such as the recent move in the Northern Cook Islands from deferred 
payment to cash on delivery). Local people with skills scan the Pacific wide 
horizon of the labour market for attractive employment opportunities, and 
transnational family operations facilitate such search activity. Well-funded 
government schemes for the promotion of new activities attract widespread 
interest so long as the funding continues; witness the 1950s-1960s Citrus 
Replanting Scheme in the Cook Islands, or the 1970s promotion of passionfruit 
in Niue. Images of cultural backwardness, which so often infect popular thinking 
about non-capitalist economic systems, are utterly inapplicable. On the contrary, 
the Islander as an economic agent is close to the Renaissance ideal of the 
"universal man”, accustomed to performing a wide range of social, economic 
and cultural roles, and consequently adaptable. In economies where local 
conditions impose rapidly diminishing returns to specialisation and division of 
labour, the multi-role individual thrives. 
 
 
5.2   Goals of Policy 
 
In this economic and social environment, what long-run goals should give direction to 
economic policy? This question cannot satisfactorily be answered by simplistic and 
unspecific appeals to the idea of "economic development”, because this is nowadays an 
incoherent and ambiguous concept. It was not always so, and a little intellectual history 
may be in order here before we turn to policy specifics. In the 1950s and early 1960s a 
strong body of thought emerged to which the label "modernisation theory” is usually 
applied. The classic reference in the literature is Rostow's 1960 book, "The Stages of 
Economic Growth”.  The modernisation paradigm envisaged economic development as 
part of a general historical process of moving from "traditional society” to "modern 
society”, the presumption being that history is unidirectional (i.e. that "progress” is the 
direction in which all human societies are to move through time) and that the "modern” 
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package of institutions and technologies would by its clear superiority, progressively 
replace the "traditional” package, to the benefit of the peoples concerned. 
 
While the standard presentation of the modernisation model involved the reproduction 
of Western Europe and North America's experience with the Industrial Revolution and 
the rise of capitalism, it must be emphasised that the same overall vision informed most 
Marxist-based analyses of economic progress; Lenin's "electrification plus the soviets” 
and Stalin's Five Year Plans are as fundamentally part of the modernisation view as 
Kennedy's Alliance for Progress or the United Nations' First Development Decade. The 
shared core was the idea of development towards "modernity” as the installation of a 
package of innovations, which were assumed to be mutually compatible and mutually 
reinforcing (as seemed to have been the case in the history of Europe or the USA).  It 
was this approach which made modernisation theory so immediately useful as a tool of 
operational policy making: it offered direct prescriptions for a process of social 
engineering in the "underdeveloped world”, and it promised at the end of the day a 
world-wide reproduction of the modern western civilisation which was assumed to 
represent the desirable goal for all human communities. 
 
Of the various policy preconceptions embedded in modernisation theory, two are of 
greatest relevance for our discussion here. The first is the view that where "traditional” 
and "modern” come into conflict, the former must yield (or be swept aside) in the long 
run interests of society at large. The second is the belief that "progress” is unequivocal   
- for example, that an increase in production is a good thing, because it advances the 
society concerned towards modernity without producing any countervailing 
retrogression on other fronts. 
 
The recent academic dissatisfaction with modernisation models stems largely from a 
loss of faith in these two beliefs. There has been growing academic respect for the 
virtues of many aspects of "traditional” society. In consequence, where the achievement 
of other "goods” such as economic growth or political modernisation threatens the 
survival of valued institutions or practices, it is no longer so easy to assert that in the 
long run society will be better off. At the same time, growing experience with 
development planning and increasing knowledge about development processes has 
made clear the multi-dimensional nature of social and economic evolution. In numerous 
countries, an obvious correlation between capitalist economic growth and worsening 
income inequalities caused crises of conscience for development economists5. In others, 
the failure of economic growth to promote democratic political modernisation on the 
US model attracted criticism. 
 
It cannot, however, be said that the burgeoning of critical writing about modernisation 
has yet yielded any replacement for modernisation theory as a universal rule of thumb 
for policy formation. "Dependency theory”, probably the best known of the critical 
schools, starts from the observed failure of the "modernisation” claim that the various 
aspects of  
"development” are complementary rather than antagonistic. In the dependency view, a 
two region model of the world economy (core and periphery) distinguishes between 
those parts of the world where the rise of capitalism and the advance of productivity 
have  led to the outcome predicted in modernisation theory (the "core countries”); and 
those where the same processes have had malignant or equivocal effects (the 
"periphery”). To be located in the periphery is to be subject to different economic 
"laws” than those which apply at the centre. The analysis may be pursued in 
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international terms, or in terms of class conflict on a world scale, or via "articulation of 
modes of production"; all yield interesting research hypotheses, and all provide good 
grounds for abandoning the universal prescriptions of modernisation theory. Apart from 
the explicitly revolutionary versions, however, these writings do not provide clear, 
sweeping answers to the question: what is to be done? 
 
The only operational prescriptions of dependency models seem to be bismarckian 
nationalism or revolutionary activism. The lesson appears to be that abandoning the 
universal prescriptions offered by the modernisation view will not open the way for any 
new universal set of rules of thumb for policy. The challenge is to find appropriate 
policies for particular cases. 
 
The first step in such a process is to break down the modernisation package into 
component parts, each of which embodies one dimension of "human progress” or 
"social welfare”.  One possible such tabulation is presented in Figure 1, and will be used 
as the framework for our discussion of economic policies for small Pacific societies. We 
list there six possible dimensions of "progress” against which the achievements of 
policy may be assessed. The ideal-type modernisation model presumes that advance on 
all six fronts is possible without internal conflicts  - at least in the medium to long run. 
(Obviously in the short run there could arise temporary frictions or dislocations; the 
modernisation view is that these will be overcome sufficiently rapidly to be acceptable). 
The three other columns indicate other possible combinations of social and economic 
change which might well be encountered in the real world. Set (1) corresponds to a 
situation where increased commodity production and the generation of economic 
surplus has been achieved, but at the cost of lowered living standards, political 
retrogression, social disintegration, and environmental degradation. The model is 
familiar from critiques of the early Soviet Five Year Plans of the 1930s, and from 
"dependency” critiques of capitalist economic growth under highly exploitative 
conditions on the "periphery”.  Its relevance at this stage is to make the point that one 
should not take for granted any correlation between economic growth per se, and 
improvements in human welfare: there is no a priori reason for such a correlation. 
 
Set (2) emphasises that neither is there any a priori reason to suppose that the impact of 
economic growth will be altogether negative. In the situation portrayed, growth has 
been accompanied by improved material living standards and political advance, but at 
the expense of social cohesion and the environment. Critiques of growth along these 
lines are familiar from the evaluation of major projects in advanced countries. 
 
Set (3) brings us to the central point in the case of the Island mini-economies: that 
substantial advances in social welfare, political organisation, and material living 
standards can be achieved in the absence of "economic growth”.  As we shall see 
shortly, this is the essence of the New Zealand achievement in its former dependent 
territories, and extends also to the experience of Tuvalu. The process charted here can 
be described as "colonisation by the welfare state”, and is the outcome of a particular 
set of paternalist (or better, fraternalist) policies applied to small societies with very 
limited resource bases. So long as the social contract under which the result was 
achieved continues to hold, the economic system is stable, viable, and sustainable (to 
use three of the fashionable "buzz words” of the moment). Abrogation of the social 
contract, implying a sharp drop in disposable incomes in the Islands, could turn many of 
the pluses into minuses within a short space of time as local economies declined and out 
migration picked up. The maintenance of such an economic position, in other words, 
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rests permanently upon a conscious policy commitment. In Tuvalu, where the United 
Kingdom has unilaterally declared the likelihood of a phasing out of budgetary support, 
the strain has to date been taken on living standards; political and social cohesion have 
held up. This result, however, has been possible only because the option of out 
migration has not been open to Tuvaluans, since they lack automatic access to any 
metropolitan economy. A New Zealand withdrawal of financial support from one of its 
associated territories would be likely to have an immediate and massive impact via 
migration. 
FIGURE 5.1 
A Sample Checklist for “Development” Policies 
 
Policy Objectives "Modernisation" Other Real-World Possibilities 
  process  (1)   (2)   (3)  
Material consumption/ 
standard of living + - + + 
Commodity production/ 
surplus generation + + + - 
Political and bureaucratic 
"modernisation" + - + + 
Social cohesion + - - + 
Diversification of economy + - + + 
Environmental protection or 
enhancement + - - + 
 
 
Policy makers influenced by the "modernisation” perspective would be prone to look at 
Set (3) and assume that full modernisation could be achieved simply by initiating a 
growth of commodity production  - that is, they would tend to assume that commercial 
investment projects could be established in the Island setting without undermining the 
gains on other fronts. The critic of modernisation models would raise the possibility that  
the insertion of a "+” in the commodity production row would imply a movement not to 
full modernisation, but to the situation represented by "Real World” Set (2) or even Set 
(1). That is, the promotion of commercial commodity production may be subversive of 
living standards and political and social order. 
 
The argument advanced below tends to support this point of view. The conspicuous 
"failure” of commodity production in the small Island context, we suggest, is an 
intrinsic part of the working of the economic and social mechanism which has delivered 
so conspicuously on the other targets. The visitor to Rarotonga or Niue is immediately 
struck by the extremely high standard of social infrastructure and services, and by the 
general quality of life of the local population. These are societies where local onshore 
production has remained almost static over the long run (e.g. see Chapter 6), but where 
conditions of life have improved by a quantum leap in the past three decades, thanks to 
close economic and social integration with the New Zealand economy, and the benefits 
of the "special relationship”.  These are not, in fact, societies where the word 
"underdeveloped” makes much sense. They are satellite extensions of one of the 
affluent Pacific Rim economies, and their clear economic and social interests lie in the 
maintenance of that basic integration. In such a context the indiscriminate promotion of 
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large scale commodity production in the name of "development” is likely to prove 
subversive rather than beneficial. 
 
The likelihood of severe "backwash effects” from any programme of growth promotion 
in the Islands is increased by the observable absence of profitable investment 
opportunities. Market forces clearly militate against successful capitalist type projects, 
and policies aiming to promote such projects are therefore working "against the wind”.  
Under these circumstances the likelihood of distortions and backwash from policy 
intervention is increased. 
 
Before turning to the statistical record, two points should be made as qualification or 
elaboration of the above line of argument. The first is that we are not arguing against 
the encouragement of all commercial activities. On the contrary - where chances exist 
for local people to enhance their situation by participating in commodity markets for 
local products, this is to be welcomed. This will be particularly true where the 
opportunity is for participants in the village mode of production to earn additional 
disposable income from their family enterprise, so that commercial expansion reinforces 
rather than undermines the local social system. The growing of wet taro in the village 
mode of production for local sale in Avarua is an example. The key point here is that 
increased commodity production is pursued not as a policy goal in itself, but because it 
contributes to other, primarily social, policy goals. This is in line with the original 
perception from which New Zealand policy began in the 1950s6, but which becomes 
regularly buried in developmentalist dogmas; namely that once "self sufficiency” is 
admitted to be unattainable on any realistic basis, the true object of policies for 
economic growth must be social rather than economic - related to morale and cohesion 
within the local society, rather than towards the generation of increased economic 
surplus from onshore activities. 
 
The second point that should be made here (and which will be taken up in more detail 
below) is that we do not agree with the application to Island mini-economies of 
dogmatic condemnations of so called "dependency”.  We shall argue that what many 
people call "dependence” is a positive rather than a negative feature of these societies, 
and that policy prescriptions based upon the supposed goal of "reducing dependence” 
are misplaced. The standard formulations of "dependency” textbooks are as inapplicable 
in the Pacific as are those of the modernisation school; in analysing the political 
economy of the small Island societies, one has to start from scratch, and not from 
continental "Third World” models. One contributory reason for this is the nationalist 
fallacy of assuming that Island societies are bounded geographic national entities, rather 
than organic parts of a wider economic system from which on balance they derive 
substantial benefits. (The nationalist argument against "dependence” has always, after 
all, been the ad hoc one that the "nation” is worse off in some meaningful sense as a 
result of its economic linkages, and that abandoning or modifying those linkages is the 
key to improvement). 
 
5.3   Import Affluence and the "Jaws Effect" 
 
We turn now to a survey of the major economic trends in the five Island societies 
covered by this study. Long-run data series are presented on "overseas trade” and 
government finance; on the basis of these data, we discuss similarities and differences 
among our five case study economies, and identify the key historical turning points. 
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It is striking that the quality of the published statistical record for small Pacific 
economies has deteriorated markedly in the last decade or so, as the regular reporting 
practices of the old style colonial administrators gave way to the political (as distinct 
from economic) priorities of the emerging national elites and the new generation of 
New Zealand, Australian and British officials7. 
 
Despite this deterioration, the quantity and quality of statistical material available from 
primary sources is still considerably greater than is often supposed. The impression of a 
total lack (or total unreliability), of data arises largely from the glaring inadequacy of 
the information assembled and published by multinational agencies such as the South 
Pacific Commission, the Asian Development Bank, the United Nations and the 
Commonwealth Secretariat. The statistical coverage of small Pacific economies by all 
these agencies is quite unsatisfactory, and we have found it necessary to go back to 
primary sources to obtain figures in which we could have any confidence. (As a case in 
point, Asian Development Bank figures for government expenditure in the Cook Islands 
appear to be overstated by nearly 50%). 
 
Data on export and import values, deflated to constant dollar terms, are presented 
graphically in Figures 5.2 5.6. All our "countries” exhibit large commodity trade 
deficits in the early 1980s; the proportional size of this trade gap varies from 77% of 
imports for Kiribati 1980-83 up to 96% for Tuvalu 1979-82. The real interest of our 
graphs is to show for each country the period during which this pattern of heavy 
commodity trade deficits emerged. If we view imports as a proxy for "luxury 
consumption” and exports as a proxy for suplus production, it can be seen that in the 
first half of the twentieth century the normal situation for Pacific Island economies was 
one of equality between the two. Following the Second World War, however, one after 
another of our "countries” moved through a transitional phase into what seems to be a 
new steady state of consumption greatly in excess of production. First to pass clearly 
through this transition was Niue, where the gap began to open in the mid 1940s and 
where the transition to high "unproductive consumption” was complete by the late 
1950s. Next came the Cook Islands, where, however, the rapid rise in consumption 
levels during the 1950s was nearly matched by an impressive growth rate of export 
production, so that the final transition to "import leadership” did not occur until the end 
of the 1960s or early 1970s. Third came Tokelau, where commodity trade was still in 
balance in the early 1960s8, but moved dramatically into deficit during the years 1966-
75 before settling at the steady state level which has persisted through the last decade. 
Next came Tuvalu, whose separation from the profitable Gilbert and Ellice Islands 
colony in 1976 created overnight an import led economy. Finally came Kiribati, which 
ran a steady export surplus until the exhaustion of Ocean Island phosphates in 1979 
plunged the economy abruptly into deficit. 
 
The transition from commodity trade balance to trade "deficit” thus did not occur at the 
same time throughout the region. Different islands reached the transition phase at 
different times over the past four decades, and only in Niue and the Cook Islands has 
the post-transition steady state been in existence for more than a decade. Furthermore, 
the precise mechanism of transition varied from case to case. In Niue, Tokelau and 
Tuvalu the deficit arose from the superimposition of rapidly increasing standards of 
material consumption on top of a static production system; in none of these did export 
production ever look likely to support the newly attained material consumption 
standards. Quite simply, the resource base in these countries was inadequate to permit 
major expansion of the economic surplus.
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In the Cook Islands, as already noted, it was possible during the period from the 1940s 
to the 1960s to entertain the possibility that rising production might be able to underpin 
the new consumption levels, but this possibility evaporated during the 1970s as 
production sagged (for reasons discussed below9) while consumption levels continued to 
soar. 
 
In analysing the pictures shown by Figures 5.2-5.6, it is important to emphasise two key 
points: first, that it is completely inappropriate to read the increasing deficits on 
commodity trade as revealing any emerging "crisis"; and second, that the commodity 
trade figures are the tip of an iceberg, many of whose most important features are 
submerged and therefore out of sight in our diagrams.  
 
5.4   The "Widening of the Jaws” Effect 
 
The first point is the hardest for most New Zealanders to grasp: there is no crisis of trade 
dependence in the islands. New Zealanders have become so accustomed to live in fear of 
trade deficits and current account deficits, that it seems to require a real effort of will to 
recognise that there is nothing magical or necessarily "good” about equality between 
commodity exports and commodity imports. In New Zealand, the problem with trade 
deficits is that they (a) arise from internally generated stimulus to aggregate demand, 
and (b) therefore have to be paid for by overseas borrowing, since New Zealand is an aid 
giving rather than an aid receiving society. In our small island societies, in sharp 
contrast, there are no fiscal or monetary policies in the hands of local governments, and 
there is therefore no means of generating excess effective demand internally. All of the 
disposable cash income which is spent on imported commodities in the Islands is 
derived from "foreign exchange” injections to the local economy10. The widening of the 
"jaws” in most of our diagrams is driven not by fiscal expansion validated by overseas 
borrowing (the bane of so many “Third World” economies), but by a growing wedge of 
invisible current-account inflows on the balance of payments.  The balance of payments 
in four of our five case studies was in equilibrium, without major foreign borrowing, 
throughout the transition process. Only in Kiribati did the "jaws” open the other way  - 
by an abrupt collapse of phosphate exports which left established consumption 
expectations unsupported by incomes, so that a balance of payments crisis might have 
ensued but for a sharp increase in aid and remittance flows. 
 
The implication which follows from the preceding paragraph is also evidently not 
widely understood. With "excess imports” fully financed by flows of invisible payments  
- financial aid, remittances, tourism, philatelic revenues and so on - increases in 
commodity export earnings will have no effect whatever on the size of the "trade deficit” 
unless exports "crowd out” some category of invisible earnings. Otherwise, every dollar 
of additional export income flows through to finance an extra dollar of imports. Starting 
from the situation of 1984, commodity export earnings can never "catch up” with 
imports unless aid, remittances and tourism disappear. When policy-makers in New 
Zealand and the Islands talk of "increasing self-sufficiency”, by which they appear to 
mean reducing the trade deficit, they are talking about removing one or more of the 
props of the existing import affluence of the Island peoples. From a social-cost-benefit 
point of view, it is extraordinary that Island policy makers should contemplate 
committing substantial investment resources to projects whose intended payoff for the 
local population is zero. It is not easy to argue for increasing Island commodity exports, 
in the teeth of hostile market forces, purely to reduce the New Zealand Government's 
deficit by cutting the aid vote. This, however, appears to be the central plank in much 
aid policy design in recent years. 
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The second point, the relationship between the trade data of Figures 5.2-5.6 and the rest 
of the economy, involves us in some primitive national- income accounting. Total gross 
domestic production in any country consists of goods and services produced for home 
absorption11, plus tradeable production for export. Total absorption of goods and 
services in the community ("gross national expenditure” in the SNA accounts 
framework) consists of purchases of that part of home production destined for home 
absorption, plus tradeable goods imported from abroad. If we think of the economy as a 
layer cake with icing, then exports can be thought of as the icing on the production cake, 
and imports as the icing on the consumption (or absorption) cake: 
 
Our diagram shows three sectors of economic activity: subsistence production and 
consumption (with production, by definition, equal to consumption); government 
services (where again production and absorption are equal by definition); and foreign 
trade, where exports would be equal to imports only if there existed no inflows or 
outflows of "invisible” payments. Our graphs of foreign trade trace over time the 
growing gap between exports and imports, thus revealing the growing importance of the 
wedge of invisible payments which force open the "jaws”.  What is missing from those 
graphs is the layer cake which underlies the "surplus” production and absorption 
associated with foreign trade. In order to construct a complete picture of the historical 
trajectories of our five economies, we would need to add information about the 
magnitude and trends of the subsistence and government sectors. For the subsistence 
sector, this would involve a substantial amount of literature searching and some 
adventurous extrapolation; for the government sector, it would require disaggregation of 
annual budgeted expenditures between imports (which would have to be netted out) and 
local-economy expenditures. Pressure of time, and lack of resources, have prevented us 
from conducting this exercise in the context of the present study. The impression is 
gained from various sources that over the last few decades there may have been some 
decline in the volume of output and consumption of subsistence sector goods in all our 
economies, but especially in the Cook Islands and Niue, due largely to the effect of 
import competition in food, housing and apparel. Casual observation suggests, however, 
that the subsistence sectors remain strong in all five of our cases (in sharp contrast to the 
situation in, for example, Nauru or the Society Islands, where imports have almost 
entirely displaced home production). 
 
At the same time there has occurred a substantial expansion of the government sectors in 
all five, with a rising share of expenditure on local economy salaries and wages as jobs 
have been transferred from expatriates to locals. While we have not disaggregated the 
figures, we have constructed graphs of government revenues and expenditures, deflated 
to 1982 dollars, which are reproduced as Figures 5.7-5.11. In all cases the sharp 
expansion of real government expenditure in recent decades is evident, as is the 
dependence of the government sector on non-local sources of revenue, mainly financial 
grants from New Zealand (Niue, Cook Islands and Tokelau) and the UK (Tuvalu and 
Kiribati). 
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5.5   Differences in the Five Economies 
 
Having emphasised the similarities among our five economies, it is worth focussing on 
some comparative data to emphasise the differences. To begin with, it is clear that the 
level of surplus production from the neo-traditional economy, as reflected by export 
earnings, is dramatically greater from the "high island” economies of Niue12 and the 
Cook Islands than from the pure atoll economies of Tokelau, Tuvalu and post-1979 
Kiribati. This is brought out by the per-capita export data presented in Table 5.1. It is 
also evident that, starting from their greater productive base, the first two have remained 
consistently ahead of the rest in terms of import consumption, with Cook Island imports 
having reached $1,400 per capita by 1982/83 compared to less than $400 per capita in 
the three atoll societies. In all five cases, the early 1980s have been a period of 
stagnation or decline in levels of import consumption, reflecting the end of the "boom 
phase” of the transition to import led economies, and the Pacific-wide impact of world 
recession. 
 
The greater import absorption in Niue and the Cook Islands reflects substantial 
differences in "style of life” in the larger islands as against the small atoll societies. 
Roads, motor vehicles, and space for extensive recreational activities generate more 
import "needs” than occur on atolls. As, however, the monetisation of atoll society 
proceeds (which seems inevitable on present trends) it can be anticipated that unsatisfied  
demands for more imports will increase, with consequent pressure on local governments 
to secure the financing to permit those imports. The sadly familiar "debt syndrome” then 
becomes a definite prospect for the future in Tuvalu and Kiribati unless offshore sources 
of funding are located which do not involve the creation of overseas debt. Of various 
possible means of generating a greater flow of funds to pay for imports, the least 
attractive is the promotion of uneconomic onshore ventures to produce commodity 
exports (in other words, the normal "development aid project”). Of much greater interest 
for the future are philatelic type sources of rent ("hiring out” the distinct local identity to 
a world market); access to offshore labour markets for migrants, with associated 
freedom to transfer remittances (this is a major issue for Tuvalu and Kiribati); and 
increased levels of direct consumption subsidies from the donor economies of the 
region. 
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TABLE 5.1 
 
TRADE DATA IN 1982 CONSTANT DOLLARS 
 
YEAR 
COOK 
ISLANDS 
$NZ 
NIUE       
$NZ 
TOKELAU  
$NZ 
TUVALU     
$A 
KIRIBATI   
$A 
   Per Capita Imports 
      
1950 629 301 87 …  174
1960 618 604 26 …  184
1970 1,121 655 178 …  238
1980 1,704 1,208 328 506 343
1982/3 1,401 1,143 287 348 218
      
   Per Capita Exports 
      
1950 304 219 99* …  230
1960 320 58 56 ...  288
1970 551 170 35 ...  499
1980  153 173* 11 59
1982/3 281 197 32 3 48
            
* Untypical boom year 
 
This brings us to the structure of the balance of payments in our various case study 
economies. In Table 5.2 we assemble some very crude figures13 for the past decade and 
a half. The essential point is the clear evidence that the balance of payments, and with it 
the total economy of each of the economies, is driven not by commodity exports but by 
current-account invisibles. This is the defining characteristic of "MIRAB” economies14. 
In the Cook Islands, the invisible categories philatelic, tourism, remittances and "aid” 
come to four times the income from commodity exports.  On Niue the ratio is ten times; 
in Kiribati four times, in Tokelau seven times, and in Tuvalu 45 times. Narrowing the 
focus to grant aid and remittances alone yields much the same conclusions. 
 
Two major anomalies strike the eye in Table 5.2. The first is pre 1980 Kiribati, where 
the balance of payments exhibits the classical colonial structure of a mineral-exporting 
primary producer. Until phosphates ran out in 1979-1980, Kiribati normally ran a 
massive cash surplus on current transactions, which flowed out of the economy as a 
profit outflow until the establishment by the Kiribati Government of the Revenue 
Equalisation Reserve Fund in 1975; thereafter phosphate profits went to finance 
overseas investment by the Government. Since 1980 Kiribati has exhibited the balance 
of payments characteristics of a modern atoll economy. 
 
The second anomaly arises in the case of remittances and the residual balance in Niue. It 
will be noted that throughout the period covered, the amount of New Zealand financial 
assistance to Niue exceeded the total value of imports, with philatelic revenues and 
commodity export earnings adding to the consequent cash surplus. Adding in 
remittances from New Zealand brings the total cash surplus balance in our Table to 60-
70% of the value of imports; and this appears to be a case where imports were reported 
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TABLE 5.2 
SOME BALANCE-OF-PAYMENTS ESTIMATES : ANNUAL AVERAGES 
000 at 1982 prices 
  Commodity exports   - 
Commodity 
imports + 
Philatelic & 
tourism + Aid + Remittances = 
Residual 
balance 
 Cook Islands              
1970-74 8,638  20,524   -   12,694  3,371  4,179
1975-79 5,413  32,345  6,000  12,798  3,923  4,211
1980-83 5,199  27,346  8,530  10,295  4,000  678
            
Niue             
1970-74 608  3,172   -   4,700  50?  2,186
1975-79 483  4,302  150  6,106  100?  2,537
1980-83 568  3,984  300  5,353  300  2,537
            
Kiribati             
1970-74 31,213  15,739  n.a.  n.a. n.a. n.a.
1975-79 35,581  18,712  1,000?  4,000  1,000  22,069
1980-83 3,446  14,879  1,000  11,000  2,000  2,567
            
Tokelau 
8 c
           
1970-74 85  363a    270b  
1975-79 104  410a  40  236b  30? c
1980-83 63  490a  100+  227b  100?? c
         
Tuvalu             
1979 82 124  3,021  1,500  3,500+  600  2,703
                        
a – Store goods only  b -  Calculated as a residual   c – See note b. 
CIF rather than FOB, so that we have fewer unrecorded invisible payments than in some 
of the other cases. The implication, confirmed by some casual impressions gained in a 
rapid visit to Niue, is that the Niuean private sector is a net exporter of financial 
savings, which places Niue in sharp contrast to the other economies where net 
remittances run clearly from abroad to the local economy. With a very high ratio of 
lucrative government employment to total population, Niue is a society whose current 
cash needs are over-financed relative to absorptive capacity, and in the absence of 
opportunities for profitable private investment on the island, private sector savings are 
transferred to New Zealand15. A major channel for this transfer is the Post Office 
Savings Bank, which takes in deposits in Niue but transfers surplus balances to New 
Zealand; in 1982 this is reported to have involved the transfer of $1.5 million to New 
Zealand to be banked there16. 
 
Niue, therefore, is a MIAB rather than a MIRAB economy, which matches other aspects 
of Niuean evolution, particularly the high rates of out-migration to New Zealand and a 
lack of confidence in the future of the local economy and society. Niuean migrant 
households in New Zealand are less likely than migrants from the other islands to have 
close relatives remaining on the island to receive remittances; and still less likely to 
have relatively poorly off relatives (given the almost all pervasive spread of public 
service salaries and the total lack of pressure on subsistence resources). 
 
Table 5.3 provides some indicators of the importance of government employment in 
some of our case study economies. (Data on Kiribati could not be located). In no case 
except Niue does government employment occupy more than about 20% of the 
population of working age; in Niue the figure is 40% (which is equivalent to nearly 
every able bodied male on the island, since female participation rates are low). The 
combined impact of an exaggerated early expansion of the public service under New 
Zealand administration, a Constitution which makes cutbacks extremely difficult, and a 
rapidly falling population, account for the Niuean imbalance. (In 1970, when population 
was still around 5,000, the government employment ratio for Niue was very similar to 
that in the Cook Islands. The 1970s migration process in Niue can thus be summarised, 
not altogether unfairly, as the departure of everyone except the public service and their 
families). 
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TABLE  5.3 
 
ROLE OF GOVERNMENT EMPLOYMENT 
 
 
  COOK ISLANDS TOKELAU NIUE TUVALU 
Population 15 & over 9,730  1,959 4,943
     
Economically active 5,810  976 4,010
       
Cash employment 5,541  976 936
     
Government employment 2,154 180 784 500
     
Government % of cash empl. 39 90+ 80 53
     
Government % of popn. 15+ 22  40 10
          
 
 
 
 
 5.6   Official Culture and "Development” Policy 
 
Policy emerges from the operation of a collective political and bureaucratic "mind”, and 
naturally reflects the "mind set”, or culturally determined preconceptions, of the policy 
makers. Within the magic circle of official discussion, it is possible to use words such 
as "development”, "dependence”, "viability” and so on without pausing to worry about 
what these words actually mean, because they are really just verbal triggers for a set of 
shared assumptions and interpretations of the world. This world view is shared by 
virtually all those in positions of responsibility and power both in New Zealand and in 
the Pacific Islands (where New Zealand has played a major role in the training and 
indoctrination of the local political and administrative elites). There thus exists an 
"official culture” within which solutions are sought to policy dilemmas. In 
communicating with each other, officials proceed easily within the comfortable 
framework of their shared world view; their main problem is not so much 
communicating with each other, as communicating with "outsiders” who see the world 
in different ways, and hence lean towards policy proposals which to the official mind 
are clearly "not on". 
 
The two sections which follow attempt to deal with two areas where from the outsider’s 
point of view, the official culture seems to produce muddled thinking. These are the 
extension to small island economies of the nationalistic assumptions familiar in large 
countries; and the denial that capitalist development is subversive of island society. 
 
1)  The nationalist fallacy. This is the idea, introduced on the first page of this 
chapter, that "economic analysis must conform to political demarcations rather 
than economic reality”.  The training and world view of the staff of the Ministry 
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of Foreign Affairs are, naturally enough, directed to relations between nations 
conceived of as separate geographic and political units. It requires real effort to 
adapt to situations where the normal formulae of international affairs do not 
apply. We have argued elsewhere (Chapter 3) that a failure by many officials to 
make this necessary transition accounts for some current difficulties with the 
concept of "free association”.  Our concern here is to suggest that attempting to 
analyse, and prescribe for, MIRAB economies on the basis of a nationalistic 
model is a recipe for confusion and disappointment. 
  
Consider, for example, the status of those members of island communities who 
live outside their home territory as migrants, whether temporary or permanent. 
The official view, reinforced with plenty of precedents from international law, is 
that islanders resident in New Zealand are part of New Zealand, not part of the 
Islands. This is the usual census approach - "de facto” place of residence is what 
the official statistician wants to know about. When, therefore, an official 
document talks about "the Cook Islands labour force”, what is meant is the 
population of working age actually resident in the Cook Islands. When the 
"standard of living” is discussed, what is meant is the average disposable income 
of those resident in the island group concerned. 
 
This pigeonholing of people according to where they happen to be physically 
located has the convenient result of resolving numerous policy dilemmas, in 
accordance with a pre-determined set of criteria which all "insiders” share (and 
which are, of course, inculcated into administrative elites in the islands as part of 
their training). It also fits conveniently into the modern conventions of national 
income accounting, with its focus on Gross Domestic Product (that is, the 
production of goods and services within the defined territorial boundaries of the 
national unit).17  It also fits well with the Departmental structure of New 
Zealand’s administrative management of island affairs. The Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, by definition, is concerned with matters which lie offshore from mainland 
New Zealand, which is how the Islands (including Niue, Cook Islands, and 
Tokelau) are now conventionally regarded. 
 
There is, however, another way of viewing the same reality, and it is a way which 
seems to conform more closely with the way in which the key actors perceive 
themselves. Even though resident in New Zealand, an islander is still recognised 
as an islander, both by the New Zealand community and by fellow islanders. 
Many island country census reports include attempts to measure the de jure, as 
well as de facto, population; and there is a wide spread feeling that the community 
of, say, Tokelauans, includes both those living in Tokelau and those in New 
Zealand in the overall Tokeluan identity - language, culture, family ties, and so 
on. If we define "Tokelau” as the atolls and those physically resident thereon, then 
New Zealand policy towards Tokelau is clearly to be seen as dealing with 
relations between two geographic entities. If, on the other hand, we define 
"Tokelau” in social or organic terms, then we would include all those who 
identify themselves as Tokelauan, wherever they presently live. 
 
That this is not mere hair splitting becomes evident as soon as we ask what is 
meant by "development for Tokelau”.  On the official definition of Tokelau, 
development is conceived of as the expansion and diversification of economic 
activity taking place geographically on the Tokelau atolls. On the organic 
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definition of Tokelau, "development” might be conceived of as the opening up of 
successively wider economic and social horizons for Tokelauans, including the 
opportunities represented by migration out of Tokelau itself to work in New 
Zealand. In official eyes the latter view is clearly illegitimate as a description of 
"development”   but it is in line with what the islanders themselves do; in other 
words, it corresponds to the aspirations of many Tokelauans as revealed by their 
real world choices. 
 
It is further true that if we take a view of "development” which emphasises the 
raising of incomes and wealth over time, then for island societies with limited 
natural resources but well-educated labour forces there are obvious attractions to a 
strategy of allocating the community's labour force internationally so as to take 
advantage of the highest paying niches of the world economy, and then to 
redistribute part of the income earned by migrant workers among the rest of the 
community. Certainly, from the point of view of the individual household in the 
islands, the economic logic of selective migration is compelling: it pays to operate 
as a transnational enterprise. 
 
The status of islanders living and working in New Zealand is therefore 
ambiguous:   they are at the same time part of New Zealand and part of their home 
islands, so long as they retain links with home. Cook Islanders resident in New 
Zealand but retaining relatives, a family home and land rights in the Cook Islands, 
are a key part of the Cook Islands economy. A policy-maker's perspective which 
insists that economic activities in New Zealand cannot be "part of” the Cook 
Islands economy is therefore only one of the possible ways of interpreting, and 
hence prescribing for, that economy. It is certainly, compared to the alternative 
which we have been outlining, a perspective which predisposes one towards a 
pessimistic and draconian view about "development of the Cook Islands 
economy”.  The observer of the Cook Islands in the 1970s sees a large number of 
the most productive workers abandoning agricultural export production and 
moving into the more lucrative opportunities offered by employment in Auckland. 
Is this a positive or a negative thing for "Cook Islands development"? If a 
geographically exclusive view is taken, the trend seems negative - agricultural 
production has "collapsed”.  If an organic view is taken, the picture looks quite 
different: Cook Islanders have managed, by hiring out family members offshore, 
to raise their standards of material consumption considerably above what could 
have been attained by the export production route. Remittances from Cook 
Islanders in New Zealand are now a more important source of purchasing power 
in the Cook Islands than are commodity export earnings. We are looking here at 
that frequently trumpeted goal of policy economists, "reallocation of resources 
from less efficient to be more efficient uses”, with an accompanying restructuring 
of the economy in which the relatively uncompetitive sectors go to the wall. The 
New Zealand policy response (faithfully echoed, though without much conviction, 
by the Cook Islands Government) has been to attempt to revive the dying sectors 
and attract the reallocated resources back to less profitable activities. 
 
What does this signify for our conception of "development"? Basically, that if we 
want to promote the idea of the  open economy (that is, an economic system open 
to the world and responding to international price signals in its resource 
allocation), then it is not very helpful to exclude from our definition of 
"development” the key real world response of economic agents to those signals. 
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The geographically restricted definition of "development”, if it is to be used 
prescriptively, makes sense only if we are at the same time promoting a closed 
economy (along East German/Berlin wall lines). The maintenance of New 
Zealand citizenship and free movement of labour from the Cook Islands, Niue and 
Tokelau to New Zealand simply runs counter to the conception of development 
promoted in many policy statements. One or the other will have to "give”, and 
faced with the choice between depriving New Zealand citizens of their rights on 
the one hand, and adjusting the official perception of the world on the other, we 
have no hesitation in supporting the latter. 
 
It must be emphasised at once that we are not accusing New Zealand officials of 
being blind to the issues raised here. On the contrary, there is much anguished 
discussion of the implications of the migration/remittance linkage. What we are 
suggesting is that the widespread perception of "failure” on the development front 
is a problem in the heads of New Zealand officials, rather than in the islands 
themselves. Coping with "failure” therefore may involve changes in official 
assumptions rather than substantive changes on the ground in the Pacific.  Indeed, 
seen from the Islands' side of the fence, there are grounds for suggesting that what 
we have witnessed in the former New Zealand territories during the 1960s and 
1970s has been an economic and social success story. The central achievements 
have been: 
 
(1) preservation of the links to New Zealand via citizenship, migration and 
financial grants to maintain basic services; 
 
(2) relocation, either temporary or permanent, of a substantial part of the Island 
labour force into relatively lucrative employment niches in New Zealand, 
providing the basis for long term maintenance of the "home” social order in 
the Islands by means of income transfers (this applies less to Niue than the 
other two, for reasons discussed elsewhere); 
 
(3) creation of a range of positions in public service employment which have 
served to hold some of the best educated and most able islanders in the 
Islands (a role which commercial enterprise has never seemed likely to 
perform) and provided them with fulfilling and socially prestigious tasks to 
perform in their home society. 
 
The main negative elements in the picture have been the efforts of aid donors 
(including the newly imperialistic multi-national agencies) to get inappropriate 
strategies and unprofitable projects off the ground. The problem lies in the 
preconceived "development” models of the international consultant. 
 
2)  The Dualist Fallacy. In the "modernisation” paradigm, discussed earlier, the 
dynamics of long run economic and social change are usually analysed in terms of 
a "dualist” transition phase during which the modern sector, superior in all key 
respects to the traditional sector, steadily expands as the traditional society 
withers away. Because the superiority of the modern world is taken for granted, 
this withering away is considered both inevitable and welcome since at the end of 
the process (when dualism has been eliminated by the triumph of modernity) 
everyone is better off. 
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Standard dualist models of development suffer from two important blind spots. 
The first is a failure to recognise the possibility that dualism could become 
entrenched as a permanent equilibrium state of society, rather than a temporary 
"construction period”.  The second is a failure to allow for the possibility that in 
certain circumstances, the "modern” may be inferior to the "traditional”, so that 
the displacement of the latter by the former is undesirable. These can be 
summarised as a failure of the standard development paradigm to recognise that 
modernisation can be destructively subversive without yielding convincing 
compensating benefits. 
 
The theme of this section is that it is a fallacy to suppose that in the conditions of 
very small Pacific economies, the implantation and nurturing of a capitalistically 
organised modern sector is the key to improving either economy or society over 
the long run. Small island resource endowments do not provide the "space” for 
large scale commercial projects onshore to coexist with the village economy; and 
the displacement of the latter by the former is of dubious merit in a setting where 
commodity production is inherently unprofitable. The replacement of an 
integrated non capitalist economy by a permanently subsidised (and hence 
potentially unstable) capitalist economy should certainly not be promoted merely 
because the process superficially resembles some stereotype of "development” 
drawn from continental labour surplus economies. 
 
If, indeed, permanent subsidies are regarded as acceptable by donors, they may 
better be directed towards enhancing the prosperity of the existing economy, 
rather than promoting unwarranted structural changes18. (Since subsidies from 
New Zealand to island economies have similar economic implications to a real 
exchange rate devaluation for those economies, it may be helpful to imagine such 
an exchange rate change, and ask whether the capitalist or the non capitalist 
sectors would come out ahead in a straight competitive race). 
 
 
5.7   Dualist Policy Dilemmas 
 
Throughout the Pacific, proponents are to be found of two potentially-conflicting 
visions of the long-run objectives of "development”.  On the one hand are those who see 
the existing village economy as the permanent core of society and economic life, and 
who judge allegedly "developmental” activities by the extent to which they contribute 
to supporting and enriching village life. On the other hand are those who conceive of 
development as the transformation of the existing order by means of investment projects 
and the expansion of wage labour, bureaucracy, and the capitalist economy. Tuvalu's 
First and Second Development Plans, for example, pay lip service to both visions, but 
then take refuge in the delusion that both can be realised simultaneously without 
fundamental conflict. The typical development planner focuses on the search for 
profitable commercial projects and underestimates (or discounts) the extent to which the 
deliberate creation of a dual economy is subversive of village life. 
 
There is always a risk, in such small economies with so many responsibilities and 
powers placed upon their governments, that ambitious bureaucrats and politicians, 
abetted by the international aid establishment, may push these "countries” into large 
scale commercial ventures which turn out to be permanent loss makers. (Examples are 
the grandiose 1980-82 plans for tuna exports from Tuvalu, including the acquisition of a 
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Japanese boat for the industry; and the current Cook Islands plans for wood-fired 
electricity). Neither capitalism nor state capitalism are readily sustainable in MIRAB 
economies, and it is far from clear that sustained capitalism is the correct object of a 
"development” exercise. Under the circumstances, it is important not to encourage 
island governments to embark upon inefficient, risky and socially disruptive projects 
within their territorial boundaries. 
 
New Zealand aid officials over the past couple of decades seem to have been divided 
over the aims of "development”, and hence over the criteria to be used in evaluating the 
effectiveness of aid in contributing towards the achievement of the aims. The original 
view19 of most New Zealand policy makers in the 1950s and 1960s was that the major 
role for financial grants was to underpin the "foreign exchange” needs of a more 
affluent village system, by subsidising consumption within that system. Rising levels of 
financial support from New Zealand thus underpinned the emergence of the MIRAB 
economy in the Cook Islands, Niue and Tokelau; while similar UK financed evolution 
took place in Tuvalu, and in Kiribati excluding Banaba. The channels for these 
consumption subsidies were various: payment of salaries in an expanding public 
service; subsidisation of shipping costs to reduce the landed cost of imports; provision 
of social infrastructure (schools, hospitals, roads); and in a few cases, payment of 
producer subsidies to households engaged in production for export. The underlying 
rationale was very much the same as that which underpinned the welfare state in 
mainland New Zealand: a duty was recognised to ensure that certain basic welfare 
needs were met, over and above the subsistence needs which were readily available 
from local resources. 
 
The direct target of such a programme of financial assistance was the standard of living, 
and both New Zealand and UK administrators could claim success on this front by the 
mid-1970s. The main problems which were emerging by that time related to areas 
where the delivery system for consumption subsidies had the form of a "modern sector” 
to an extent which was beyond the local society's absorptive capacity; the most striking 
example is the impact of the public service in Niue and Tokelau. (In Tokelau, rigid 
application of bureaucratic rules of employment and payment prevented integration of 
the expanding public service with the village system of labour organisation and income 
sharing; in Niue almost the entire locally resident labour force was absorbed into the 
public service, making the entire island a government department with nowhere to go). 
Another case in point is the organisation of shipping   particularly the Joint Shipping 
Service to Niue and the Cook Islands, where the terms of the so called Waitangi Accord 
mean that much of the subsidy is paid to New Zealand seamen rather than island 
households. 
 
There is a strong case to be made for the continuation of a policy of subsidising 
consumption in the island societies, especially so long as they remain closely integrated 
with the New Zealand labour market. The notion that island populations are not "self 
supporting” or "self reliant” is highly dubious unless migrant workers are excluded (the 
"nationalist fallacy” already discussed). A recent study of migration from the Cook 
Islands (Hayes, 1982: 374-379) used estimates for the decade 1967-1976 to suggest that 
in 1966 dollars, Cook Islands migrant workers in New Zealand generated $137 million 
of GDP, of which about $100 million went to them as wages (i.e. corresponded to their 
labour contribution to GDP).  Of this, $10 million was remitted back to the Cook 
Islands, and about $27 million was paid as taxes to the New Zealand Government. New 
Zealand aid over the period was $21 million, leaving $6 million of tax revenues to 
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finance social services provided to the New Zealand resident islanders. Because the 
dependency ratios among migrant households were lower than the New Zealand 
average of that period (with many dependents remaining behind in the islands), and 
because the education ("human capital”) of island workers was paid for out of the aid 
grant to the islands, Hayes suggests that the net cost of the Cook Islands MIRAB 
economy to the New Zealand economy was negligible or negative. 
 
Similar estimates for the last decade are not to hand, but no doubt could be constructed. 
Hayes' figures, of course, are not immune to criticism. His point, however, is a valid 
one: Cook Islanders as a total community more or less "pay their way”.  But because 
that community is divided into two halves - a group of surplus households resident in 
New Zealand, and a group of deficit households in the islands - it is easy for official 
commentators to define the surplus households out of the Cook Islands economy, and 
then to prescribe for the deficit households a programme of "bootstraps development” 
within the territory of the islands, on the grounds that income transfers between the two 
halves of Cook Islands society are a "burden” on New Zealand. 
 
A better way of looking at the existing situation is that the Cook Islanders (and Niueans 
and Tokelauans) already participate in a dual economy, with a modern sector absorbing 
labour freed from the neo traditional village economy. The modern sector is located 
where both economic and commercial sense suggest it should be located: on the New 
Zealand mainland. Proposals to build up a modern sector in the islands, to compete for 
labour with the existing modern sector in New Zealand, would carry some conviction if 
there were a strong case for the transformation of the island economies from the village 
mode of production to capitalist systems. No such case, however, has been made to 
date. The argument generally advanced for production oriented "development” 
programmes  in the islands is that the provision of more lucrative onshore employment 
would contribute to reducing the flow of out-migration, and maintaining a more 
demographically balanced population in the islands themselves. 
 
Here we turn to the second, competing, strand in New Zealand official thinking. Since 
the eclipse of the Department of Island Territories by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
official views on aid and development in the islands have been based upon the 
application in the Pacific of slogans derived from other so-called "developing areas”, 
where the link between living standards and local production remains strong. The 
change of emphasis was most clearly evident in the redesign of New Zealand's financial 
assistance to the Cook Islands in 1975. The New Zealand Representative set out the 
change as follows: 
 
"New Zealand's economic assistance to the Cooks was transposed 
from the old essentially monetary aid system administered by Maori 
and Island Affairs, into a more purposefully  
developmental aid package in line with New Zealand's normal 
overseas assistance programme. 
 
Basically the change from the New Zealand standpoint, entails 
according to the Cook  
Islands precisely the same treatment, based on a mutual respect for 
independence, that New Zealand operates in its aid relationships 
with all other aid recipients. Secondly, it has involved the evolution 
of an aid package based on the perceived needs and priorities of the 
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Cook Island authorities themselves. It has entailed, thirdly, the 
establishment of certain politically subscribed goals (which may or 
may not be attainable in the short to medium term) and in 
particular, establishes that the aim of the aid programme shall be to 
build progressively a more self sustaining economy in the Cooks, to 
give practical expression to that sovereignty envisaged under the 
Constitution"20. 
 
A Foreign Affairs Position Paper of 16 April 1975 set out the nuts and bolts of the new 
approach: 
 
"The purpose of this paper is to ... explain the policies and 
procedures employed by the External Aid Division of the Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs in the administration of New Zealand's official 
development assistance (ODA) programme. With the Ministry's 
assumption of responsibility for overall relations with the Cook 
Islands Government, these policies and procedures would normally 
become the operational framework for any programme of 
development cooperation with the Cooks. They differ in several 
very important respects from those employed in the past by the 
Department of Maori and Island Affairs in connection with the 
previous arrangements for financial aid. 
 
... In simplest terms New Zealand's official development assistance 
(ODA) philosophy is to assist other countries to assist themselves. It 
is aimed basically at supplying inputs of capital, technical skill and 
training to assist economic, and social, development in countries 
which, for one reason or another, are unable themselves to supply 
those inputs, and which therefore ask New Zealand for help. The 
programme is project oriented. That is to say, the New Zealand 
contribution is linked specifically to given projects or undertakings 
which the receiving country itself considers important to its own 
economic and social progress; and in all cases the programme 
contains an important training element in order that counterpart 
personnel from the cooperating country may acquire the necessary 
skills and expertise to take over, in the shortest space of time, the 
running of the project(s) in question. At the heart of the programme 
is a transfer of technology. 
 
... The application of this ODA philosophy to any aid programme 
with the Cook Islands implies therefore, and it is important to 
recognise this at the outset, the phasing out of any system of 
unspecified capital grants. It will incidentally also entail the 
discontinuance of loan type assistance. New Zealand's ODA 
programme is, for the present anyway, based almost exclusively on 
grant, as against loan, assistance.  
 
... There is a second and longer term implication. To the extent that 
such a development oriented programme is successful in 
contributing to the progressive efforts of the Cook Islands 
Government itself to build a self supporting economy, so the 
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requirement for budgetary assistance from New Zealand for 
administrative purposes should diminish. The New Zealand 
Government will also be pursuing trade and other economic policies 
designed to accelerate this process. 
 
... While no exact time scale can be placed upon such a 
development, it is a clear objective to produce a situation within 
about ten years where budgetary support from New Zealand to the 
Cook Islands for administrative purposes could be progressively 
phased down, and eventually discontinued entirely. Otherwise, it 
will be very difficult to arrive at the full financial and economic 
sovereignty envisaged for the Cook Islands in the Constitution. 
 
This is the logic of building a programme of development 
cooperation with the Cooks in  keeping with the ODA principles 
and philosophy as explained by this paper. In such an evolving 
situation the level and direction of development assistance would 
always be sustained in accordance with the needs and priorities 
established by the Cook Island authorities themselves. 
 
... There are three consequences of the system of overall 
development assistance planning which it is proposed will in future 
apply to the Cooks and which merit emphasis. First the present 
system of triennial financial review ... will no longer operate. The 
system of annual project identification mission(s) will permit yearly 
reviews. ... 
 
... The application to the Cook Islands of the ODA principles and 
practices described above would mean, from the New Zealand 
standpoint, that the situation of the Cooks would be identical, in all 
respects, to that of all other countries, in Asia, the Pacific, Africa 
and Latin America, with whom New Zealand has development 
assistance programmes in operation. 
 
... Budgetary assistance programmes do not customarily form part 
of New Zealand's official development assistance (ODA) policy as 
administered by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The assumption of 
budgetary assistance responsibilities for the Cook Islands will 
represent therefore a new departure for the Ministry. 
 
… In terms of the forward planning procedures, it is envisaged, at 
least to begin with, that the same procedures should apply to the 
budgetary assistance component as with developmental assistances 
to the Cooks.” 
 
Such ideas were not, of course, altogether new to the islands; strong elements of 
similar thinking appear in, for example, the 1955 Belshaw/Stace report in the Cook 
Islands. Even during the period when the de facto impact of New Zealand assistance 
was to subsidise consumption, there was a good deal of rhetoric about promoting 
onshore commodity production, usually for the twin purposes of (1) reducing the level 
of New Zealand subsidy required to support a given level of living standards, and (2) 
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creating a "healthy' society with employment in productive as well as unproductive 
activities. Frequently the two strands blur together, as in Belshaw and Stace's 
suggestion that a healthy society is a self reliant one21.  The Cook Islands citrus 
programme rested on just such a rationale, as does the current support for banana 
production on Aitutaki and coconut cream on Niue. 
 
In analysing this line of thinking, the main problem is separating the baby from the 
bathwater. What needs to be discarded is the notion that production should be boosted  
for its own sake (that is, that "development' is identified with rising GDP). GDP 
growth is not an end in itself, but one possible means to an end - namely the 
improvement of the human condition. Growth is neither a necessary nor a sufficient 
condition for such improvement. Failure to recognise this remains a major blind spot 
in conventional thinking among aid donors active in the Pacific region. 
 
In evaluating any proposals relating to promotion of productive activities, therefore, 
the key issue is the ends to be attained. "Improvement of the human condition' is as 
vague a term as "development"; before it can be used analytically, it must be given 
substantive content. When New Zealand officials articulate the goals to be served by 
productive projects in the smallest Pacific economies, the reduction of "aid 
dependence” and the promotion of "healthy” or "viable” societies are recurrent themes. 
The points which need to be borne in mind when evaluating aid and "development” 
performance relative to these goals are the following: 
 
 (1)  Reducing aid dependence is not self evidently a sensible goal; 
 
(2) "Productive” activity which absorbs economic surplus rather than generating it, 
does not contribute to economic self reliance; 
 
(3) Official New Zealand perceptions of what makes a society "healthy” or 
otherwise are rather suspect, because of the strong conditioning effect of 
modernisation theory on New Zealand aid thinking. 
 
All three deserve some further comment. Starting with the first, we confront the 
question of why "reducing dependence” has been such a powerful element in New 
Zealand thinking about the island economies. It is certainly true that a familiar set of 
slogans are available from other parts of the world economy, suggesting that 
dependence can have undesirable consequences; but on inspection virtually all such 
slogans turn out to be inapplicable in the particular case of the micro economies. What 
we are then left with is the point that the main beneficiaries from any process of 
"reducing dependence” in the Pacific islands are the New Zealand taxpayers, not the 
islanders. The "hidden agenda” behind the anti dependency stance of New Zealand aid 
officials, we would suggest, is the view that New Zealand taxpayers either  should not, 
or  are unwilling to, subsidise living standards in the islands. We suspect that this view 
may not be well founded. 
 
The second point, relating to the generation of economic surplus, is the familiar one 
from project evaluation manuals, that investment projects which yield a zero rate of 
return on the resources committed to them are in fact indistinguishable from straight 
consumption subsidies. One may opt for producer subsidies as an efficient, or 
equitable (or both) channel for the distribution of income supplements; but it should be 
explicitly recognised that such programmes change the form, rather than the substance, 
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of so called "aid dependence”.  There are, we would argue, substantial advantages in 
shifting some of the flow of financial assistance from present channels into producer 
subsidies   but those advantages do not relate to any goal of so called "self reliance”.  
These arguments also are set out at greater length below. 
 
The third point, that even the best intentioned observers from wealthy modern societies 
are prone to see modern practices as "healthy” and traditional ones as "unhealthy”, 
relates closely to the points already made about the "official culture” which determines 
the mind set of policy makers. 
 
 
5.8   Why Dependence Doesn’t Matter 
 
This is not the place to embark upon any detailed discussion of dependency theory; our 
concern in this section is merely to criticise the mechanical application to the special 
circumstances of the Pacific of the slogan that "dependence” is a bad thing. When 
pressed to explain what is undesirable about "dependence”, most people using the term 
seem to fall back on one or more of the following propositions: 
 
  dependence produces instability 
  dependence is incompatible with true political independence 
  dependence is psychologically destructive 
  dependence prevents the emergence of "autonomous” capitalism. 
 
Taking these in order, we can immediately dismiss the first as inapplicable in the 
island setting. The familiar argument linking dependence to instability is one which 
focuses on the problems arising from being a primary product export producer in a 
fluctuating world market; this conception has had a strong influence on New 
Zealanders’ perception of their own economic problem22. "Dependence” is here 
defined in terms of trade structure   either as "excessive” concentration upon 
production of a few specialised commodities, or an "excessive” reliance on one 
overseas market to take export production. In MIRAB economies, neither point is of 
great significance: commodity export earnings are of only minor importance in driving 
the economy, so that fluctuations in such earnings are less important than in full blown 
export led systems; and the close integration of at least the three New Zealand MIRAB 
clients with the metropolitan economy tends to provide protected market status rather 
than vulnerability. 
 
In this connection, it is worth recalling that the introduction of SPARTECA, which 
opened up the New Zealand market to a wider range of Pacific economies (including 
several relatively large export led ones such as Fiji) posed an actual threat to the 
previously favoured export products from the Cook Islands23 and Niue, and specific 
steps were taken in New Zealand's "negative list” to preserve their protected status. 
The protection was withdrawn (e.g. from citrus products and passionfruit) only when 
production in the client economies faded out. It is, in other words, not necessarily any 
bad thing to be "dependent” on a particular market, if preferential conditions are 
enjoyed there and the authorities are well disposed. (New Zealand, indeed, long and 
vigorously resisted having to diversify away from the familiar and friendly UK market 
for major primary commodity exports, for the straightforward reason that agreed 
preferential market access confers not instability, but relative stability and 
predictability of export earnings). 
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Turning to the second proposition, that economic dependence is incompatible with full 
political sovereignty, we may immediately accept the proposition without changing 
our stance. We have argued elsewhere (Chapter 3) that full sovereign independence, 
and a corresponding untrammelled freedom of action, has never been the main goal 
sought by MIRAB societies. The Cook Islands, Niue and Tokelau, all explicitly and 
clearly rejected proposals for their full independence from New Zealand, opting 
instead to emphasise the preservation of links with the patron state. In these societies, 
it is not evident that political independence is an overriding priority, and indeed the 
essence of the "special relationship” of free association with New Zealand entered into 
by the first two was the acceptance and legitimation of continued economic 
dependence, it being clearly recognised that this placed limitations upon the islanders’ 
freedom of action in the political sphere. It has been New Zealand officials in 
Wellington, together with a few ambitious individual members of the political elite in 
the Cook Islands, who have viewed sovereign independence as the ultimate goal, and 
hence have argued for the elimination of both "trade” and "aid” dependence. Since the 
premise is flawed, the argument does not stand. 
 
In the somewhat different cases of Tuvalu and Kiribati, very similar points apply. In 
neither case did either the elites or the population at large wish to see any diminution 
of the inflow of aid to their territories; quite the contrary, they appear to have taken the 
view that political independence was a necessary price to pay in order to qualify for 
increased aid. As one Kiribati official confided to a visitor, "independence is as good 
as a negotiable bank draft"24.  The prospect of having to embark upon programmes of 
self reliance and belt tightening, once aid flows turned out to be limited and declining, 
was greeted with dismay in both countries; as the latest Kiribati Plan notes25. 
 
 
If viability means the capacity of a country to feed and look after its population from 
its own resources then, obviously, under existing conditions Kiribati is either not 
viable or is rapidly attaining that unhappy state. Perhaps the most important objective 
towards which decentralisation must seek to make a contribution, should be identified 
as national survival.  
 
Both countries, we suspect, would willingly trade some of their freedom of action for a 
secure flow of financial assistance. 
 
Turning to the psychological impact of dependency, there appear to be two main 
issues. One is the protestant ethic view, widely held in official circles, that incomes 
and consumption should be tied to productive activity, and that in order to "deserve” 
aid, countries must demonstrate a willingness to work26. When this view is projected 
by donors onto recipients of aid, it produces a fear of being seen as parasitic, and a 
strongly emphasised verbal commitment to the developmentalist dogmas favoured by 
the donor community. The donor attitude that the "deserving poor” should be 
patronised, but not the unproductive and undeserving, reflects the decay in New 
Zealand and elsewhere of an earlier consensus in favour of welfare state ethics. The 
welfare state of social democratic theory was an attempt to remove the stigma from 
being economically dependent, and to make proper provision for those who were in 
that position. Human dignity and basic needs were seen as things which society should 
make available to all its members as of right, and without imposing demeaning 
conditions on the recipients. All members of society, whether currently engaged in 
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"productive” activity or not, should be treated as (and should feel themselves to be) 
full participants in the fruits of modern technology and productivity, via a system of 
income redistribution and the collective provision of services such as health, education 
and transport. Proponents of the welfare state sought to liberate welfare recipients from 
the sense that to be dependent upon transfer payments was to be a parasite. 
 
The central point here is that the attitudes of aid recipients are, of necessity, formed 
largely as mirror images of the attitudes of donors. It is the attitude of the dominant 
partner towards the dependent one which matters, rather than the relationship of 
dependence per se. An anecdotal, but pertinent, example may clarify the point. 
 
Albert Henry, as Premier of a Cook Islands heavily dependent upon New Zealand 
financial support, and aware of its continuing necessity, described the relationship 
between donor and recipient communities in terms which reflected the welfare state 
ethics of the New Zealand Labour Government of the 1930s and 1940s. The 
relationship he saw as being akin to a marriage27 -  that is, a contract entered into 
between equals but allocating different roles, with the housekeeping partner dependent 
upon the income generated by the bread winner. In the context of the 1960s, this image 
was psychologically supportive to the dependent partner, and served to legitimate the 
sharing of income and the permanent status of the relationship. In the context of the 
1980s the image still seems particularly apt, since the role of the population remaining 
in the Cook Islands, Niue and Tokelau is basically a housekeeping or caretaking one, 
looking after the lands and property of absentee relatives, maintaining the village mode 
of production, acting as guardians of the descent group, preservers of things held dear 
in the cultural and social spheres, and in general guarantors of the continuity of island 
life and culture28. The position of the dependent group, in this view of the world, is 
perceived as socially useful, by both partners in the relationship. 
 
In strong contrast to the Henry generation's image of a "marriage”, is the idea of the 
relationship between New Zealand and the islands as one between parent and child, 
with the dependent community regarded as immature and unfit to look after itself or 
take full responsibility, but with an expectation that the relationship will change as the 
dependent partner matures and finally leaves home to make its own way in the world. 
This perception corresponds much more closely to the way New Zealand officials of 
the past couple of decades have conceptualised the situation, and helps to account for 
their insistence on an evolving, rather than a stable, constitutional position for the 
islands. Most political leaders in the Cook Islands now appear to subscribe to the 
parent child analogy rather than the marriage one (see Table 11.2); this seems to 
represent a significant shift from the Albert Henry days, and probably reflects a real 
psychological change in the island communities towards greater feelings of insecurity 
as New Zealand pressures them to "grow up” by moving towards self reliance. New 
Zealand official statements of the 1960s laid emphasis upon the permanence of New 
Zealand's commitment to provide financial support. Statements of the 1970s laid 
emphasis upon New Zealand's wish that aid be progressively reduced, and that island 
Governments exhibit more signs of independent action. 
 
The presumption that islanders are in some sense "immature” appears to be widespread 
in Wellington, and is reflected in repeated comments, often rather slighting, in official 
commentaries on developments in the islands.  New Zealand in general has a good 
reputation throughout the Pacific for competence, loyalty, aid and political leadership. 
But it attracts frequent adverse comment for a patronising insensitivity to the nuances 
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of island culture, society and politics. The remedy, if one is to be found, for the 
psychological problems associated with "dependence” lies not in the abolition of 
dependence, but in a change in New Zealand attitudes. 
 
The second aspect of psychological dependence involves motivation. It is often 
observed that recipients of remittances from migrant relatives tend to withdraw to 
some extent from productive activities and devote more of their time than previously 
to activities considered "unproductive”.  From the production centred point of view 
this is easily perceived as a negative development   partly because such a reduction of 
labour inputs to local production runs counter to the official goal of local self reliance, 
and partly because the village society and economy of which the home resident 
population are "caretakers” loses some of its vitality when the core of productive 
activity, around which neo-traditional practices were originally organised, is 
weakened. This complaint is apparently often expressed by migrant relatives returning 
home to Western Samoa to find the village economy moribund by comparison with 
their memories of earlier times. It is less frequently encountered in the very small 
island societies which are the subject of the present study. 
 
Two comments are relevant here, in the context of our argument that "dependence” is 
not the real enemy. The first is that insofar as a reduction of labour effort follows from 
a transition to a MIRAB economy and consequent reduction of the urgent pressure of 
subsistence necessity, this probably represents a gain in welfare for the local people. 
To a considerable extent, the loss of vitality of the village system may be in the eye of 
the beholder as much as in the system itself. The second is that if the iron discipline of 
working for subsistence is not to be reimposed, a revival of the village economy must 
rest primarily upon a new set of economic incentives to produce, and these are more 
likely to be forthcoming from a restructuring of external financial flows, than from any 
reduction of dependency as such. Again we come around to the view that producer 
subsidies may have an important constructive role in promoting the "caretaker” 
function of remaining populations in the small island societies. 
 
Finally, we come to the question of autonomous capitalism. Here there is a substantial 
body of writing, largely from Latin America over the past two decades, which suggests 
that economic dependence constitutes a "conditioning situation” in which autonomous, 
self-sustaining capitalist enterprise is either absent or stunted. Among several 
mechanisms alluded to, the most directly relevant in our discussion is the issue of 
generation and appropriation of economic surplus (profit). Dependency models 
suggest that the operation of the world market system tends to suppress local 
profitability in dependent economies, or else to drain off the profits created to swell the 
balance sheets of metropolitan firms. The profits drain is accompanied by a skills and 
brain drain, as the best of the local population are drawn into metropolitan 
employment or become local comprador agents of multinational interests. 
 
We have suggested elsewhere29 that models of this kind have some relevance in 
explaining the course of historical events in countries such as Peru; and some of the 
specific mechanisms adduced by dependency writers appear applicable to the case of 
the small island economies - particularly the preoccupation with a skills drain, the 
importance of consumption tastes acquired from metropolitan example, and the 
suppression of profitability through the market mechanism. From a description of the 
mechanisms to a policy prescription, however, is a considerable leap, which should not 
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be taken before the outcome of "dependency” has been carefully evaluated and the 
realistic alternatives compared with it. 
 
For continental "less developed economies” with large populations, where long-run 
consumption possibilities remain closely tied to, and limited by, productive capacity, 
the appeal of autonomous capitalism (in which we include state capitalism) as an agent 
of brute economic growth, is considerable. The familiar historical model of Western 
Europe, the USA and Japan emphasises the creative role of capitalism in raising 
commodity production, and hence permitting the improvement of living standards. The 
prescription for reducing "dependency” has always rested upon a view than 
autonomous development would deliver the goods more effectively than dependent 
development; this in turn has rested upon the ad hoc assessment that the growth 
suppressing propensity of dependency has not been offset by any compensating 
mechanism. 
 
The difference between Peru and the Pacific micro-economies is dramatic, and the 
usual adverse judgement on dependency is immediately thrown into doubt by the scale 
of the inflow of remittances and financial support. Dependency mechanisms may 
indeed stunt the growth of productive capacity, but MIRAB societies do not depend 
for their living standards or social cohesion upon their onshore productive capacity. 
The backwash effect of dependency on local commodity production is therefore 
largely irrelevant  on its own; what is interesting from an evaluative point of view is 
the question whether the benefits flowing from dependency (aid, remittances, security 
of market access, migration opportunities) outweigh any disadvantages arising from 
the feedback on local production (e.g. skewed demographic structure, low morale, 
poor nutrition). The key difference between, say, Peru or Bolivia on the one hand and 
the Pacific MIRAB economies on the other is that the former are net rent payers, while 
the latter are rent receivers. The MIRAB economic system is closely akin to that of 
another group of rent dominated economies, the OPEC oil producers. 
 
Oil- and aid-driven economies are indeed characterised by the suppression of local 
tradeable-goods production in the market sector, and by sectoral domination by 
services and non market activities30. They are also frequently characterised by living 
standards considerably above what could be "sustained” on the basis of the existing 
(suppressed) level of commodity production in sectors other than the rent-generating 
one. In the case of the MIRAB societies, it is safe to say that living standards are above 
what could be sustained by local production capacity even if the anti-production bias 
caused by dependency were to be removed. 
 
Another example of relevance to the small Pacific economies is that of Costa Rica - a 
country which has experienced a successful and constructive process of "dependent 
development” with relatively high living standards, equal income distribution, and 
social cohesion31. 
 
If we grant that the living standards argument against dependency is irrelevant in the 
special case of MIRAB economies, two arguments for using policy instruments to 
reduce dependency still remain. One says that even though living standards may have 
to be sacrificed, the goal of self sufficiency and autonomous production is so 
overwhelmingly important as to justify the sacrifice. This is the argument for 
reproduction in Niue, the Cook Islands and Tokelau of the Tuvalu experience (see 
Chapter 10) without the grant in aid. It is certainly true that the island economies 
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would survive a reversion to subsistence affluence with some surplus consumption 
financed by commodity production. It is, however, difficult to see such a course as 
politically feasible for New Zealand to impose; and it is hard to find any commentator 
willing to argue directly for the trade-off of living standards against commodity 
production. Proposals do, nevertheless, circulate in the official underworld for a 
cutting loose of the MIRAB economies, leaving them to find their own level. Such 
arguments are usually put up as "straw men” to highlight the alternatives to existing 
policies, rather than as serious documented proposals. Clearly, at the very least, any 
such policy switch would have to begin with the closing of migration outlets, in order 
to render captive the resident population on the islands concerned  - hence the political 
difficulty in the case of New Zealand linked societies. 
 
The second line of argument is a less extreme version of the first, and has enjoyed 
strong currency among New Zealand officials over the years. It suggests that while the 
elimination of dependence per se is neither feasible nor necessarily desirable, there are 
nevertheless considerable gains to be made by mounting a campaign to raise 
production  under conditions of continuing dependence. This is, in essence, the 
familiar argument for policy intervention to offset market failure  - the market failure 
in this case being the relative-price backwash which suppresses profitability of 
commercial production in the islands. New Zealand exchange rates, subsidised 
transport, financial transfers to service sectors, and migration opportunities are not to 
be abandoned, but their economic impact via the market mechanism is to be mitigated 
by the expansion (subsidised if necessary) of areas of commodity production which 
contribute to non-economic or structural goals such as the implantation of modern 
practices, the building of local experience and confidence in productive activities, the 
provision of onshore productive employment to reduce the incentive for young people 
to leave the islands in search of high wage work, and the quest for an altered balance 
in the sectoral make up of the economy. Islanders, it is suggested, will feel better-off 
and more self-confident if they have access locally to a variety of employment 
opportunities which would otherwise be available only in New Zealand. They will 
also, it is suggested, feel more self-respect if they see themselves participating in 
commodity production and thereby contributing directly to the total social product out 
of which living standards are ultimately financed. 
 
The Belshaw Stace Report (1955:59) set out the basic line of argument as follows: 
 
"By economic development we mean a process which leads to a 
cumulative increase in levels of consumption. This includes not 
only food, clothing, and other consumer goods as commonly 
understood, but also housing, and the benefits of health, education, 
recreation, water supply, transport and communications.      
 
While major emphasis is necessarily on such consumption levels, 
we are by no means unconcerned with less tangible elements in 
welfare, such as result from effective participation in political 
decisions and group activities, and the extent to which work is a 
pleasurable form of expression, and not merely a necessary evil ... 
 
At present the major services and facilities are provided by the 
New Zealand Government. But as long as they are thus financed 
they can hardly be regarded as evidence of the development of 
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Cook Islands societies. For this to be the case, growth in services 
and amenities must be substantially the result of effort by the Cook 
Islands people themselves. This is not an argument for the 
reduction of expenditure by New Zealand.  On the contrary, 
additional antecedent expenditure is required to set the process 
going. Later, this should reduce the burden on the New Zealand 
taxpayer." 
 
This is a plausible argument, suggesting that the benefits of dependence can be 
retained, while other benefits from economic restructuring are added on. An alternative 
formulation would be a restructuring of the links of dependence, so that more aid came 
into the dependent economy via producer subsidies and less via bureaucratic salaries. 
The MIRAB system might thereby be transformed into a MIRASP one, with 
subsidised producers replacing bureaucrats. In both Niue and Tokelau, this approach 
has a great deal of appeal, and in the latter case a beginning has been made via the 
Community Services Levy (a local tax on public service salaries to finance 
expenditures by the village councils on areas which include local pensions and 
supplementary prices for copra producers). 
 
It should be noted immediately that this is an argument not against dependence  per se, 
but for a modification of the character of dependence. Dependence upon producer 
subsidies is felt to be preferable to dependence upon public service salary supplements, 
partly on the grounds that producers are more "socially useful” than bureaucrats, and 
partly because of the hope that increased commodity exports, albeit subsidised, may 
take some of the strain off New Zealand taxpayers. So long as policy prescriptions 
remain within these bounds, we have no grounds to quarrel with them (although one 
needs to be careful in looking for the point at which transfers of financial assistance 
from bureaucrats to producers run into diminishing and eventually negative returns: 
the elimination of government salary support is not an intelligent goal). 
 
The very real danger with this line of thinking is that inapplicable ideas about 
autonomous capitalism may be imported from other economies where capitalist 
enterprise is profitable and self sustaining. It is altogether realistic to subsidise islands 
producers’ incomes on a permanent basis, and thus provide the incentive for economic 
diversification within the framework of a MIRAB economy. It is altogether unrealistic  
to imagine that commercial ventures, once launched with subsidies on their initial 
capital investment, will thereafter become "viable” in the sense of being able to 
survive over the long haul without assistance. There is a fundamental distinction 
between the use of subsidies to maintain an otherwise unsustainable economic 
structure, for reasons of social policy, and the injection of "development aid” in the 
form of investment projects to establish new ventures which are thereafter supposed to 
pay their way. The danger is that this distinction will not be recognised. 
 
Belshaw and Stace erred, if anything, on the side of optimism on this latter point, 
probably because of the high expectations in the Cook Islands at that time regarding 
the future for Rarotonga citrus and Mangaia pineapple. Their vision of the future was 
one in which growing local self reliance on the basis of onshore commodity production 
would be compatible with continued dependence on New Zealand (1955:63): 
 
"While New Zealand subsidies must continue,  the hypothesis in 
this report is that as far as possible over the long period the 
 - 122 -
economic development process shall be self perpetuating, and 
provide the means out of which further development is financed. 
The bulk of the resources should come out of the growing income 
of the territory ... The important desideratum is not so much that 
the New Zealand subsidy should decline, but that the local 
contribution should increase in relative importance. 
 
To this end it is important to devise measures by which locally 
derived tax revenue shall increase, ... investments by business 
concerns shall be encouraged, and savings and the direct 
application of labour promoted." 
 
The remittance leg of the future MIRAB structure was not foreseen by Belshaw and 
Stace32, and the major expansion of aid and bureaucracy was still to come (see Figure 
5.7). So was the collapse of citrus production in the face of economic realities and 
consequent failure to replant ageing trees in the 1970s; and the rise of remittances to a 
level where they provided more local incomes than commodity exports. The feeling in 
the  
1950s that Cook Islanders were not "paying their dues” to New Zealand society, and 
should be induced to do so via an expansion of their production of exportable staples, 
has been increasingly sidelined by the rising direct contribution to New Zealand GDP 
by migrant Cook Islands workers. 
 
A useful indicator of the paucity of commercially profitable niches in the context of 
the island micro economies is provided by the experience of the one New Zealand aid 
programme which rests explicitly upon the scouting out of such niches through the 
medium of private entrepreneurs wishing to set up ventures in the islands. This 
scheme, the Pacific Islands Industrial Development Scheme (PIIDS), has in fact 
provided New Zealand with a means of capitalising politically on the low capital 
absorptive capacity of the island economies. Sustained and intensive administrative 
and political effort has been put into the promotion of a programme which has been 
unable to spend more than $1.3 million over more than seven years of operation since 
197633. New Zealand's political leadership has thereby been able to gain high marks 
for effort at low financial cost. The files relating to PIIDS are replete with officials' 
comments on the difficulty of finding commercial "winners” in the MIRAB context, 
and this applies most strongly to the micro economy cases. Of $1.3 million paid out 
under PIIDS to the end of June 1983, the Cook Islands and Niue had absorbed only 
$209,000, while Tokelau and Tuvalu had attracted no projects at all. (Only one project 
had even been considered for Tokelau - a proposal in 1978 for a knitwear plant, which 
quickly ran into the sand). 
 
We conclude this discussion of the "autonomy” critique of dependency, therefore, with 
the comment that in practice this constitutes more an argument for changing the form 
of the dependency relation, than for eliminating it. The discussion hinges really around 
how a well intentioned patron state should design its impact on the dependent client. 
The persistent tendency of New Zealand official debate to slip over into the view that 
production growth could and should eliminate dependence, suggests that the "hidden 
agenda” of some participants in that debate has been to put an end to dependency   not 
because of any malignant impact on the island societies or economies, but because of 
the burden which it is believed to place upon New Zealand taxpayers. 
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5.9   Politics and Economics Again 
 
A clear, well argued statement of the case for more "self reliance” as the essential 
foundation for political independence is Kolff (1965).  Kolff's position reflects the 
view, popular in official New Zealand circles even at that time, that "political 
independence ... is the main issue at stake".34  He also makes explicit his view that 
"self government”, as provided for in the Cook Islands Constitution Act 1965, was 
indistinguishable from political independence, and that economic policy could 
therefore usefully be discussed on the assumption that the aim was to promote such 
independence. Since in Kolff's view "politics and economics are inseparable, as are the 
degrees of effective independence which can be achieved in each"35, it follows that the 
pursuit of independence as a political goal must entail the reduction of economic 
dependence, defined as reliance upon New Zealand budgetary support, migrant 
remittances, free entry to New Zealand, and the concentration of both export and 
import trade on New Zealand.36  Kolff then poses the issue as he sees it37: 
 
"To what extent will self government in the Cook Islands be 
meaningful as long as they remain economically dependent upon 
New Zealand?" 
 
The answer to this is not at all self evident, for Kolff's formulation begs a crucial 
question (what do we mean by "meaningful” self government?), and because in any 
case the question is one which must be answered in Wellington, not in the Cook 
Islands. The extent to which economic dependence is a fetter on political independence 
depends on the degree to which the dominant power exercises the power it possesses38. 
Economic dependence upon a benevolent patron is perfectly compatible with political 
autonomy, so long as the patron tolerates that autonomy   as New Zealand has tended 
to do in the Cook Islands case since 1965, with a couple of notable exceptions 
discussed in Chapter 6. 
 
Kolff argues however39 that to be dependent upon a patron's tolerance is ultimately 
irreconcilable with political independence: 
 
"If the Cook Islands want political independence they will have to 
face up to the economic consequences." 
 
Those consequences are immediately evident from Kolff's definition of dependence. In 
order to secure long run political independence, the Cook Islands would have to give 
up New Zealand aid, New Zealand citizenship, the remittance linkage, and the 
concentration upon New Zealand as a trading partner. It was precisely this calculation 
which induced Cook Islanders (in common with Niueans and Tokelauans) to declare 
themselves uninterested in sovereign independence at the time of decolonisation. The 
fact of the matter still is that no Cook Islands Government which credibly threatened 
to eliminate the New Zealand link could survive in office beyond the next election. 
Kolff, inter alia, recognises this40: 
 
"The virtually unrestricted entry of Cook Islanders into New 
Zealand unfortunately [sic] conflicts with the goal of 
independence, particularly with respect to raising the productive 
capacity of the Cook Islands. For the individual Cook Islander this 
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is probably the most important link with New Zealand, which must 
be maintained at all costs." 
 
The reference to "raising the productive capacity” in the preceding quotation brings us 
directly to the heart of Kolff's economic prescription for the Cook Islands41: 
 
"For as long as the Cook Islands continue to base their living 
standards not basically on the productive capacity of the economy, 
but on grants from New Zealand, political independence can mean 
relatively little. ... How then are the Cook Islands going to achieve 
economic independence ...? Basically, the answer must lie with 
more rapid economic development ... Consequently, the Cook 
Islands will have to concentrate to a much greater extent on 
increasing the  productive capacity of the economy in order to help 
pay for a greater share of the social services ..., and so decrease its 
dependence on New Zealand ... (S)ince the economy is 
predominantly based on the output of the land, investment in 
agriculture ... will have to be greatly increased both for export and 
subsistence crops ... New Zealand will also have to allow and 
actively encourage its subsidy to be channelled into a different 
range of projects, in accordance with this shift of emphasis." 
 
As we have already seen, this was precisely the programme set out by the 1975 New 
Zealand aid mission to the Cook Islands. It has been the perceived failure of that 
programme which accounts for much of the current disillusionment among officials in 
Wellington with "Cook Islands development” (not to mention the parallel evolution of 
events in Niue). Yet the central flaw in the programme has always been apparent: it 
rests upon false premises. The programme would hold together logically only if (a) full 
sovereign political independence were really the  top priority in the Cook Islands, and 
(b) Cook Islanders were willing to sacrifice their special relationship with New 
Zealand, and if necessary their established standard of living, in pursuit of that goal. In 
fact neither of these holds. 
 
The reality is that although Cook Islands Governments from Albert Henry on have 
always regarded political autonomy as welcome and desirable, they have equally 
consistently placed other matters higher on their list of priorities   specifically, the 
links of aid, migration and remittances which constitute, in Kolff's analysis, "economic 
dependence”.  In any conflict between the two, dependence wins. The only way at 
present in sight to change this would be the imposition from Wellington of an 
alternative set of priorities, in order to force the Cook Islands Government to pursue 
autarkic political and economic development at the expense of the clearly expressed 
and strongly held wishes of the Cook Islands people. This would require at the very 
least a recontracting of the special relationship between New Zealand and the Cook 
Islands. 
 
The 1975 aid mission thus posed a problem for Albert Henry as have other New 
Zealand inspired attempts to promote the expansion of commodity production. Polite 
agreement with New Zealand aid officials was the least the Cook Islands Government 
could offer to its chief paymaster; yet the task those officials sought to impose upon 
the Cook Islands was clearly unachievable. The Henry regime's political survival 
hinged upon the continuance of aid, migration and remittances (that is, upon the New 
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Zealand link), and also upon the preservation of Cook Islands culture and society (that 
is, the preservation and strengthening of the neo traditional order42). Yet attempts to 
expand productive  
capacity could achieve very little unless one or both were sacrificed to some extent. In 
the event, the Cook Islands Government acquiesced in Wellington's 1975 plans to shift 
aid from budget support to project aid over a ten year span; but quite reasonably 
exhibited little conviction in its pursuit of a breakthrough on the production front43. 
(After recurrent fits and starts, the first official Development Plan appeared only in 
early 1984, and identified no area where dramatic gains were rapidly attainable). 
However, an impressive effort was mounted to meet Wellington's desire for local 
revenues to finance more of the government budget. As Figure 5.7 shows, a 
considerable tax squeeze was  put on the Cook Islands economy after 1975, at a time 
of falling export earnings but rising incomes from tourism and philatelic sales. At the 
same time, real expenditures were held constant. The subsequent Davis and Geoffrey 
Henry regimes have continued the process (under a good deal of pressure from 
Wellington, especially in 1980-1981). The outcome has been that the proportion of 
Cook Islands Government expenditure financed from local sources has been pushed up 
from 42% in 1971-75 to 63% by 1981-84 (see Table 6.11), while real GDP has 
remained static or falling. 
 
This was not, of course, what New Zealand aid officials had in mind in 1975, nor what 
Albert Henry himself had envisaged a decade earlier, when at a 1964 public meeting 
he44: 
 
"... pointed out the desirability of reducing the extent of financial 
done dependence on New Zealand, but showed that this could only 
be by an increase in production, which would thereby increase 
incomes and, accordingly, the amount that could be raised by 
taxation ..." 
 
The problem which has come to light in official experience since 1965 is that what 
seemed to many a coherent "modernisation package” of policy measures, actually 
contained internal contradictions. Modern infrastructure and improved living standards 
rested upon financial linkages which rendered "real independence” impossible. "Real 
independence” could be pursued without subverting the New Zealand links only if 
profitable opportunities for productive investment could be found and exploited within 
the Cook Islands. But in a MIRAB economy adjusted to operating on the basis of those 
links, profitable investment opportunities were the exception rather than the rule; and 
heavy subsidies to local producers could be paid only if financial assistance from New 
Zealand (or other donors) continued. Breaking the links in order to render investment 
projects in the islands more profitable would immediately subvert local living 
standards and ability to maintain social infrastructure. 
 
These dilemmas are, of course, those which now exercise the minds of Foreign Affairs 
officials in Wellington. "Economic development” continues to be seen as vitally 
important, and provides the perceived focal point for New Zealand aid (even though in 
practice, and of necessity, most "aid” is in fact directed to maintenance of the status 
quo via budgetary assistance). Free movement of labour between the Cook Islands and 
New  
Zealand is recognised to be subversive of efforts to force local production up (since 
migration drains off the potential reserve army of cheap "surplus labour”), but 
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unilateral action by New Zealand to stop the migration flow would encounter bitter 
political opposition both in the islands and in New Zealand. Officials feel themselves 
to be facing a logical impasse, and in this they are absolutely correct. The problem, 
however, is in their heads, not in the islands. All that has happened is that 
inappropriate slogans from elsewhere were slung together into a policy package which 
was always devoid of coherence, but which was so closely in tune with the 
presuppositions of "official culture” that no effective internal critique of it could be 
mounted. Several Foreign Affairs officials have nevertheless made the effort, most 
notably the departing New Zealand Representative in the Cook Islands in 198245: 
 
"(W)e are not faced with a typical developing country situation. 
These people are our citizens who can all move to New Zealand 
tomorrow. For as long as the special relationship continues - ... at 
least to the 1990s I suspect - our choice lies between helping Cook 
Islanders here and having them in New Zealand. There remains a 
political obligation to provide aid arising directly from 1965. The 
decisions taken then emanated from New Zealand and suited us 
better than the possible alternatives. 
 
A basic conclusion from my experience here is that until the 
constitutional relationship changes, New Zealand needs to view 
aid to the Cooks, and the economic development of the country, in 
relative, not absolute, terms. Where free movement is possible, the 
key issue is to get the relativities right. If conditions in the Cooks 
are too bad in relation to New Zealand, people simply will move. 
... 
 
If the situation is viewed in this light, the 1975 principle of 
reducing over 10 years the annual amounts devoted to budgetary 
support was misguided ... Cooks history since 1900 is more the 
story of New Zealand assumptions that have not materialised than 
we care to concede. From Premier Seddon on, we have not 
managed quite to get it right." 
 
The persistent error in New Zealand official thinking has been the attempt to apply 
modernisation policy packages in a MIRAB setting. No committee of New Zealand aid 
officials has yet made more headway on the theoretical issues than did Kolff in his 
1965 discussion already cited and attacked. Confronted with the choice between two 
alternative possible worlds, Wellington wants both; but the reality of MIRAB systems 
is that the economic mechanisms which deliver higher living standards are at the same 
time incompatible with "bootstraps growth” of production. Production growth requires 
people, and forced draft "development in one country” can be induced only if its 
labour force is captive, which the labour forces of the Cook Islands, Niue and Tokelau 
are not. In Tuvalu and Kiribati, where local labour is indeed captive in the absence of 
major migration outlets, "bootstraps development” (or rather, in the words of the 
Kiribati Plan, a "struggle for national survival”) may indeed be induced, but only at 
high social and economic cost. 
 
Further, the expansion of profit oriented productive activities (that is, the advance of 
capitalist or at least commercial production) requires relative price signals which 
favour productive as against service activities - but so long as aid is linked to 
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bureaucracy (that is, financial assistance is injected into the local economy through 
public service salaries) the price system will be skewed the other way. The dominant 
purchaser in the Cook Islands is the New Zealand Government, and what it wants to 
buy is social services delivered by the bureaucracy. Those services therefore, being in 
demand, command the best price. Only if the New Zealand Government shifted its 
effective demand away from social services towards the buying up of commodities 
produced in the islands would the  
relative price situation swing in a way which favoured expanding onshore production. 
The resulting expansion, however, would have nothing to do with comparative 
advantage or international competitiveness of Cook Islands producers; it would reflect 
simply a New Zealand view that producers of (say) bananas were more deserving of 
high cash incomes than suppliers of public services. The outcome, in other words, 
would have nothing to do with "development potential” of the islands, or domestic 
forces of social or economic evolution. It would reflect simply a shift of priorities in 
Wellington. 
 
Seen from another angle, the point here is that whether "development” is "necessary” 
or not is a decision not for the Cook Islands but for New Zealand, and the (draconian) 
measures which are normally required to get bootstraps development ("autonomous 
capitalism”) going in a small resource poor country would have to be unilaterally 
imposed by Wellington, even if a compliant puppet government could be installed in 
the islands to take ostensible "responsibility”.  The goals whose pursuit require that 
"development” be pursued in the face of hostile market forces are those of the 
dominant partner, not the dependent one. 
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and Shand (1969). 
2  For example, Lewis (1956), Ranis and Fei (1963). 
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a time statistical work fell into arrears after independence. Shaky Tuvaluan statistics exist only due 
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better in statistical reporting, although the quality of the published material is not always adequate. 
8  Though it should be noted that our Tokelau import data exclude government imports. 
9  A useful analysis of the collapse of agricultural production in the 1970s is G. Hayes, "Population 
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Islands 1966 76”, cigov Stats. Office Occasional Papers 1 & 2, 1979. 
10  The quotation marks around "foreign exchange” reflect the fact that in fact no exchange of 
currencies is involved, since most trade and income transfers take place within the New Zealand 
or Australian currency areas. 
11  "Absorption” here means consumption and investment by the private and public sectors. 
12  Purists would object to the description of Niue as a "high island”, given its non volcanic origin as 
a large atoll, since uplifted. In terms of natural resource endowment per head of population, 
however, the classification is appropriate. 
13  We have no capital account data, nor does Table 5.2 cover several categories of invisible receipts 
and payments   particularly freight, insurance, and travel costs, and investment income. 
14  Migration remittances/aid bureaucracy. 
15  This should not be taken as an argument for reducing the level of New Zealand financial support 
for Niue. A policy of "people conservation” may require the maintenance of disposable incomes 
above the level of current consumption expenditures. 
16  Iosefa Maiava, Preliminary Survey of Transnational Corporations in Niue, (ESCAP 1983) 
17  Thus, goods and services produced by islanders resident in New Zealand are unambiguously 
defined as part of New Zealand's production, not the islands'. If those same islanders then remit 
part of the wage income, resulting from their productive activity in New Zealand, back to their 
families in the islands, this is treated as an entirely separate transaction between separate national 
units   a balance of payments flow. 
18  Chambers (1977) sets out a critique along these lines of New Zealand promoted agricultural 
extension work in the Cook Islands. As he puts it, "the advisers and research people do not 
understand the basic thinking and motivating forces of the growers they are trying to assist”.  
Enclosures, mechanisation and monoculture run counter to the low input garden agriculture 
system. Chambers suggests as an alternative the intensification of the existing system rather than 
its transformation, with the incentive provided by paying aid money direct to growers rather than 
to the Government. A recent survey of global prospects for intensification of so called "traditional 
agriculture” is Orskov (1984). 
19  Albeit not expressed in these terms. 
20  N.Z. Representative's Report : "Economic and Political Events in the Cook Islands in 1975', 
24/3/76, in File 118/13/104/1 Part 5. 
21   Belshaw and Stace (1955): Chapter 2. 
22  For example, Simkin (1947). 
23  An article in the Evening Post (Wellington) 7 July 1983 pointed to the possible threat to Cook 
Islands exports of apparel to New Zealand as a result of the extension to Fiji of duty free access to 
                                                                                                                                               
the New Zealand market. With 13% of the private sector work force, the clothing industry was 
regarded as a major employer in Rarotonga, the existence of which had historically rested on the 
special relationship of the Cook Islands to New Zealand. 
24  New Zealand High Commission Apia to Wellington, 15 May 1978, MFA 316/1/1. 
25  Kiribati National Development Plan 1983 1986:4. 
26  Cf, for example, the comment in NZ High Commission Apia to Wellington, 15 May 1978, MFA 
316/1/1, that "the Gilberts will, at least, try hard before they become a mendicant society and our 
guess is that if the present Government retains power they will not squander what they have". 
27  Chapman (1976): 68-69. 
28  Cf descriptions of Samoan village life in Wendt (1973) 
29  e.g. Thorp and Bertram (1978). 
30  Cf. Hagen (1971), Shahid Alam (1982), Barker and Brailovsky (1981). 
31  Rodriguez (1980). 
32  Their discussion of migration (Belshaw and Stace, 1955:61-62) was based upon the assumption, 
already unfounded in the Cook Islands by 1955, that out migration imposed a straightforward 
deadweight loss on the local economy: "the Cook Islands bear the full cost of upbringing and 
training, but do not enjoy the full benefits of production during the working life of the migrants”.  
However it was difficult to appreciate this value of remittance flows as early as 1955. 
33  Development (MFA Wellington), December 1983. 
34  Kolff (1965), p.119. He qualifies this in parentheses: "(or rather, a greater degree of political 
independence)”, but then goes on to pursue his argument on the basis of full independence. 
35  Kolff (1965), p.119. 
36  Ibid. 
37  Ibid. 
38  Although obviously the latent power of the dominant partner is never extinguished, and will 
influence the behaviour of the client. 
39  Kolff (1965), p.120. 
40  Kolff (1965), p.122. 
41  Kolff (1965), p.121. Emphasis in original. 
42  During the 1964 meetings to set up the Cook Islands Party, Henry laid down clearly his position 
on this issue, especially with regard to land tenure: "... the land question was a most difficult one, 
but that the land was of great importance to the Maori. He said the solution would not be easy to 
find but that perhaps economic plans should be made to fit the land system which the people 
understood and wanted rather than the land tenure system be made to fit economic plans” (Stone, 
1965:92). 
43  The New Zealand response to the Henry regime's priorities is interesting as a reflection on the 
frequently heard claim that New Zealand acts always "in accordance with the wishes of the Island 
peoples” as expressed by their governments. A ministerial briefing document of 8 August 1978, 
prepared for the impending visit by new Cook Islands Prime Minister Davis, sets out Wellington's 
view of the Henry era as follows: "The Henry era saw corruption and ineptitude in almost every 
sphere of Government activity and few attempts to come to grips with economic development 
problems, particularly in agriculture. The principal emphasis was on social infrastructure 
development and patronage. In part this was a reflection of 65 years of benevolent New Zealand 
rule with its emphasis on social welfare. But it was also a reflection of the lack of any real 
leadership in economic issues under the Henrys. The emphasis which we sought to place in our 
aid programme since 1975 on revenue earning development rather than social welfare projects, 
which had more political appeal, was one of the main causes of the deterioration of New Zealand's 
relations with the Henry Government. Sir Albert had other priorities..." 
44  Stone (1965):90. 
45  Watt to Minister of Foreign Affairs, 24 February 1982. 
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PART TWO: 
 
COUNTRY STUDIES 
 
 
 
CHAPTER SIX 
 
THE COOK ISLANDS: A COUNTRY SURVEY 
 
6.1 Introduction 
 
The Cook Islands are a “self governing country in free association with New Zealand”, a 
status which dates from the end of formal New Zealand colonial rule in 1965. The main 
heritage of the colonial period, which has been reinforced since 1965 by the operation of 
social and economic forces, is the close organic intergration of the Cook Islands 
community with New Zealand economy and society. Retention of the linkages through 
which that integration operates   in particular, New Zealand citizenship, and membership of 
the New Zealand currency area   has remained the top priority in Cook Islands politics 
despite efforts by both the New Zealand Government and some of the Cook Islands' 
political elite to steer the group towards full sovereign independence. The central theme of 
this chapter is that policymakers have given too much weight to the idea of the Cook 
Islands as a separate country, and not enough attention to the real world consequences and 
implications of the centripetal forces tying the Islands to New Zealand.  
 
In designing political institutions for the post colonial era, for example, New Zealand 
established in the Cook Islands the full fledged institutional apparatus of an independent 
nation state, and strong jurisdictional boundaries were established between those Cook 
Islanders resident in the Islands and those living in New Zealand. (The Cook Islands 
Legislative Assembly has unilaterally smudged those boundaries by extending the Cook 
Islands franchise to the New Zealand resident community - a decision which accurately 
reflected realities which New Zealand policymakers have preferred to ignore).  
 
Similarly, in the area of economic policy, New Zealand aid priorities have been oriented 
towards a model of autonomous “development” for the Cook Islands, which would imply a 
progressive phasing out of budgetary support, and the halting or even reversing of the out 
migration of young Cook Islanders to work on the New Zealand mainland. In line with this 
approach, New Zealand policy has treated the Cook Islands as a foreign country, has 
recognised no durable identity of interest between the two communities of Cook Islanders 
(those in New Zealand and those in the Islands), and has aimed to eliminate the widely held 
view that the Cook Islands are part of New Zealand, albeit a distinctive part.  
 
The facts which appear to us to be the central features of Cook Islands reality are that 
family ties and remittances span the geographical gap between New Zealand and the Cook 
Islands, that the two entities share citizenship, currency and tariff regimes, that the labour 
and capital markets of the two are closely integrated (though with standardised wage 
differential, and with some division of the capital market in recent years due to changes in 
Cook Islands tax law) and that the question of the separate constitutional status of the 
Group is still only partly settled.  
 
The survey which follows is an attempt to set out how the Cook Islands economic and 
social system actually functions, and to highlight the discrepancies between the reality and 
the assumptions on which New Zealand policies have tended to be based. 
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6.2 Society1 
 
In general, the society of the Cook Islands may be thought of as “post tribal” in character. 
While descent is still very important as a principle governing many attitudes, the descent 
units have partially lapsed. Individualism has proceeded a fair way with regard to the scope 
of personal action and the spread of consumerism, but the underlying descent structure and 
seniority acts as something of a break. Certainly, action is far from the rugged 
individualism and acquisitive drive of Western entrepreneurs or of “Jeffersonian socieites”. 
 
Society evolved on the basis of a gardening fishing gathering economy and the level of 
subsistence affluence that existed suggests that subsistence could be acquired easily 
without large periods of time being required. Although the link to the land and lagoon area 
was strong, the relationship was mediated through the descent group structure. Exchange of 
goods and services occurred within a social nexus and the primacy of social relationships 
based on the overriding principle of reciprocity meant that no monetised market system 
was able to evolve. These two facts   the absence of strong individual attachment to and 
control over land and of monetised marketing governing exchange, together with the 
absence of an overriding class structured civilisation in which an elite dominated and 
appropriated the so called surplus from a rural lower class   meant that nothing akin to a 
“peasant society” has evolved. 
 
The Cook Islands have been subjected to 150 years of culture contact that has strongly 
shaped society. One of the most pronounced processes was missionisation, the process of 
stamping on the local society a rather Victorian form of Christianity, morality and set of 
values which has, however, been “Cook Islandised”.  Although the prevailing Victorian 
theocracy and formalism of missionisation has often been commented upon (Beaglehole, 
1957), in recent decades local elements appear to have reworked Church practices in 
accordance with their wishes. The beche de mer, coconut oil and later copra traders began 
to exert an influence, and later the inhuman depredations of Peruvian labour slavers and the 
shattering impact of introduced diseases took their toll in the 19th century. 
 
In the first decade of the century the ethnocentric and authoritarian colonial policies of the 
New Zealand administrators began to shape suitably submissive local societies, especially 
after the power of the ariki was greatly weakened by the removal of their authority over 
land, district courts and councils by Colonel Gudgeon. The destruction, weakening, or more 
often simply by-passing of traditional institutions by the colonial authorities led to growing 
apathy and loss of self confidence among the local people. 
 
The pronounced mobility that these islanders have always shown as sea-farers, carried over 
into the colonial and modern eras. While force was characteristic of the labour trade, 
islanders have seldom been slow to take advantage of new employment opportunities. They 
moved in large numbers to the phosphate islands and large coconut plantations of the 
French territories and central Pacific working for a one year contract. Between 1942 and 
1956, 2900 Islanders worked on Makatea, earning the small fortune of at least $592 
annually. A high proportion of the working age male population of most of the Cook 
Islands thus gained experience in labouring positions in the wage economy. In other words, 
for the de-cades leading up to the 1950s and 1960s, thousands were “proletarianised”, 
becoming increasingly familiar with modern medium scale wage labour in unskilled and
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some semi skilled employee roles. Married men on Makatea were required to remit two 
thirds of their wages home (Hayes, 1982:83). The steady growth of the great migration 
movement to New Zealand in the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s has been simply merely the 
logical extension of the Makatea and other central Pacific population movements. 
 
In the 1950s and 1960s there was a rapid growth in the size of the local public service, 
begun first by New Zealand to administer non traditional services such as education, health 
and public works and extended somewhat in the 1970's by the Cook Islands Government, 
ostensibly to improve services and infrastructure, but fundamentally as a means of ensuring 
economic security to a larger section of the population (who in turn redistributed a portion 
of their earnings to relatives who lacked a wage earner). In 1981 the public service had 
1,916 employees, or over 50% of all employment (Escap, 1983). Here, the bureaucratision 
process, though most evident on Rarotonga, the seat of Government, has also extended to a 
great extent on some of the outer islands: on Aitutaki for instance, about one half of the 
households have a member employed in the public service. The number of men in the 
public service on Aitutaki rose from 69 in 1951 to 150 in the 1960s, about 190 in 1975 and 
224 in 1981. Bureaucratisation which feeds on aid supplied from New Zealand (and now 
also from other international donors) has thus added a further dimension to the modern 
migration remittance society in the last 15 years or so. 
 
As we have described in Chapter 2, the whole process of migration developed to such a 
large scale that it dominated the character of the islands increasingly from the 1960s 
onward and about half of the total population came to live in New Zealand. In the 1966-81 
period about 9,000 people migrated. By the early 1960s chain migration was in full swing 
and as satellite communities were established in New Zealand they removed the economic 
worries and much of the culture shock of people moving into the larger society. Chain 
migration can provide four essential services to the migrants: the passage money, 
accommodation, the  
promise of a job and psychological support. Thus, there has developed a binary society 
with roughly half in the metropolitan country (nearly 14,000Cook Island-born, and 24,000 
ethnic Cook Islanders in 1981) and half in the islands (16,435 in 1981). While over time 
one might expect a fundamental distinction to be drawn between the two halves, with the 
“Stark effect” (Fig 6.1) occurring as long term residents in New Zealand begin to remit 
funds less and less frequently (or in smaller amounts) as their ties to relatives in New 
Zealand become relatively stronger, this does not appear to have happened to date. 
Moreover, the returned migrant to the Islands, bringing large sums of accumulated savings 
from New Zealand and the sophistication of the larger society, is not accorded any superior 
status, and accordingly takes his place back in the island society (if he/she decides to 
remain) on the same status level as his village relatives.2 This emphasises the relatively 
unified, organic oneness of the whole Cook Islander community. 
 
While there is evidence of recognition of the different life circumstances of islanders in 
New Zealand (especially perhaps the 10,000 born there) compared to those in the islands, 
when the proposition is suggested that a difference exists or the relationship between the 
two might weaken, it is immediately rejected. If any difference occurs, it is in the self 
image of Islanders in New Zealand. Islanders affirm strongly the indissoluble nature of the 
link   and any political or economic policies which threaten the link would be rejected out 
of hand. The society as a whole is one community. 
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FIG  6.1 
 
COOK  ISLANDER  REMITTANCES 
 
COMPARED  TO  “STARK  EFFECT 
 
 
 
 
The heavy line ABDE is Stark’s hypothesized time-profile of remittances from an 
individual migrant, measured in real terms.   If the migrant returns home early, or 
is joined by his/her family, the time-path will be ABC.  For a migrant who does not 
return home within a short time, the time-path is ABD, with the gradual tailing-off 
of remittances interrupted by one-off “jumps” corresponding to particular cute 
needs such as family ceremonials, or village fundraising for capital works.  The 
“tail” DE corresponds to an intended terminal movement (e.g. at retirement) back 
to the migrant’s place of origin.  (After Connell 1980) 
 
 
The superimposed time-path of remittances from Cook Islanders in New Zealand 
does not exhibit the “Stark effect” of a falling-away after the initial peak.  On the 
contrary, there is a remarkable constancy about the series, which almost certainly 
reflects the continual “topping-up” of the pool of migrants by new arrivals. Thus 
although each individual migrant may behave as Stark suggests, the aggregate 
volume of remittances will not fall unless net migration ceases (or rather, falls 
below the level required to make up for the “depreciation” of Cook Islands human-
capital investment in the New Zealand labour market). 
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What are the characteristics of the migrant society? Ties between islanders in New Zealand 
and relatives in the islands remain strong   it was asserted to us that even if whole families 
including cousins went to New Zealand, relatives would still remain to keep in contact with   
“even if they were only cousins 52nd times removed”.  A great flow of resources (that 
reached over $4 million dollars in 1983) came back to the Islands as remittances, 
equipment and trucks, quite apart from the effect of the Islanders' side of the reciprocity 
relationship, expressed in food, flowers, tere parties, visiting and in other ways. As Loomis 
(1984) suggests the reciprocity relationship represents an investment both in the Islands 
and in New Zealand. Attitudes toward New Zealand, as the larger society where greater 
incomes, a higher standard of living, better education, superior services, more diversified 
culture and greater power in general reside, have become paramount and “dependency” on 
that country, economically, socially and politically, has developed to a high degree. 
 
Loomis (1984) has suggested that the kopu tangata, or family estate is a limited duration 
corporation of kin maintaining long distance relationships of production, investment and 
resource allocation. Following George Marcus (1981), Loomis uses the concept of family 
estate to refer to those kin dispersed for many reasons, but who continue to act together in 
spite of distance. Currently, he is studying why the kopu tangata maintains the flow of 
“investments” back to the islands, the direction and purposes of these inputs, how extensive 
and durable the corporations are and the dynamics of rank and of decision making in 
resource allocation. Thus, not only are the Islands increasingly being integrated 
economically into the New Zealand economy (Chapter 5), but the social processes of the 
community as a whole and of individual kopu tangata are extending the integration 
socially. There are obvious political consequences of this process. 
 
 
6.3  Birth of the “Mirab Society” 
 
Writing 40 years ago Felix Keesing aptly described the South Pacific in general as 
“hyphenated cultures” -  consisting of native trader-mission-offical cultures.3 There is still 
some truth in this approach and to a degree we could add more adjectives and hyphens to 
cover the changes of the last 40 years. But this simplistic, additive approach would do less 
than justice not only to the great rapidity of social change since World War II, but also to 
the great qualitative differences in the change process itself. For since then the migrant 
remittance, aid financed, bureaucratic society has been born and begun to evolve. Its 
characteristics are now so firmly in place that we must recognise them   the MIRAB society 
(MI = migration, R = remittances, A = aid financed, B = bureaucratic characteristics). 
 
We have already outlined some of the characteristics of the MIRAB society as illustrated 
by Cook Islanders. For many decades economic and social life has been shaped by 
injections of large subsidies into the Islands. The role of government has always dominated 
over private enterprise and in the last four decades there has been a great expansion of the 
bureaucracy   a bureaucracy which has had little effect in stimulating autonomous 
development. Government indeed has always been paternalist and society dependent on it. 
As the Belshaw-Stace Report (1955:2) stated 30 years ago: 
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“Government ... is regarded as something apart to be protested 
against, or an orange to be sucked for unrequited handouts, rather 
than an agency with which the people co operate for their own 
benefit”. 
 
The achievement of a high standard of social conditions in the Islands, and the 
implementation of welfare policies, flowed directly from the link with the developing 
welfare state in New Zealand. Successive New Zealand Ministers of Island Territories took 
it for granted that the achievements of the welfare state in New Zealand should be extended 
to the peoples of the New Zealand dependent territories; Sir Maui Pomare, for example, 
referred to4 
 
“New Zealand's moral responsibility to develop the Cooks 
socially as well as economically, even if this meant New Zealand 
had to pay for what the islands could not afford themselves.” 
 
By the 1920s, government spending was well above the level that could have been 
sustained on the basis of local revenue alone; from then until self government New 
Zealand's “subsidy” to the Cook Islands accounted for around half of total spending.5 
Having been thus “colonised by the welfare state”, and with their continuing freedom to 
move to mainland New Zealand at any time, Cook Islanders have been able to take for 
granted their continued access to a level of services, and a standard of living, which would 
not have been attainable on their own. The bureaucratic superstructure, which 
simultaneously provided both employment and services, was constructed to New Zealand 
specifications, and on the base of the strength of the mainland New Zealand economy. 
Opportunities for able Cook Islanders have been most readily available in the bureaucracy, 
in the commercial sector (mediating trade with New Zealand) and in New Zealand itself. 
Given the mobility of the Cook Islanders, their proletarianisation and acquaintance with 
remittance systems from the Makatea period, and the lack of sustained profitability in 
agriculture or manufacturing in these small, remote islands, the evolution of the MIRAB 
society is to be seen as a rational, and indeed inevitable, response to clear opportunities. 
 
Having thus been enabled by the link with New Zealand to “leapfrog” the textbook “stages 
of development”, and to achieve directly a situation which has elements of the so called 
“stage of high mass consumption”6, the MIRAB society in the Cook Islands does not 
exhibit (and should not be expected to exhibit) any of the familiar indicators of so called 
“underdevelopment”.  Surplus labour is virtually non existent, dualism is muted, 
“exploitation” is not an issue, and nutritional problems are linked to consumption of 
luxuries, not malnutrition. In practical terms, the Cook Islands are an offshore New Zealand 
province, and continue to share in the values and expectations of their mainland dwelling 
fellow citizens. The question: are the Cook Islands an underdeveloped country? resolves 
itself very simply into the basic question of whether the Cook Islands are a part of the New 
Zealand society and economy or not. While the New Zealand connection holds firm (as it 
has done to date), the Cook Islands are an integral part of a developed economy and 
society, and have virtually nothing in common with the stereotyped “underdeveloped 
country”.  Destruction of the New Zealand connection, and with it the welfare state in the 
Cook Islands, would of course change matters radically   but until such a change has 
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actually been imposed in reality, it makes no sense to discuss Cook Islands issues in terms 
of “Third World” models, and it is unhelpful to promote policies based upon such models. 
 
6.4  Population and Migration 
 
Table 6.1 and Figure 6.2 show population trends over the past century and a half. The 
nineteenth century de population which was customary throughout the Pacific halted about 
the time of the 1890s Federation, and during the New Zealand colonial era the Cook Islands 
passed through the first stage of “demographic transition”7 with high birth rates and falling 
death rates. Between 1900 and 1960 the total population approximately doubled, the great 
bulk of the increase showing up in the Southern Group (including Rarotonga) while total 
population of the atolls of the Northern Group rose only 50%, mostly during the 1950s. 
 
TABLE 6.1 
 
COOK ISLANDS: POPULATION 
 
YEAR LOWER GROUP NORTHERN GROUP TOTAL RAROTONGA
1823 NA NA 14,000 
1843 NA NA 10,250 
1845 9,760 NA NA 
1855 8,700 NA NA 
1872 7,292 1,447 8,739 
1881 6,852 NA NA 
1899 NA 1,786 NA 
1900 NA 1,864 NA 
1902 6,234 1,834 8,068 2,060
1906 6,577 1,801 8,378 2,441
1911 6,791 1,684 8,475 2,759
1916 6,856 1,673 8,529 3,064
1921 7,437 1,721 9,158 3,503
1926 8,066 1,735 9,801 3,936
1936 9,969 1,974 11,943 5,054
1945 11,522 2,052 13,574 5,573
1951 12,396 2,361 14,757 6,048
1956 15,043 2,611 17,054 7,212
1961 15,511 2,867 18,378 8,676
1966 16,819 2,432 19,251 9,971
1971 18,919 2,398 21,317 11,478
1976 16,082 2,030 18,112 9,802
1981 15,366 2,264 17,695 9,530
1983 17,400 
  
 
Up until the mid 1960s the migration rate was low, and with a high rate of natural increase 
of 23 per 1000 the population grew rapidly. Crude birth rates were exceptionally high 
(often over 40 per 1000) and in this period, improved health care led to a fall in the death 
rate. 
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During the 1960s the rate of out migration to New Zealand rose as the population “bulge” of 
young people born in the post Second World War baby boom led to a large number of new 
entrants to the labour market for whom local opportunities were few, while the New Zealand 
labour market was characterised by excess demand and high wages.8 Overall population 
growth slowed and then turned negative in the early 1970s due to the heavy out migration 
accompanied by a fall in the birth rate (Table 6.2). 
 
TABLE 6.2 
 
SOME KEY POPULATION RATIOS 
 
A. Birth rate, Death rate, Migration rate 
 
 1967-1971 1972-1976 1977-1981 
*  Births 4,097 2,917 2,416 
*  Deaths 775 562 683 
*  Migration 1,247 5,549 2,166 
  
Crude Birth Rate (%/year) 4.3 2.7 0.75 
Crude Death Rate (%/year) 0.81 0.53 0.75 
Crude Migration Rate (%/year) 1.3 5.2 2.4 
Natural Increase (%/year) 3.5 2.2 1.9 
Total Increase (%/year) 2.07 3.19 0.48 
 
B. Cook Islanders in Group and New Zealand 
 
Year 
Ethnic Cook 
Islanders 
Resident in  
Cook Islands 
Cook Island 
Maoris 
resident in  
N.Z. 
Total N.Z. % 
Cook-Islands-born 
residents of New 
Zealand 
1936  93  157
1945 13,754 353 13,927 3 393
1951 14,757 1,359 16,116 8 999
1956 16,259 2,320 18,579 12 1,992
1961 18,378a 4,499 22,877 19.6 3,374
1966 18,301 8,663 27,010 32.1 5,838
1971 20,355 13,772 34,127 40.4 7,389
1976 17,325 18,610 35,935 51.8 12,156
1981 16,435b  13,848
a. Total population 
b. “Cook Islands Maori” plus “Cook Island Maori/Other” 
c. Sources:Hayes (1982), p.207, Table 5.20: Cols. 1,2,3 and 4, 1936 76. Cook Islands 
Government Statisticians Office, Cook Islands Census of Population and 
Dwellings, 1981: Demographic Characteristics of the population of the Cook 
Islands (December 1982), Table 7, p.13. 
 - 137 -
By 1971-75 net migration reached an average annual rate of 49.6 per 1000, almost double the 
rate of natural increase. New Zealand observers, who had viewed the high rate of population 
growth in the 1950s and 60s with considerable alarm, felt by the 1960s the problem was 
correcting itself as the outflow gathered pace. Between 1966 and 1981 the annual rate of 
emigration has fluctuated markedly due to a variety of factors. The average annual rate 
through the period of 28.4 per 1000 represents a Cook Island Maori outflow of about 600 
persons. Some islands that might be considered on some criteria as relatively 
“underdeveloped” experienced high emigration rates in 1966-81 -  Mangaia (50 per 1000), 
Palmerston (64.5) and Manihiki (64.2). However, the northern atolls which might be 
considered to be just as deprived, experienced much lower rates - e.g. Pukapuka (21.2) and 
Tongareva (22.6). 
 
The Escap (1983) Report has argued that the pressure exerted by the extremely rapid rate of 
natural increase was perhaps the primary cause of the massive emigration of the 1960s. 
Without the relief of emigration the working age population would have increased by almost 
5,300 persons between 1966 and 1976. If 17 is taken as the average age of entering the work 
force, the number of new entrants per year between 1966 and 1971 would have been 434, 
rising to 566 in the period 1971-76 and 777 in the years 1976-81 (Escap, 1983:153). Without 
free entry to the New Zealand labour market the absorptive capacity of the Cook Islands 
economy and society would have been stretched.  
  
The recent (1977-1982 data) situation is one of a moderate rate of natural increase (1.9% p.a. 
compared with 3.5% in the late 1960s) and a moderate, but not particularly dramatic, out 
migration rate of 2.4% p.a., yielding an overall population trend of -0.5% p.a. The present rate 
of change is probably somewhat smaller than this   population, in other words, is virtually 
static, and the major adjustments of demographic transition and labour export have been 
followed by what amounts to a steady state. The major concern of the Cook Islands 
Government, reflected in the strategy of the recently published  Development Plan9, is that a 
resumption of growth and employment opportunities in the depressed New Zealand economy 
may generate renewed depopulation at some time in the future, unless high income 
opportunities are available at home. 
 
The land area of the Cook Islands is only 240km, and the average density of population 
reached 89 per sq km by 1971. On such tiny islands with often a high proportion of steep 
terrain or infertile soils on the atolls, the pressure on available resources increased steadily 
throughout the 1950s and 1960s. It appears that in this period there was a growing perception 
that the Islands' capacity to absorb the steady growth in population was becoming severely 
constrained. However, it is argued in this report that the “pull factors” were dominant in 
explaining out migration after World War II as horizons broadened, the pace of social change 
quickened and the islands became increasingly enmeshed in the economic growth pole zone 
based in New Zealand. 
 
Contributory “push factors” are the stagnation of agriculture under the village mode of 
production and the extreme fractionalisation of land ownership rights. Hayes has shown how 
demographic factors placed increased pressure on the village mode of production and family 
structure to meet the new needs. With women bearing an average of 7 children during their 
lifetime and most of these now surviving into adulthood, more children would have to share 
in the father's plot of land. And with increased longevity, the children would have to wait 
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longer in the village (if they decided to wait) before succeeding to ownership rights of 
productive resources. The low profitability of agriculture based on citrus, tomatoes and 
pineapples in the 1960s and 70s acted as a further push factor as did the general instability of 
prices and the chronic difficulties and irregularities of ship transport. Finally, the increasing 
alignment of the secondary school curriculum to that of New Zealand and the clear escalation 
of local aspirations towards finding jobs that were unlikely to eventuate in the Islands but 
could be found on the mainland (see Hayes aspirations survey 1980) provided additional 
inducement to leave. 
 
Throughout the whole period however, the great underlying factor enabling the migration 
movement to occur, was the possession of New Zealand citizenship and open access to New 
Zealand. Undoubtedly one of the strongest of all “pull” factors was the buoyant economy and 
rapid industrial expansion in New Zealand beginning with the high wool prices of the 1950s. 
10There was a strong demand for Cook Island labour at wage rates four or more times those 
prevailing in the Cook Islands in similar occupations (Escap 1983): Table 101). Douglas (196 
) and Curson (1970 and 1973) have shown that higher incomes, the prospect of achieving 
substantial savings with a view perhaps to later investments back home, and the appeal of 
high living standards were major factors in the movement. The desire too to take advantage of 
the better quality of education available in New Zealand is an oft recurring reason for 
movement. While the motives in the earlier period appear to be primarily economic, from the 
1960s onward chain migration has become more and more characteristic. In this phase, the 
primary aim (as well as the mechanism) of moving to New Zealand, is to join a brother, son 
or sister etc. who has travelled a year or two earlier. Now kinship and social factors are 
primary, and intermediate obstacles that had provided difficulties lose much of their force: the 
passage money can be provided by relatives in New Zealand, accommodation for some weeks 
or longer, job promises and the psychological as well as social support that provides a buffer 
to the shocks of adjustment to a new society. Finally the availability of transport after 1973 
when the Rarotonga international airport was opened greatly stimulated migration. 
 
6.5  The Effects of Migration 
 
The consequences of migration in the islands also need to be clearly identified. The society 
remaining is very different from a “normal” population, in the sense that it has a very 
unbalanced age structure (see Fig. 6.2 and Fig. 6.3 on Aitutaki). A great gap exists in the 
young, working age groups (mapu), and the working population between 15 and 64 have to 
support an extremely high number of dependents. The “dependency ratio” showing the ratio 
between this population of dependents (0-14 years and 65 plus years) to the population of 
workers is extremely high, rising from 95 per hundred in 1956 to 123 in 1966 and 121 in 
1971. This was the second highest amongst 130 countries reporting figures to the United 
Nations11, exceeded only by Niue, and closely followed by American and Western Samoa. 
The ratio has fallen in recent years  - to 116 in 1976 and to 92 in 1981. 
  
In interpreting the dependency ratio, of course, it is important to bear in mind that the task of 
providing for these dependents is by no means entirely borne by the locally resident 
productive labour force. The cohorts of overseas resident migrant workers send back 
substantial sums in the form of remittances, which play a vital and continuing role in the 
Cook Islands economic system.  
 
 - 139 -
FIG 6.3 
 
AITUTAKI  AGE  STRUCTURE, 1975 
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Hayes12 has estimated that in the 1970s the amounts remitted from New Zealand to the Cook 
Islands were virtually equal to the value of the additional production which those workers 
could have generated had they remained in the Cook Islands. Since remittances absorbed 
roughly 10% of the pre tax earnings of Cook Island workers in New Zealand, there can be no 
doubt that those workers' ability to contribute to the support of dependents was increased by 
their decision to migrate. (That is, the lower “dependency ratio” which would have resulted 
had those Cook Islanders not migrated, would have been offset by their reduced economic 
capacity to support dependents out of current incomes). 
 
A second qualification which must always be made to census data in partly subsistence 
societies is that not all those registered as “dependents” in terms of census categories are in 
fact non productive. Many children and old people work part time in various areas of 
subsistence activity, so that the actual dependency burden represented by a given 
“dependency ratio” tends to be relatively lower in such societies than in fully specialised 
wage labour systems. This amounts to saying that the impact on local production of the out 
migration of working age people is mitigated in settings such as the Cook Islands by the 
greater flexibility of production systems in the village mode. 
 
Nevertheless, it is true that out migration in the Cook Islands probably created labour 
shortages in certain areas of activity - particularly those in the sphere of commercial 
agriculture and industry. In the absence of out migration, the swelling population of working 
age during the 1960s and 1970s would have depressed real wages and facilitated labour 
recruitment for capitalist type ventures. In the event, no such reserve army has been available 
to date, which has mitigated the impact of government policy on wages (see below). 
 
Naturally, if we treat the Cook Islands economy as totally separate from that of New Zealand, 
the out migration will appear to involve a loss of productive capacity. Although some of the 
migrants (about 40% of males in the 1970s) appear to have been unskilled, and hence might 
be portrayed as “surplus labour” being drained off from an economy with limited absorptive 
capacity, Hayes has noted the substantial transfer of skilled labour categories to New 
Zealand: 
 
“The image of unskilled labourers and/or agricultural workers 
streaming out of rural into urban occupations is partially accurate, 
but a large number of “urban” occupations are present here as well. 
Surveyors, health inspectors, laboratory technicians, administrators, 
radio operators, plumbers, planters, all these occupations and more 
are present in the emigrant stream. In other words, this is not simply 
a case of an exodus from agricultural occupations”13 
 
The drain of manpower thus also included talent; leadership was lost as well. Hayes' 
interviews indicated that a greater proportion of the most advanced school leavers, with 
higher educational levels, emigrate. 
 
With the loss of mapu the amount of land under cultivation shrank. Informants told the 
Graves that on Aitutaki in 1974 the amount of cultivated land was only about one third of the 
area in the 1950s14 (There would appear to have been a significant increase recently with the 
boom in banana production in the late 1970s).  
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Socially too the effects are marked: there are poor attendances at village meetings and 
voluntary work groups. There has been a decline in the members of sports teams and some 
villages have found it hard to put a dance team together. 
  
Psychologically too, it has been suggested that the islands have changed over the last 30 
years, with the modal personality turning away from co operation and generosity towards 
greater individualism and rivalry. Thus, few mapu boys participate voluntarily in community 
work, and fines for not attending have no effect. Well over half of the families were nuclear in 
form by the early 1970s and many parents worry that all their children will go away and leave 
them destitute. 
  
Whether all of these changes can fairly be attributed to migration is an open question. To a 
considerable extent migration itself was part of a wider pattern of social adjustments of which 
these other trends also formed part. In particular, the decline of production in the Cook 
Islands during the 1970s1 reflects the fact that in the context of the New Zealand economy of 
which the Islands form an integral part, local productive activities generally suffer from 
absolute disadvantage and hence are unable to offer employment on terms which might have 
been attractive to skilled Cook Islanders. Migration and falling production are thus two faces 
of the same coin; it is not possible to say that either “caused” the other. 
  
As migration slowed in the late 1970s and early 1980s (see Table 6.2 above), the locally 
resident labour force has again been increasing and in the next few years may return to the 
peak level of 1971. Whether these new entrants to the labour market remain in the Group or 
move to New Zealand will depend mainly on trends in the New Zealand economy, and to a 
lesser extent on trends in disposable income available in the Islands. Policies of “people 
conservation”, seeking to maintain more “balanced” age structures and the demographic basis 
for integrated community life, will require either continuing recession and high 
unemployment in New Zealand, or an increased level of subsidy to otherwise unprofitable 
economic activities in the Group. The present steady state in the migration/population balance 
reflects an equilibrium adjustment to a situation where the New Zealand economy has not 
grown significantly for a decade and where, therefore, it has been possible to hold or reduce 
the levels of subsidy to the Cook Islands. In the event that New Zealand resumes rapid 
growth, then (in the absence of some unforeseen boom in the Islands) the rational response 
for Cook Islanders is likely to be renewed migration, unless the New Zealand Government 
considers that there are adequate reasons of social policy for raising the present level of 
subsidy to disposable incomes in the Islands. 
 
(It may be noted that the main policy option currently under discussion in this area, namely 
portability of National Superannuation, would have its impact upon “dependent” groups 
rather than working age Cook Islanders; the predicted effect of this policy innovation on its 
own would be to raise the demographic dependency ratio in the Islands, and convert the 
migration process from one of permanent movement to one of “circular migration”, with more 
migrant workers returning home to retire. A probable corollary would be an increase in the 
level of remittance flows from New Zealand to the Cook Islands, since migrants committed to 
eventual return would perceive greater returns from the investment in goodwill and family 
infrastructure. Only the most marginal impact on working age migration would be likely to 
result, however.) 
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6.6  The Economy 
 
During the last three decades the Cook Islands have passed through an economic transition 
from a primary product export economy at a low to moderate level of income, to a services 
dominated import economy at relatively high standards of living. The decline of onshore 
production has proceeded hand in hand with a rise in onshore incomes, both being related to 
the rise in offshore productive activity by migrant labour. The consistent thrust of official 
policies on economic development throughout the period has been the encouragement of 
commercial onshore productive activity; the consistent failure of “development” conceived of 
in this way has resulted in official perceptions of the economy as “fragile” and “unstable”.  
Neither term applies to economic reality in the Cook Islands; both apply aptly, however, to 
the structure of economic analysis on which established policies were based until recently. 
 
The strictly limited scope of commercial productive activity arises from the operation of the 
mechanism described in the 1950s by Gunnar Myrdal as “backwash”15. The Cook Islands 
economy is closely integrated with New Zealand by monetary, migration and trading 
linkages. This integration is characterised by a set of circumstances which enhance onshore 
incomes and the quality of life in the Group, while rendering commercial production 
unprofitable outside a few limited enclaves. Monetary integration with New Zealand has 
committed the Islands to the overvalued exchange rate policies of successive New Zealand 
Governments, which in turn has helped to render the Group uncompetitive in overseas 
markets other than New Zealand. Subsidised transport partly overcomes the natural protection 
which distance would normally afford to local manufacturing activity in an economy as 
isolated as are the Cook Islands. At the same time, transport modes and schedules are adapted 
to the encouragement of tourism and imports rather than commodity exports, and transport 
bottlenecks play a large part in forming the (generally pessimistic) expectations of potential 
and actual export producers. Migration to New Zealand is facilitated by an education system 
which enables Cook Islanders to fit easily into the New Zealand labour market, and by the 
maintenance of New Zealand citizenship, with its concomitant right of free entry to New 
Zealand. The government sector, modelled upon the New Zealand one and heavily (though 
decreasingly) financed by New Zealand, provides better employment opportunities than the 
private sector, and attracts the best of the locally resident labour force into tenured posts with 
union representation through the PSA. Private sector unions have been almost entirely 
suppressed (the waterfront workers offer the sole exception) but the consequent low wage 
environment provides little assistance to private sector profit rates in the absence of a reserve 
army of labour, since only unskilled and relatively low calibre workers are available for 
recruitment at wage rates below those obtainable in the public service or in New Zealand. 
 
Commercial activity in this environment is mainly concerned with trading activities, tourism 
services, and exploitation of the short run and short lived opportunities offered by recurrent 
cycles of “new export products” from the agricultural sector. These last provide the basis for a 
gradually emerging small class of full time commercial horticulturalists, but offer no prospect 
(or threat?) of a wider agricultural transformation. 
 
The overall picture, viewed from the perspective of the individual islander or island 
household (which seems the most appropriate of several alternative viewpoints for us to adopt 
in assessing “development”) is thoroughly satisfactory. Living standards are comfortable, and 
conspicuously good by comparison with many other Pacific island countries. Subsistence 
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agriculture has remained sound, providing an assured basis to the local diet at low monetary 
cost. Destitution is virtually unknown because of the continuing extended family structure 
and access to wage opportunities in New Zealand. Standards of education and health are in 
general comparable, if not fully on a par, with those in mainland New Zealand. A cohesive 
value system focussing on the church and the family is still strong, and local culture and 
society have largely escaped the fate of the more money swamped societies of French 
Polynesia or Nauru. Self government has succeeded in providing a functioning and locally 
directed administration. 
 
The past two decades of self government, in other words, have seen the central aspirations of 
most Cook Islanders realised. Village life remains intact, living standards have risen, links 
with New Zealand have been maintained, and the social climate has, if anything, improved. 
Political factionalism, Air New Zealand obduracy, competition from Asian canned pineapple, 
and the somewhat lagged impact of the New Zealand inflation rate, are minor irritants 
compared with the achievements. 
 
It is perhaps inevitable that this picture should arouse the ire of those commentators to whom 
“dependence” in any form is anathema. An inordinate amount of attention is consequently 
paid by policymakers and observers to one of the less important and least successful sectors 
of the economy   export agriculture   the performance of which is usually (and incorrectly) 
mis-read as an indicator of the “health” of the overall economy. The constant travails of the 
uncompetitive, but erratically spoonfed, cash cropping sector, perform the useful function of 
legitimating official financial transfers from mainland New Zealand under the inappropriate 
title of “development aid”, and provide meaningful and active employment for a large part of 
the local public service. 
 
The three main pillars on which the present economic system rests - New Zealand citizenship, 
New Zealand aid, and tourism   all appear both solid and sustainable. The first two in 
particular, underpinned as they are by solid ties and binding political undertakings, offer a 
considerably firmer economic base than any likely to be found in international commodity 
markets, and cushion the Cook Islands economy from the instability which is characteristic of 
other less open Pacific economies, whose international economic relations are confined to 
commodity trade across defined national frontiers. 
 
 
6.7  Structural Long run Trends 
 
Long run data series of acceptable reliability are available for export and import trade, 
government finance, population, and occupational structure. Data on gross domestic output 
and national income are spotty and of doubtful reliability, which is normal for economies 
dominated by the subsistence and service sectors (since the great bulk of the GDP valuation 
rests upon inputed valuations of non quantified magnitudes). Income distribution data 
(particularly inter island comparative figures) are remarkably scarce, and virtually nothing 
can be said at present about trends in relative incomes among the islands of the Group, 
although there are some grounds for supposing that the dominance of Rarotonga in the early 
1960s has been reduced over the past two decades. 
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6.8  Labour Force and Occupation Structure 
 
The impact of migration on the size of the total labour force and the shift in the structure of 
the economy away from agriculture towards service occupations, is shown in Table 6.3. It is 
notable that the 1976 and 1981 censuses record an upturn in the economically active 
population, from 5113 in 1976 to 5820 in 1981. The Development Plan 1982-1985, 
however,16 gives figures of 4945 for 1976 and 4333 for 1981. The main error seems to be the 
Plan's use of a massive under estimate for 1981 agricultural employment, and its failure to 
utilise the 1981 census provisional results which had been available for a year by the time the 
Plan was published in early 1984. The error is significant, as the Plan's figures give a 
completely false impression of the trend in active labour force since 1976, and thereby create 
an unjustifiably pessimistic view of the migration problem. 
 
The structural transition from a “producing” to a “service” employment structure took place 
between 1945 and 1971, since when there has been virtual stability in the share of tertiary 
employment. Over the decade 1971-1981 the main apparent trend is a decline of 
manufacturing and construction employment (due to the ending of airport construction, the 
rundown of fruit processing, and the decline since reversed, of clothing manufacture offset by 
a recent resurgence of agricultural and fishing employment). 
 
Comparison of the 1976 and 1981 censuses suggests that the earlier trend 
towardsconcentration of the Cook Islands labour force in Rarotonga has largely 
ceased.Hayes17 in 1979 drew attention to the falling share of the outer islands in the total 
actively engaged work force, from 41% in 1966 to 33% in 1976. By 1981, however, the share 
had returned to 40%, with most of the increase concentrated in the outer islands agricultural 
and fishing sector. It is difficult to know how this should be interpreted   as a sign of 
agricultural “involution” on the outer islands as external opportunities for out migration 
decreased; or as a sign of a genuine revival of agricultural activity; or both. The central point, 
however, is clear: the great era of in migration to Rarotonga, with the lure of jobs in an 
expanding public service, is over. Indeed, the past decade has seen an expansion in the public 
service on islands such as Aitutaki, while public service employment in Rarotonga appears to 
have fallen. 
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TABLE 6.3 
 
OCCUPATION STRUCTURE, 1946-1981 
 
Economically Active Population Engaged in: 
 
Year Agriculture & fishing 
Manufacturing 
& construction 
& quarrying 
Services Other 
Total 
labour 
force 
 % No % No % No % No  
MALES 
1945 84 3,048 2 68 11 398 3 112 3,626a
1961 74 3,362 3 148 23 1,022  5 4,537a
1971         
1976 31 1,145 13 483 50 1,852 6 209 3,689
1981 35 1,429 13 518 49 1,971 3 133 4,051
         
FEMALES 
1945 37 225 24 145 14 85 25 150 605a
1961 1 13 30 321 69 738  0 1,072a
1971   0 0  0  
1976 2 22 23 323 65 932 10 147 1,424
1981 15 268 12 204 66 1,168 7 119 1,759
         
TOTAL 
1945 77 3,273 5 213 12 483 6 262 4,231a
1961 60 3,375 8 469 32 1,760  5 5,609a
1971 23 1,421 21 1,321 54 3,364 3 163 6,269
1976 23 1,167 16 806 54 2,784 7 356 5,113
1981 29 1,697 12 722 54 3,139 4 252 5,810
 
a. Total population 15 and over, includes those “not gainfully employed”. 
 
Sources: 1945 and 1961 from Cook, J.G.,  Labour and Employment in the Cook Islands, Department 
of Internal Affairs, 1968, pp. 2-3. 
  
1981 from Cook Islands Government Statistics Office, “Economic Characteristics of the 
Population of the Cook Islands Provisional Data)”, January 1983, pp. 7-8. 
 
1971 from Hayes, G.R., “Employment and Occupational Trends in the Cook Islands 1966-
1976, Cook Islands Government Statistics Office, Occasional Paper No 2, 1979, p.6. 
 
1976 from Census of Population and Dwellings, 1976, Table 13.01. 
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TABLE 6.4 
 
RAROTONGA VERSUS THE REST 
 
 
Economically Active Population Total Population 
Year Rarotong
a 
Outer 
Island
s 
Total Rarotong
a % 
Rarotong
a 
Outer 
Island
s  
Total Rarotong
a % 
1945     5573 8515 14088 39.6 
1961     8676 9702 18378 47.2 
1966 3229 2197 5426 59.5 9972 9276 19247 51.8 
1971 3849 2420 6269 61.4 11478 9845 21323 53.8 
1976 3409 1704 5113 66.7 9802 8326 18128 54.1 
1981 3487 2323 5810 66.0 9530 8224 17754 53.7 
 
Sources:  Hayes (1979), pp.7-8; and 1981 Census Publications CPD5 82 and CPD9 82 for 
economically active population. 
 
Development Plan 1982 1985, Table 4.1, p.21 for total population. Note discrepancies 
between these figures and our Table 16.1. 
 
 
6.9  Export and Import Trade and the Economy  
 
At the beginning of our discussion of the balance of payments it is worth quoting the sentence 
which opens the Development Plan’s chapter on Finance18: 
 
“Foreign exchange is not a constraint in Cook Islands development nor 
is it likely to be in the forseeable future so long as present banking and 
financial arrangements continue between the Cook Islands and New 
Zealand.” 
 
This accurately captures the central reality of the Cook Islands balance of payments. The 
great bulk of both export and import trade is with New Zealand, and these transactions take 
place in New Zealand currency. The Cook Islands no more suffers from any “foreign 
exchange deficit” in dealings with its major trading partner than do Masterton or Kaitaia in 
their dealings with the rest of New Zealand. The assumptions with which observers are prone 
to approach the analysis of independent nations' balance of payments are therefore 
inappropriate in the case of the Cook Islands. In particular, it is quite incorrect to deduce from 
an excess of imports over exports that there is any need to “build up  exports in order to “pay 
for” the imports. Any increase in export earnings will generate a matching increase in import 
purchases, unless at the same time some other source of income for Cook Islanders (such as 
private remittances or public sector transfers) is reduced. The trade figures are therefore 
useful as an indicator of the evolving structure of the economy; but they do not serve to reveal 
any emerging “crisis” requiring a remedy. 
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Having made this point (to which we return below), we introduce in Table 6.5 the total export 
and import data for the period since the Second World War. Figure 5.2 provides a graph of 
annual data back to 1893, converted to 1982 New Zealand dollars using the New Zealand 
consumer price index. The data thus represent the real purchasing power in New Zealand of 
the Cook Islands' exports for each year, and the real equivalent in New Zealand of the 
purchasing power surrendered in order to purchase imports. This method of deflation is 
admittedly crude, but it serves the purpose we have in mind here   namely a comparison of the 
balance of trade over time. The trade statistics used have been the subject of some criticism 
by various commentators.19 Most criticism has focussed on the import figures (export data 
appear to be more reliable, and are on a consistent FOB basis). The problem appears to be 
that import trade tends to be under reported in the official published figures -  both because 
goods imported by Government Departments are often excluded from the statistics and 
because until the last few years, values tended to be recorded FOB rather than CIF. Both these 
criticisms apply most strongly to the period between 1966 and 1975 (when, as can be seen 
from Figure 5.2, our data are obviously somewhat erratic). Neither of them, however, affects 
our analysis of the basic trends; purists should simply read Figure 5.2 in the knowledge that 
the import series are lower bound if anything. 
 
TABLE 6.5 
 
THE COOK ISLANDS BALANCE OF TRADE, 1945 1983 
 
000NZ Dollars deflated to 1982 constant dollars 
 
 Annual averages   
Period 
Exports 
FOB Imports 
Balance   1 - 
2 
Trade 
“deficit” as % 
of imports 
1930-39 2,293 2,324 -3 1.3 
1945-49 3,285 5,335 -2,050 38.4 
1950/55 5,572 9,243 -3,671 39.7 
1955-59 6,431 10,188 -3,757 36.9 
1960-65 8,506 13,438 -4,932 36.7 
1965-69 9,864 16,360 -6,496 39.7 
1970-75 8,638 20,524a -11,886 357.9 
1975-79 5,413 32,345 -26,932 83.3 
1980-83 5,199 27,346 -22,147 81.0 
 
a. 1970, 1973 and 1974 only. 
 
Source: Working paper, “Some Long Run Data Series for Five Pacific Micro economies”. 
 
 
The story told by Table 6.5 and Figure 5.2 is straightforward. Three periods stand out: first, 
the pre World War II era of equality between reported imports and exports; second, the years 
from 1942 to 1964, when the Cook Islands ran an apparent excess of imports over exports 
amounting to 40% of total imports, but with strong growth of both export earnings and import 
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purchases; and thirdly, the period from 1970 to 1983, when (after five years of virtual 
stability) there occurred a strong rise of imports accompanied by a steady decline in export 
earnings. By 1983, “real” export earnings had fallen back to the 1950 51 level, while imports 
were three or four times their level at that time. 
 
What this amounts to is that commodity exports have lost their previous role as the driving 
force in the Cook Islands economy. Prior to the War the Cook Islands had a fairly stagnant 
export economy characterised by occasional boom periods (around 1910, and in the 1920s). 
After the war, material living standards were driven steadily up by a combination of export 
growth, government spending, and private remittances from emigrant labour. At the end of 
the 1960s, exports dropped out of the group of “leading sectors”, leaving the economy to be 
driven through a further decade of rapidly rising living standards by government spending, 
remittances, and a new source of “invisible” earnings, tourism. 
 
In the early 1980s, it appeared that exports had bottomed out, while imports were against 
some sort of ceiling. With population more or less constant, and enough continuing out 
migration to make up for “depreciation” of the economy's investment in New Zealand 
resident human capital, the situation is now one of stable equilibrium, which can be sustained 
for as long as the five props of material living standards   subsistence agriculture, commodity 
exports, tourism, remittances, and government transfers   remain unchanged. Changes in any 
of these would induce a series of adjustments in the Cook Islands economy; the nature of 
those adjustments would of course depend on which of the five changed, and in which 
direction. It is worthwhile, therefore, to look at each of the five in turn, and make some 
attempt to describe its linkages to the total system. This is done below. In summary, the 
adjustment mechanisms which are of most concern to policymakers are: (a) out migration (if 
local conditions of life deteriorate relative to those in New Zealand); (b) decline of 
subsistence agriculture (if income from exports and “invisibles” rises towards or beyond the 
Nauru threshold); (c) further decline in export performance (if the “wedge” of invisible 
inflows increases); and (d) financial crises for the Cook Islands Government if its attempts to 
stem (a), (b) and (c) outrun the willingness of the New Zealand Government to pick up the 
tab. (In each of the above four cases, the adjustment is of course reversible   i.e. in migration, 
agricultural involution, export growth, and government cash surpluses are all equally 
possible. In each case, the necessary resources exist at the margin: a large pool of Cook 
Islanders in New Zealand, reserves of agricultural land, and a world financial market which 
has been only lightly tapped to date). 
 
 
6.10  Export Production and Earnings 
 
Export production in the Cook Islands falls into three categories. The first is the gathering and 
minimal processing of natural products of the Group: examples are the old export staple, 
copra, and the harvesting of lagoon products such as pearls, pearl shell and beche de mer. The 
second category is commercial agricultural production from smallholdings, destined for 
central processing/marketing firms: major examples are citrus, pineapples, bananas and 
pawpaw. The third category is manufactured exports, mainly clothing and footwear, produced 
in plants of medium scale (10 100 employees), utilising labour intensive technology and 
drawing on the limited labour surplus pool of female workers available on Rarotonga. 
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Figure 6.4 shows the changing composition of exports over the period 1948-1983. It is 
immediately obvious that the most consistent (though undramatic) growth sector over the 
long term has been apparel   clothing and footwear for the New Zealand market. Fruit and 
vegetables (both fresh and canned) were however the mainstay of export earnings until the 
mid 1970s, and it is the decline of processed fruit which has been the main reason for the fall 
in total export receipts over the past decade. Table 6.6 gives the same information by five 
year periods for the main commodities. 
 
In terms of the three broad categories outlined above, it is possible to trace a succession of 
export products from copra and pearlshell (which together accounted for about half of total 
exports in the early 1950s) to the fresh fruit and processed fruit trade (which provided 55% of 
export earnings in the early 1960s and over 60% in the 1970s) and most recently clothing, 
pawpaws and specialty vegetable lines sent by airfreight (which account for roughly 60% of 
export earnings in the early 1980s). For the 1983 calendar year apparel was up to 48%, 
pawpaws and specialty horticultural lines 29%; while other fresh fruit was down to 6% and 
processed fruit 1%. The dramatic scale of these swings androundabouts effects contrasts in a 
striking manner with the much smaller fluctuations of total export earnings; as Fairbairn has 
noted20: 
 
   “Given the degree of fluctuation experienced by individual export 
products, aggregate export earnings of the Cook Islands ... until 
recently display an unusual degree of stability.” 
 
At first sight it is not clear whether the mutually offsetting character of export product cycles 
is pure chance or reflects resource reallocation backwards and forwards as relative 
opportunities shift. The consistency of the pattern over time, however, and the prevalence of 
the same phenomenon in Niue (see Chapter 7), suggests the latter. The Cook Islands and Niue 
share a tendency to exhibit rapid rates of growth in individual export products, 
counterbalanced by equally rapid declines in others; the considerable importance of 
government policy in the promotion of commercial activity suggests that a partial explanation 
may be found in the shifting interests of policymakers as much as in changing circumstances 
in the main markets. 
 
The decline of citrus on Rarotonga opened the way for a swing into a new generation of cash 
crops (and indeed, the new opportunities associated with the latter had a good deal to do with 
the decline of the former!). Following the opening of the new airport in 1974 there was an 
immediate surge in experimental shipments of new horticultural products   avocados, 
capsicums, beans, pawpaws, and similar crops. The Civil Aviation Agreement with New 
Zealand was the key to success in the new boom products: wide bodied jet service, schedules 
to Auckland, and air freight rates (currently around $0.90 per kilo) were all matters for 
negotiation between the Cook Islands and New Zealand Governments. Air New Zealand's 
service to the Islands still remains one of the most widely discussed political issues, as does 
the N.Z. Ministry of Transport's management of Rarotonga Airport. Growers of the new crops 
did not have to pay for the massive infrastructural investment in the airport, nor for its current 
operating loss. With the infrastructure provided, however, there is no doubt that horticulture 
on a moderate scale has been commercially attractive. 
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Ageing citrus stands, thus, were replaced not with new citrus but with pawpaw and other 
crops suitable for airfreighting. Total FOB export values, certainly, are lower than at the 
height of the processed fruit trade; but the grower's share in FOB value is substantially 
higher because of the absence of the factory “middleman”. 
 
 
6.11  Apparel Industry 
 
In the light of these largely policy induced swings in commercial agriculture the record of 
the apparel manufacturing sector is of special interest. This sector attracts very little policy 
support from the Cook Islands Government   it is virtually ignored in most official analyses 
of the economy, including the Development Plan21, and officials interviewed in Rarotonga 
in April 1984 (by which time apparel was the dominant export product) were generally 
slighting, referring to the sector's low domestic value added (widely estimated at about 
25% of export value) and vulnerability to policy changes in New Zealand. In the light of 
the low priority given by the local Government, the long run performance of the sector 
attracts attention, as a possible candidate for the description “competitive”.  Certainly it 
benefits substantially from the $1.34 per hour minimum wage rate in Rarotonga and high 
labour productivity. However, it would be incorrect to see the clothing industry as 
operating in a free market situation. The key to the existence and performance of the Cook 
Islands industry is a combination of New Zealand government policy and the marketing 
strategies of a few large New Zealand companies. 
 
New Zealand firms such as Woolworths/McKenzies have for many years operated what 
amounts to a “putting out” system of production in Rarotonga. Cloth is imported from 
cheap (usually Asian) suppliers, made up in Rarotonga, and shipped on to New Zealand, 
where it enjoys duty free entry from the Cook Islands. The keys to profitability in such an 
operation are the landed cost of cloth in the Cook Islands (which appears to be considerably 
lower than in New Zealand, due to partly informal tariff concessions not available in 
mainland New Zealand) and labour costs, which as just noted are substantially below those 
on the mainland. Distance from the market, and concentration on low cost lines restrict 
Cook Islands production to the non fashion high volume market; but the transport costs 
which might have been crippling are kept down by the availability of subsidised shipping 
(the Cook Islands Niue Joint Service) and the shortage of south bound cargoes. 
 
Cook Islands clothing occupies a niche in the New Zealand market which could always 
become precarious if it were too noticeable. In the late 1940s there was a major dispute 
with New Zealand clothing unions over the growing imports of “low wage” clothing from 
the Cook Islands, and this pressure for protection against the Cook Islands was averted only 
by informal production limiting arrangements, and the onset of boom conditions with full 
employment in New Zealand. The 1976 slump in the New Zealand economy brought an 
immediate sharp cutback in clothing imports from the Cook Islands, and the recent revival 
has been helped by the fact that much of the clothing produced in Rarotonga carries “Made 
in New Zealand” labels. 
 
Ownership of the clothing factories is expatriate or overseas (New Zealand), although the 
(local) Ingram family owned two factories for much of the 1970s, and sold out in the early 
 - 152 -
1980s in response to low profit margins (since Cook Islands companies are very much at 
the mercy of Auckland buyers). 
 
Despite the official reservations apparel manufacture is well established in Rarotonga and 
exhibits every sign of continuing success. A typical export factory visited in April 1984 
was employing 35 machinists, a cutter and two assistants, and paying out $5,000 per week 
in the local economy ($3,000 in wages, $500 on power and transport, $1,500 on salaries 
and sundries). The value of its production appeared to be in the range $20,000 - $25,000 
per week, confirming the estimate of around 25% domestic value added provided by 
Government officials. With local “retained value” of this magnitude, the apparel industry's 
export value of $2.5 million in 1983 translates to roughly $650,000 of local payments   
which puts this sector in the same league as bananas and pawpaw at their best. It would 
seem, therefore, that more analytical and policy attention could well be paid to the apparel 
industry; certainly if New Zealand is seriously interested in assisting in the promotion of 
commodity exports from the Cook Islands this is the most obvious sector for New Zealand 
policymakers to focus on, since protectionist barriers and restrictive practices in New 
Zealand are the limitation on the market for Cook Island producers. The unknown factor is 
the extent of the labour force that is available for an expansion of the sector in the Cook 
Islands; the existing factories appear to encounter no difficulty in recruiting and holding 
labour at the prevailing wage rate, but any substantial expansion of employment might well 
encounter a labour supply constraint. 
 
Reviewing the trends in overall export performance, a couple of clear pointers seem to 
emerge. The first is that the surge of export production in the 1950s and 1960s was a 
Rarotonga Aitutaki phenomenon above all, with a minor role for Mangaia pineapple. Just 
as the balance between the outer islands and Rarotonga Aitutaki shifted in the latter's 
favour during the export boom years, so the decline of the Rarotonga fruit trade has 
contributed to the redressing of the inter  island balance in the last decade or so. At the 
same time there has been some revival of pearl shell production (mainly on Manihiki) and 
also of pearl production on Penrhyn, while copra producing capacity on the outer islands 
has remained fairly constant over time (see Table 6.7), with a ceiling of about 1,700 tonnes 
in good years. The recent reorganisation of copra purchasing (with the Government run 
marketing board now replaced by a cooperative system offering prompt payments in cash) 
means that production will probably hold up in the Northern Group. Coconut harvesting in 
the outer islands of the Southern Group, meantime, seems likely to receive a boost in the 
near future from plans by a Niue entrepreneur to open a coconut cream plant on Rarotonga, 
processing nuts from the Southern Group. All of this implies some broadening of the spread 
of export earnings away from Rarotonga, reinforcing the trend already noted for the 
dominance of Rarotonga in the Group to drop somewhat. 
 
A second point is that the peak level of export earnings achieved around 1965-1970 (in the 
vicinity of $10 million in 1982 dollars) probably indicates the maximum attainable return 
from the Group's natural resource based productive activity in the absence of some 
revolutionary shift in land tenure and technology. A sustained programme of governmental 
promotion and investment might enable the Group to regain that level of exports at some 
stage in the future; but it does not seem realistic to think in terms of export earnings rising 
to anywhere near the current level of imports (roughly $30 million). 
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6.12 Agriculture 
 
Agriculture in the Cook Islands is characterised by a number of very distinctive 
characteristics. While the soils and climate of the larger islands are, in general, suitable for 
a wide range of crops, the characteristics of the MIRAB society - namely the effects of 
migration, remittances, aid financing and bureaucracy - have undercut interest in, and 
sustained motivation toward, agricultural production. On the major islands part time rather 
than full time farming has been common and indeed characteristic. There has been limited 
availability of long term credit and the repeated failures of agricultural projects suggest that 
the two existing banks are not likely to be keen to reform this situation. High levels of 
Government support (both from the New Zealand and Cook Island Governments) have 
been characteristic for many years, inducing high costs and distortions that now appear to 
be irrevocably built in to the system. Over the years there has been heavy dependence of 
commercial agriculture on bulky perishable products, often products that deteriorate with 
handling, and poor inter island and international shipping services have been so chronic 
that waste, and the expectation of waste by growers, have become built into the agricultural 
systems. In the period 1961 78 there was heavy reliance by commercial growers on the 
Greggs fruit juice canning factory which, since its purchase by the Government and the sale 
of its canning equipment, has become moribund. Figure 6.5 which shows agricultural 
production from 1966 83 of the four main crops reveals the steady decline in output of all 
products since 1973, apart from a recovery of bananas from 1979-82. In 1983 agricultural 
products contributed under 36 percent of total exports. 
 
The agricultural sector enjoys few areas of comparative advantage relative to other 
countries in the region and it is clear that it will continue to be a problem area in the 
economy. 
 
6.13   Distorted, Uneconomic Production Systems 
 
In this widely scattered group of very small islands, freight rates take up a very 
highproportion of the market value of exports. (Altogether, it is believed that shipping and 
air freight costs, including subsidies and losses borne by the Cook Islands and New 
Zealand Governments, are equivalent to about 30 percent of GDP). This is a major 
constraint to be borne in mind in formulating agricultural strategy. 
  
Heavy subsidies on freight costs have resulted in economic distortions, such as the growing 
of crops whose prices do not even cover true transport costs. At the same time, the personal 
consumption stimulated by remittance incomes has led to the development of personal 
tastes for imported foods in preference to traditional substitutes which exist in the Islands 
and could (at least in theory) be produced more economically locally22. The frequency of 
shipping services - and so, to a large extent, their cost - is influenced by the need to 
transport perishable uneconomic crops to market. 
 
6.14  Citrus 
 
A brief examination of the citrus scheme illustrates some basic features of Cook Island 
agriculture. With the decline of production from wild citrus, a commission in 1935 formed  
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the view that the local grower was unable to initiate the substantial reforms needed to grow 
citrus successfully on a commercial basis. It recommended that the administration take the 
initiative to revitalise citrus production. This decision was crucial, for it laid the basis for 
heavy involvement by Government in production and marketing and left for the future, the 
important question of how and when the grower was to assume actual control (Johnston, 
1967:51). After 1945, with the beginning of the Citrus Replanting Scheme (CRS) we can 
almost speak of two distinct citrus industries. Scientific plantation agriculture was ushered 
in, for once the grower had established security of tenure over a plot of land, the 
Government established and nurtured the orchard, providing the considerable initial and 
recurring costs for labour, fertiliser and machine hireage which were charged against the 
owner's account, to be debited from the return from the crop. Thus, skill, technology, 
capital and overall direction, came from the Government; all the grower had to do was to 
pick thefruit. Few growers felt involved enough to wish to co operate with the Government 
in weeding and pruning. Thus was laid the basis for heavy Government involvement in a 
high cost agriculture, and a form of development in which the grower had little real 
involvement. 
 
TABLE 6.6 
 
CITRUS PRODUCTION, COOK ISLANDS 1966-82 
 
Year Total factory intake
1  
000kg 
Exports to N.Z.  
000kg 
1966 4,474  
1967 4,166 1,064 
1968 2,971 775 
1969 5,844 1,588 
1970 4,727 1,412 
1971 3,519 613 
1972 3,808 277 
1973 6,537 669 
1974 3,701 121 
1975 4,320 372 
1976 2,997 21 
1977 3,579 103 
1978 2,779 84 
1979 2,618  
1980 1,436  
1982 2,672  
1983 931  
 
1. From 1979 on, total commercial output. 
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TABLE 6.7 
 
COPRA PRODUCTION, COOK ISLANDS 1968 83 
 
Year Exports tonnes  
1968 1,695  
1969 1,055  
1970 1,181  
1971 1,028  
1972 803  
1973 673  
1974 1,428  
1975 902  
1976 592  
1977 868  
1978 642  
1979 1,608  
1980 738  
1981 962  
1982 1,137  
1983 581  
Mean 993  
 
PINEAPPLE PRODUCTION, COOK ISLANDS 1966-83 
 
Year 50 lb c/s Tonnes,  000kg  
1966 44,264 1,004
1967 41,729 946
1968 47,769 1,083
1969 69,640 1,579
1970 73,000 1,655
1971 68,860 1,561
1972 63,960 1,450
1973 54,300 1,231
1974 68,528 1,554
1975 68,089 1,544
1976 60,226 1,367
1977 44,908 1,018
1978* 40,733 200
1979  188
1980  382
1981  296
1982  136
1983  409
 
* From1978 exports by sea and air 
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TABLE 6.7  (cont.) 
 
BANANA PRODUCTION, COOK ISLANDS 1969-83 
 
 
Year 50 lb c/s
Tonnes 
(1000kg
) 
1969 20,100 511
1970 92,500 2352
1971 159,000 4042
1972 36,400 925
1973 68,477 1741
1974 47,674 1212
1975 28,461 724
1976 22,839 581
1977 8,484 215
1978 6,717 171
1979  1106
1980  2,076
1981  2,509
1982  1,940
1983  237
 
 
With the sudden and massive break from the village mode of production that occurred, it is 
hardly surprising that the new orchard technology was not accepted. As the New Zealand 
adviser Fletcher has described (1972 and 1976) he made numerous technical suggestions in 
the late 1950s that were not followed up, making even more total involvement by 
Government necessary. It took 8 to 12 years for returns to the grower to eventuate and they 
were very low and disappointing   well below the level envisaged (Johnston, 1967:52; 
Taylor, 1978:35). Cook Islanders have shown repeatedly they respond best to crops that 
can be marketed quickly for prompt payment. For a number of years the requirements that 
the Administration receive two thirds of the export price meant a very low return or even 
indebtedness for the grower. As a result of their low incomes, grower enthusiasm waned. 
They switched either to new crops, such as pineapples, vegetables or bananas, sought other 
employment, or migrated. In view of the steady drop in output after 1973 (see Table 6.7) it 
is hardly surprising that Gregg N.Z. Ltd insisted that their processing factory was only 
marginally profitable.  
 
The C.R.S. has been an agricultural failure, but it has had considerable social and economic 
impact. It has succeeded in leading to what appears to be a permanent transition from the 
village mode of production to capitalistic plantation type production in parts of Rarotonga 
and to at least a quasi plantation type system on Aitutaki. Thus, at least the basis of a more 
efficient agriculture system has been laid and this has been useful for the recent 
development of banana growing on Aitutaki, and the highly commercial pawpaw and 
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vegetable growing enterprises on Rarotonga. The establishment by the Government of 
carefully tended plots without training the grower to learn the new agricultural techniques 
and encouraging his initiative and self reliance meant of course that the orchards would 
soon be allowed to deteriorate rapidly. And the scheme as a whole underlined that a very 
high value crop was essential in view of the substantial subsidies and high costs. 
 
6.15  Pineapples 
 
As late as 24 July 197923 in a memo from Rarotonga to Wellington, New Zealand 
Representative O'Brien wrote that: 
 
“Pineapples are the 'white hope' of Cooks agriculture given that 
there are endemic problems with citrus. There is a chance (just a 
chance) that pineapple production will escape some of the 
(critical land tenure) problems associated with citrus” 
 
Subsequent events proved the ‘white hope’ forlorn. 
 
This history of the Cook Islands’ pineapple production was nicely summarised in the Tariff 
and Development Board Inquiry of June 1973 which stated that the pineapple crop had 
been an important component of exports since the 1890s.  Until 1961 Fruit Distributors 
Limited handled the entire crop.  As a result of recommendations in the Belshaw-Stace 
report in the 1950s a secondary processing plant was set up by Greggs N.Z. Ltd, on 
Rarotonga, subsidised generously by the Cook Islands Government. This led to the 
predominance of pineapples on the islands of Mangaia and Atiu.  However, the Tariff 
Board raised the key point that the whole economic structure was dependent upon strict 
import controls at New Zealand's end for pineapple products. All in all a precarious balance 
was maintained. 
 
 
TABLE 6.8 
 
NEW ZEALAND IMPORTS OF PINEAPPLES, 1974-76 
 
Dollars (?) 
 
YEAR MALAYSIA AUSTRALIA TAIWAN COOK ISLANDS 
1974-75 2,600,000 897,994 764,769 113,502 
1975-76 2,700,000 1,777,754 665,375 376,707 
 
 
As Table 6.8 shows, by the mid 1970s the Cook Islands ranked only a poor fourth in the 
New Zealand market, being unable to compete because of poor economies of scale and the 
persistent transport problem.23 Although good crops can sometimes be produced on 
Mangaia and especially on the drier Atiu, two days sailing were needed to bring the crop to 
the processing factory. 
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On 8 October 1980, Rarotonga reported that the National Bank was refusing to lend any 
further funds to the Kia Orana Foods Corporation, the successor to Greggs, which 
processed the product. The New Zealand Representative credited the debacle to low 
throughput, low quality fruit and exorbitant transport costs. 
 
The pineapple industry as a whole has been heavily subsidised, so that viewed at the 
national level, the industry has been of somewhat dubious validity. The Agricultural 
Planning Unit (1984) points out that its estimates of cost of production based on a labour 
cost of $1.35 per hour for the present average yield of 25 tonnes per acre per crop cycle 
(without considering fruit loss) give a net profit of only $256 per acre, or $85 annually. 
Non subsidised production of the poorer quality fruit suitable for processing would produce 
an annual loss of $120 per acre. 
 
The pineapple consultant D.J. Watson found in 1977 78 that the low level of production 
was due to the lack of plant selection (superior clones were needed), insufficient and 
inefficient inputs in cultural and pest control measures and lack of equipment (Watson, 
1977 and 1978). Over recent years a problem affecting Mangaia has been erosion in the 
central parts of the island, induced partly by the use of heavy machinery on sloping land 
and heavy cropping. In some respects the drier island of Atiu is more suitable for pineapple 
growing. If, however, development is considered regionally, it can be seen to be important 
to maintain pineapple production on these two islands. Indeed the prospects for Mangaia 
would be grim indeed without its pineapple crop; in the late 1970s its society had many 
characteristics of under development (Hayes, 1980). The commercial output of pineapples 
declined from $54,000 or 3 percent of all growers' income before tax in 1981 to only 
$25,000 (2 percent) in 1982. Currently there seems to be some stimulus to pineapple 
exports by air and the quality is estimated by Turners and Growers to be as good as ever. 
Since Mangaia lacks wharf facilities, air freight of high quality fruit is a possibility. 
 
6.16  Bananas 
 
As Fig. 6.5 shows, banana production fluctuates greatly like other island products, with 
peaks being reached in 1971 and 1981 when there were problems of supply from Ecuador 
and the Philippines. Banana production is now confined to Aitutaki, being planted mostly 
on the Tautu loams, which are fertile and versatile, the most productive soil type in the 
Cook Islands. Although Aitutaki has been greatly affected by out migration with a good 
deal of the lands of absentees lying idle, by the late 1970s with the banana boom there has 
been an expansion of the agricultural area. Currently 250 acres are cropped under bananas; 
the aim is to expand the area to about 400 acres, a little less than one tenth of the island's 
area. 
 
Bananas are cropped right through the year. The Department of Agriculture hires out 
tractors for land preparation and employs a gang which sprays all banana plots fortnightly 
to guard against Sigatoka and other plant disease. Growers apply four dressings of fertiliser 
in the life of the crop and herbicide is used to deal with weeds. At a spacing of 11 feet by 6 
feet, growers can plant 700 trees per acre. The average planter has about one acre under 
bananas which might yield about $2000 in gross income. The largest farmer has only 6 
acres in bananas; overwhelmingly, growers are part time farmers. 
 
 - 160 -
One of the greatest constraints hindering the expansion of the industry is the difficulty of 
transporting the crop to the New Zealand market. Currently two ships alternate to handle 
the banana trade and while in 1981 a fortnightly visit was made, the lower production now 
warrants only one voyage a month. Ship loading is difficult, with an average loading of 
6000 cartons taking about six trips by the barge out to the ship at the reef edge. The old 
fruit packing shed, constructed in the 1940s, has been extended in 1979 and 1981 to cope 
with the increased volume of fruit. However, a bumper yield of fruit leads to a great 
increase in wastage. Unskilled temporary workers have to be recruited, leading to bruising, 
and cargoes of even 6000 cartons are often roughly handled and banged against the ship's 
hull on loading. With a small shipment of 2000 cartons only the skilled permanent staff are 
needed and little bruising results. (In 1984 the wastage with such smaller shipments was 
running at only 5 percent.) The other major problem is the lack of interest of many growers 
who do not adquately look after the growing crop. 
 
The Cook Islands Government was not enraptured with the growth of banana exports in 
1979 80 for their own share of the returns was minimal. Premier Davis personally met Fruit 
Distributors Limited to negotiate for a higher price for the banana crop. The Cook Islands 
Government felt strongly that the old Primary Produce Marketing Board had done a pitiful 
job in prior negotiations which constituted one of the reasons that Dr. Davis wanted to get 
rid of it. At this meeting Fruit Distributors Limited agreed to pay between $4.50 and $5.50 
a carton provided that the quality was high. 
 
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs was heartened at these prospects: 
 
“We are encouraged that in one important area the Cooks are 
showing a wish to put their economic house in order. In terms of 
volumes Cook Islands bananas have been a success story this year 
and last. The Cook Islands Government's net returns are another 
question altogether.” 
 
Attempts to redress low government returns entailed further problems; the Cook Islands 
Government in 1982 removed a large part of their subsidy on Aitutaki bananas. This 
implied a price rise of fifty cents per carton if growers' incomes were to be maintained. 
Fruit Distributors were upset because they claimed they already paid their highest price for 
Cook Islands' bananas as compared to those of the Philippines and Ecuador. They 
threatened to find “alternative sources”. 
 
After the record year of 2,500 tonnes in 1981 ($363,000) the crop declined to 1940 tonnes 
($307,000) in 1982. Drought in 1982 and especially 1983 contributed to the dramatic fall in 
1983, while the removal of the government subsidy on fertilizers also led to a decline in 
growers' interest. 
 
Table 6.9 shows the cost of production in 1981; while prices and costs have changed, the 
relativities are the same. The table shows the considerable degree of subsidy built into the 
banana industry: the grower's profit on land (the amount of $500 per acre has been allowed 
for), historical bonus and government price support are all forms of subsidy. 
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TABLE 6.9 
 
COOK ISLANDS, BANANA COST STRUCTURE 
 
  Carton Case 
   
Growers' Production Cost (including 
labour) 1.22 1.63 
(including   
Growers' Profit on Land 0.98 1.31 
Bonus - Historical 0.5 0.62 
Insurance Fund 0.15 0.2 
 2.85 3.76 
Spraying Cost 0.64 0.86 
Packing/handling lightering/marketing   
lightering/marketing 2.8 3 
Total Costs 6.29 7.62 
Price ex F.D.L. = -5.5 -5.63 
Government Price Support 0.79 1.99 
      
 
6.17   Air Freight Production 
 
In recent years there has been a most encouraging trend in the rapid development of exports 
of pawpaw and a number of winter vegetables (beans, courgettes, capsicum, watermelons, 
radish) grown to catch the off season market in New Zealand (see Table 6.10). The trend is 
upward in spite of the increase in air freight rates, limited space, increase in input costs and 
competition. Exports have also grown to Pago Pago and to Niue. 
 
TABLE 6.10 
 
EXPORT OF AIR FREIGHT PRODUCE (METRIC TONNES) 
 
Year Pawpaw Airfreight produce1 
1978 110 304.7 
1979 106.7 364.8 
1980 202.1 432.2 
1981 290.9 551 
1982 410 837.7 
1983 433 832.2 
Note: 1. This column also includes pawpaw 
 
This trade is a direct consequence of the availability of the big jets and after the 747 
replaced the 737 about four years ago, the volume of produce that could be exported 
doubled. 
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It was suggested that over the last five years there has been a considerable economic 
evolution, a flowering of entrepreneurship on Rarotonga. A small class of relatively 
dynamic capitalist farmers has emerged, using family land and sometimes leased land for 
commercial production of air freighted crops. While a number of them are small growers, 
and in total the group probably comprises only about 20 people, the largest ones are 
significant producers. They have become progressively more geared for production for the 
New Zealand winter market. One of the larger growers has leased some irrigable land and 
has planted beans, courgettes, eggplant as well as pawpaws and mangos. Increasingly, he 
feels that the future lies in tropical luxury lines that don't compete with New Zealand 
producers (in contrast to citrus and the earlier tomato production). The larger producers are 
concerned that the quality of produce should reach a high level before steps are taken to 
advertise the product in New Zealand. Some Cook Island pawpaw (the Hawaiian “solo” 
variety) were judged by Turner and Growers to be superior to Hawaiian produced fruit and 
Turners and Growers are well satisfied in the main with the quality24 on arrival in 
Auckland. A major complaint of the growers however is the inappropriate day of the flight 
to New Zealand. The fruit have to be picked green on Wednesday for the plane which 
arrives from New Zealand on Thursday. On the return flight it reaches Auckland on Friday 
and the fruit has to be stored over the weekend, not reaching the shops until Monday. Thus 
considerable deterioration in the quality occurs. Growers much preferred the earlier 
arrangement under which the plane arrived on Friday, returning to Auckland on Saturday. 
Turners and Growers suggest that without the weekend delay, fruit would arrive in a 
condition to fetch $16 $20 per carton instead of the frequent $10 $12. 
 
Although growers appreciate the Air New Zealand service, it is recognized that flights to 
Rarotonga are planned to suit the interests of the airline. Little account appears to be taken 
of the needs of agricultural producers, or of the kind of service that would be more relevant 
to the Cook Islands. While it appears that the extent of the problem is sometimes 
exaggerated, some witnesses have seen up to 50 tons of pawpaw excess cargo left on the 
tarmac. On such occasions little can be done with the wasted fruit except perhaps sell it at 
$5 per tonne for pig food. Some astute growers try to avoid competition with stone fruit 
production in New Zealand in March, when the price might drop. On occasions when the 
price falls, pawpaw trees are regarded as useless, “except to tie the horses to”.  However, in 
early 1984 the market was still promising with cartons fetching $11 (or 91 cents kg) the 
“break even” point. At $13 or $14 a profit could be made. 
 
The allocation of cargo space on the plane depends on how many passengers are travelling 
but may vary from 11 to 15 tons, averaging 13 or 14 tons. Space is allocated on a “first 
come first served” basis, so the less well organized smaller growers are the ones who are 
most severely affected. 
 
A major bone of contention of growers concerns the poor cargo facilities available at 
Rarotonga airport. Although trouble with the fumigation plant has now been rectified the 
space in the cargo shed (in a different location) is grossly inadequate for handling trailer 
loads of pawpaw. Trailers of fruit sometimes stand in the hot sun for hours awaiting 
fumigation. The provision of a shed to shelter highly perishable fruit and vegetables is 
urgent; fumigation and cargo storage should be under one roof. It is all too obvious that 
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Rarotonga airport was built almost solely with the interests of tourists in mind.   
Fortunately Air New Zealand has promised to rectify the situation. 
 
It is difficult to gauge the full potential of air freighted production, but there appears to be 
room for considerable expansion yet. The larger farmers sub contract certain crops to other 
growers who supply land and labour; the difficulty of leasing land appears to be a serious 
constraint on expansion. (This may lead the Cook Islands Government to consider land 
tenure anew.) As tourism is expanding at present, there may be prospects of more flights 
per week. Certainly producers would benefit from less total dependence on flights geared 
for tourists; two or three flights per week of a smaller plane (say 10-12 tons each flight) 
would be preferable. Closer evaluation of the need and the economies of alternative 
available transport planes appears to be required. Other major weaknesses are the lack of 
commercial ability or negotiating strength on behalf of island producers. 
 
 
6.18   Agricultural Policy 
 
The 40 percent drop in total agricultural production in the decade 1966 76 has been very 
great, partly the result of massive migration, the switch to services and the growth of the 
mirab society. It is too early yet to judge whether the islands have “turned the corner” with 
respect to migration outflow: apart from the banana boom of 1981 and the air freight trade 
the very low harvests of citrus, pineapples and copra (Fig. 6.5) paint a bleak picture for 
agriculture. The growing importance of tourism, the clothing industry and services seem to 
indicate the emergence of a new economic structure. In the meantime, the production of 
perishable crops on outer islands with no harbour facilities and few roads, remains 
hazardous even when market prices are promising. 
 
Indicative of the long term backwash effects afflicting agriculture is the 1970s failure to 
replant ageing citrus orchards. Citrus has a 20 year cycle, after which replanting becomes 
essential. As Castle has pointed out, 70 percent of the citrus orchards on Rarotonga were 
less than half a hectare in size and average gross incomes per hectare were in the vicinity of 
only U.S. $425 (SPAS 1980). In only one year of the 1970s did real gross receipts exceed 
real purchased input costs in the citrus industry. In order to maintain production it would 
have been essential to revive the processing facility sold off by Greggs in 1977 and now 
lying idle under Kia Orana Ltd. Yet the farms are too small and unreliable, in terms of 
continuous production, to provide the supplies necessary a successful processing operation. 
Unless farming units expand or are aggregated to allow efficient use of capital intensive 
methods, no basis will exist for a processing unit. Up to date the land tenure system   
multiple ownership, fragmentation and absentee owners   has blocked any attempts at land 
aggregation and the Cook Islands Government has not made much headway on overcoming 
this situation. The alternative is to adopt processing technologies which are suitable for 
small volumes of input, probably produced almost entirely on Rarotonga. The plant 
operated by Cook Island Dairy Foods is of appropriate scale for the remaining citrus 
production. 
 
It is important to plan in a regional sense, recognizing the positive advantages and also 
disadvantages possessed by each island. Given the promising start begun in air freighting 
and the emergence of a distinctly capitalistic, entrepreneurial “class” of perhaps 20 growers 
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on Rarotonga, the future of that island agriculturally would appear to lie with the pawpaw 
and winter vegetable trade by air freight to New Zealand and in supplying the tourist trade 
and town with necessary fruit and vegetables.  The price paid for taro in Avarua appears to 
be amongst the highest in the South Pacific. 
 
Aitutaki will no doubt continue with its markedly fluctuating banana industry, aided by its 
phosphate rich soils, yet seriously hindered by the absence of harbour facilities or long 
term, consistent encouragement by the New Zeland market. The lack of water for irrigation 
is also a constraint. 
 
Atiu and Mangaia pineapple production has reached a low ebb and there are plans to plant 
vanilla and “find another crop” for another two or three of the islands in the southern 
group. The alternative of course is marine resources and/or the expansion of tourism to 
other islands (Aitutaki now has two small hotels to take advantage of its large lagoon and 
attractive reef). The northern group has copra and pearlshell; little else is in prospect. But 
regional economic planning is shallow and insubstantial, and one must not assume, in such 
an economy, that government planning or definite price signals will have much influence 
on the actual development process. 
 
To attempt to deal with these problems, bolder and more radical policies have been 
suggested, although success could not be guaranteed. Thus Castle suggests land reform on 
Rarotonga to amalgamate farm units to permit plantation type production (SPAS 
1980:373). Such an approach would at least bring the advantages of economies of scale, to 
combat the disadvatages of location, resource base and inadequate levels of skill. Equally 
important would be the need for high quality management. At the same time he commends 
the plan in 1979 of establishing two large (50 ha.) blocks of citrus on Aitutaki and 
establishing a small juice processing facility on the island, rather than shipping whole fruit 
260 kms to the Rarotonga factory. 
 
Another recent proposal is for the conversion of a large part of the accessible land on 
Rarotonga into tree plantations to provide fuel for a wood fired electricity generating 
station. Neither the economics nor the social and environmental impact of this scheme 
seem to have been well analysed to date, but it would be unlikely to proceed far in practice 
once landowner opposition was aroused. 
 
 
6.19  Institutions 
 
The large range of tropical fruits and vegetables that grow well on Rarotonga bear witness 
to many failed projects. The problems are basically economic, relating to external market 
conditions, transport, or other factors beyond the farm gate. Yet it is only relatively recently 
that New Zealand advisers have recognized this. Approaches have too often been narrowly 
scientific or agronomic and quite inadequate in assessing the economic problems. Often a 
bench scientist has been sent to do, what in effect, is a broad spectrum job. A serious 
omission, policy wise, has been in the area of agricultural economics, and in producing 
realistic rather than misleading estimates of costs of production of crops and likely rates of 
return. While this is primarily a matter for the Cook Island Government, it is an area in 
which New Zealand might be able to provide assistance. 
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“Frequently, the Department of Agriculture has been unfairly blamed for past failures. 
“Scape goating” also distracts attention from the fundamental causes. The local Department 
of Agriculture does possess some very competent staff but serious errors or poor decisions 
have been made from time to time (such as the recent decision to allow all three of the 
trained agricultural research specialists to go overseas at the same time). Sufficient skills 
often exist locally; the problem is to combine and galvanise them in an effective way. Local 
officers do however often respond to constructive external influence. 
 
A major need for departmental activities is to adapt their approaches to the actual 
conditions that affect part time farmers. Some encouraging work has been done in this area, 
such as devising demonstration displays or extension work to reach growers in the weekend 
when they are free of their weekly full time duties. Field days staged on Saturday are likely 
to interest more growers. Such flexible approaches are necessary. 
 
While production problems are still serious, the lesson for New Zealand policy is the 
important feedback influence of marketing difficulties on production. Consistent policies 
on access and renewed attempts to improve transport, including air transport are called for. 
 
 
TABLE 6.11 
 
COOK ISLANDS: ACREAGE OF DIFFERENT CROPS PLANTED ON 
 
DIFFERENT ISLANDS, 1984 (ACRES) 
    
  PLANTED IN 
CROP ISLAND 1982 1983 1984 
  and older  
(Jan/March
) 
Banana Aitutaki 47.5 182 13
Pineapple Mangaia 74 35 20
Pawpaw Mangaia 2 11 1.8
 trees 970 7350 1170
Pawpaw Rarotonga Total producing 115 acres 
   = approx. 103,000 trees 
Citrus Rarotonga Approx. 25,000 prod. trees* 
   ± ( 150 tr/acre). 
Citrus Mauke Approx. 43 acres  
Citrus Mangaia Approx. 2,000 young trees 
Citrus Atiu Approx. 1,000 prod. trees 
  Approx. 4,150 seedlings 
Citrus Aitutaki  Aitutaki Approx. 20.4 acres producing 
  16.0 acres young plants 
 
 
 - 166 -
6.20  Remittances from New Zealand 
 
Figures are available to permit a rough and ready estimate of annual remittances from Cook 
Islanders in New Zealand since 1966, in addition to which we have a separate estimate for 
1963/64.25 The method used here is that of Hayes26, and is based upon the Post Office 
figures for money orders issued in mainland New Zealand and cashed in the Cook Islands, 
adjusted to take account of other means of remitting cash (e.g. in currency notes, or by 
bank transfers through the National Bank branch in Raratonga). Hayes uses as his base year 
1979, for which he has both the money order data from the Cook Islands, and a sample 
survey of Cook Islanders living in Wellington27 which can be multiplied up to give an 
estimate for the total Cook Islander community in New Zealand. Hayes' Post Office figure 
for 1979 was $1,106,000. The Wellington sample survey indicated a total of cash 
remittances per year of $1,632,000 (or 1.48 times the money order figure) plus a further 
$1,003,000 of remittances “in kind” (i.e. goods paid for in New Zealand and sent over). On 
this basis, Hayes calculates total remittances in a two stage process, first marking up total 
money order remittances to give an estimate of total cash remittances, and then adding a 
further 60% of this amount to allow for remittances “in kind”.  In preparing his estimate for 
earlier years, Hayes aims for a lower bound series28, assuming that money orders were the 
sole form of cash remittances up to 1970, and that thereafter the mark up for cash transfers 
rose by straight line interpolation to reach 48% by 1979. 
 
In extending Hayes' series beyond 1977 (Table 6.12), we have used the 1979 conversion 
factors unaltered, since no better baseline survey has been conducted to supersede that of 
1979. The best check is a comparison with the 1981 estimate given in the recent 
Development Plan29, of $2,344 million dollars (compared to our $2,699 million) of cash 
remittances. The Development Plan figure was calculated as the total of money orders, 
cheque transfers through the National Bank, and cash sent in envelopes. It seems probable 
that the main difference between the Hayes methodology and that used by the authors of 
the Plan would have been the Plan's use of a net rather than a gross figure for money order 
transfers. 
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TABLE 6.12 
ESTIMATED REMITTANCES FROM NEW ZEALAND TO COOK ISLANDS 
$000 
 
Calendar 
Year 
Money 
order  
transfers 
Hayes' 
series 
updated: 
cash 
transfers 
Development 
Plan 1981 
estimate 
Hayes' 
total 
series 
updated 
Deflated to 1982 
NZ$ 
          Cash Total 
1966 355 355  568 1,919 3,070
1967 372 372  594 1,888 3,015
1968 388 388  621 1,893 3,029
1969 404 404  646 1,879 3,005
1970 421 421  669 1,838 2,921
1971 382 382  612 1,510 2,419
1972 424 466  746 1,720 2,753
1973 667 761  1,218 2,597 4,157
1974 782 936  1,497 2,880 4,606
1975 671 832  1,331 2,305 3,687
1976 869 1,122  1,796 2,621 4,196
1977 918 1,239  1,982 2,478 3,964
1978 911 1,285  2,056 2,319 3,711
1979 1,106 1,632  2,636 2,511 4,055
1980 1,120 1,658  2,653 2,117 3,388
1981 1,667 2,467 2,344 3,947 2,699 4,318
1982 1,598 2,365  3,784 2,365 3,784
1983 2,040 3,019   4,830 2,816 4,506
 
Source Notes: 
 
Col. 1  1966 1980 from Hayes (1982), Table 8.10, p.364. 1981-1983 figures based 
upon March year data supplied by the Post Office in Rarotonga. 
 
Col. 2  1966 1976 and 1979 from Hayes (1982), Table 8.11, p.369, adjusted to 
exclude remittances in kind. Other years calculated from Col. 1 on Hayes' 
methodology. 
 
Col. 3 is from the Development Plan 1982 85, p.41, and represents the result of 
what seems to have been a fairly careful survey of money orders, National Bank 
cheque clearings, and estimated cash sent in the mail. 
 
Col. 4 1967 1976 and 1979 from Hayes (1982), Table 8.11, p.369. Other years 
calculated as 1.6 times cash remittances shown in Col. 2. 
 
Cols. 5 and 6 calculated using the NZ CPI, 1982 = 1000.  
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In addition to the money orders sent from New Zealand to the Cook Islands, there is a 
substantial return flow. 
 
TABLE 6.13 
 
POST OFFICE DATA 
$000 
 
   
March 
year 
Money orders 
from NZ paid 
out in Cook 
Islands 
Money orders 
from Cook 
Islands paid out 
in NZ 
Net money 
orders 
    
1977/78 955 158 797 
1978/79 988 210 778 
1979/80 1,098 156 942 
1980/81 1,215 140 1,075 
1981/82 1,817 172 1,645 
1982/83 1,525 157 1,368 
1983/84 2,211 195 2,016 
 
 
Thus, possibly half of the difference between the Plan figure and our estimated series could 
be accounted for by the netting out of money order transfers to New Zealand30. In any case, 
the divergence is well within the margin of error of our methodology. 
  
In our discussion it is preferable to stick to gross remittance flows, since it is the flow of 
funds from New Zealand to the Cooks that concerns us here; the transfers to New Zealand 
through the Post Office are left to be included with other, unaccounted for, invisible items 
in the balance of payments. 
 
It is important to emphasise that the data assembled above refer to recurrent flows of 
remittances within the Cook Islands family economy. There exist other categories of what 
amount to remittances, which can on occasion be quite substantial, but which relate to the 
village or island economies and take the form of capital levies on the New Zealand resident 
members of the relevant community. For example, at the time of our visit to Aitutaki (April 
1984) the village of Amuri was in the process of erecting a very large hall, at an estimated 
cost of some $100,000, of which $75,000 had been raised in donations from relatives in 
New Zealand and the other $25,000 had been raised within the village (a massive act of 
saving for a community of about 300 people31 in which the typical agriculturist receives 
about $2,000 per year in cash income32, to which should be added salary income for those 
households with a member in the public service. If we assume 50 households in the village, 
the average contribution to the hall project was $500 per household   in addition to which, 
some of the money raised from relatives in New Zealand was probably diverted from 
remittances to local families). 
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Similarly, there are regular visits to New Zealand by island tere parties, which raise funds 
from the community in New Zealand to pay their travel costs, and to pay for island 
projects. 
 
The private remittance data are thus only part of the total volume of purchasing power 
transferred from Cook Islanders resident in New Zealand to those still resident in the 
Group. Even so, the figures are substantial, equivalent to $160 p.a. per head of the 1981 
Cook Island born population of New Zealand, and $125 p.a. per head of resident population 
in the Group. 
 
One is tempted to speculate that private remittance income has greater potential multiplier 
effects within the Cook Islands economy than do many of the other sources of income from 
New Zealand. This is because remittances are injected at the bottom end of the income 
distribution as well as the top, and re to a large extent spent on basic “wage goods” 
consumption   the categories of goods where, prima facie, import substitution is most 
feasible. At present, however, the import content of even these basic goods   clothing, 
bread, beverages, construction materials   is high. In addition to their relatively egalitarian 
impact on income distribution, remittances are directed to the outer islands as much as to 
Rarotonga, thus offsetting some of the concentration of (say) government spending, or 
export income, in Rarotonga.Table 6.13, which is based upon the Post Office's encashment 
of money orders from New Zealand in each of the individual islands, shows Aitutaki, 
Mangaia and Rarotonga as the “remittance rich” islands (on the basis of the ratio between 
remittances share and share of total population), and all of the Southern Group except 
Mitiaro as receiving money order remittance inflows at least in line with their population 
share. Per capita remittance inflows are a great deal lower in the Northern Group. 
 
TABLE 6.14 
ISLAND BY ISLAND REMITTANCE DATA : $000 
 
Island 
Money orders from 
New Zealand, April-
December 1983 
Col.1 as annual 
estimate    ( x 
4/3) 
Percentage shares of: 
      
Money-order 
remittances 
Population 
(1981) 
Rarotonga 823.60 1,098 59.7 53.7
Aitutaki 268.50 358 19.5 13.2
Atiu 69.00 92 5.0 6.9
Mangaia 116.70 156 8.5 7.7
Mauke 53.80 72 3.9 3.8
Mitiaro 7.00 9 0.5 1.4
Manihiki 7.60 10 0.5 2.3
Penrhyn 13.70 18 1.0 3.4
Pukapuka-Nassau 16.80 22 1.2 5.2
Rakahanga 2.20 3 0.2 1.5
      
Totals 1,379.0 1,839 100.0 100.0
Source:  Col. 1 from data supplied by Cook Islands Treasury Department. 
 Cols. 2 & 3 derived from Col. 1. Col. 3 from 1981 census report. 
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6.21  Official Flows 
  
The broad outlines of the financing for the government sector in the Cook Islands are set 
out in Table 6.15 and Figure 5.7. Following the Second World War there took place a 20 
year expansion of the level of government spending, involving a five fold increase in real 
terms as the bureaucracy was expanded and basic services such as education and health 
improved. By the time of self government in 1965, the peak had been reached; the most 
striking feature of the past two decades since self government is that in real terms, there has 
been absolutely no further expansion of the government sector as measured by the level of 
expenditure. (It may be noted that our expenditure series includes both recurrent and capital 
expenditure by central government). The key to this abrupt shift from rapid growth to 
complete stagnation lies in the resource constraint which has been imposed upon the Cook 
Islands Government by the limited local revenue base and the steady decline from 1970 on, 
in the real value of New Zealand budgetary support grants. Local revenues, which suffered 
in the late 1960s from the end of the export boom and the new Government's reluctance to 
squeeze taxpayers, were steadily built up during the 1970s and early 1980s, but these 
increases were almost exactly offset by declining New Zealand grants. The philosophy 
expressed by the 1975 New Zealand aid mission   that local revenues should progressively 
displace New Zealand grants in the financing of local government   is clearly reflected in 
Figure 5.7 and Table 6.15, albeit the substitution of local revenues for New Zealand grants 
has proceeded less dramatically than some had expected. The turning point about 1970 
clearly coincides with the major confrontation between the New Zealand Government and 
the Cook Islands Government over the latter's funding requirements33; the subsequent drive 
by Cook Islands Governments of both parties to reduce so called “dependence” upon New 
Zealand grants has had the result (remarkable in a country experiencing rapid out migration 
of the “productive” age groups, combined with a steady fall in export income) of raising 
local revenue from 44% of expenditure in 1966 70, to 63% by 1981 84. This considerable 
effort of surplus mobilisation has, however, merely served to hold the line as New Zealand 
budgetary support declined in real terms. The record appears to suggest that New Zealand 
has in effect operated a policy of subtracting a dollar from the grant for each additional 
dollar of revenue raised by the Cook Islands Government; this approach offers no great 
incentive for any continuing drive towards “self reliance”. 
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TABLE 6.15 
 
COOK ISLANDS GOVERNMENT FINANCE, 1945 1984 MARCH YEARS 
 
(These March year data can be read alongside the calendar year trade data in Table 6.5; 
thus 194549 in Table 6.5 is more or less the same as 1946-50 here). 
 
000 1982 NZ Dollars, annual averages 
 
Period 
Expenditur
e Local Revenues Deficit NZ Grant 
1946-50 3,541 1,833 1,708 1,670a 
1951-55 7,072 3,359 3,713 4,134 
1956-60 9,900 5,107 4,793 4,803 
1961-65 14,799 7,243 7,556 8,435 
1966-70 18,066 8,026 10,040 10,326 
1971-75 18,293 7,666 10,627 9,870 
1976-80 17,534 10,520 6,914 7,236 
1981-84 18,930 11,866 7,064 7,137 
 
 a. Includes the “low” figure for 1947. Excluding 1947, average is 1,980. 
 
The pattern revealed in Table 6.15 and Figure 5.7 have two implications for our analysis of 
the economy and the balance of payments. The first is that incomes derived from 
government expenditure have not risen significantly over the past two decades34, which in 
turn suggests that the rapid rise in import purchases during the 1970s (Table 6.5) was 
powered by private sector incomes, not public sector ones. Reading Table 6.15alongside 
Table 6.5, it can be seen that the ratio of total imports to government expenditures was 0.9 
in 1966 70 March years, and 1.45 by 1980 84. Government has thus been a lagging rather 
than a leading sector in real income growth during self government - a most unusual 
phenomenon. 
 
The second point, which has significant implications for the analysis of New Zealand 
policy on “aid” to the Cook Islands, is that neither the stagnation of real government 
spending, nor the falling real value of New Zealand budgetary assistance in the second half 
of the 1970s, have been visible at first sight, because of the double digit inflation which 
began in the mid 1970s. In nominal dollar terms, Cook Islands Government expenditure has 
risen nine fold 1964 1984, and the New Zealand grant has increased five fold, from $1.5 
million to $8.4 million. It has therefore been easy for cash flow crises in the Cook Islands 
Government to be attributed to “extravagance” rather than the ravages of inflation; and it 
has been politically easy for New Zealand to reduce its real subsidy, because of the steady 
increase in the nominal amount of subsidy. 
 
Turning from budgetary support (which comes in to the Cook Islands Government as a 
straight cash payment from New Zealand) to the total aid inflows, we see in Table 6.16 that 
the steady fall in budgetary support grants during the 1970s was offset to a considerable 
extent by increases in other areas of New Zealand aid (mainly projects) which do not pass 
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through the Cook Islands Government budget as such. The deflated value of New Zealand's 
total bilateral aid in the March 1984 year was thus much the same as in 1970; the pattern 
over the intervening years was a steep increase in the mid 1970s, followed by an equally 
abrupt decline. Since 1979 the real value of total bilateral aid has been more or less 
constant. 
 
The fall in the proportion of “aid” which passes into the Government's hands for spending, 
and the rise in the proportion going directly to contractors for New Zealand sponsored 
projects, has major implications for aid policy which are dealt with elsewhere. For balance 
of payments purposes, however, the total bilateral aid is the best figure to use, since a 
considerable volume of imports to the Cook Islands will have been financed from project 
aid. 
TABLE 6.16 
New Zealand Bilateral Assistance, 1970 1984. 
(Excluding shipping and air subsidies) 
NZ $000 
    
  Bilateral aid total Budgetary support   
March years          NZ 
 Current 
dollars 
000 
1982 
dollars 
000 
Current 
dollars 
000 
1982 
dollars 
000 
CPI, 
1982=1000 
1970 2,259 10,362 2,224 10,202 218 
1971 2,375 10,106 2,200 9,362 235 
1972 3,242 12,566 2,759 10,694 258 
1973 3,951 14,367 3,050 11,091 275 
1974 3,925 13,083 2,886 9,620 300 
1975 4,485 13,348 2,453 7,300 336 
1976 7,002 18,000 3,864 9,933 389 
1977 6,068 13,455 3,700 8,204 451 
1978 6,253 12,095 3,350 6,480 517 
1979 5,913 10,301 3,450 6,010 574 
1980 6,722 10,139 3,400 5,128 663 
1981 9,043 11,714 5,700 7,383 772 
1982 8,358 9,370 5,884 6,596 892 
Sources: Bilateral total from  New Zealand Official Yearbook, annual, for years 1970 1981; data supplied 
by EAD thereafter. 
 
Budgetary support 1970 1974 from Cook Island Government Accounts for the calendar year 
preceding; 1975 1984 from EAD data. 
 
6.22 Tourism 
  
Tourism has been the dominant growth sector in the Cook Islands during the past decade 
since the opening of the international airport on Rarotonga. Given its significance for local 
employment and the balance of payments, tourism has been subjected to surprisingly little 
quantitative analysis. Prior to construction of the airport a number of studies were prepared 
suggesting tourist potential35, but comparable work in the past decade appears to be slight. 
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The Development Plan provides estimates of gross earnings from tourism of $5.3 million in 
197936 and $7.4 million in 198137 (the latter figure appears to have been obtained by 
adjusting the former for inflation during the two intervening years, since there was little 
change in the number of visitors - 19,722 in 1979 and 18,638 in 198138). The Plan 
furthermore estimates that 50% of gross earnings were retained in the local economy (an 
estimate which seems high by comparison with some other recent work in Pacific 
countries). Table 6.17 below uses the (admittedly crude) measure of total number of 
visitors to the Group to produce an estimate of annual gross tourism revenues since 1973, 
on the basis of the assumption that revenues average $400 per visitor in 1982 dollars 
(roughly equivalent to the $270 per visitor in 1979). 
 
TABLE 6.17 
Tourism Data 
 
Year Number of visitors 
Estimated  gross 
revenues 1982 dollars 
000 
1973 1,776 710 
1974 6,477 2,591 
1975 9,114 3,646 
1976 9,898 3,959 
1977 14,584 5,834 
1978 16,998 6,799 
1979 19,722 7,889 
1980 21,051 8,420 
1981 18,498 7,399 
1982 17,464 6,986 
1983 19,472 7,789 
 
6.23  Estimating the Balance of Payments. 
 
Balance of payments estimates for the Cook Islands are not easy to come by, and this 
reflects a consistent official policy bias over the past three decades at least. The figures on 
which policymakers have wished to concentrate (and which have therefore been assembled 
and published) are the visible commodity trade balance, the migration outflow, and the 
government sector expenditures and revenues. The focussing of public debate on these 
figures has naturally brought to the fore policy packages giving prominence to reducing the 
trade imbalance, emigration, and the government deficit   in other words export promotion, 
import substitution, improved local employment opportunities, and local revenue increases. 
Such measures, assembled under the slogan of “reducing dependence”, have enjoyed a near 
monopoly of the field of economic policy discussion. This has been unfortunate, as it has 
diverted attention from more basic issues, to which overall balance of payments figures are 
a partial key. 
 
One of these basic issues is the question of what the economic impact of out migration has 
actually been. Conventional wisdom since Belshaw and Stace39 has taken it for granted that 
the impact of out migration is negative, and that the reduction of migration should therefore 
be a policy goal. The recent attempt by Hayes to provide empirical underpinning for this 
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anti-MIRAB position brings out clearly some of the crucial flaws in the reasoning40. Hayes 
points out that the (concrete) returns from labour remittances over the past couple of 
decades almost entirely offset the (highly speculative) estimated loss of domestic 
commercial production due to removal of part of the labour force, and he is in no doubt that 
the private benefits of migration outweigh the costs41. 
 
In order to construct a case for high social costs from migration, Hayes resorts to the 
familiar assertions that “nationhood” and “autonomous development” are the criteria for 
assessment42, and his rather weak anti migration conclusions would fall if these are not 
accepted. (The conclusions are weak because although Hayes believes that less migration 
would be a necessary condition for economic automony and stronger nationhood, he 
concedes that it would not be sufficient, and indeed raises the possibility that the sufficient 
conditions may not be attainable43). 
 
While it can readily be agreed that out migration from the Cook Islands has contributed to 
the fall in onshore commodity production, and that the residence overseas of a large part of 
the population undermines the idea of the Cook Islands as a fully independent nation state, 
neither of these perceptions speaks for itself in terms of policy response. Cook Islanders 
would be, and know they would be, substantially worse off materially in a fully 
independent nation without access to New Zealand. A consistent lesson of Cook Island 
politics is that the New Zealand connection and high living standards rank above such 
goals as autonomy and national independence in the preferences of the local people. The 
relevance of the balance of payments to this debate is that the various economic impacts of 
migration   individual and group remittances, reduced export production (which Hayes 
deals with), and reduced import demand due to the fact that most Cook Islander 
consumption takes place offshore (which Hayes overlooks)   can best be put into context by 
relating them to the actual flows of purchasing power manifested in balance of payments 
trends. 
 
This brings us to a second key issue which is commonly misunderstood: the financing of 
imports. The standard cliche in discussion of the Cook Islands balance of trade is the claim 
that it is “unfavourable to the Islands”.  In fact the opposite appears to be the case. A large 
excess of imports over exports tells us in the first instance nothing more than that Cook 
Islanders resident in the Islands consume more than they produce; the idea that this is 
somehow “unfavourable” to the Islands certainly does not follow unless one begins from a 
puritan point of view which insists that high material living standards are undesirable in 
themselves. The question which really matters in the discussion of any such trade balance 
is how the excess imports were financed. Most commentators on the Cook Islands trade 
balance appear to assume, unjustifiably, that an import surplus cannot be financed on a 
sustainable long run basis, and that import demand has in some sense a life of its own (that 
is, that effective demand for imports would remain high even if the means to finance those 
imports vanished). 
 
Consider the trends of the past two decades. Using data deflated to 1982 dollars, the total 
import bill was $14.5 million in 1963, $17 million in 1973, and $27.7 million in 1983. Real 
export earnings over the same period were $9.9 million in 1963, $8.6 million in 1973, and 
$5.0 million in 1983. The two trends are quite unequivocal: rising levels of import led 
consumption, combined with falling levels of export commodity production. The trade 
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deficit widened from $4.6 million in 1963 to $8.3 million in 1973 and $22.7 million in 
1983. Taken out of context (as is usually done) and embellished with vague references to 
“trade dependency”, these figures are commonly viewed as indicators of some sort of 
economic failure. What is missing from such a view is information on how the trade deficit 
was financed. 
 
If the widening gap between visible exports and imports had been filled by rapidly rising 
overseas debt (as was the case for many LDCs during the 1960s and 1970s) then pessimism 
would be in order   the community would have been “living beyond its means”.  But this 
was not the case: the outstanding funded indebtedness of the Cook Islands Government at 
31 March 1982 was a piffling $1.7 million, of which only $712,000 was owed in currencies 
other than the New Zealand dollar44. Private sector overseas indebtedness was similarly 
minimal. The Cook Islands thus entirely avoided (up to 1982 at least) the “debt trap” 
syndrome which afflicts most of the “underdeveloped” world. 
 
A second way of financing a visible trade deficit is by governmental financial transfers. In 
1982 dollars, New Zealand official bilateral aid to the Cook Islands was $9.2 million in the 
1963/64 March year, $13.1 million in 1973/74, and $10.5 million in 1983/84. Over the first 
period, 1963- 1973, thus, the increase in the trade deficit correlates fairly closely with the 
increase in official financial assistance and can be attributed to it. Over the second period 
1973 1983, in contrast, the trade deficit widened by $14.4 million while official transfers 
fell nearly $3 million. Over $17 million p.a. of increased imports during the past decade, 
thus, were financed other than from export earnings, overseas borrowing or official 
financial assistance. 
 
Once the financing is understood, so are the imports   for without the financing, the imports 
would not have happened. In many small dependent economies, high imports reflect  
domestic internal inflationary pressures, due to fiscal/monetary stimulus by national 
governments. In other words, imports are a “spilling over” of excess demand from the local 
economy - and where that demand has been generated internally by paying out increased 
local currency incomes, a foreign exchange shortage is the usual result, leading to exchange 
rate pressure and foreign borrowing. This familiar model simply does not apply in the Cook 
Islands, for the straightforward reason that neither fiscal nor monetary policy instruments 
are available to the Cook Islands Government to expand internal demand. The instruments 
of macro economic policy   exchange rate, money supply, fiscal deficit   are controlled by 
New Zealand, not the Cook Islands Government. The only instrument controlled by the 
local Government is taxation, but this can be used only for contractionary purposes (e.g. by 
increasing local revenue while holding expenditure constant, thus sterilising the proceeds 
from increased taxation   either by banking them in Government accounts, or by reducing 
the call on New Zealand financial assistance dollar for dollar). Any attempt to stimulate 
internal demand by tax cuts would be cancelled out by the matching reduction of 
government expenditure which would have to occur  - since the Cook Islands Government 
cannot expand its deficit at will. (The proviso, which is now for the first time becoming 
relevant, is that the Cook Islands Government might embark on its own programme of 
external borrowing and use the proceeds to finance additional domestic consumption -  but 
in that case, as already noted above, the resulting import demand is automatically financed 
in advance). 
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The point is that the necessary conditions for a trade deficit to be a macro economic 
“problem” do not exist in the Cook Islands. The trade deficit is consequently not a macro 
economic problem (although it may, of course, have micro economic side effects on the 
domestic allocation of resources). In fully independent economies with their own fiscal and 
monetary policy, import demand can “drive” the balance of payments. In the Cook Islands 
the opposite is the case   imports are  driven by the balance of payments. It is imports that 
provide the balancing item in the total, and not the more familiar monetary buffers (foreign 
exchange reserves, IMF account balances and the like) of independent economies.45 
 
Where, then, did the rapidly increasing import demand of the 1970s come from? The 
answer lies in three categories of balance of payments inflow: remittances, philatelic 
revenues, and tourism. None of these is reported in the visible trade statistics, with the 
result that those statistics are utterly inadequate as analytical tools in the modern Cook 
Islands economy. By the first half of the 1980s visible exports financed only one fifth of 
total imports. Available data suggests that remittances financed 14%, tourism 27%, 
philatelic revenues 3%, and New Zealand financial assistance 37%. 
 
In Table 6.18 we assemble such data as we have been able to locate on the Cook Islands 
balance of payments. The figures must be treated as orders of magnitude only, given the 
difficulty of placing the data on any sort of consistent basis, the shortcomings of the 
published statistics, and some probable biases arising from our blanket use of the New 
Zealand consumer price index as a deflator for the forty year period covered. The picture 
which emerges, however, is a consistent one, showing the growth and composition of the 
“wedge” of invisible current account items which account for the increasing deficit in 
visible trade, and emphasising in particular the strength of private remittances and tourism. 
 
The interpretation of Table 6.18 merits some discussion, as it is not presented in the normal 
format, with “current” and “capital” accounts and monetary balancing items. Not only is 
the current/capital distinction impossible to apply to the data in its available form, but it is 
not a particularly helpful distinction to make. In constructing the table, we have assembled 
what is available on credits and debits in the Cook Islands' “international” economic 
transactions, and then calculated a residual balancing item which incorporates a wide 
variety of transactions: profit remittances, direct investment, invisible charges such as 
freight, insurance, airfares and commissions; and of course errors and omissions in the 
items recorded in our table. With the exception of the period 1975-79 it will be noted that 
the balancing item is negative   that is Cook Islands imports are “over financed” by the 
recorded credit items, which accords with the intuitive feeling that there should be 
substantial invisible debits   mainly, one would suspect, remittances from the Group to New 
Zealand (of profits and expatriate savings, the latter having been quite insignificant in the 
colonial period): and costs associated with importing (freight, insurance and other charges   
since there are grounds for supposing that import values were on occasion reported FOB 
rather than CIF until the mid 1970s). The negative residual item from 1945 to 1974 in 
Table 6.18 varies from less than 20% of imports to somewhat over 40%   a range which 
seems consistent with the above suggestions, since the gap between FOB and CIF values 
can run as high as 25% or so, and the repatriated profit item is likely to have been at its 
peak in the second half of the 1960s (the high point for our residual figure) when the 
Greggs cannery was running at a high level of capacity utilisation
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TABLE 6.18 
 
A Rough Reconstruction of the Cook Islands Balance of Payments, 1945 1982 
All data deflated to 1982 NZ$000, annual averages 
 
  Visible Trade Balance   Invisible Credit Items   
Period Exports Imports Deficit Tourism Philatelic NZ “Aid” Remittances 
Profits 
of 
foreign 
firms 
Overseas 
direct 
investment 
Residual 
balancin
g item 
1945-49 3,285 5,335 2,050   1,670 1,380   -1,000 
1950-54 5,572 9,243 3,671   4,134 1,337   -1,800 
1955-59 6,431 10,188 3,757   4,803 1,500   -2,526 
1960-64 8,506 13,438 4,932   8,435 1,500   -5,003 
1963/64* 9,364 16,668 7,304 117  9,851 1,747a 729 765 -4,447 
1965-69 9,864 16,360 6,496 400  10326 3,000   -7230 
1970 8,638 20,524 11,886 1000  12,694 3,371   -5179 
1975 5,413 32,345 26,932 5,626 n.a. 12,798 3,923   4,585 
1980 5,199 27,346 22,147 7,650 880 10,295 3,999   -677 
1981** 5,487 31,439 25,952 8,096 “ 9,847 2,188 33 “ -5,854 
* Kolff's estimates. 
** Development Plan estimates. 
a. Including mission transfers (48,500) as well as private remittances (100,000). 
 
Sources: Exports, Imports and Trade Balance from Table 6.5. Tourism from Table 6.17. Remittances 1965-83 from 
Table 6.12. Philatelic revenue from Cook Islands Government Accounts, annual NZ.  
Aid is total bilateral aid from Table 6.16. (For the construction of this table we have read each March year as 
the preceding calendar year.) 
The Kolff estimates for the 1963/64 March year are from Kolff, J., “The National Income of the Cook 
Islands 1963-64” (Victoria University of Wellington, 1965) pp. 171-172. 
The 1981 estimates are from Development Plan 1982 1985 p.41 Table 5.6.  
All data deflated to 1982 dollars using the New Zealand consumer price index.
For the past decade, import values appear to have been recorded CIF (which may 
contribute to their sharp increase from the early to the late 1970s in our table   this issue 
needs more research) and the nature of the residual items changes sharply. For the first half 
of the 1980s, a residual of only 2% of imports suggests that we have identified all the really 
significant flows for those years. For the 1975-79 period, however, we find that our table 
leaves imports seriously “under financed” to the tune of about 17%, a residual balancing 
item of $4.6 million. What this implies is that we have failed to identify a credit item or 
items of this magnitude during the later 1970s. Possibilities are under valuation of exports, 
over valuation of imports, understated tourism or remittance receipts, or unidentified 
capital inflows (possibly associated with private investment in the growing tourist 
industry). Of these the last seems the most probable. 
 
Looking at the trends which emerge, the MIRAB structure is clear. In the late 1940s “aid” 
and remittances together already financed half of the Cook Islands' imports and other 
debits. The same proportion continues to hold in the early 1980s. The trajectory over the 
intervening period is traced in Table 6.19, which shows the shares of exports, tourism, 
“aid” and remittances in financing the total debits on the balance of payments (obtained by 
summing imports and the residual column in Table 6.18). The end of export leadership 
shows up clearly, with this source of financing dropping from 52% of the total in 1945 49 
to 20% by the late 1970s. Remittances, it can be seen, had their greatest proportional 
impact in the 1940s (when the supply of indentured labour to the Makatea phosphate 
diggings revolutionised the cash incomes of Cook Island households) but has consistently 
since then held a 12 14% share of balance of payments financing, a role which it shows no 
sign of losing. “Aid” rose to a leading role in the first decade of self government, but has 
dropped back in the succeeding decade as tourism became the dynamic new source of 
financing. (One should obviously add here the qualification that since the tourist industry 
has a high import content, it accounts for a good deal of the increase in imports which it has 
helped to “finance”). 
 
6.24  Some Notes on Economic Policy 
 
The essential point about the Cook Islands economy is that it is not confronted by any 
pressing economic crisis, and will not be confronted with any such crisis until and unless 
the link with New Zealand is broken. The Cook Islands certainly may share in New 
Zealand economic problems, but that does not involve any crisis for the Islands economy as 
such. The New Zealand Government may at any time force the Islands into a manufactured 
crisis, by abrogating one or more parts of the existing social contract (e.g. budgetary 
support, or free labour access, or duty free trade access). But any such crisis would have to 
be recognised for what is was: the result of a unilateral breach of undertakings explicitly 
given and accepted between the governing authorities of the two communities. One of the 
pillars on which economic policies in “civilised” nations rest is, of course, the assumption 
that nations will honour their agreements; to assume otherwise would make impossible the 
present trade and financial arrangements which bind the world economy together. 
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TABLE 6.19 
 
“Financing” the Cook Islands Balance of Payments 
1982 NZ$000, annual averages 
 
 
  Percentage Contribution of 
Period Financing required* 
Visible 
exports Tourism Remittances 
NZ 
“Aid” 
1945-49 6,335 52 - 22 26 
1950-54 11,043 50 - 12 37 
1955-59 12,714 51 - 12 38 
1960-64 18,441 46 - 8 46 
1965-69 23,590 42 2 13 44 
1970-74 25,703 34 4 13 49 
1975-79 27,760 19 20 14 46 
1980-83 28,023 19 27 14 37 
 
*Imports plus financing required to cover the residual balancing item in Table 6.18. 
 
Source: calculated from Table 6.18. 
 
 
 
It is, therefore, ironic that both the New Zealand and the Cook Islands Governments persist 
in prescribing for the Islands economic policies which are based on the presumption that 
the agreement with New Zealand for long term support and access will or should be 
broken. The prescriptions for reduction of “dependence” on New Zealand, which seem to 
dominate much official thinking on both sides, are ultimately prescriptions for the Islands' 
economic survival  without the special relationship. It is certainly true that in order to 
survive economically as a fully independent autonomous entity, the Cook Islands would 
have to step up productive activity well beyond the margin of what is presently profitable, 
and accept a considerable reduction of living standards below the level which has been 
regarded as the entitlement of a community associated with (and sharing some of the 
economic personality of) the New Zealand welfare state. Yet the special relationship with 
New Zealand was originally designed, and presented, as a means of averting that necessity 
in perpetuity. 
 
In its steady advocacy for “development”, understood as increased domestic production for 
export or import substitution in the Cook Islands, with a concomitant increase in domestic 
economic surplus (hence taxable capacity, hence government revenue, and therefore less 
need for New Zealand revenue support), New Zealand lays itself open to the charge that the 
possibility of abrogating the special relationship is being kept open as a permanent policy 
option. There may well be good reasons for New Zealand to do this (see our discussion 
Chapters 3 and 11), but the consequences should not be overlooked. A community living 
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permanently under threat of losing the key to its livelihood (which for a MIRAB society 
means migration outlets, unhindered ability to transfer funds, and assured revenue support) 
will be characterised by uncertainty; and long run planning under uncertainty will be 
dominated more by survival calculations and the taking out of insurance, than by 
systematic and constructive investment. The rational response to New Zealand's current 
policy stance, we would suggest, is for each Cook Islands family to ensure that it has a 
nucleus of members firmly established in New Zealand, to facilitate rapid emigration of the 
entire family should the special relationship actually collapse. 
 
Let us attempt to restate the problem more starkly. New Zealand has since 1960 
consistently assured Cook Islanders that they would not be abandoned to their fate, and that 
the special links to New Zealand would be preserved for as long as they wished to keep 
them. If those assurances are accepted at face value, the MIRAB society is the rational and 
appropriate system for Cook Islanders to obtain the greatest benefit from the social 
contract; their actions since 1965 confirm this. At the same time, however, New Zealand 
has lectured the Cook Islanders on the need for domestic production to be built up in order 
to promote genuine “independence”   in other words, to make possible the abandonment of 
the special relationship. If those lectures are taken at face value, the rational response 
would be to assume that the special relationship is not in fact durable, and to act 
accordingly (namely by moving to New Zealand at the earliest opportunity). It says much 
for the degree of trust which exists between the two communities that Cook Islanders have, 
in practice, taken the assurances of support seriously, and treated the “development” 
lectures as rhetoric rather than reality. This we believe to be the correct approach. 
 
The question then arises: what purpose is being served by the rhetorical commitment to 
“development”, and might this purpose be better served in some other way? It seems that 
the main point of the so called “developmental” approach is to provide political legitimacy 
for the special relationship within New Zealand. If New Zealand taxpayers are asked to 
guarantee some fixed level of budgetary support in perpetuity, as a straightforward subsidy 
to Cook Islands consumption, it appears to be felt that this would be unacceptable. If, on 
the other hand, financial transfers to the Cook Islands are presented as the means of 
promoting “development investment”, and hence ultimately self liquidating, this is felt to 
be more politically acceptable. The flaw is that a degree of deception is involved, which in 
the long run promises to be profoundly subversive of the special relationship, and hence 
destabilising for the Cook Islands society and economy. The issue is dealt with at greater 
length, and with particular reference to the Cook Islands case, in Chapter 3. 
 
As matters presently stand, the Cook Islands economy is in a stable and satisfactory steady 
state which is likely to be upset only by deliberate political intervention. There is a real 
danger, however, that policymakers will observe the evident fact that the system has a good 
deal of flexibility, and hence scope for adjustment, and will then attempt to drive the Cook 
Islands economy down some “desired” path without taking account of the way the system 
functions. Both the pressure in the mid 1970s for a “self reliant” economy, and the current 
emphasis on raising domestically generated disposable incomes as a means of reducing 
future out migration, fall into this trap. 
 
 
The central truths about the Cook Islands economy are that 
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(1) it is currently functioning very satisfactorily in a steady state; 
 
(2) the net burden on New Zealand of financial transfers is low and falling, and the 
social return on our financial assistance is high: 
 
(3) crash programmes of so called “development” are both inappropriate and 
dangerous46; 
 
(4) the long run evolution of the Cook Islands cannot be sensibly discussed separately 
from that of the New Zealand economy, unless the links of citizenship, migration, 
and remittances are broken.  
 
It is hard, in retrospect, to see how things could have worked out much better in the Cook 
Islands. This is a case of economic success achieved despite the occasional efforts of 
policymakers (in both New Zealand and Rarotonga) to the contrary. The top priority in the 
Cook Islands for the next decade is maintenance of an economic status quo which seems 
likely to be gradually enhanced by rising horticultural exports, and which will benefit 
directly from any picking up in the New Zealand economy. Policies which prevent a New 
Zealand recovery from flowing through to Cook Island households (for example, tax 
increases aimed at reducing the Government's financing “gap”) will trigger one or more of 
the adjustment mechanisms (most likely renewed out migration). 
 
The environment is therefore one in which conservatism is appropriate and policy 
initiatives should be approached with caution. Probably the most important policy change 
required on the New Zealand side is the relabelling of our financial transfers to remove 
budget support from the context of “development aid” and place it more clearly where it 
belongs, as an assured ongoing commitment by New Zealand to underwrite the viability of 
the existing economy. Secondly, and inextricably linked with the first, is a rethinking of the 
terms of the special relationship, either to impose upon the Cook Islands Government some 
obligation to consult with New Zealand on the broad outlines of its expenditure policies, or 
to remove any residual New Zealand responsibility for underwriting the security of 
international lending to the Cook Islands Government. Our present policy of muddling 
through on the issue of financial control has proved workable to date, but will come 
undersevere strain if the Cook Islands Government embarks upon the incurring of large 
scale foreign debt. 
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NOTES TO CHAPTER SIX  
  
                                                 
1  See Gilson (1980); 111 25, 136 56. 
2  This is fundamentally different to the status of returned migrants in some other countries. For example, 
in Peru, the returned migrant with money is accorded a higher status. That, however, is returning to a 
situation of subsistence poverty; in the islands the returned migrant is moving back to subsistence 
affluence. 
3  Felix H. Keesing,  The South Seas in the Modern World. John Day, New York, 1942, p.71. 
4  Cited in Wilson, S.D., “The Cook Islands and Niue 1901-1945”, in Ross, A. (ed.) New Zealand's 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
 
NIUE 
 
While superficially the Niue economy has a good deal in common with that of the Cook 
Islands, there are differences of fundamental importance. 
 
7.1   The Niuean Malaise 
 
Niue does not exhibit the strength and stability of the Cook Islands economy and society. 
There has been no -collapse- of aggregate export earnings, because there has never been any 
process of export led growth in Niue. Rather, the export economy has been characterised by 
a series of product cycles as one commodity after another found brief favour before running 
into crisis. Nor do remittance inflows to Niue appear to have been as strong as has been the 
case in the Cook Islands. Niue's import economy is almost entirely driven by New Zealand 
budgetary support; its resource base promises very little in the way of commercial export 
potential; its public service is grotesquely large relative to the society to be administered; 
and the out migration mechanism, which in the Cook Islands seems to have yielded a 
sustainable equilibrium situation, has in Niue's case proceeded to the point where the island 
has become acutely depopulated, which renders resettlement by surplus population from 
Tonga a distinct possibility for the future. 
 
Underlying the Niuean malaise are factors of natural resource endowment, social structure, 
culture, and history.  
 
7.2  Society 
 
Niue lies 388 kms east of Tonga. The population of about 3,000 people have strong 
linguistic and cultural affiliations with both the Tongan and Samoan groups. Loeb (1926) 
has suggested that two distinct ethnic groups are represented on the island - the Motu of 
Samoan origin in the north and the Tafifi of Tongan origin in the south. 
 
Before the establishment of a British protectorate, there had never been, apart from the 
Church, any really successful unifying agency on the island. No king had ever managed to 
gain full control over, or support of, the people. The strength of purely local social factors is 
represented in the 13 villages which have always been important autonomous units, and 
today the system of representation in the Assembly is strongly based on this pattern.1 
Village leadership was on an elected basis and not through hereditary right. Within the 
village, kinship groupings created further divisions, and it is not surprising therefore that the 
Niuean is a strong individualist. 
 
The first Samoan missionary was landed by the London Missionary Society (LMS) in 1849; 
in 1867 the first permanent European residents arrived, an LMS missionary and his wife. 
Missionisation has had a profound effect in shaping Niuean society and its values and 
directing the welfare of its people. A recurring problem that many New Zealanders have 
experienced in trying to force externally devised programmes on to Niue is the distinctive 
quality of Niue's strongly missionised culture. It is important to recognise Niuean attitudes 
and values and to be sensitive to their needs. 
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Niue was placed under New Zealand's protection in 1901, at the suggestion of the New 
Zealand Government. For 50 years little social and economic development was attempted; 
education was left in the hands of the LMS and a hospital was not opened until 1922. A 
change in New Zealand's laissez faire policy did not begin until after World War II. 
Following the murder in 1952 of Larsen, the New Zealand Resident Commissioner, a major 
and successful effort was made by J.M. McEwen to establish good communication with the 
Niuean people. A policy of steady social and economic development was prosecuted with 
steady improvement of the infrastructure. A small local political elite, headed by Robert 
Rex, emerged. Conscious of the strong pressure from the United Nations that dependent 
territories should be set on a course that would lead rapidly to self government or 
independence, New Zealand took steps rapidly to promote the political and constitutional 
“evolution” of the island. However, it must be emphasised that there has only been a period 
of 30 years of pronounced social, economic and political development and the recency of the 
whole process needs to be borne in mind. 
 
7.3  Environment 
 
The island's geology distinguishes it sharply from Tonga, the Southern Cook Islands, or 
Samoa. Most of its area of 259 sq kms (25,000 ha) is a raised coral plateau covered by thin 
and patchy soil, and with a rough surface broken by numerous coral “pinnacles”. 
 
The elevated coral reef rock which comprises Niue provides a rugged environment making 
movement and agriculture difficult, while the steep and broken coast line of cliffs fall 
abruptly to a narrow fringing reef and wave cut platform. Alofi Bay is one of only a few 
spots at which a channel exists through the platform enabling access to a small service 
wharf. However, ships are forced to anchor off the wharf and are unloaded by lighters. 
 
7.4  Soils 
 
Four main soil groups have been distinguished on the different terrace levels or former 
lagoon area. In undertaking the basic soil survey over 20 years ago, Wright and van 
Westerndorp stated that the problems are all the more formidable because “the solutions ... 
must be in balance with a soil whose outstanding property is a capacity to undergo rapid and 
often irreversible change”.  Recently, D.M. Leslie (1980) has pointed out that many experts 
visiting Niue erroneously characterise the soils as of poor quality and of limited potential, a 
conclusion arrived at by noting the amount of rock exposed across the land surface, and not 
realising that the true soil is between these rock outcrops. However, Leslie corrects this 
impression and states that “given our current knowledge we would view the agricultural 
potential of the soils with great optimism given wise decision making and sound 
management”.  Moreover, knowledge of Niuean soils is as well documented as that of any 
other country. Investigations by Widdowson and others have shown that nitrogen is low in 
all soils and is rapidly depleted (hence the necessity for shifting cultivation in the absence of 
artificial fertilisers), calcium and magnesium are abundant, phosphorus is high, potassium is 
low in most soils, and of the trace elements, zinc is consistently in short supply.2 
 
The main limitations are thus the physical properties of the craggy coral outcrops which 
leads to patchy crop intensity in gardens, plus some chemical deficiencies. The main
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implications of this are the difficulty in using machinery on the land; Widdowson (1980) has 
shown the detrimental effects of discing shallow soils. The “desert” or fern lands mainly in 
the south are the result of over intensive use of poorer soils usually overlying makatea sand 
and gravel beds. Thus Leslie's optimistic comment is based on “wise decision making and 
sound management” and for large scale commercial agriculture, this would probably require 
the provision of skilled management from overseas. 
 
7.5 Climate 
 
Niue has a climate that is on the margin of the typical hot, wet, tropical climate. It has a 
distinct wet and dry season with the main rainfall occurring in the summer period of 
November to April. Its mean annual rainfall is 2030mm with a variability rating of 21 percent. 
The climate is not always stable and droughts are not infrequent. A very serious drought 
occurred in 1982 83 as a consequence of the El Nino failure off the Peruvian coast. During 
the last 26 years Niue has experienced four severe hurricanes. The hurricane of 1959 
destroyed 180 houses (23% of the island's total), damaged a further 260 and severely affected  
agricultural production. 
 
7.6   Water Supplies 
 
Water has in the past sometimes acted as a constraint on agriculture. There is no running 
water on the island and the very porous nature of the soil and subsurface material means that 
rain water is not easily stored in areas accessible to vegetation. Rain water is trapped in 
subterranean caverns which, in the past, provided emergency supplies during droughts3. A 
number of bores tap the fresh water lens at the depth of about 60 metres. Very little stored 
water is available for agricultural use. No running water is available to private growers and 
very few make any attempt to store water near their garden areas.Until a few years ago, it was 
feared that the hydrological resources of the island would not be adequate even if agriculture 
could be greatly expanded. However, the Schofield Report on irrigation found that it would 
be safe to use 6000m a day from about 300 holes as was estimated at the height of the 
pressure front expansion. This was based on an estimated groundwater increment of about 
300mm/year, which for the island's total area of 26,000 ha means a yearly intake of 0.3 x 
26,000 x 104 cubic metres or 314,000 m/day. The requirement of 6000 m/day is small by 
comparison4.However it is very dubious whether the use of pumped irrigation water would be 
economic, given the low and fluctuating prices of agricultural exports. 
 
The Niuean environment is thus one which gives poor returns to intensive land use and 
favours extensive operations. Traditional “bush garden” agriculture, which provides the 
islanders' subsistence crops, is of a shifting slash and burn variety, and only a few tree crops 
(particularly coconuts and limes) have been successfully established on a permanent basis. 
House gardens in the villages contain banana trees, but there has been no exportable surplus 
of bananas for some decades. Attempts in recent years to develop intensive passionfruit 
cultivation have been defeated by the short bearing life of the vines under Niuean conditions, 
and the large labour inputs required for weeding and pollinating; part time family ventures in 
passionfruit growing are apparently unable to sustain the management of even an acre of 
vines with the labour available, including children. In any case, the commercial returns on 
passionfruit have been consistently disappointing, despite intensive promotional and 
marketing efforts by the Niuean and New Zealand Governments (see Section 7.6 below). The 
land use pattern is shown in Table 7.1A. 
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TABLE 7.1A 
Land Use on Niue (1976) 
Land use classification Area in hectares 
Percentag
e of total 
area 
Not available for agricultural use, house sites, buildings, roads 162 162 1 
    
 for agricultural production Land available     
     
1. Land which has never been used    
 (a)   under high forest (mainly very rocky) 2,540   
 
(b) under coastal forest. (Rocky  shallow soils 
exposed to salt inundation) 698 3,238 12 
       
2. Land not widely used at present    
gly rocky soils unsuitable for most 
 
(a) exceedin
subsistence crops 10,947   
 
itable for cash crops and subsistence 
4,463 15,410 60 
(b) Soils su
production 
       
3. Land at present producing subsistence and cash crops    
 (a)  subsistence crops    
  Taro 142   
  Tapioca 10   
  Yams 10   
  Kumera 4   
  Fallow land needed to maintain an     
  average 7 year rotation 1,162   
 (b) Cash crops  28 28   
  Passion fruit   17   
  Limes  17   
  Coconuts  1619   
Development Blocks     
  Pasture and Coconut  546   
 Pasture only 61 3,599 14 
       
4. Land formerly in production now largely abandoned 
(includes Niuean desert) 3,276 3,276 13 
       
  25,685 25,685 100 
 
Source: New Zealand Soil Bureau Bulletin No. 17 Appendices to the Journal of the New Zealand 
House of Representatives. Agriculture Department, Annual Reports. 
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7.7  The Characteristics of Agriculture 
 
The lessons of the past show that Niuean agriculture exports follow the same cyclic pattern   
of growth, a short period of relative boom and then speedy decline as th
Islands. As the cattle, kum agricultural industries do
h itabl d to re. This 
due to the characteristics of Niuean agriculture, the hazards of handling and shipping a 
p rket and to the economic process of “backwash” 
from the New Zealand mainland. The great shortage of labour and its high cost is a factor of 
m  part timers already enjoying a relatively secure public 
service salary and unwilling to undertake what, in effect, become
s cond one ent to cash cropping for an 
uncertain m som iuea ls are n
infertile, there is great difficulty in working the craggy, rocky terrain and the grower is 
required to shift frequently. Drought can be a problem and the lack of piped water can be 
c arket is by no 
means easy hable produce, great efforts 
have to be m
sufficiently mely favourable, as with 
p ssionfruit in t 's, the scale problem (lack of large pl s) r with t
fragility of this industry, based on high labour costs and dubious profitability, frustrates 
d  be gre , in the st resort e have 
t  confront
 
7.8 Passion
 and collapse   e Cook 
 not ara and passionfruit eras indicated, 
ave solid foundations and several factors in combination inev y lea failu is 
roduct to a distant and often uncertain ma
ajor importance. Most growers are
s a third occupation (their 
e  is taro growing and fishing). Hence their commitm
arket is bound to be shallow. Secondly, although e N n soi ot 
ritical. As the kumara weevil incident revealed, access to the New Zealand m
; nor, once gained, assured. When trading with peris
ade to arrange freezer capacity, deck containers on ships and that ships call 
 frequently. Even when market demand is extre
he mid 1970a anting togethe he 
evelopment. Thus while marketing difficulties can often at la  w
o  a production problem. 
fruit 
 
The passionfruit cycle illustrates some important points about Niuean agriculture. Before the 
bubble burst, it appeared as if Niue had discovered her “Kiwifruit”. 
 
T e yellow v ssiflora edulish ariety of passionfruit (a  var. flavicorpa) wa  introdu d from 
R rotonga shown that the fruit grew well. Following a 
v sit by A J N
p ssionfruit as ercial product. In 1967 a half acre plot was planted on a trial basis. 
Trial shipments and the discovery that passionfruit pulp could be successfully deep frozen led 
t  further p 7, 199) suggests that because of th
yields of fruit were lower per hectare than in some other Pacific countries: 2015 kgms/ha as 
a ainst 2747 in g/ha in Fiji. Moreover the crop
climatic conditions and better adapted than most crops to cope with soil deficiencies. 
 
T wers to get loans from the 
Niu B). All material (trellis supports, wi dlin  fertilis
etc) was supplied by the Board and the trellis erected by the Department of Agriculture as 
agents of the Board. Each time a member sold passionfruit to d  proce
ere retained until the costs of developing and maintaining the area were recouped. 
These costs were also charged against the growers'
The introduction of incentive schemes stimulated the rapid development of passionfruit 
production. Although the hurricane of 1968 almost entirely destroyed the initial plantings and 
s ce
a in 1964. Experimental plantings had 
i eil to Cottee's factory in Fiji in 1965 the first consideration was given to 
a  a comm
o lan ell (197tings. Mitch e limestone soils of Niue, 
g  W. Samoa, and 3296 k  seems well suited to the 
he Passionfruit Development Scheme made it possible for gro
e Development Board (ND re, see gs and er 
the Boar half the eds 
w
Maintenance was carried out by the Department of Agriculture who sprayed the vines with 
fungicide and insecticide, fertilised the areas regularly and sprayed weeds with herbicides. 
 accounts. 
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ene 72 the average income of scheme growers was 
ouble that of private growers and by 1974 the number of scheme members was substantially 
damp d the growing enthusiasm, by 19
d
more than private growers. 
 
The initial target was to plant 10 acres a year in  acre plots to reach a total of 50 acres, a plan 
well suited to the lack of time available to part time farmers. However, enthusiasm was such, 
that the industry experienced steady growth. By 1973 35 acres were in production in 180 
gardens. Up until 1972 the future demand for passionfruit on the New Zealand market was 
uncertain, but a decline in N.Z. production with crop disease coinciding with a steady (and 
later astronomic) increase in demand for passionfruit pulp with the boom in yoghurt and 
topping sales worked in favour of Niue. Although it was recognised at least as early as 1973 
that a large amount of labour was needed for seeding and hand pollinating (Niue Economic   
PH 296/2/1/ April 1973), this was forgotten in the boom period. In 1972 passionfruit was the 
island's biggest earner, returning $50,000 in gross income with $40,000 of this being retained 
on the island in returns to growers and on island costs. Experts from UNDP were so 
impressed with the project that FAO granted US$30,000 for equipment to be installed in a 
new processing factory that was built by the Government of Niue for the Development Board. 
 
Externally, vigorous efforts were made to assist the Niuean production effort. Due to hold 
design and storage problems neither the Lorena nor Toa Moana of the N.Z. Shipping 
Corporation could carry frozen cargo outward from Niue but the Niue Development Board's 
marketing officer persuaded the Corporation to install freezer lockers in one of the holds of 
the Toa Moana. It was planned in 1975, to hire a deck container for use on the Toa Moana 
ith a second one on an occasionw al voyage by the Lorena. The product was handled in New 
 and Crosfield and after a visit to Niue by one of their representatives 
commission to a lower level than requested (from 10 percent to 6.25 
nsure that there were no 
75 only 
Zealand by Harrison
ey reduced their th
percent) to assist the Niuean industry (the grower then received an extra 1 cent/lb). 
 
dministration controls were implemented from January 1971 to eA
imports of passionfruit pulp into New Zealand other than Niue's. In 1973 the industry was 
assured of sales for the whole of the product before it left Niue. The Department of Trade and 
Industries (D.T.I.) deferred an application to import $15,000 of pulp and juice from Fiji in 
1974. After the visit of the Niuean Premier and senior officials, the D.T.I. tried to obtain a 
comprehensive and accurate picture of the market for processed passionfruit in New Zealand. 
 
When the market “exploded” in 1974 it soon became apparent that Niue could not meet all 
the orders accepted. Fearing competition from other countries in the New Zealand market the 
Niue Development Board lobbied hard to exclude them from the granting of additional import 
licenses and urged the acceptance of imports from Tropic Islands Ltd of Fiji for 19
when Niue could not meet all its commitments. The Comptroller of Customs pointed out that 
the Niue Development Board was on tenuous ground in accepting commitments from other 
countries for their domestic shortfall: 
   
“The Government of Niue is being facilitated to trade its 
passionfruit pulp in this country and there appears to be no 
compelling reason to accept an assumed right to manipulate 
imports from other sources” (Comptroller of Customs to 
Secretary MFQ, 8/11/76, PH 269/2/1). 
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d. Several factors seem to be relevant: the vines lasted only four 
ears and costly replanting could only be done once between the initial row of vines.  
 is a labour demanding crop - especially for hand pollinating and weeding. UNDAT (1981) 
per hour). 
cre for pollinating. Since the value of 4.5 tonnes at 30 
nts kg t in labour for 
pollinatio
 
While hig e prime reasons 
for declin t pollination, a 
drought in problems experienced by growers with the 
epartment of Agriculture all contributed to the decline. Growers felt that they had little 
By November 1976 the N.Z. Representative reported that “the first flush of enthusiasm is now 
over, the small areas are now past bearing and have not been replaced.”  Once the decline 
began it could not be stoppe
y
 
In spite of their quite high fertility, Niuean soils require most crops to shift after a few years. 
Moreover, the costs of establishment are especially heavy. As Mitchell (1977, 233) has 
shown, Niueans growing passionfruit were drawn from all groups and occupations. Many 
public servants were involved for they would be the first to appreciate that substantial loans 
were available from the N.D.B.   loans that often were not repaid. Often one must wonder 
about their commitment to growing the crop seriously. Since most growers were part timers 
the question of how much time they would allocate to passion fruit cultivation becomes 
highly relevant. In a survey of the average allocation of time by males 20-50 years Mitchell 
(1977: 233 34) found that from 5 to 15 hours were devoted to subsistence activities including 
agriculture. To expect them to allocate an additional 5-15 hours for cash cropping   i.e. to 
undertake a third occupation in the course of each week is scarcely realistic. This fact exposes 
the basic weakness of cash cropping on Niue. Yet the crucial problem with passionfruit is that 
it
estimated that hand pollinating required 1.2 labour units per acre, 130 days at 4 hours a day. 
Large growers earning in excess of $1,000 spent from 28-35 hours in maintenance and 
weeding per week. For such a high labour crop which also required high inputs of fertiliser 
(fortnightly dressings), pesticide and disease control, very large yields were required for the 
crop to be profitable. Although harvests of 8 tons per acre were talked about, yields did not 
often exceed 4 tons per acre and frequently they were only half of this. In an analysis based 
on a yield of 5 tons per acre in years two to four (above average), UNDAT calculated that 
current subsidies of over $223 per tonne permitted a small return to the private grower of 
$189 per tonne as reward for his labour and management (approximately $1 
Excluding subsidies, the loss would have been $34 per tonne. While the net returns to labour 
appear to have been higher than for copra the profit calculated by Mitchell (1977) for a 
standard  acre holding was only $18 for 1969 and marginally less ($20) for 1977, a period 
when grower interest was visibly waning. A rapid rise in price from 17 cents per kilo to 20 
cents in late 1976 and then another rise to 22 cents did not stem the decline. 
 
Throughout the 1970s it was often claimed that passionfruit is “the biggest money earner for 
primary producers”.  In 1983 the NDB produced about 70 percent of the total crop. It had 
about 100 acres available for the crop, of which 72 acres were planted in March 1982. A large 
part was in poor condition by 1983. Yields were claimed of 4.5 tonnes/acre on 28 of the 72 
planted acres, but it appears that the average yield was much below this. 
 
In 1983 Brook and Cole calculated that even at 4.5 tonnes/acre it was doubtful if the crop was 
profitable. Thus, 6 pollinators per 2.5 acres covering flowering over 150 days a year 
excluding Sundays would cost $999/a
ce is only $1350 74 percent of the total value of the crop is spen
n. (Brook and Cole 1983: 4). 
h labour and other costs and only mediocre harvests appear to be th
ing interest by the grower, an increased disease problem, inefficien
 1976, the need to replant vines, and 
D
  - 190 -
r it was 
elt that some Departmental employees were inadequately supervised. Some destroyed vines 
o cope with the 
creased crop disease. With improved management techniques, production “could increase 
nes, completing the 
ollapse of the scheme. Today, apart from a small number of healthy plantings, many derelict 
control over the costs involved in production with the Department and NDB taking such 
dominant roles. Many growers were annoyed at being charged for spraying and fertilising 
without being notified of the necessity of those actions. Every time the Departments' 
employees visited the target of paying off the debts became more remote. Moreove
f
by inadequately flushing out spray tanks after using the herbicide paraquat; afternoon (rather 
than morning) spraying with pesticides can kill young buds (Mitchell 1977: 212-13). 
 
At the height of the boom some years earlier growers had expanded from ¼ acre plots to 1 
and then 2 acre vineyards. Finally they were even urged to plant 5 acre orchards. It is clear 
that with the lack of labour available, vineyards much larger than ¼ acre “backyard” sections 
near the home were unrealistic. As the gap between island production and orders widened 
desperate efforts were made to bridge the gap. The NDB planned 20 acre orchards to replace 
the small vineyards of ordinary growers. By 1977 the promises of the NDB marketing officer 
in Auckland that the shortfall in Niue production would be made up “next year” were 
beginning to wear rather thin. Whereas a production order of 100 tons had been promised, 
only 60-80 tons were actually exported. Harrison and Crosfield, importers of passion fruit 
pulp, gave gloomy predictions of future Niuean production. The manager of the Auckland 
Milk Corporation, the largest user of Niuean passionfruit imports began to express an interest 
in Samoan suppliers. He was however encouraged to visit Niue to inspect the new plantings 
and a letter from Mr Adams-Schneider, the Minister of Trade, urged the Corporation to 
continue to support Niue. In Niue a task force was formed by the government to deal with the 
situation: 100 acres of vines were to be planted (and 100 acres of limes), incentives and loans 
were to be provided to growers operating “on a commercial scale” and a full investigation of 
the problems of pollination was carried out. While the Ministry of Foreign Affairs declared 
that these measures were “expected to double production in 1978”, they agreed that if the 
Auckland Milk Corporation could not be supplied by imports from another source, it should 
be granted an import licence, since their production of certain lines had stopped. (SFA to 
SDT1, 23 Sept 1977). The task force was to assist the NDB in launching a “gigantic effort” to 
increase production and there is no doubting the earnest efforts of some of the people 
involved. A New Zealand D.S.I.R. scientist laid much of the blame on inefficient pollination 
by untrained adults and children and inadequate imports of fungicide t
in
from 75 tonnes in 1976 to 300 tonnes in 1978”.  Unfortunately Niue has experienced too 
many foreign “experts” whose promises turn out to be false, since their analysis has been 
faulty. 
 
Finally, Hurricane Ofa in 1980 destroyed many of the remaining vi
c
rows of vines testify to vanished hopes. 
 
7.9  Some comments on exports and imports, 1944-19715 
 
1944: Higher quantity of copra produced. Storm damage to crops in 1944 which effected 
exports. Kumara consumed locally. 
1945: Bananas recoved from 1944 storm. New Zealand markets take kumaras. Australia takes 
plaited ware. 
1946: Copra price rise. Shipping problems for plaited ware. Imports up through 
Administration purchases. 
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proving 
public services and to the introduction of facilities to increase the volume of trade 
: Second hurricane, January 1960. No copra for this reason. Affects bananas too. 
: M
1947: No bananas this year because of problems getting shipping not to call on the Sabbath 
when the Niuean will not work. Very good prices for copra, tripled since 1945. 
1948: Bananas revived. “Considering the limited revenue derived from these exports and from 
other sources and the continual expenditure and development programmes undertaken 
with the encouragement of the New Zealand government Niue at her present rate of 
production cannot be self supporting. To meet the island's yearly deficit, due mainly to 
the increasing costs of labour and materials employed in maintaining and im
special and general subsidies are granted by the New Zealand government”. 
1949: Nine year copra contract with the United Kingdom. New Zealand Marketing 
Department buys bananas. Plaited ware suffers from overseas competition. 
1950: Fruit Distributors now handle bananas. High price for copra takes attention of growers 
from bananas. 
1951: Kumaras down because of high price for other products. New Zealand Waterfront 
dispute disrupts shipping. 
1952: Potato shortage in New Zealand stimulates sales of kumara, price to producers rises 
from 1d/lb to /lb. A good part of the deficit this year comes from the final payment to 
the N.Z. Ministry of Works for the construction of a new Residency. 
1953: Copra price £70/5/3d ton. Potato shortage in New Zealand keeps demand up but price 
falls with increased supply. 
1954: Copra price falls on 1/1/55 to £65/4/10d ton. Potato glut in New Zealand causes low 
prices, Administration subsidises at a 1/  bag. Bananas up but still behind pre war 
levels. 
1955:Kumaras almost ceased due to low price in the year before. Increase in copra exports 
though a complaint about its quality, dirty through sun drying. Storm damage in early 
1956 reduces banana output, 376 cases not loaded due to bad weather, Administration 
advises that they are likely to lose shipping if amounts do not go up. 
1956:Kumaras still low because of low 1954 price. Bananas a disappointment to the 
Administration. 
1957: Drought in 1957. Increase in N.Z. price stimulates production of kumaras. Banana price 
goes up, quantity produced goes up. 
1958: Bananas suffer from the drought of the preceding year, then they have a hurricane. Taro 
suffers from the drought so the Niueans plant kumaras. 
1959:Level of imports blamed on construction. The February 59 hurricane destroyed much of 
the copra crop. Some kumaras consumed locally.  
 
“The export of kumaras is controlled as much as possible to 
ensure that it does not interfere with the New Zealand potato and 
kumara crop since the Niuean prices depend on these prices”. 
 
1960
961 issing. 1
1962: Reports say no copra, figures say small amount. People busy rebuilding houses. 
Bananas behind expectations. Many bags of kumaras exported but found to have black 
rot. 
1963:Black rot still a problem. Effects of hurricanes still felt. Imports  
are heavy because of rebuilding. 
1964:Copra up. Bananas up but expected more, road building programme to give better 
access to plantations. Percentage of black rot down. 
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1966: onciling 
1966:
1967: il found. 
1970:Copra starts to build up again, still low. 
 
7.10  
1965:Black rot mostly dealt with. Bananas and copra unaffected. 
Report on Colonialism for the U.N. “To some degree the dilemma of rec
isolation and meagre resources with a desire to retain the individuality of their own 
community” forces the 2,000 people of the Tokelau Group and the 5,000 people of Niue 
in to a problem of an even more acute form than the Cook Islanders have experienced. 
“If a degree of economic viability is a far distant prospect for the Cooks it is a chimera 
for these specks of coral with their thin infertile soils and unreliable rainfall”. 
Fall in output blamed on the weather and lack of interest on the part of growers. 
Dry weather throughout the year. Copra plantations overgrown. Kumara weev
1968:Hurricane February 1968. 12% coconut trees destroyed. Bananas down and no more 
expected for at least fifteen months. Black rot and kumara weevil found. 
1969:Hurricane effects copra, bananas and honey. Weevil restricts kumaras. 
1971:Higher price for copra stimulates production in the second half of the year. No bananas. 
 
Agricultural Policy 
 
chron trategy seems to be appropriate: (1) encouraging ¼ acre 
“plan
moderately intensive production is only likely to be achieved on these gardens for very high 
type, 
 
A con onomically if scale 
improved pastures (green panic and other grasses) on an estate basis since the climate does 
prove of beef production is import substitution: the island 
saved s 
killin mand would appear to be for 8-10 
east/week if available. 
 
Cattle unde iuean economy 
and the rec t that warrants full 
encouragem ent of extensive pastures and cattle with coconut 
refully  
s in any case is likely to depend on the quality of management. It is doubtful if 
produ
Auckland. 
e island cannot afford to be without a competent agricultural 
The policy most likely to succeed is one which recognises these basic characteristics and 
ic difficulties. A two fold s
“backyard” gardens adjacent to dwellings, and (2) large scale, extensive farming, of the 
tation” or estate kind. Backyard gardens can produce supplementary income, but even 
value crops. Limes isn't really very high value, but it is a crop that fits into ¼ acre garden 
since the labour demand is not high. 
siderable area of this large, empty island, could perhaps be farmed ec
economies were employed. The most promising possibilities appear to be beef production on 
have a short dry season, and cattle under coconuts, an ecological combination that is well 
n in the humid tropics. The rationale 
imported $338,000 worth of meat products in 1982. Much of this large sum could perhaps be 
 by a vigorous policy of extending cattle grazing. Animal health is good (internal worm
can be controlled by drenching) and cattle have very good growth rates, with 2 year steers 
g out at 500 550lb carcase weight. The local de
b
r coconuts recognises the continued importance of coconut to the N
ent promise of coconut cream exports   a new developmen
ent. Both the establishm
plantations would require costly investments; their economic feasibility needs to be ca
studied. Succes
any Niuean manager is available: there have been only one or two fully trained agronomists 
ced from Niue and unfortunately one was serving the Government as Consul in 
 
Finally, it must be stressed that th
economist, otherwise it is likely to repeat the mistake of the passionfruit era in the vain 
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ptions have occurred in the 
 
Exten
has, h
of cu
betwe
 
1960s  was achieved 
ea of reasonable 
ed on green panic (Panicum maximum var. 
pursuit of illusory profits. Some serious omissions in basic assum
past as Markwell (1980) has noted with respect to limes. 
sive cattle ranching might also form the basis of limited exports to Tonga and Samoa. It 
owever, proved impossible to protect cattle against poaching under the existing system 
stomary land tenure. Indeed the whole project would depend on improved relations 
en villagers and the management of such a ranch. 
 
The vital importance of continuity in agricultural policy and for skill in key positions to build
on proven achievement and research findings needs to be borne in mind. Thus in the late 
 when a New Zealand officer went to Niue a ten fold increase in legumes
with the application of zinc. After pasture trials in the Vaiea area a large ar
quality pasture was gradually built up bas
Trichogluma) and the legume siratro (Macroptilium atropurpuream) which carried more than 
one head of cattle per acre. After the return of the officer to New Zealand there was a lack of  
xpertise and after one or two drought years the pasture was opened up and ratstail appeared. 
e rayed with 24D which also knocked out the legumes. The nutrient 
vel of the pastures then began to decline and when nitrogen became deficient the whole 
g them under local conditions. Such innovations 
owever brought the very strong danger of importing some citrus disease that would have 
e
Unwis ly the ratstail was sp
le
pasture area became infested with ratstail and other weeds. It is essential to maintain records 
on pasture establishment techniques in the past. 
 
Similarly it is vitally important to guard jealously those comparative economic advantages 
that Niue does possess. Thus the Mexican limes of Niue are considered of superior quality 
and are disease free. Recently an officer in Niue was about to import a range of overseas 
varieties of citrus with the idea of testin
h
infected the local limes; fortunately the imports were cancelled in time. (Money 1982b: 6-7) 
 
 
7.11   Niue as Part of the New Zealand Economy 
 
So long as Niue remains economically integrated with New Zealand, the island suffers from 
absolute competitive disadvantage in virtually every line of productive activity. Trading 
activity and government services are therefore the backbone of the system; and in the absence 
of opportunities for profitable investment onshore, there seems to be a steady flow of savings 
out of Niue to New Zealand, partly offsetting the inflow of governmental assistance. The 
land's present “success” with exports of lime juice and coconut cream owes less to any 
attle ranching clearly holds commercial promise in the area of import substitution, 
nd might form the basis of limited exports to Tonga and Samoa. It has, however, proved 
 
is
inherent comparative advantage than to the fact that Niue has “captured” a capable individual 
entrepreneur able to hold his own in the world of administered pricing and oligopolistic 
competition. Whether Niuean coconut cream is competitive in the long run against low wage 
competition from elsewhere in the Pacific remains to be seen. Niuean lime juice seems likely 
to hold a permanent market niche in New Zealand and possibly Australia, but offers little 
prospect for large scale future expansion. 
 
Extensive c
a
impossible to protect cattle against poaching under the existing system of customary land 
tenure, which renders fences and gates permeable. 
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poorer areas of Northland.  In the 
ontext of the New Zealand economy, Niue is an area of marginal land, the exploitation of 
nother “development” programme in 
griculture (although such programmes probably play an important on-going role in 
All in all, it is significant that the parallels which Niuean political leaders draw between Niue 
and New Zealand refer to the Chatham Islands or the 
c
which can be sustained only by permanent subsidy. It follows from this that productive 
activity in Niue must be promoted, if at all, not for commercial returns but for reasons relating 
to social policy. It is, however, difficult to envisage any rejuvenation of morale and cohesion 
in the existing Niuean society via the agency of yet a
a
legitimating the existence of a large number of otherwise- redundant public servants). 
 
 
7.12  An Outlet for Tongan Resettlement? 
 
The exception to the conclusion in the preceding paragraph lies in the possible utilisation in 
Niue of cheap “surplus labour” from overpopulated territories such as Tonga. By allowing the 
ey were themselves guaranteed the status of a 
ling unproductive elite on the Nauru model; and New Zealand labour organisations would 
emergence of a large low wage enclave in Niue, it might be possible both to repopulate the 
island to the point where the public service once again has a public to serve, and to secure a 
genuine lift off of commercial agriculture and small industry. While economically feasible, 
however, such a policy would encounter severe political obstacles. Niueans would be likely to 
agree to large scale Tongan settlement only if th
ru
no doubt strenuously oppose free entry to the New Zealand market for competitively priced 
goods from Niue under such conditions. If, however, a genuine alternative to the economic 
status quo is to be promoted, it is here that the most obvious possibilities lie. 
 
 
7.13  The Case for Radical Surgery 
 
On the assumption that in practice the status quo will be maintained, it is important for policy 
omic potential of Niue as the economy is 
ow structured. Neither land tenure reform nor more stringent controls over public finance 
nder these circumstances, the risks associated with radical surgery are relatively low in 
stance is strong; this in turn implies a 
bstantial re thinking of the existing constitutional relationship with New Zealand, and in 
makers not to indulge in delusions about the econ
n
offer more than palliatives; the first could facilitate some extensive land development for 
(say) cattle ranching, but at the risk of a collapse of subsistence agriculture, unless reforms 
are carefully designed. The second, while easing the consciences of New Zealand aid officials 
and averting the present risk of politically embarrassing financial scandals, would leave 
untouched the basic reason for laxity in Niuean public finance, namely the absence of socially 
useful activities to occupy much of the Niuean public service6. When all participants in a 
system such as the public service can see that much expenditure goes straight to waste   and 
indeed when a public service has been designed to promote this process   it is difficult to 
secure willing adherence to high standards of propriety in the management of public moneys. 
In a small and tight knit society such as Niue, furthermore, it is extremely difficult to design 
any effective set of sanctions with which to enforce public service discipline. 
 
U
comparison with the potential benefits. Niue will not cease to be a charge on the New Zealand 
taxpayer, but the existing system of channelling subsidies almost entirely in the form of 
public service salaries has little to recommend it. The case for performance related incentives 
in the provision of New Zealand financial assi
su
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particular a recognition by New Zealand that the political re integration of Niue into New 
Zealand, on appropriately designed terms, has to be taken seriously. 
 
 
7.14 Population 
 
Table 7.1 and Figure 7.1 trace Niue's demographic history over the past century. Two periods 
of depopulation stand out clearly: the first from about 1890 to the early 1920s, when high 
mortality and a substantial flow of out migration to Tonga and the phosphate islands led to 
larm among the New Zealand administration, and measures to restrict outward migration 
ere imposed, accompanied by efforts from the 1920s on to improve standards of public 
. t four decades, until by 1966 it had returned to 
e level of a century earlier (about 5,000). Out migration to New Zealand then began to make 
a
w
health Population then rose rapidly for abou
th
dramatic inroads into the locally resident population, especially after 1971. The correlation 
between the mass exodus of the 1970s and the onset of self government (1972-1974) seems 
too strong to ignore, especially since the constitutional changes occurred in a climate of great 
uncertainty and insecurity over the maintenance of prized links with New Zealand. The 
inclusion in the 1974 Constitution of explicit reference to these ties does not seem to have 
sufficed to reassure Niueans. 
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TABLE 7.1 
NIUE: POPULATION 
 
 De facto population 
De Jure 
population 
 Year     Male Female Total  
1959 4,300    
1864 5,010    
1875 5,076 5,454   
1884 5,070 5,573   
1887 4,726 5,089   
1891 4,482 4,851   
1895 4,433 4,854   
1900 1,765 2,250 4,015 4,576 
1902 1,908 2,166 4,074 4,492 
1906 1,774 2,048 3,822 4,402 
1911 1,855 2,088 3,943  
1916 1,828 2,052 3,880  
1921 1,736 2,014 3,750  
1926 1,781 2,014 2,795  
1936 1,991 2,113 4,104  
1945 2,054 2,199 4,253  
1951 2,231 2,322 4,553  
1956 2,279 2,428 4,707  
1961 2,404 2,460 4,868  
1966 2,533 2,661 5,194  
1971 2,507 2,483 4,990  
1976 1,928 1,915 3,843  
1979 1,823 1,755 3,578  
1981 1,671 1,607 3,278  
1982   3.000*  
 
*Official estimates based on the (unpublished) 1981 census. 
 
Between 1971 and 1981, Niue's population fell by more than one third, and the exodus seems 
to be continuing (offset slightly in recent years by a countervailing influx of Tongans7, many 
of them descended from the Niuean migrants of 1900 1920). Provisional results from the 
1981 census show a population total of 3,278, nearly 1,000 of whom were in Alofi. Of 609 
houses enumerated, 169 were unoccupied; 105 of these were in the “back villages” of 
Makefu, Tuapa, Hikutavake, Toi, Lakepa and Liku. Population aged fifteen years and over 
was given as 1,959, of whom 977 were “economically active in money earning activities”, 
900 of then as wage and salary earners, and 784 of these (80% of the economically active 
population) apparently working for Government8. 
 
Overwhelmingly the main destination for recent out migrants has been New Zealand, where 
the Niuean born population has risen from 2,014 in 1966 to 2,912 in 1971, 4,379 in 1976 and 
5,091 in 19819. While there are here some signs of a slackening in the rate of migration in the 
later 1970s, the 712 new migrants of 1976 81 represent 19% of the 1976 population of Niue. 
 
Table 7.2 shows the migration figures since 1969; the sharp peak of emigration in 1972 73 
(the years following completion of the airport, and when self government was looming on the 
horizon) is the most obvious break in the overall trend, and it is only in comparison to this 
peak that the migration rate has shown any sign of falling. Figures for the last three years do 
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not suggest any tailing off of the outflo , particularly when it is noted that the 
arrival figures in Table 7.2 includ  hundred Tongan immigrants per 
year. 
 
w of Niueans
e possibly as many as a
TABLE 7.2 
 
ARRIVALS, DEPARTURES, AND NET OUT MIGRATION, 1969 1983 
 
Depa
s Net out m gration Year Arrivals 
rture i
1969 163  290 453
1970 343  
971 302
972 499
973 477
974 226  
975 34  
976 165  
977 1 75  
978 1 462  
979 1 199  
980 1 339  
981 1 70  
982 1 114  
983 1 183  
251 594
1 403 705  
1 498 995  
1 533 1,010  
1 740 966
1 876 910
1 982 1,147
1 ,345 1,420
1 ,606 2,068
1 ,936 2,135
1 ,851 2,190
1 ,438 1,508
1 ,662 1,776
1 ,808 1,991
Sources:  Niue  Abstract of Statistics 1980, p. 7; Quarterly Abstract of 
Statistics March 84, pp. 2 &
 
Table 7.3 sho ld steady during the 
ast decade and has shown some upward trend in the early 1980s (probably a standard 
, 19  4. 
ws the sources of population change. Crude birth rate has he
p
demographic response to depopulation). Crude death rate has been stable at quite a low rate. 
In the absence of out migration, Niue would have a rate of natural increase in excess of 2% 
p.a. 
TABLE 7.3 
 
SOURCES OF RECENT POPULATION CHANGE: PERCENTAGES 
     
Period Crude birth rate 
Crude death 
rate 
Crude 
m
Rate of population 
igration rate change 
1971-76 2.7 0.7 6.5 -4.5
1976-81 2.7 0.8 6.0 -4.1
1982-83 3.0 0.7 4.6 -2.3
 
ourcesS :  Calculated from same sources as previous table. For each period, crude rates are 
calculated as average births, deaths etc. for the period divided by average 
population. This may produce some upward bias for a period of rapidly falling 
population. May need recalculating on a different basis. 
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7.15  A View of the Migration Process 
 
The Niuean is conscious of being a Niuean with a distinctive culture but he also sees himself 
s a New Zealand citizen and Niue as part of New Zealand. The fact that the Niuean economy 
is a part of the larger mainland econom ecial relationship” which includes New 
Zealand citizenship for all Niueans, explains th  of people to move back and 
forward b
The Niuean has always been accustomed ty aeological signs of 
intended permane  early and it is possible to assert that the Niuean 
has always been a would-be migrant. Moreove oving to New Zealand is not 
final; many people go just for a visit but end up staying permanently. In interviewing several 
members of the poorer holds akupu v  (i.e. families having few regular wage 
earners) it became apparent that ma eople st ing in Niue e pai at least one, and 
often several visits, to ealand ee rel All that is n d is the $580 for an air 
ticket plus “a bit of food” for the relatives - which is not regarded as a particularly large sum. 
Many go with only a o  ticke owing th e relatives w elp. O ten the initiative 
comes from a family m  in Ne aland s  a one way t. 
 
It was suggested that tion e sig t when edu on an  health services 
became important10. T rove of thes ices in the 1960s and the growth of the 
public service did not t ou tion: i the stirrings he mi ration movement 
seem to reflect the loss of an earlier stability, w
form of social change. Even although people could get a new house easily from the New 
Zealand funded housing program llowin 959 and 1 hurric nes, this did not 
induce everyo
very much easier to leav
iring these things on Niue are being frustrated they are likely to migrate. In general it is a 
rational choice between all those factors that constitute the benefits/costs of migrating to New 
Zealand (people think of positive benefits first) compared to the benefits/costs of remaining 
on the islan
With m ilie r mem  livin  it is 
proba  peop ”  But it is not always a hard 
decision about going or staying as the frequency and fluidity of the visiting of New Zealand 
relatives indicates. And while the people who return to the island on holiday talk of the goods 
thing ealand (the f tories of l ng a cigarette  a $5 note after a win at the 
any people realise there is another view of life in New Zealand   the 
Zealand, 
gossip net
 
a
y and the “sp
e relative freedom
etween Niue and the mainland. 
 
 to mobili . There are no arch
ncy in  settlement patterns 
r, the act of m
 house in H illage
ny p ill liv  hav d 
New Z  to s atives. eede
ne way t, kn at th ill h f
ember w Ze ending ticke
 migra  becam nifican cati d
he imp ment e serv
preven t migra ndeed  of t g
ith migration being a response to a deep seated 
me fo g the 1 960 a
ne to stay: indeed many moved out. The opening of the airport in 1971 made it 
e. 
 
The size and isolation of Niue continue to be important, for with an education system that is 
increasingly preparing islanders for employment on the mainland, some people feel that life 
on the island deprives them of many opportunities. Basically, people wish to acquire the usual 
material possessions associated with the “good life”, and if they feel that their chances of 
acqu
d11. 
 
ost fam
bly more pertinent to enquire “W
s having ove half of their 
hy do
bers now
le stay in Niue?
g in New Zealand,
s in New Z olk s ighti with
races, and the like), m
problems of unemployment, housing shortages and of ending up “at the bottom of the heap” 
in New Zealand society. But those who made a mistake in migrating, who fail in New 
are usually too ashamed to admit it, of passing back such bad news through the 
work. So the “positive” images seem to dominate in decision making. 
  - 200 -
iffic s which often prompt some people to leave, for 
ften people who are well off or have good jobs choose to leave. The whole process of 
ctive “core” and Niue as the poor “periphery”. 
It is d ult to determine the set of factor
o
training people to fill public service positions, and rapid promotion to fill vacancies, is itself 
very unsettling, and the drastic depopulation induces social malaise and low morale. Even 
where people are educated or trained to a high degree to meet Niue's special needs, there is a 
feeling that the island is “too small to hold them”.  Increasingly, many of the younger people 
seem to perceive the mainland as the attra
 
 
7.16 Balance of Payments 
 
Figure 5.4 traces Niuean exports and imports over the period 1902 1983, in terms of constant 
1982 dollars. Two features stand out. The first is that the average growth rate of Niuean 
export earnings in real terms over the past 80 years has been zero. This in turn suggests the 
existence of a rather well defined “ceiling” on export production, presumably related to the 
physical capacity of Niue's natural resource endowment to yield an exportable surplus under 
prevailing conditions of land tenure and agricultural technique. 
 
The second feature is the take-off of commodity imports after the Second World War, 
subsidies , which have flowed back out as payment for rising 
ports. (There is, of course, nowhere much else they can go, apart from capital flight, of 
 imported directly by Government have probably been missed in the import 
atistics. Some indication of the low level of net remittances into Niue is also provided by 
initiating a steady growth at about 3.5% p.a. in real terms which has been sustained (with 
occasional hiccups) to the present day. In per capita terms, the increase of real import 
purchases is higher   increase over the 36 years of 4.5% (the increase during the 1970s was 
considerably faster than this, since depopulation has been a phenomenon of the past decade or 
so). The beginning of Niue's drive towards “import affluence” coincided with a shortlived 
burst of higher export earnings associated with high commodity prices around the time of the 
Korean War; but the real driving force behind the import growth has always been the inflow 
of New Zealand financial 12
im
which there seems to have been a certain amount). 
 
Table 7.4 assembles data on export earnings, commodity imports, and the size of the annual 
New Zealand Government grant to Niue. It can be seen that the New Zealand grant has 
consistently run ahead of Niue's trade deficit, indicating that “invisible” flows run from Niue 
to New Zealand rather than vice versa. There is, therefore, no indication here of any large 
scale net remittance of funds into Niue by the private sector, even taking into account the fact 
that some goods
st
Post Office figures on money orders issued and cashed during the 1981/82 year13, which 
show an inflow to Niue of $301,000 and an outflow of $400,000 for the year. This picture of 
net outflow of funds appears to be the norm, according to the Post Office staff. 
 
7.17  New Zealand Subsidies   The Driving Force of the Economy 
 
The balance of payments data thus confirm the picture already drawn, of an economy entirely 
dependent for its dynamism upon the inflow of government financial assistance to sustain 
local purchasing power. In turn, the availability of this ready source of finance for imports 
leaves no room for the economic adjustments towards more productive activity which would 
e forced to occur if aid were to stop. This crowding out of productive activity by aid - the 
classic “Dutch disease” syndrome should not, of course, be read as implying that Niue's 
b
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existing living standard could be sustained by local production in the absence of aid   quite 
the contrary. If aid were to be withdrawn, the economy's adjustment would take three forms: 
out migration, increased productive activity by those remaining, and a shift to permanently 
lower levels of real income. 
TABLE 7.4 
 
SOME DATA ON NIUE'S BALANCE OF PAYMENTS 
 (NZ$000 of 1982, annual averages) 
 
Period Exports Imports Apparent trade balance 
Philateli
c N.Z. grant 
“Invisible” 
residual revenues 
1935-39 522.5 620.7 -98.2    
1940-44 539.7 626.3 -86.6  229.6 -143.0
1945-49 930.2 1,227.9 -297.7  1,050.6 -752.9
1950-54 1,101.2 1,698.8 -597.6  1,050.6 -453.0
195-59 785.8 2,184.0 -1,398.2  2,132.7 -734.5
1960-64 518.2 2,540.5 -2,022.3  2,292.7 -270.4
1965-69 488.8 3,117.3 -2,628.5  4,065.3 -1,436.8
1970-74 608.0 3,172.1 -2,564.1  4,699.5 -2,135.4
1975-79 483.2 4,301.7 -3,818.5 500? 6,105.0 -2787.3
1980-83 568.0 3984.2 -3416.2 405 5352.8 -2341.6
 
7.18  Aid and Productive Activity 
 
The question thus raised is whether increased productive activity could (and should) be 
induced without withdrawing aid, and without triggering out migration and falling living 
standards. The answer appears to be that in theory, at least, it might be possible to achieve 
such an end by linking a progressively greater proportion of the aid inflow to productive 
erformance   for example, by paying out aid moneys as income supplements to successful 
in Dutch disease 
conomies, once the world market is properly tapped. 
.19  Philatelic Sales and Financial Accountability
p
producers, rather than as salaries to civil servants. The existing Constitution, however, would 
make such a change rather difficult, since it explicitly loads onto public service employment, 
the task of sustaining the level of local economic activity14. 
 
It will be noted from Table 4 that since self government, income from philatelic sales has 
been more or less equal to the total earnings from other commodity exports. As in the case of 
Tuvalu, it seems desirable that stamps should be recorded in Niue's export statistics, since 
they are the most successful, and most readily sustainable, export product. Since the ratio of 
sales income to production cost of stamps is very high, the great bulk of revenue is pure rent 
(a transfer of surplus), which makes stamps highly profitable even 
e
 
7  
 
There seem to be grounds for suspecting that the official data under record the actual level of 
Niue's income from philatelic sales. The country has a contract with Finbar Kenny on what 
seems an identical basis to the Cook Islands contract   namely, a fifty percent share of gross 
proceeds. It is in Mr Kenny's interest fully to exploit the world market for the stamps of those 
countries for which he acts as agent. There being no obvious difference (nor any reason for 
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ed to the official Niue estimate of $400,000 or less. In this 
connection, it is interesting to note the fo ment, from the Auditor General's report 
on the 1982/83 public accounts: 
 
“Once again it is necessary to observe that little or no control has 
been exercised over the collection of philatelic revenue for the 
year. The representatives appoi  N rnm  
accurately assessed have conducted no further inspections since 
t audit. T  pa  received
 the year ep thout any  b  the Treasur
confirm that it was correct.” 
 
Since then there appears to have been no change in this situation. 
 
Th f philatel  thing t ase, for i the f tal 
con l question c tion by e bly of the Auditors Reports and the 
ho he Execu a for all  rece n iture on 
behalf of the Niuean Governme it appea uestion ed udito rts 
ach year since 1978 have continued to be unanswered. What is the reason for the Assembly 
t ailing to pursue its duty (Niue Constitution Act 1974, 
lauses 56 to 60)? What should New Zealand do about it? Such issues may of course be 
em had been discontinued by his 
ccessor and in 1983 expenditures exceeded estimates by $500,000. In the last three years 
any difference) between the marketing strategies pursued with Cook Islands and Niue stamps, 
it is hard to see why gross revenues from Niue's stamps should be only half those from Cook 
Islands stamps. Philatelic revenue in the Cook Islands is presently running at a level of about 
$800,000 per year, compar
llowing com
nted by the iue Gove ent to
exercise controls to ensure that revenue due is fairly and 
las he final yment  from the Philatelic Bureau 
for was acc ted wi check y y staff 
to 
e issue o ic sales is some of a tes c t raises undamen
stitutiona  of the onsidera  the Ass m
lding of t tive to ccount  revenues ived a d expend s made 
nt. Yet rs that q s ask  in the A r's Repo
e
consis ently over the last 5 years f
C
affected by the role of a few members of the political elite in economic and political areas 
(see also Chapter 11). 
 
In recent years there has been some concern in Wellington over the question of financial 
management in the Niue Government. A major reason for this appears to be the rapid 
turnover of key staff and the lack of qualified accountants. One previous Financial Secretary 
introduced a system of monitoring the expenditure of each Government Department over the 
last three months to avoid over spending. However, the syst
su
there has been a cumulative over run of about $1.7 million. The appointment of a competent 
expatriate accountant in April 1984 was intended to improve the situation and lay the basis 
for good financial management. 
 
 
7.20  The Government Sector 
 
The Government is the key sector in the Niuean economy, and the dominant source of cash 
e ically active population work for the 
overnment, for salaries and wages which total around $4.5 million ($0.4 million of which is  
incom  for the population15. 80% of the econom
g
second round wages and salaries paid from money “recycled” through government trading 
arms). The $4.1 million of first round payments of government salaries and wages compared 
to total FOB export earnings of around $600,000 p.a. 
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on made it clear that New Zealand had embarked with open 
yes on a set of policies which implied permanent subsidisation of the Niue budget16: 
 
lic services and to the introduction 
of facilities to increase the volume of trade, special and general 
 
rogrammes, mainly through the agency of the large Public Works 
epartment (see Table 7.5). The difficulty which became apparent during the 1970s was that, 
ectively). 
The funding of the government is mostly external, so that a large part of its expenditure 
represents a net injection of income into the Niuean economy. The present structure of public 
finance, with a permanent internal deficit equivalent to half or more of total expenditure, 
dates from the 1940s, when the New Zealand administration embarked upon programmes of 
education, public health, and construction designed to raise local living standards. The 1948 
annual report of the administrati
e
“Considering the limited revenue derived from ... exports and 
other sources and the continual expenditure and development 
programmes undertaken with the encouragement of the New 
Zealand government Niue at her present rate of production cannot 
be self supporting. To meet the island's yearly deficit, due mainly 
to the increasing costs of labour and materials employed in 
maintaining and improving pub
subsidies are granted by the New Zealand Government.”
 
Initially, the government deficit arose from the costs of providing ongoing services to the 
community   mainly education and health. In the later 1950s and early 1960s, however, there 
was a pronounced shift of emphasis towards investment in new physical infrastructure   first 
the housing programme following the 1959 and 1960 hurricanes; then a series of 
“development” schemes (airport, roading, water reticulation, electrification, the fruit 
processing factory and the cattle scheme).17 Consequently, by the 1970s Niue had a 
government sector large enough not merely to sustain the delivery of services (e.g. the current 
hospital would be adequate for a population twice as large) but also to conduct large scale 
ongoing investment p
D
once the island's physical infrastructure had reached a certain level, and once the first 
generation of (now failed) “development” projects had been launched, there was a scarcity of 
new investment needs relative to the capacity of the government to carry out projects. The 
result (the normal one in “Dutch disease” economies) was that the public service pre empted a 
variety of activities which might have been undertaken by private operators   most notably the 
construction of housing and factory space. The two private builders during the 1970s (Gary 
Cooper and Russell Kars) both found themselves unable to secure work against the 
competition from the public service, and both moved out into other areas of activity (coconut 
cream and a trading venture, resp
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TABLE 7.5 
 
GROWTH OF THE NIUE PUBLIC SERVICE 
 
  Numbers Population 
Number of 
inhabitants per post  
1965 Permanent staff 266   
 Expatriate Officers 42   
Temporary 5   
Casual 321   
Total 634 5,1941 8.2 
    
Permanent staff 328   
Expatriate Officers 50   
Temporary 4   
Casual 312   
Total 694 4,9902
 
 
 
 
1970 
 
 
 
 7.2 
     
1976 Permanent 349   
 Expatriate 42   
 Temporary 4   
 Casual 368   
 Total 763 3,8433 5.0 
     
1984 Permanent staff 369   
 Expatriate Officers 17   
 Temporary 40   
 Casual 244   
 Total 670 3,0003 4.5 
   
Source: State Services Commission, Wellington 
Notes: 1. 1966 Population 
  2. 1971 Population 
   3. Estimate 
 
The 1974 Niue Constitution Act underpinned the position of the island's overblown public 
service, by making it the task of the public service not merely to provide services efficiently, 
but also to provide employment for Niueans in order to keep up the level of economic 
activity. The result is that Niue now has a rather unusual form of “surplus labour”, namely an 
under utilised pool of fairly skilled personnel drawing regular salaries and wages from 
government. This means that the government has at its command sufficient local resources to 
undertake a considerable range of new activities, if any such activities could be found that 
make sense. Table 7.5 shows that Niue has more than one public service job for every 5 
people in the population. The difficulty is, quite simply, that the absorptive capacity of the 
Niuean economy for large scale investment is currently rather limited, if standard criteria for 
project evaluation are applied. It is certainly possible to dream up “things for the public 
service to do” - the enormous (and quite profitable) airport passionfruit farm is a good 
example, and a large scale programme to raise the standard of kitchen facilities in the 
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“hurricane houses” would be another po pt that the male dominated priorities of 
Niue would be antipathetic). The problem is that there are no projects in sight which could 
keep the public service ith a positive rate of 
turn. 
 
Ano er way of p ting the sa is nse iue “lacks 
savings capacity”.  On the contrary, in terms of local resources there are excess savings, 
reflected in the existence of substantial underutilised labour and plant, and an apparent 
outward drain of financial savings*. Wh
in productive ways, which offer good enough return to justify the effort. The role of overseas 
“ evelop ” in Niue is not to m  up for any deficit of savings or foreign exchange, 
but rather to pay for things that Niueans themselves do not find it worthwhile to pay for. All 
Niueans probably agree that it is socially desirable that uneconomic activities be keep alive 
(in other words, that Niue be kept alive as ic 
a ents th han to com it their own personal savings to this task. 
 
7.21  D  Inappropriate Polici
ssibility (exce
 fully occupied18 in carrying out investments w
re
th ut me point that it is no nse to suggest that N
at Niue lacks are chances to put those savings to work 
d ment aid ake
 a functioning entity), but as individual econom
g ey have more sense t m
anger of es 
 
Nor would it solve the problem if the government were to embark upon a programme of 
increased taxation of private income  order to finance ongoing uneconomic activities 
undertaken in the interests of social survival. For, in the first place, such taxation would imply 
a squeeze on disposable incomes which would induce more out migration (and hence 
undermine further the goal of social viability); and in the second place, tax revenues must 
come from s realised econom ic 
surplus. The “excess savings” referred to before relate to the unrealised potential surplus 
represented by excess capacity in the government sector, and excess financial savings 
represented by the steady apparent capital flight. Neither of these could exist in the absence of 
the inflow of “aid”. 
 
We come fore, to the point which is implicit in m st policy analyses of
 standards would require a great increase in 
no prospect of such an increase, there is no 
ill not contribute to self reliance for aid donors or government to 
ulge port substitution, unless that 
oductio  economic surplus. The Development Plan data is therefore mistaken to 
s, in
 a society' ic surplus   and Niue is not realising much econom
, there o  “aid” to Niue: 
self sufficiency at anything like the present living
rplus. There being Niue's realised economic su
prospect of self reliance. It w
otion of production for export or imind in the prom
r n generatesp
suggest that the trade deficit is the problem, rather than a symptom of the problem. The Plan 
states (p. 10): 
“The existing trade deficit is considered the main reason that 
makes Niue's economy so totally dependent on foreign aid at 
present. Therefore, the trade deficit needs to be reduced if the 
degree of self reliance is to be increased ...” 
 
This diagnosis is back to front. 
 
7.22  A Retrospective View of Constitutional and Political Change 
 
It is perhaps worthwhile reviewing the political and constitutional change of 1974 today, 10 
years later. In the view of one leading figure the Niuean people in 1974 did not want any 
change. As in 1965 when they stated they needed more time when further instalments of self 
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ion or independence were never seriously raised (and almost no one favoured the 
tter); by the time they were seriously considered, the country was “already over half way 
ince the “loudest drum” at the time was “we don't want to change”, self government was 
s d it, and the United Nations and New Zealand were 
en to be the main beneficiaries. To gain this, certain concessions had to be made. In return 
reasingly tied, economically and socially to New Zealand. While the 
elivery of social services to the population, and the encouragement of what degree of 
ed of people” was appearing. For the bulk of them the idea had emerged that 
Niue was ubsistence to a 
market ec time employee, 
part time a “permanently 
transitiona ket economy; it is nurtured by aid, the 
rowth of the bureaucracy and closely tied, economically and socially to New Zealand). This 
in the public service, couldn't see why they shouldn't get cost 
f living increases, since in their analysis, Niue was fully a wage economy. In recent years the 
re part of the Northland 
ranch of the PSA, but when they felt they did little for them, the Niue PSA became 
government were being proposed, there was considerable support for the status quo. At all 
stages their main concern has been to preserve the migration and aid link with New Zealand. 
It was believed that decisions were made on behalf of Niue before the issue was put. 
Integrat
la
down the track” toward self government. Professor Quentin Baxter's advice in 1973 was to 
“let the people get a taste of self government”.  However, it is believed that all three options 
are still open: 
1. To stay where Niue is at today; 
2. Independence; 
3. A closer link with New Zealand. 
The people have no experience of integration and need to explore what it might involve. 
However, it is realised that there is real pressure on now from New Zealand (e.g. to use aid 
for purposes for which it was intended) which might affect the constitional relationship. 
 
S
seen a  being bought by those who wante
se
for self government, Niue wanted maximum protection of the civil service (there was also a 
desire to keep nepotism, which was seen to be a fact of life in the Cook Islands, out of Niue). 
These concessions were made by New Zealand in official guarantees of support. Thus Clause 
7 of the Niue Constitution Act 1974 on Economic and Administrative assistance states: “It 
shall be a contining responsibility of the Government of New Zealand to provide necessary 
economic and administrative assistance to Niue”.  Thus the constitution solidified the public 
service and fixed its role in the Niue economy and society. While this aim is admirable in 
terms of safeguarding Niuean welfare it helped to inhibit the potential growth of the private 
sector19 and it ignores the possibility of a dynamic and changing role of the public service in 
a mirab society inc
d
autonomous development is realistically attainable are legitimate roles for the public service, 
its real nature is somewhat different. Moreover the main effect of the provision of aid in a 
mirab society (which is not fully autonomous) is to create a bureaucracy and the main local 
purposes of that bureaucracy (in contra distinction to New Zealand purposes) is to live off 
that aid as it ostensibly channels it into various development programmes. 
 
One informant pointed out that while constitutional changes were taking place in the 1960s 
70s a “new bre
 now a wage economy and that there had been a total shift from s
onomy. (Yet in reality the shift was not total, but merely to a part 
 gardener. The mirab society was evolving, which is perhaps 
l” society rather than one based on the mar
g
new class of people, employed 
o
Public Service Association SA) has become very militant. They we
b
independent. Formerly they wanted to keep the employers and controlling authority (the State 
Services Commission) at arm's length overseas, but now they want them here “so they can put 
the heat on them”. 
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olitical elite is adroit in managing the mirab society and resisting excessive 
dema r, the Government did not budge, and arbitration 
from New Zealand helped achieve a solution. 
 
 
In spite of the militancy of the PSA and the new style of leadership within it that is emerging, 
there seems to be some recognition that Niue has achieved some significant social progress 
over recent years. Living standards are now much better, the island has been electrified, 
pensions are available and assembly men now get $7000 a year instead of only $1500 a few 
years ago. The political leaders of Niue are conscious of the hard times in New Zealand and 
the need “to tighten the belt” under the circumstances. Indeed, in spite of the complaints of 
the PSA the p
nds. In the island's first strike last yea
7.23  Issues for the Future 
 
There is much in the record of Niue that stands to the credit of Niue's government and leaders 
nd the quality of New Zealand assistance. Social conditions are good, and while the island 
 needs, some fears 
re likely to emerge of a “Niuean Maniatoto”.  There are in Niue, as well as in other small 
a
has had its local problems some worthwhile, positive achievements have occurred since 
internal self government. A considerable measure of local consensus appears to exist for 
many policies. Sir Robert Rex and other political leaders have shown understanding of New 
Zealand's difficulties in the current recession and a good measure of restraint has been shown 
in some areas. Relations between political leaders in the two countries have always been 
cordial. 
 
It is important for New Zealand to respect the local self government that Niue enjoys; New 
Zealand has not interfered in the running of the country and only in foreign affairs and 
defence does New Zealand retain a residual role under the constitution. However, the 
continued massive depopulation of Niue is worrying as well as the social malaise this process 
induces. There is some suggestion (though no firm evidence as yet) that out migration is 
slowing down somewhat and since it is rare for any country to be entirely depopulated, it is 
possible the population may stablise in the future. In recent years however it has become 
painfully obvious that the public service, designed for a population of 5000 and a process of 
rapid development of social and infrastructural services, is grossly too large (Table 7.5). In 
1984 moreover all the main public works on infrastructure are now in place, not requiring the 
manpower to administer the work. While it is important for New Zealand not to seek to 
impose its own standards, and the public service must above all meet Niue's
a
states of the Pacific, great problems and temptations involved in managing and administering 
large sums of aid moneys. Historically, the last 15 years have witnessed a great expansion in 
the flow of public moneys and it is clear that there are grave problems in the process affecting 
both countries (New Zealand has requested three aid reviews in the last 10 years). New 
Zealand must not play a paternalistic, neo colonial role, and there is much to be said for 
guaranteeing a certain acceptable flow of subsidy (a preferable term to “aid”) for say a 10 
year period. But New Zealand would probably assume that the ways in which such moneys 
are spent conform to New Zealand's ethical standards and values. Since Niue's version of the 
Westminster system has not produced checks and balances and mechanisms within the 
political structure to hold the executive to account in ways visible to the electorate, a number 
of disturbing trends could perhaps become worse in the future, and an unfortunate neo 
colonial backlash from New Zealand politicians or the taxpayer in the future could not be 
ruled out. Since in the last resort, “he who pays the piper calls the tune”, the volume of 
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bsidies and the conditions affecting subsidies provided by New Zealand becomes the 
k” and to avoid public embarrassment. New 
ealand also wishes to preserve the South Pacific as a stable, harmonious area in which 
riendly towards New Zealand. Basically, strategic denial is the 
ssence of our defence position and Niue, as an “unsinkable aircraft carrier”, must be on our 
ointed, in 1983 the Director of Agriculture was dismissed and a new Director was 
ppointed, and a new team of officers was appointed to Treasury to straighten out financial 
su
decisive factor. 
 
New Zealand's policies then are likely to be determined by the order of priority of New 
Zealand's various goals in Niue. New Zealand has an obligation under the constitution and 
before the United Nations to ensure high standards of administration and financial 
management. 
 
There is a real danger that New Zealand bodies will lose sight of this major obligation and 
seek merely “to get themselves off the hoo
Z
countries like Niue remain f
e
side in any great power conflict. Though in 1984 that appears unlikely and the fear of 
aggression in the South Pacific quite remote, concern will exist that the present unity and 
stability of the countries of the region should not deteriorate. (It is of course argued by many 
that such unity and stability could be achieved in some non nuclear, post Anzus arrangement). 
 
Because of New Zealand concern over the size and competence of the public service a 
number of innovations have recently occurred: a new Director of Economic Development has 
been app
a
management. If these measures achieve considerable success, maintenance of the status quo is 
feasible; if not, the logic for considerable further changes would be very persuasive, so that 
internal standards roughly conform to New Zealand's values. The Niue Government accepts 
the desirability of at least considering change: it agreed in May 1984 to a thorough review of 
the Niue public service. Of course, in reforming and trimming down the public service its 
prime role of supplying a large source of income to the resident population would be 
lessened, and this could lead to a sharp increase in out migration. How important then in New 
Zealand's priorities is it to retain population in Niue rather than to accommodate it on the 
mainland? The Niue Government has also appointed a select committee to enquire into 
possible constitutional change. 
 
It may well be that something like a “Chatham Islands solution” may best serve Niuean 
interests in the future, acknowledging the great integration of the economy and society with 
the mainland that has occurred. Under such an arrangement the Assembly would retain much 
internal autonomy over local affairs, technical matters could come under the jurisdiction of 
the appropriate New Zealand Government Department, though the latter would need to 
become sensitised and experienced in Niuean conditions. At any rate the Niue Assembly 
would have to agree by a two thirds majority to any change in the constitution. It may be that 
a Select Committee comprising both Niuean and New Zealand members and chaired by a 
mutually respected Ombudsman type figure could provide a mechanism for the friendly 
sharing of problems and discussion of major issues. Moreover, these considerations suggest 
that even a revised constitution with a different “special relationship” with New Zealand 
might not quite meet all the requirements of both countries. The actual functioning of a 
constitution rarely happens according to the assumed precepts; there is the need for a 
carefully thought out “compact” (e.g. the Kirk/Henry letters for the Cook Islands) to cover the 
less clear cut spirit of the relationship. 
NOTES TO CHAPTER SEVEN 
                                                 
  The 20 member Assembly has one member from each of the 14 villages (Alofi being divided into Alofi 
nt water supply for human consumption is adequate for all seasons. Almost every house (all 
reconstructed since 1961) has a 2000 litre watertank using the roof for catchment. Every village has 
1
North and Alofi South) and six members elected by a common roll. 
2  The soil process is also beneficial in contrast to the usual sequence in the humid tropics, thus the 
weathering of the rock provides alkaline in the form of calcium carbonate in solution to the soil, helping 
to balance the acidity caused by leaching. 
3  The prese
piped water to village taps and finally there are emergency tanks with roof catchments. A number of old 
cisterns, constructed during the 1920s or 30s are also still in use. 
4  There is of course great need for caution in tapping fresh water supplies. In a pump test of 100 hours at 
the Fonuakula well in which 1800 litres an hour were pumped, a maximum drawdown of two feet was 
reached after 6 hours of pumping. Recovery took 2 hours 20 minutes. See J.C. Schofield “A Quantitative 
Look at Niue Groundwater Supplies - a Preliminary Statement”, 1977; also P. Money to W. Burns MAF, 
Dec 6, 1977, MAF 53/3/8. 
5  Compiled from Annual Reports on Niue (AJHR), by David Booth. 
6  For a discussion of the public service role, see pp.12-14 below. 
7  Estimates of the number of Tongans now resident in Niue range between 200 and 400. These figures, 
however, are merely guesses provided by various respondents during unstructured interviews. 
8  We say, “apparently” because the provisional census tables are incomplete and difficult to interpret. 573 
persons are explicitly identified as working for government departments, and 211 appear as employed by 
“other” employers excluding the private wage- and salary-paying sector. 1979 estimates prepared by the 
Planning Office, and published in  Niue National Development Plan 1980 1985, Table 1.6, p.6, show 
total government employment as 737 out of a total wage labour force of 854 and total economically 
active population of 974; these figures tally well with those given in the text above. 
9  New Zealand Census of Population for the years cited. These figures provide some rough and ready 
confirmation of the 1981 provisional census total if we assume that the rate of natural increase in Niue 
remained more or less the same between 1971-76 and 1976-81. Thus an increase of 1,467 in the New 
Zealand community of Niue born persons 1971-76 corresponded to a fall in Niue's population of 1,145; 
and an increase in the New Zealand community of 712, 1976 81 corresponds to a reported fall in Niue's 
population of 565. In both cases the second figure is roughly 80% of the first. 
10  Some of the following comments are based on the views of Mr Terry Chapman, Secretary to 
Government, in an interview. However, the team is responsible for the views expressed. 
11  Informants stated that positive reasons for staying on Niue were: have a job here, we are “alright here”, 
have a house here (house prices appeared to be about 60% of the N.Z. price), have a free life here, “don't 
have to lock your door here” etc. Disadvantages of New Zealand were: afraid of not getting a job, don't 
know your neighbour, cost of living and of a house are too high. Positive reasons for migrating were to 
join family members there, higher standard of living, exciting life. However, preferences for staying were 
paramount, since informants were attempting to justify why they hadn't emigrated. 
12  New Zealand's expenditure on education and health expanded rapidly after the Second World War. A 
major housing programme began after the hurricanes of January 1959 and January 1960, and kept the 
level of government spending high through to the mid 1960s. During the subsequent decade a series of 
large investments in “development” followed the housing programme: the new airport (1969-71); a fruit 
processing factory for the Niue Development Board funded by F.A.O.; water reticulation; a 1,300 acre 
coconut and cattle scheme; electrification of the island. (Chapman, 1976, pp 84-90). 
13  Niue Post Office,  Annual Report 1981/82. 
14  See Clause 69 of the Niue Constitution (p.41) on appointments to the Niue Public Service. Clause 69(3) 
states that factors to be taken into account include: “(b) the need to afford reasonable opportunities of 
employment in Niue for the people of Niue, and in so doing to have regard to the employment 
opportunities and levels of remuneration available in New Zealand. Furthermore paragraph (c) Clause 69 
refers to “The need to act consistently with Government economic and social policy, bearing in mind that 
the terms and conditions of employment in the Niue Public Service are a major element in the general 
well being of Niue.” 
15  The expected government wage and salary bill for 1984/85 is $4.1 million in government departments, 
plus about $350,000 in government trading activities (sawmill, hotel, bond store, cattle farm, honey, 
handicraft, quarry, concrete products, electric power supply, airport, housing authority, port, fuel bulk 
store). (Government of Niue, Report, Instructions, Appropriation and Estimates of Expenditure and 
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Revenue, 1 April 1984 - 31 March 1985, passim). This total of $4.5 million cash incomes derived from 
government activity should be compared with the FOB value of total exports, currently around $600,000 
per year. 
16  AJHR, 1948. 
Chapman (1976), pp. 84-90. 
The very high rate of absenteeism in the pu
17  
18  blic service appears to reflect this situation. 
ile private enterprise actually does the 
19  e.g. Private builders who wished to build houses found themselves a few years ago unable to compete 
with the Housing Department whose quotes for jobs were unrealistic in that they could be raised later by 
supplementary grants. While the situation is now improved it would seem that a proper role of the 
Housing Department would be to order and import materials, wh
building. 
CHAPTER EIGHT 
 
TOKELAU 
 
The three atolls of Tokelau were the last Pacific territory to come under New Zealand control, 
and they retain their formal status as a dependent territory of New Zealand. In pre European 
times the Tokelauan community controlled four islands: the present three -  Nukunonu, Atafu 
and Fakaofo - plus Swain's Island, or Olohega, to the southeast. A British protectorate was 
established in 1877, and the islands were formally annexed in 1916, becoming part of the 
Gilbert and Ellice Islands colony. However, the islands were too small, isolated and 
unproductive to be of much interest to Britain, and little effort was made to assert British 
control over the most commercially successful island, Olohega, where the American Jennings 
family had claimed ownership since the 1850s. In 1925 Britain divested itself of the burden of 
administering the group, passing the three northern islands over to New Zealand, and 
acquiescing in United States annexation of Olohega to American Samoa. The number of 
Tokelauans living and employed on Olohega has varied since then between a peak of perhaps 
50, and the present low of less than half a dozen1, and the community's historical claim to 
Olohega has persisted as a folk memory, although a treaty signed under New Zealand pressure 
by the Tokelauan elders in 1980 formally renounced the Tokelauan claim in favour of the 
USA. 
 
8.1   Limited Room for Manoeuvre 
 
In theory, policy design in the three Tokelauan atolls administered by New Zealand has been 
rendered easier than in Niue or the Cook Islands by the very limited room for manoeuvre either 
economically or socially. This has not prevented several generations of New Zealand officials 
from pushing ahead with a succession of grandiose programmes; but the stalling and eventual 
modification or abandonment of those programmes has occurred more rapidly and 
unequivocally in Tokelau than in the other New Zealand territories. Tokelau has thereby been 
spared, to date, the degree of social disintegration and bureaucratic parasitism that has 
occurred in Niue, although the forces at work in the two territories are comparable. 
 
So far as the room for economic manoeuvre goes, a British Foreign Office minute of 1925 
sums up the reasoning behind the handover to New Zealand2: 
 
“A small and worthless group. Perhaps we should give them to New 
Zealand.” 
 
Virtually all observers since have agreed that “development”, in a sense of a large scale 
expansion of commodity production, makes no sense as a central policy goal. As the latest 
New Zealand Official Yearbook puts it3: 
 
“Tokelau's size, isolation, and lack of land based resources allow little 
scope for economic development.” 
 
The natural resource endowment of the three atolls consists of 12.2km2 of land area (all coral) 
plus lagoons and sea. This endowment is sufficient to permit a secure subsistence life for up to 
2,000 people organised in a tightly integrated neo-traditional social order based upon the
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descent group and the village4. Subsistence existence under atoll conditions requires the 
maintenance of a margin of productive capacity as insurance against natural disasters; in the 
Tokelau case this is manifest in the fact that the harvest of coconuts available in a normal year 
exceeds the subsistence requirements of the population and a small exportable surplus of copra 
can thus be produced in most years as an income supplement for households. There is, 
however, no tradition of plantation organisation or wage labour in Tokelau except for Olosega. 
Specialisation and division of labour are alien to Tokelau society; each individual in the village 
system is expected to perform a variety of roles, among which copra cutting is merely one, and 
commonly a fairly minor one. 
 
The size of the exportable copra surplus has changed very little over the years. In 1926 it was 
estimated at about 365 tons in typical years, with a peak of 437 tons in 1924-25.5 Around 1950 
the exportable surplus was estimated as 400-440 tons, although lack of shipping restricted 
actual exports to less than 300 tons6. Exports during the 1950s and 1960s were generally 
around 200-300 tons, falling during the 1970s to 100 tons or less; but a recent revival has taken 
exports up again to 200 tons or more, and it is probable that a substantial margin of unutilised 
productive capacity exists on outer islets, so that the potential exportable surplus probably 
remains much the same as it was in the 1920s. 
 
In the absence of major investments in raising the productivity of the atolls' stands of coconut 
trees (see Appendix 1. below), the potential exportable surplus of copra in any year depends on 
rainfall in the previous year and the level of subsistence demand; actual exports then depend on 
the amount of labour time devoted to collecting and cutting the nuts. The desire of New 
Zealand administrators to maximise potential copra production led early on to a declared 
interest in installing concrete water tanks to make possible a substitution of potable fresh water 
for drinking nuts7. 
 
The first major set of local infrastructural investments undertaken by the New Zealand 
administration in the group, at the beginning of the 1950s, focussed on copra related 
requirements: water cisterns, copra drying and storage sheds, concrete jetties and reef 
passages. Up to that time, in fact, benign neglect had been the hallmark of New Zealand 
administration, with the Tokelau group run as a minor offshoot of Western Samoa8. The 
extension during the 1950s of government provided services in education and public health 
made the islands for the first time a net charge on the New Zealand taxpayer (up till 1951, 
public expenditures were funded entirely out of copra tax and other minor local taxes and 
duties) and began an expansion of the public service which gathered pace in the 1960s and 
threatened to swamp the neo traditional social order in the 1970s. 
 
The emergence of the public service brought to the fore the limited room for manoeuvre on the 
social front in a society organised on a non cash reciprocity basis. The neo traditional society 
was able to accommodate without difficulty the addition of a few professional specialists 
performing technical functions outside the normal range of subsistence related activities in 
village society. Doctors, teachers and radio operators could thus be fitted in without difficulty, 
accorded status appropriate to their skills, and excused duties such as participation in 
communal labour. In Tokelau as in the other territories, however, New Zealand in the 1960s 
and 1970s embarked upon an attempt to transplant into the Tokelau environment a series of 
institutions and specialised roles modelled directly upon the New Zealand governmental 
structure. There appears to have been a genuine insensitivity among New Zealand officials to 
the impact on atoll society of the institution of full time wage labour (as distinct from a few 
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salaried professionals), and the institutional design of the Tokelau Public Service continues to 
run counter to both common sense and the clearly expressed feelings of a fair number of 
Tokelauans - an issue which is taken up at greater length below. 
 
Meantime, New Zealand had also been coming slowly to terms with the limited room for 
political manoeuvre in a society with a strong tradition of local government by elders and 
family heads, prepared strongly to defend and preserve the all important links with New 
Zealand. Tokelau over the past twenty five years has successfully resisted New Zealand or 
United Nations initiatives aimed to incorporate the atolls with Western Samoa or the Cook 
Islands (1963-64), evacuate them (1966-71), and finally, “decolonise” them (1974- ). This is 
no mean achievement, even granting New Zealand's consistent unwillingness to push through 
political changes to which Tokelauan acquiescence could not be secured. Tokelauans show 
every sign of possessing a clear perception of their collective interests, and have been 
successful in developing political strategies to protect those interests. They have been less 
successful in coping with the internal, divisive impact of the spreading cash economy and New 
Zealand sponsored bureaucracy. 
 
8.2  Population 
 
Table 8.1 and Figure 8.1 show the long run movement of population on the three atolls9, and 
the recent increase in the number of Tokelauan born residents of New Zealand. The 
demographic disasters of the mid nineteenth century (slave trade, disease) which reduced 
population to less than 400 persons by 1871, were followed by two surges of population 
growth - one in the last couple of decades of the nineteenth century, and then another 
beginning about 1920 and continuing until the mid 1960s. At times during the 1940s and 1950s 
population growth rates reached 3% p.a. for the group as a whole, and even higher rates were 
recorded on individual islands (notably Nukunonu). Total population peaked at 1,900 in 1966, 
in which year a mass resettlement scheme, sponsored by the New Zealand Government, began 
to move entire families to New Zealand. During the period of the scheme's operation, 1966-
1971, the Tokelau born population in New Zealand rose from 248 to 950; this appears to have 
been accounted for by nearly 400 assisted migrants under the official scheme, and about 300 
other Tokelauans moving under their own steam (mostly from Western Samoa, where a 
substantial Tokelauan community had become established during the 1940s and 1950s, but 
moved to New Zealand following Samoan independence in 1962)10. 
 
8.3   The Role of the Tokelau Community in New Zealand 
 
At the 1981 Census, the Tokelau community in New Zealand (including Tokelauans born in 
New Zealand) numbered 2277 people, compared to 1572 in the islands. Although it has been 
the policy of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to recognise only one of these two entities   that in 
the islands   in accordance with its activities in external affairs, the continuing intimate 
relationship between the two needs to be recognised. The following statement on the 
relationship between Tokelauans in Tokelau and Tokelauans in New Zealand as expressed by a 
Tokelauan representative in New Zealand to the visiting United Nations Mission, is worth 
citing: 
“The strength of family bond that exist amongst Tokelau 
wherever they live, may be beyond the understanding of a
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TABLE 8.1 
 
Tokelau Population 
 
Year Fakaofo Atafu Nukunonu Total 
Resident in 
N.Z.* 
1863 250 140 140 530  
1868 190 170 40 400  
1871 200 150 48 398  
1876 207 180 na na  
1881 180 216 na na  
1884 191 256 123 570  
1887 227 250 na na  
1896 278 350 na na  
1898 302 350 138 790  
1900 367 375 133 875 0 
1910 345 369 144 858 0 
1921 419 364 206 989 0 
1926 444 360 229 1033 0 
1936 508 378 284 1170 0 
1945 570 451 367 1388 0 
1951 662 458 451 1571 0 
1956 666 489 464 1619 7 
1961 783 564 513 1860 23 
1963 807 539 553 1899  
1964 724 560 551 1835  
1965 742 556 563 1861  
1966 733 616 551 1900 248 
1967 740 615 528 1883  
1968 730 595 507 1832  
1969 699 594 452 1745  
1970 679 600 408 1687  
1971 625 632 398 1655 950 
1972 678 593 362 1633  
1973 649 572 366 1587  
1974 648 549 377 1574  
1975 665 564 374 1603  
1976 666 546 363 1575 1212 
1981 650 554 368 1572 1281 
1983 633 584 368 1585   
      
 
*Persons born in Tokelau. 
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palagi, namely because the word family to him is himself, his wife and 
their children. But to the Tokelau, it means an extended family, or 
whoever possesses the family blood, and even the in laws” families are 
considered as within this family framework.” “When we were brought 
up in Tokelau, we fished together, played together, shared together, 
suffered together, and even (experienced) joy together. 
 
We Tokelau in New Zealand still share family properties (especially 
lands) in Tokelau, remit moneys to our families of approximately 
$50,000 per year and even contribute to the capital investment for the 
formation of Cooperative Stores on each island when they were first 
established.  
 
The uniqueness then, of this “aloha” family bond symbolises our efforts 
to ensure the survival of this social characteristic in the future of 
Tokelau. 
 
We are concerned at the possibility that the Office of Tokelau Affairs 
and the Minister of Foreign Affairs, in accordance with their 
bureaucratic beliefs, are endeavouring to discourage the fundamental 
social togetherness which has been built into the hearts of all Tokelau 
since the time of their childhood.  
 
We suggest that a part of that Tokelau canoe ... is to be allocated to 
include the Tokelauans in New Zealand an to illustrate the significance 
of this relationship. 
 
This binding we do not want to destroy and our cooperation must also 
be encouraged at all costs”. (Te Vakai, 14, 3 August 1981).  
 
It is interesting to note that the United Nations Mission accepted this argument on the 
continuing strength of the link between Tokelauans in New Zealand and the islands. They 
stated that the “Mission considers that the Tokelau communities abroad should have a say in 
the affairs of the Territory of their origin. The level of education and the social conditions that 
those communities enjoy, as well as their dual cultural experience, offer them a unique 
opportunity to help shape the future of Tokelau”.  Accordingly, the Mission called on the New 
Zealand Government, the administering power, in consultation with the General Fono, to take 
into consideration the views of the Tokelauan community11 concerning the Territory. 
 
In the early 1970s the rate of out migration slowed abruptly, and total population stabilised at 
about 1,580 in 1973-74, a level which it has maintained with only minor fluctuation ever since. 
The Tokelau born population of New Zealand rose by 262 between 1971 and 1976, but by only 
69 between 1976 and 1981. The population/migration “equilibrium” reached by Tokelau is 
strikingly similar to that of the Cook Islands. In both cases, out migration to New Zealand 
during the 1960s and 1970s proceeded to the point where the Island born group living in New 
Zealand reached about 80% of the remaining population in the home territory, and where the 
home resident population total had dropped about 16 17% from its peak level. (Tokelau's 
population fell 16.5% 1966-73, and then stabilised, at which stage the Tokelauan born group in 
New Zealand totalled about 1200 - or 76% of the home resident group. The Cook Islands 
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population fell 16% from the 1971 peak to 1981, at which stage the Cook Islands born group in 
New Zealand was 80% of the home resident group). In both cases, total resident population 
then stabilised, with out-migration proceeding only at a rate sufficient to offset natural 
increase; the present slow increase in the New Zealand resident communities of people born in 
these Islands does not at present imply any depopulation in the sense of falling total population 
in the Islands. 
 
This is in strong contrast to Niue. The Niue born group in New Zealand reached 162% of the 
resident population of Niue by 1981, and out-migration continues to drain the Niue resident 
population at an undiminished rate. Niue's population fell over 40% between 1966 and 1982 
and shows no sign as yet of bottoming out (see Figure and discussion in Chapter 7). 
 
8.4   Economic and Social Trends 
 
Until 1950 Tokelau was a stagnant, largely self-sufficient export economy. Being of smaller 
size and more isolated than the other New Zealand territories, it was the first one in which 
private sector commercial operators threw in the towel. Until the 1930s the purchase of copra, 
and supply of store goods for the local population, had been conducted by a trading firm 
operating with schooners out of Apia. Shortly before the out break of War, this service was 
ended, and the Department of Samoan Affairs in Apia was obliged to step in with a launch 
service to keep the islands supplied. After the end of the War the Administration moved on to 
the use of chartered schooners and occasional RNZAF air services.12  Thereafter a constant pre 
occupation of the Administration was the problem of maintaining shipping services to the 
islands. Repeated attempts to persuade private trading ventures to take over copra buying and 
the operation of stores in the islands were unsuccessful, and after some years of running the 
trading operation, the Administration passed it over to WSTEC, the holding company for the 
confiscated German estates in Western Samoa. After 1957 trading operations moved from 
(marginal) profit to steadily growing losses, and as WSTEC was unwilling to carry those 
losses, the management of trade gravitated back to the Administrator. During the 1960s Burns 
Philp agreed to act as the Administration agent in managing the trading venture, but since there 
were no significant profits to be made, their interest was low and the relationship broke down. 
Finally, in 1977 the Administration devolved trading operations to the newly established 
cooperative village stores, with the Administration to remain responsible for chartering (and 
paying for) the necessary shipping. After several marginal years the stores have recently begun 
to record profits on their trading. 
 
For the past forty years, then, there have been only two groups of economic agents in Tokelau: 
Tokelauan village society, and the New Zealand-run Administration and its agents. The private 
merchants, self-employed professionals, and occasional entrepreneurs found in Niue and the 
Cook Islands have been entirely absent in Tokelau, and links with the outside world have been 
entirely mediated by the Administration. 
 
The same factors that deterred private capitalist firms from remaining in the Tokelau trade, 
placed clearly perceived limits on the Administration's plans for “development” of the atolls13: 
 
“In a community such as the Tokelau Islands any development 
programme must be limited by the availability of suitable resources, 
and on present indications there seems little prospect of introducing 
any products other than copra and handicrafts of the curio type. New 
  - 217 -
Zealand is, however, concerned to see that within these natural 
limitations the Tokelau Islands are developed as far as possible. 
Medical and educational facilities adequate to the requirements of the 
people are to be maintained, and every encouragement will be given to 
the production of copra and handicrafts ...” 
 
This 1950 statement was written during a mini boom period associated with the Korean War, 
when copra prices were exceptionally high and the New Zealand economy was buoyant. 
Earning from copra in the 1950/51 March year were over $16,000 at current prices, equivalent 
to $157,000 in 1982 New Zealand dollars - a level more than double the normal export earning 
of the 1980s, and substantially above anything seen again during the 1950s or 1960s14. At the 
same time the Administration embarked on a major programme of public works on the islands, 
including new copra sheds, schools, and hospitals. The boom quickly faded, however, and the 
following decade and a half were a period of stagnation and decline for the cash economy in 
Tokelau, while population growth put gradually- increasing pressure on the subsistence sector 
and on living space on the village islets. Tables 8.2 and 8.3 show that until the early 1960s, the 
purchasing power of the local population (reflected in imports of store goods) remained below 
the value of total exports (which in turn suggests that the tax on copra overshadowed the 
salaries paid out to public employees resident in the islands). The decline of the cash economy 
was reflected in a steady erosion of the Administration's revenue base (which had fallen so far 
by the mid 1960s that annual reports ceased to carry information on revenues from 1961 to 
1967); and although the government accounts show a steady increase in expenditure, and 
consequent rise in the deficit, this appears to have been absorbed in paying for goods and 
equipment imported to the islands by Government, and in paying the costs of the Apia office, 
so that the government sector did not function during that time as a source of rising cash 
incomes in the islands (in contrast to, for example, events of that period in Niue and the Cook 
Islands). 
 
Two new elements of the 1960s abruptly broke the pattern. The first was a growing awareness 
of population pressure on the village islets and a fear in Administration circles that over 
population was a looming problem. (This fear was compounded by the fact that throughout the 
1950s and early 1960s official “estimates” of population based on inadequate vital statistics 
consistently tended to overstate actual population growth15). The response was to propose to 
the village councils a programme of resettlement of population to New Zealand; this was 
agreed to, and implementation begun, in 1965-66. At the same time, a second set of changes 
were induced by the new interest in New Zealand's Pacific territories following from United 
Nations pressure for decolonisation, and the political changes in Western Samoa and the Cook 
Islands. In the late 1960s government spending in Tokelau began to increase steeply (see 
Figure 5.10), and the role and size of the public service began to increase. At the same time, 
the government sector became a newly-important source of cash injections into the local 
economy (where previously it had injected material and a few specialised personnel). The 
rising trend of government expenditure is clearly evident in Table 8.3, and its qualitatively new 
character hinged on the introduction of wage labour for the work gangs involved in the new 
building programme initiated in 1966.16 
 
As public service employment on the islands increased, and the cash incomes thus generated 
were supplemented by the beginning of remittances from the migrant Tokelauans in New 
Zealand, Tokelau's import consumption passed through the same transition already 
experienced in Niue and the Cook Islands. (See Table 8.2 and Figure 5.5). The increase in 
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imports of store goods began in 1963, and by 1970 the real value of imports had reached a 
level six times that of 1962. Whereas in 1962 storegoods imports had still been roughly equal 
in value to exports of copra and handcrafts, by 1970 80% of store goods imports were financed 
by non export derived income.  
 
TABLE 8.2 
 
Tokelau Imports and Exports 
1982 NZ$000, annual averages 
 
March years Exports Imports (store goods only)* Balance
1951-55 110.2 91.8 18.4
1956-60 74.5 41.3 33.2
1961-65 44.5 81.5 -37
1966-70 67.9 237.2 -169.3
1971-75 85.1 362.8 -277.7
1976-80 104.1 410.2 -306.1
1981-84 63.2 490.1 -426.9
    
1981 42.8 469.9 -427.1
1982 89.1 652.1 -563.0
1983 48.1 438.3 -390.2
1984 72.9 400.3 -327.4
* does not include pre-purchased Government imports, nor (we believe) pre-purchased 
private imports. 
 
Following an hiatus in import growth through most of the 1970s, a new surge in 1980 took 
stores goods imports up to their present level in the vicinity of $500,000 p.a. (about $316 per 
capital, which is still very low compared with Niue or the Cook Islands, but is comparable with 
levels in Kiribati and Tuvalu). 
 
A 1971 estimate of cash incomes received by residents of Tokelau17 found Tokelau Public 
Service wages and salaries to be the dominant source: $39,000 of the total of $54,000. Copra 
sales yielded income estimated at $6,50018, cash remittances were given as $7,500, and money 
brought by visitors and returning residents $1,000. Imports of store goods at that time were 
around $70,000 $75,000, according to the data in the annual reports. This suggests either some 
under reporting in Hooper and Huntsman's figures, or some Government purchases of goods 
from the stores. Both of these seem likely, but particularly the latter   since it appears that 
schools, hospitals and administration offices all purchase basic requirements such as 
stationery, batteries, soap and so on through the stores. Certainly the overall picture is a 
consistent one of an emerging MIRAB economy, with remittances and government payments 
providing the finance for 80-90% of import purchases. 
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TABLE 8.3 
 
Tokelau: Government Finance 
1982 NZ$000, annual averages 
 
March years Local revenues Total expenditures Balance 
New Zealand 
grant 
1951-55 66.5 138.4 -71.9
1956-60 29.7 270.8 -241.1
1961-65 27.0a 361.3 -334.3
1966-70 128.4b 658.3 -529.9
1971-75 163.2 1,272.9 -1,109.7
1976-80 286.2c 2,299.6 -2,013.4
1981-84 445.0 2,659.4 -2,214.4 2,104
  
1981 318.3 2,469.8 -2,151.5 2,079
1982 686.3 3,080.0 -2,393.7 2,043
1983 401.4 2,546.0 -2,144.6 2,041
1984 374.0 2,541.9 -2,167.9 2,251
   
a. 1961 only 
b. 1968-70 
c. Excluding 1977 and 1978. 
    
Recent data on cash incomes, in common with most other statistical information on Tokelau, is 
difficult to obtain, and virtually none of it is published in accessible form.  Back-of-the-
envelope estimates suggest that total cash incomes in Tokelau for the 1983/84 year may have 
run as high as NZ$820,000, although total store goods imports for the year were only $432,000 
(this is valuing stores goods at selling price). Possibly $40,000 of the difference would have 
been absorbed by import duties, but this still leaves a large unexplained cash balance to be 
accounted for, of the order of $350,000. Of this, some probably went into public servants' bank 
accounts in Apia rather than into circulation in the islands; some would also have been spent 
on boat and air fares; and some would have been spent on imported goods purchased directly 
from Pago Pago or Apia, rather than through the village stores. 
 
The items which we have identified in local cash incomes are set out in Table 8.4. Payments 
for copra and remittances from New Zealand are taken direct from Tokelau Office files and are 
reasonably reliable, accounting for roughly $200,000 of annual cash income. The dominant 
item, however, “government payments”, is based on a rather casual analysis of the 1984/85 
Budget, on the basis of which it was concluded that roughly 21% of total government 
expenditure was destined for wages and salaries paid in the islands; 0.8% for various other 
public sector expenditures in the islands; and 0.3% for handicraft purchases from local 
producers. In constructing Table 8.4 these percentages have been applied to the 1982, 1983 and 
1984 expenditure totals; the result is the very large figure for government cash injections into 
the local economy, which dominates our total cash income estimate. 
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TABLE 8.4 
Cash Incomes on Tokelau: Some Data 
 
1.   The Hooper/Huntsman 1971 estimates:   
     
 
Public Service Salaries and 
Wages $39,000   
 Copra sales 6,500   
 Cash remittances plus visitors 8,500   
     
 TOTAL $54,000   
     
2.   Hooper estimates for Fakaofo 1979 1980 1981 
     
 
Public Service Salaries and 
Wages WS$94,000 $100,000 $127,470
 Copra sales 19,563 9,017 22,210
 Cash remittances plus visitors 8,000 6,000 6,390
     
 TOTAL $121,563 $115,017 $157,070
     
3.  Our estimates for Tokelau March years 
  1982 1983 1984 
 
Public Service Salaries and 
Wages WS$577,000 WS$550,000 WS$607,000
 Other government outlays 22,000 21,000 23,000
 
Handcraft purchases by 
government 7,000 7,000 8,000
 Copra producers' income 46,907 36,647 49,470
 Copra related incomes 3,045 2,481 10,086
 Remittances from New Zealand 136,000 157,000 na
     
  TOTALS WS$792,000 WS$774,000 +WS$850,000
Sources: 
1. From Hooper and Huntsman (1973), p.368. 
2. From Hooper (1982), p.75. 
3. TPS salaries and wages estimated as 21% of total budget expenditure. Other government 
outlays estimated as 0.8% of total spending. Handcraft purchases guessed, from WS$8,500 
budgeted 1984/85. Copra producers' incomes from copra card ledgers in Tokelau Office, 
Apia. Copra related incomes are payments to aumaga for labour in loading ships, and to 
village stores for commissions etc. Remittances are the total payments from “remittance 
accounts” held in Tokelau Office, Apia, as shown in the annual accounts, plus $25,000. Note 
that the accounts show payments to Fakaofo of WS$46,450 for 1981/82, which is far greater 
than Hooper's $6,390 for 1981; more research is needed here. The $25,000 is a Tokelau Office 
estimate of remittances reaching Tokelau in cash, and is based on the annual “overflow” of 
currency (mainly N.Z. dollars) brought out by the Tokelau Office for banking in Apia. 
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TABLE 8.5 
 
Tokelau Copra Production 
 
March years Export Value Growers' receipts 
Average 
unit value 
1982$/tonn
e 
 Exports (tonnes) Current NZ$ 
1982 
NZ$ NZ$ 
% of 
value  
1951-55 average 238 14,438 110,200   463
1956-60 average 188 10,992 74,500   396
1961-65 average 195 9,903 44,500   228
1966-70 average 187 13,357 67,900   363
1971-75 average 152 26,013 85,100   560
1972  156 12,961 50,236 6,500 50 322
1976  110 22,658 58,247   530
1977 86 24,298 53,876   626
1978 46 17,000 32,882   715
1979 na 13,028a 23516a   na
1980 308 176,812 266685   866
1981 89 33,055 42,817   481
1982  234 79,479 89,102 46,907 59 381
1983 143 49,393 48,001 36,647 74 336
1984  184 88,412 81,863 49,470 56 445
 
Sources: Annual Reports (AJHR). Thereafter data extracted from MFA files and copra ledgers 
in Tokelau Office, Apia. 
a. Calendar 1978. 
 
 
There is clearly scope for further work to be done on the subject of cash incomes in Tokelau. 
The data certainly exists in Wellington and Apia for a more thorough reconstruction of public 
service salaries and remittance flows through the Tokelau Office; only pressure of time has 
prevented us from assembling and analysing this data in more depth. 
 
 
8.5   Quality and Usefulness of Tokelau Statistics 
 
While on the subject of statistical record, it may be worth making the point that both the 
quantity and quality of statistical information on Tokelau have deteriorated sharply since the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs assumed control over the islands. The Annual Reports of the 
Administrator vividly illustrate the changing priorities of those responsible for running the 
islands. In Island Territories days before 1975 there were annual population censuses 
(monitoring progress of the resettlement programme); reasonably dis aggregated figures on 
import and export trade; and published accounts for the trading operations conducted by the 
Administration. After taking over in 1974-75, Foreign Affairs officials almost immediately 
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reverted from annual to five yearly censuses, and within a year or so ceased to compile import 
and export data. Trading accounts were last published for the March 1976 year and 
disaggregated import statistics have not appeared since the 1974 report (the last prepared by 
the Department of Island Affairs). 
 
In general, both the published annual reports and the contents of Foreign Affairs files reveal a 
lack of interest by Foreign Affairs officials in the Tokelauan economy. Foreign Affairs 
priorities from the outset were political and constitutional; the burgeoning Tokelau Public 
Service never seems to have been charged with the task of investigating, or reporting on, 
economic and social phenomena. Population census collection in 1976 and 1981 was 
undertaken not because Foreign Affairs wanted the information, but because Tokelau is still 
part of New Zealand and is therefore included as a matter of course in the Department of 
Statistics' nationwide censuses. Aggregate estimates of the value of total imports and exports 
were demanded each year by the Statistics Department for inclusion in the New Zealand 
Official Yearbook, and were provided, but usually at the last minute and with a minimum of 
supporting detail, by the Official Secretary in Apia. On one memorable occasion the 
Department of Statistics suggested that a table showing the major categories of imports (as in 
years before 1975) would be a good idea; the Official Secretary responded with obvious 
irritation19: 
 
“It would take one officer some weeks of processing stores orders and 
invoices. Is it really worth it?” 
 
The Department of Statistics did not press its request in the face of Foreign Affairs' 
unwillingness.20 Only in the last year or two, possibly as a result of greater interest by the new 
Official Secretary, have detailed figures again been collected, although not yet published.21 
 
Also frustrating for the investigator is the way in which administration budgets and accounts 
are prepared and presented by the Apia Office. One of the most obvious questions arising from 
Hooper's 1982 paper on aid and dependence in Tokelau is the amount of money actually paid 
out by the administration, year by year, within the Tokelau Islands (as distinct from payments 
made in Apia or New Zealand). From the point of view of aid analysis this issue is the key to 
understanding the impact of the aid vote on cash incomes in the islands. However, the budget 
documents prepared each year for the General Fono by the Tokelau Office in Apia are 
designed (as are most such documents in aid receiving small countries) for the convenience of 
the donor and administrator rather than for the information of the Tokelauan community and its 
representatives. There is no attempt to indicate the expected impact of the Budget on local 
incomes and expenditures within the territory for which the Fono supposedly has legislative 
responsibility, for which reason it is quite inappropriate to refer to the annual budget exercise 
as if it were the equivalent of a New Zealand Budget.  In preparing the New Zealand Budget, 
Government has in mind various targets at which its fiscal and monetary policy is to be 
directed, and it is in a position to manipulate both revenue and expenditure items in pursuit of 
those targets. Parliamentary discussion of the Budget hinges as much upon estimates of its 
macroeconomic impact as upon the detail of expenditure being appropriated under various 
heads. 
 
The Tokelauan Fono, in debating the annual budget, has no aggregate fiscal or monetary 
instruments at its command, since the budget total is unilaterally determined by the New 
Zealand Government in the form of a cash limit, and the local money supply is not issued by 
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the Tokelau authorities. (Tokelau does, however, have substantially more flexibility in 
monetary and exchange rate matters than do Niue or the Cook Islands, since its major trading 
partners are Western Samoa and American Samoa, rather than New Zealand, and both Western 
Samoan and US currency circulate in the islands alongside New Zealand currency and 
Tokelauan souvenir coins. There is, therefore, scope for informal market adjustment of the real 
exchange rate by arbitrage among the various currencies. Official payments and receipts are at 
present in Western Samoan tala.) 
 
Despite the lack of aggregate instruments, it is however the case that changes in the 
configuration of the budget can have significant effects on the proportion of the total 
expenditure which reaches the islands in cash. Although the Fono does not yet seem to have 
pursued the point in any depth, it has at its command (so long as Wellington acquiesces in 
Fono decisions) significant power to reallocate revenue away from offshore payments for 
services (which are then delivered collectively to the Tokelauan population as a sort of “social 
wage”) to onshore payments which would boost private cash incomes in the islands. In the 
light of the precedent of the Community Services Levy (which redistributes cash income from 
public service employees in the islands to the village councils, and thence to non public service 
groups in the community via pensions, copra price supplements and so on) it can be foreseen 
that the Fono may in future give more attention to the macro economic impact of the budget on 
Tokelau.22 With only about 20% of the total budget presently spent in the islands there is much 
scope for increase   but there are major issues of social policy raised by any large scale 
increase of onshore cash incomes in the islands. (This, after all, is the key lesson from the 
expansion of public service wage and salary payments during the 1970s). These issues are 
taken up again below. 
 
 
8.6   “Administrative Decolonisation” 
 
The departmental reorganisation set in motion in Wellington by the third Labour Government 
in 1974 involved the dismembering of the integrated administrative structure previously 
furnished by the Department of Island Territories. The task of administering the islands and 
their residents passed to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, whose Secretary became the new 
Administrator of Tokelau. Meantime, matters concerning Tokelauans resident in New Zealand 
became the responsibility of various social service and internal affairs departments. The effect 
in the case of Tokelau was the same as for Niue and the Cook Islands, namely to impose a 
palagi defined demarcation on to what Tokelauans themselves perceived as an organic unity   
the total community of Tokelauans. Even the thin excuse for the Foreign Affairs takeover 
provided by self government in Niue and the Cook Islands was lacking in the Tokelau case. 
The idea that Tokelauan matters should be treated as foreign affairs, involving a relationship 
between equal and separate partners, was altogether inapplicable in the case of a dependent 
territory which had firmly rejected proposals for self government and opted for “colonial” 
status as a dependent part of New Zealand. Foreign Affairs officials were in some cases aware 
of the incongruity of their new role; the High Commissioner in Apia argued strongly against 
having the role of Administrator left with him, and for its transfer to Wellington, on the 
grounds that it was inappropriate for him to wear two hats at once   the diplomatic 
representative to an independent nation, and the colonial administrator of a territory.23 The 
Ministry itself, after six years' experience with Tokelau, promoted the separation of the post of 
Administrator from that of Secretary of Foreign Affairs, and the two were separated in 1980, 
with the retiring Secretary of Foreign Affairs, Frank Corner, retaining the Administrator's role. 
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The Ministry of Foreign Affairs nevertheless embarked promptly after 1974 on what was 
described at the time as a “process of administrative decolonisation” (a term which dropped 
out of official favour in the early 1980s, when the semantic emphasis was shifted to “moving 
towards a greater degree of self government”). The thrust of this programme echoed the 
procedure which New Zealand had already followed in Niue, namely pre emptive installation 
of the institutions which Wellington felt to be appropriate for a self governing country, in 
advance of any decision by the inhabitants to opt for self government. In Niue, this approach 
had presented Niueans with a virtual  fait accompli: by the time of their “act of self 
determination” in 1974, they were already de facto self governing. 
 
In Tokelau, New Zealand officials set about “creating a Tokelau identity” on the basis of a firm 
belief in Wellington that “anybody, including Tokelauans, are better off if forced to think 
about their own affairs and take some responsibility for them.”24 From the outset it was 
envisioned (and still is) that the end point of the evolutionary process which New Zealand was 
promoting in the islands would be an act of self determination leading to self government in 
close association with New Zealand. In Tokelau, as in Niue and the Cook Islands, options 
other than this seem not to have received serious consideration. Foreign Affairs officials 
generally agree that integration has been regarded as unacceptable, since it has always been 
understood to mean control from Wellington, the extinction of Tokelauan local government 
autonomy, and the end of protection for Tokelauans against incursions from mainland New 
Zealand (of New Zealand laws, New Zealand settlers, and New Zealand land buyers). 
 
In addition, the “colonial” status quo was until very recently discounted as a serious option 
with Foreign Affairs. The Ministry has generally been in the forefront of those who feel that 
colonialism is by definition something to be ended, in accordance with both United Nations 
Resolutions and the principles held by members of the Ministry themselves. So long as 
Tokelauans continued to resist pressures for an act of self determination, Foreign Affairs 
officials in Wellington and at the United Nations have respected and defended their wishes; but 
on the ground in Tokelau the logic of “administrative decolonisation” has continued to drive 
the islands towards a Niue type “solution”.  This has involved the Ministry in a steady process 
of evangelisation, prodding Tokelauans into acceptance of a sequence of New Zealand 
designed institutional innovations. In summary, the programme since Foreign Affairs took over 
in 1975 has consisted of consolidating and expanding the public service and imposing New 
Zealand procedures for pay fixing and PSA representation (1975-78); then turning the resulting 
destabilisation of Tokelau society to advantage by promoting the General Fono as the agency 
which should exercise “control” over the public service (1979 -1984), while at the same time 
working to convert the Fono into the equivalent of a national parliament, with the familiar 
executive committee charged with budgetary matters. In the early 1980s the key elected 
officials (the faipule) became effectively salaried officers. As the role of the Fono has been 
increased relative to that of the three village councils, it has become clear that a mini 
federation is in prospect. Meantime the role of the Official Secretary has become as difficult 
and ambiguous as was that of the New Zealand Representative in the Cook Islands from 1965 
to 1982 (or rather 1975, when the 1965 constitutional provision was informally abandoned). 
While it is true that, as part of the “decolonisation” process, “New Zealand holds back from 
exercising the power it has”25, it is clear to all concerned in Tokelau that that power exists, and 
that its continuance is a straightforward consequence of Tokelau's expressed wish to remain 
tied to New Zealand. The relationship between the Official Secretary and the General Fono is 
therefore the key to the immediate future. 
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The impact and consequences of bureaucratic “modernisation” in Tokelau have been 
documented by Hooper, in a paper which has clearly had a strong impact on Foreign Affairs 
officials and has led to some re thinking of policy26. It is perhaps ironic that the period in 
which academic discussion of development problems was focussing on the inadequacies of 
“modernisation models” and the problems of dual societies, the New Zealand Government was 
engaged in a process of social engineering in Tokelau, the two main characteristics of which 
were faith in the technocratic public servant as the agent of modernisation, and the belief that 
“traditional” structures must bow to the inescapable demands of “modern” life. Hooper cites 
the Administrator's 1979 speech to the Fono:27 
 
“The price of these new needs of yours (health, education, 
communications etc.) is a body of expert people, paid salaries and 
wages and perhaps difficult to fit into a traditional society. Give up the 
needs and you can give up the Public Service. But if you want these 
non traditional things it may be necessary to create some old and new 
traditions. The challenge is to find a way of joining old and new.” 
 
As Hooper goes on to point out, this statement by the Administrator “gave no hint of how new 
traditions were to be created or how the challenge of joining old and new might be met ... 
(W)hose traditions should be modified   those of the State Services Commission or those of 
Tokelau.28 
 
In Tokelau as in Niue and the Cook Islands, New Zealand has been unwilling to accommodate 
local variations on New Zealand ways of doing things. The assumption seems to have been (as 
the Administrator's statement just quoted suggests) that the necessary condition for delivery of 
the benefits of modernity   health, education, communications, improved housing, and the like   
was the lock stock and barrel transplantation of the New Zealand public service structure, 
under the supervision of the State Services Commission and with a virtually unmodified 
application of the New Zealand rule book. As one key official has put it:29 
 
“I don't see how you could have thrown over the New Zealand way of 
doing things.” 
 
The other side of the debate, put to us by a senior Tokelauan public servant30 but found also in 
Hooper's work and in serveral articles in  Te Vakai, is that certain types of activity   - 
especially public works - have always been done by Tokelauans in their own way, and it is not 
evident that “the New Zealand way” had to prevail in all cases. An illustration of this is worth 
considering.  
 
The installation in 1982 of new, more powerful electricity generators on the atolls provides a 
salutory example of a constructive and relevant role for the public service in working within 
and strengthening rather than bypassing the traditional structure in achieving community goals: 
 
“It is a considerable step to modernisation as we call it. Work was 
commenced on a high note; trenches were dug and a new 16mm cable 
laid; street lights were erected and private lines were laid; junction 
boxes and supply fuses were mounted. All of these were done 3 weeks 
on each island, mainly through the cooperation and support given by 
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each and everyone in the islands. The Council organised in community 
help. The men of course, share the physical labour, but we shouldn't 
forget the ladies with their traditional singing and dancing, supplying 
drinks and food for the tired workers. It is a tremendous sight and 
feeling to see this Tokelau way of participating, each section of the 
community playing their own role, and blending together to form a 
work team which would be hard to find anywhere else. 
 
This was the unity and spirit which is fading out slowly in Tokelau. 
That was the way we used to perform our task in the past, it was unique 
in its own right. The inflow of money perhaps hinders our customs a 
bit, but then it's you and me who are asking for it in the name of 
progress. But of course we will have to give up something to gain 
something, that's the law of nature. I do pray it won't be our customs 
and traditions, which our forefathers set for us and made us one of the 
most peaceful communities in the world.” 
(Te Vakai, December 1982) 
 
If the traditional community cooperation and participation had not been achieved it would have 
taken much longer to complete this work. The electricity example is a salutory contrast to the 
limited success of the coconut replanting programme, conducted by the Agriculture 
Department with its own resources (see Appendix 1). The Department was viewed by local 
communities as part of an external system, and the programme elicited little cooperation from 
the villagers. 
 
In assessing the appropriateness of the “New Zealand way” a number of officials, including the 
last two Official Secretaries, have come to the view that the institution of full time wage labour 
on a permanent basis for a public works gang on each island was a mistake, and that it might 
have been wiser to have started from the existing aumaga and rotated wage earning jobs among 
all the young men of each village.31 Recent moves to disestablish some public service posts 
reflect this new view; but it is not clear that the clock can now be turned back   there is an 
irreversible logic to the spread of the cash economy, and the Tokelauan response tends to be 
that existing wage earning positions should be preserved and new ones created, rather than that 
existing opportunities be rotated. On the basis of their past experience with the New Zealand 
administration this position is understandable enough. 
 
The problem, however, goes well beyond the issue of wage labour in the work gangs. New 
Zealand officials during the past decade have been under steady pressure from Wellington and 
New York to deliver tangible signs of so called “progress”; and they have been aware that the 
quickest and most “efficient” way to get things done is to reproduce New Zealand models. 
Material in the files from the 1970s gives the recurrent impression of officials working against 
deadlines, and impatient with the reluctance of Tokelauans to move at the speed desired by 
New Zealand. Not only public health, housing, education and transport had to move ahead; so 
also did political and administrative institutions. As frequently occurs in colonial settings, the 
metropolitan technicians called in to advise on, or implement, programmes of modernisation, 
find it hard to conceive of drastic adaptations of their metropolitan technologies to local 
conditions; and they generally have neither the time nor the inclination to explore possibilities 
of such adaptation (or to consider, with local help, how existing institutions might be extended 
or amended). Also familiar from colonial history in other settings is the impatience of New 
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Zealand officials with Tokelauan resistance to what the officials saw as beneficent innovations. 
Until the 1978 faipules visit to New Zealand brought home to Wellington officials the extent 
and implications of the disruptions brought by the Tokelau Public Service, New Zealand would 
hear no ill of its new creature. 
 
The New Zealand attitude to Tokelauan ways, thus, was that the traditional must bend to the 
modern. The gap between the two was recognised, but the model on which policy was based 
was the standard neoclassical dualism one of “development economics”32, in which an initially 
widening gap between traditional and modern is steadily closed as the population shifts from 
traditional to modern ways and activities, producing eventually a fully integrated modern 
society. The task of the social engineer in such models is to identify those elements in 
traditional society which may be amenable to modern transformation, and to incorporate them 
in the drive towards modern ways of operating. “Traditional” elements which cannot be thus 
digested have no long run future. 
 
Consider, for example, the early proposals for converting the faipule into agents of 
modernisation:33 
 
“(The faipule) is the elected representative of the people and perhaps by 
involving him more in the 'projects' of the village (the hospital, schools, 
Post Office etc) we can expect him to develop a more active 
administrative role in the areas that we think important.” 
 
And here is one of several commentaries by the Official Secretary on the question of changes 
in the role of the Fono:34 
 
“Neither the [Fono] system itself nor the present membership of the 
[village] councils is equipped to control a modern public service. The 
system is rigidly autocratic and council members are generally old, 
unfamiliar with the world outside Tokelau, resistant to change and 
jealous of their authority. There are however grounds for optimism: 
First, the General Fono is rapidly assuming the importance of, and taking 
on the attributes of, a national parliament (whose 45 members seem 
invariably to represent a good cross section of Tokelau), and secondly, 
even the village councils are starting to turn to senior public for advice ... 
I believe that Tokelau can have a promising future other than as a 
dependent territory and that it should not wait for a new generation of 
toeaina to take their places in the council. Its future lies in the fashioning 
over the next few months of a close partnership between the political 
institutions and a strong Tokelauan public service ... The question is 
whether the faipules and councils can be carried along. The forthcoming 
study tour of New Zealand [by the faipule] will be important ... in that it 
will impress upon Tokelau's representatives that New Zealand is serious 
about decolonisation.” 
 
When in 1979, against considerable local opposition, New Zealand officials headed by the 
Administrator succeeded in chivvying the General Fono into setting up a Budget Advisory 
Committee, their longer run motives were explicit:35 
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If it works it has within it the embryo of a Cabinet. New Zealand's tendency to begin with 
predetermined plans for Tokelau, and to resist possibilities of accommodating to local ways, 
has always been most evident in the case of the Tokelau Public Service. The rapid expansion 
of the TPS' role is evident in Table 8.6. It began with the works programme instituted in 1966, 
when ten man permanent work gangs were set up on each island. As Hooper points out, this 
was a radical innovation in terms of Tokelau society:36 
 
“There seems to be no question that educated teachers and medical staff 
should be paid for their skills and labour, but the work gang's tasks were 
seen as being quite within the capabilities of any able bodied man ... 
(One) compromise proposed was to rotate membership of the gang, but 
this met opposition from the overseer who preferred to deal with a 
regular body of workers, along established New Zealand lines. A less 
intransigent overseer might have compromised, but this one did not, and 
he eventually got his way in the face of some strong opposition. He was 
able to do so only because of a certain amount of local factionalism and 
because the local people really did want the work to go ahead as quickly 
as possible ... The system worked only because it seemed that it had to if 
any building was to be done ...” 
 
The following year, 1967, the Tokelau Public Service was formally set up and placed under the 
control of the New Zealand State Services Commission, which has retained responsibility for 
TPS organisation ever since. The impetus for the reorganisation came from the belief that 
Tokelau was to be prepared for self government, and should therefore be furnished in advance 
with the full trappings of a public service, despite severe misgivings about this even within the 
SSC.37 Over subsequent years Tokelauans viewed with suspicion and much incomprehension 
the extension of the scope and power of the TPS. When in 1977 the Official Secretary spent 
three months in the islands, he encountered very mixed attitudes towards the TPS in the village 
councils:38 
 
“All three councils seem generally in favour of the new TPS. It is after 
all providing more and better services, pays higher wages and salaries 
than in the past, and is creating more employment opportunities for 
Tokelauans. There are a few misgivings. For example, the principle of 
merit selection is not widely accepted. It is generally felt that the 
appointment of an administration officer in each island has detracted 
from the faipule's authority ... and, while they accept that a TPS run 
public works team will give appreciably better results, the councils view 
with nostalgia the days of the village work gangs. What staggered me 
was the depth of the councils' ignorance of even the most basic 
principles governing the operation of a public service. At numerous 
meetings ... I have tried to generate some understanding of why the TPS 
exists, what is functions are, how it operates, its relationship with the 
village, and so on. Judging by the questions and complaints voiced 
during my meetings, this programme has succeeded in focussing 
Tokelau's attention on the TPS. But there it stops ... At one meeting my 
30 minute set  piece on administrative decolonisation drew just one 
question: do casual labourers have to work in the rain? That, regrettably, 
was not untypical.” 
  - 229 -
 
The problem appears to have been that “the most basic principles governing the operation of a 
public service”, as New Zealand officials saw them, were substantially different from the basic 
principles governing Tokelauan social organisation. The question of whether work should 
continue in the rain may well have had a substantial point to it, for the characteristic feature of 
TPS organisation in the 1970s was the mechanistic application of the New Zealand rules of 
employment, including hours of work for public servants and the extraordinary (in Tokelauan 
conditions) requirement that public servants must devote themselves full time to their public 
service work, even when this was insufficient to take up all their time, and when their labour 
power could productively have been used by the village in communal tasks. Hooper39 notes the 
case of the village policeman who, once incorporated into the TPS, was deprived of the right to 
make commonsense decisions about the allocation of his time between police work and village 
work. The rigid application of the State Services rulebook continues in 1984 - it is still 
impossible to employ people in TPS posts which do not correspond to New Zealand type job 
descriptions, which has the effect of preventing Tokelauan public servants from performing 
multiple roles in a system of job sharing. 
 
The thrust of the State Services Commission's administration of the TPS over the years has 
been steadily in the direction of formalised bureaucratic empire building. The ratio of 
permanent to temporary staff rose sharply in the 1970s40, with security of employment, 
membership in the New Zealand Government superannuation scheme, and regular salary 
increments decreed from Wellington and based on those granted to New Zealand public 
servants. Hierarchical lines of command have been established in each Department, and 
prescriptions for the design of the TPS and its relationship with the rest of society have been 
mechanically and legalistically restricted to the familiar Westminster formula41, including the 
separation of powers, which seems ludicrously misplaced in a society of 1,600 persons, many 
of whose most able elders are public servants. 
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TABLE 8.6 
 
The Growth of the Tokelau Public Service 
 
   
Year Positions, Island  population 
Positions as 
percent total 
1971 Seconded 11  
Permanent 48   
Temporary 24   
TOTAL 83 5  
    
1974 Seconded 12  
Permanent 62   
Temporary 28   
TOTAL 102 6.5  
    
1976 Seconded 10  
Permanent 68   
Temporary 31   
    
TOTAL 109 6.9  
    
1977 TOTAL1 143 9.13 
    
1979 TOTAL2 171 10.93 
    
1984 TOTAL 176 11.14 
   
 
Source:  State Services Commission, Wellington. 
Notes: 
1. Following inspection in December 1976, 58 temporary staff were transferred to 
permanent staff. 
2. Following inspection in December 1978, 22 new positions were established. 
3. Calculated on 1976 population. 
4. Calculated on 1983 population. 
 
With a rigidly constituted and tenured public service established in advance, administratively 
controlled by the State Services Commission in Wellington, and responsible on policy matters 
to the Official Secretary (the local representative of the Administrator), New Zealand's 
scenario for the political development of Tokelau began to gather momentum at the end of the 
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1970s. At the end of 1977 the three faipule were brought to New Zealand to talk with 
Government officials. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, evidently under pressure from the 
United Nations, hoped that the previous few years' process of “administrative decolonisation” 
could culminate in mid 1979 in an “act of self determination” which would lead to self 
government42. In a meeting with the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr Talboys:43 
 
“the Faipule were ... appraised of New Zealand's determination that 
Tokelau should accept greater responsibility in the administration of its 
own affairs and equally were reassured that New Zealand would 
maintain at least its present level of assistance should Tokelau embrace 
this new relationship. 
 
As had earlier been the case in the Cook Islands and Niue, Ministry 
officials in 1978 found that their main problem in meetings with 
Tokelauans in 1978 was allaying their fear that New Zealand might be 
planning to “cut Tokelau adrift”.44 
 
The momentum toward self government was stepped up again in 1979, when a study group of 
Tokelauans was sent to Tuvalu to observe the working of independence, and New Zealand 
made plans for Premier Rex of Niue to pay a visit to Tokelau.45 The tone of speeches made by 
the Administrator to the General Fono in mid 1979 also reflected Wellington's evident hope 
that Tokelau would accept an early “act of self determination”.  Tokelauan resistance held 
firm, however, and when in June 1981 a second United Nations Mission visited Tokelau it 
received the same answer as had the first (in 1976), that Tokelau did not wish to revise the 
existing relationship with New Zealand. Wellington's response, echoed in statements since, 
was to retain the ostensible goal of political evolution unaltered, while conceding to Tokelau 
only the right to determine the rate at which movement towards that goal occurred:46 
 
“New Zealand remains committed to assisting Tokelau towards a 
greater degree of self- government and economic self sufficiency at a 
pace that the people desire.” 
 
Meantime, the underlying thrust of administrative decolonisation proceeded steadily, whether 
Tokelauans wanted it or not. Starting in 1978, New Zealand began to give growing emphasis to 
the idea that the Tokelau Public Service was the servant of the Fono, and would have the dual 
role of advising the Fono on policy matters and of carrying out Fono decisions. This appears to 
have been a response to fears expressed by the faipule on their 1978 visit to Wellington, that 
the TPS was undermining the authority of the traditional institutions of Tokelau. Wellington's 
response to the problem was symptomatic. Rather than considering changes to the TPS (which 
would in any case have been possible only with SSC agreement) the Administrator embarked 
on a series of changes designed to make the Fono more like the New Zealand Parliament, and 
hence able to exercise the authority of a national legislature over its public service. At the 
January 1978 Fono the Official Secretary made it clear that:47    
 
“the main role of the strengthened public service was to provide the 
political institutions of Tokelau with all the information they needed 
to make good decisions, and then to carry out Tokelau's wishes.” 
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Over the following couple of years the Fono was prodded into setting up a Budget Advisory 
Committee to decide on the allocation of that part of the New Zealand grant not pre empted by 
the (untouchable) TPS salary and wage bill and other pre fixed expenditures. Repeated 
suggestions from the Tokelau side that public servants should form part of any such committee 
were rejected by New Zealand officials, appealing to the Westminster doctrine of separation of 
powers. In November 1979, at meetings with the elders on the three atolls, the two sides set out 
their positions:48 
 
... the office of Tokelau Affairs felt that the shaping of Tokelau's 
budget was a matter for the political leaders of Tokelau to decide with 
proper advice from the Public Service through its head (i.e. the Official 
Secretary). 
 
(The Atafu elders responded that) as the issue is still one of the most 
difficult ones for them to understand, they would regard it as essential 
that one of their more knowledgeable Public Servants be included in 
the Budget Committee. 
 
The New Zealand view, maintained consistently, was that “the budget process was close to the 
heart of government”49, and that it was desirable to force the elders to “come to grips with the 
Estimates”50. From the elders' point of view, their resistance to taking on budget preparation as 
conceived by Wellington is entirely understandable. As has already been pointed out (above), 
the style of budget sought by New Zealand was quite idiosyncratic, and one does not have to 
be a Tokelauan elder to be daunted by the task of analysing the accounting categories, imposed 
by the bureaucracy in advance, within which the exercise had to take place. Comments from 
New Zealand officials about the elders' difficulties in coping with the task, and with the very 
murky constitutional dogmas invoked by New Zealand were unsympathetic: 
 
“They had to be made to realise, for the first time, that if they wanted 
more of one thing they would also have to decide to have less of 
another ...51 
 
... it was significant that much of our discussions, while completely 
familiar, gave little indication of the Elders' ability to relate 
constitutional theory to practice ...52 
 
It does not seem to have been well appreciated by New Zealand 
officials that resource allocation decisions, albeit in a traditional 
rather than a modern framework, have always been at the heart of 
the organisation of life on atolls, and that the constitutional theories 
being peddled in Tokelau bore little commonsense relation to reality 
as the Tokelauans knew it. In a society accustomed to reaching 
decisions by consensus in which the most experienced members of 
the society are supposed to participate, the exclusion of Tokelauan 
public servants from committee discussion of the annual budget ran 
directly counter to intuition. The actual working of the separation of 
powers doctrine, furthermore, was and is extremely unclear in the 
setting of a non self governing territory, which Tokelau seems likely 
to remain for the moment. To Wellington officials, in whose minds 
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the transition to full internal self government was already as good as 
made, it may well have been obvious that the TPS should remain 
separate from the representative institutions of Tokelau and an 
instrument of their will, as in a Westminster style nation state. From 
the Tokelauan side, however, if one assumes that the status quo is to 
be retained, with ultimate authority continuing to reside in 
Wellington, and with the TPS (and its policy advice) controlled by 
the Administrator, it is then by no means so clear that individual 
public servants should be prevented from playing any direct role in 
local political decision making.” 
 
This issue is one which still causes a good deal of disquiet among TPS members in Apia. As 
members of the TPS, they are responsible to the Official Secretary, and are expected to present 
the official line when formally advising the elders on any policy matter, even when they (the 
public servants) personally disagree with that official line. Under the separation of powers 
doctrine as applied by New Zealand, the Fono is not able to over rule the Official Secretary 
and seek the personal views of TPS members. TPS members then face a severe conflict of 
loyalties, since to promote policy views which they consider to be in Tokelau's best interests 
would involve them in subverting the institution of which they are part, and from which they 
earn their living. They do not have the option (which New Zealand public servants enjoy) of 
joining political parties in their private capacity as individuals, and working thus for policies 
which may directly contradict the official ones. (The option does not arise because Tokelau is 
not a multi party electoral system). 
 
The simple truth is that as the TPS and the Fono are presently constituted, the TPS is New 
Zealand's creature, not the Fono's; and in any conflict situation, it must take New Zealand's line 
in presenting advice to the Fono. As representative of the Administration, the Official 
Secretary has, and exercises, the authority to overrule the wishes of the Fono53; and the TPS is 
bound to support the official position whatever their personal views. The possibility of 
informed opposition to New Zealand wishes is thus averted, which makes the Administrator's 
life easier but tends to build up frustration in Tokelau. The problem would be resolved if 
Tokelau were to opt for self government, for then New Zealand would not have to take 
responsibility for Tokelauan decisions. If, however, as presently seems probable, Tokelau does 
not formally opt for self government, some creative thinking will be called for on the New 
Zealand side. 
 
8.7   The Olohega Case 
 
The resolution (from New Zealand's point of view) of the long standing dispute over Olohega 
(Swains Island) provides a good example of the sort of procedures which worry Tokelauans, 
and at the same time of the New Zealand tendency to implicate Tokelauans in New Zealand 
decisions, rather than taking full and careful account of their concerns. 
 
Olohega lies 100 miles south of Fakaofo and 170 miles north of American Samoa. Olohega 
was first settled by the Tokelauan people in 1400. After intermittent control by different 
European interests, the island was apparently given by a British captain to an American citizen 
named Eli Jennings. As for the natives, they were considered to be workers and property of the 
Jennings plantation on Swains Island. The question of sovereignty first came to New Zealand's 
attention in 1917, when some inhabitants complained to the Western Samoan administration 
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about working conditions on the island. The authorities in Apia referred the matter to the 
United States as the national authority over Jennings and his family. In the early 1920s, 
diplomatic exchanges between Britain, the United States and New Zealand led to formal 
United States annexation of the Swains in 1925. At the time, the Tokelauans of Fakaofo lodged 
a counterclaim to the islands, but this was largely ignored by the governing New Zealand 
administration. 
 
Any dispute between Tokelau and the United States over control of Olohega remained dormant 
for some fifty years, but in the late 1970s with the establishment of Tokelau's E.E.Z., the 
matter surfaced as an obstacle to economic benefits for all concerned. As Administrator of the 
islands, New Zealand was caught as broker between a major trading partner on one hand and a 
former colony on the other. 
 
“In 1975 and during the United Nations Mission's visit in June 1976, 
the Tokelau claim to Swains Island was again raised. The New Zealand 
Government was asked to bring it to the attention of the United States. 
We have discussed the matter with the United States Government on 
various occasions in the past two years. Two aide memoire were 
presented in June, 1978 (this year), one relating to the United States 
claim to Tokelau and the Northern Cook Islands (Penryn), and another 
relating to the Tokelau claim to Swains Island.”54 
 
The United States Government took the position that U.S. sovereignty over Olohega should be 
recognised, and U.S. claims over the remainder of Tokelau renounced, in the form of a 
maritime boundary treaty between New Zealand and the United States. Such treaties have 
opened the way in recent years for negotiations between Island governments and the American 
Tunaboat Association over licence fees for fishing operations within the EEZs of the island 
countries. From New Zealand's point of view, the importance of negotiating a treaty was to 
enable a Tokelauan EEZ to be implemented, so that local government revenues could be 
augmented by licensing fees from fishing vessels. The sums involved were not very great and 
have not yet eventuated,55 but New Zealand placed a lot of emphasis on the desirability of 
moving Tokelau “towards running its own affairs and to a greater economic self sufficiency”56 
and wished to see the boundary dispute with American Samoa resolved quickly. In mid 1979, 
during a visit by the Administrator, Frank Corner, the Tokelau Fono agreed not to press the 
claim to Olohega if the EEZ could be agreed and implemented. The EEZ was implemented by 
New Zealand on April 1 1980, but without US recognition; and it was clear that a maritime 
boundary treaty could be negotiated only if the Olohega claim was explicitly renounced (not 
merely left dormant). New Zealand officials therefore approached the General Fono in June 
1980 with the proposal that the claim be renounced and a treaty signed along the lines sought 
by the United States Government. The arguments advanced to the Fono by the leader of the 
New Zealand official party were as follows:57 
 
1) “The United States would not voluntarily abandon its assertion of sovereignty 
over the Swains. 
 
2) Because international law related to sovereignty placed great weight on 
administrative occupation, the Tokelauan claim was weak. (Legal advisors in 
the New Zealand MFA believed that a tribunal would dismiss the Tokelauan 
claim). 
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3) The final New Zealand assessment was that unless Tokelau was prepared to go 
a long way down the road of abandonment of its claim to Swains, it would not 
be possible to negotiate a treaty with the U.S. which drew a maritime 
boundary between Tokelau and American Samoa and contained a renunciation 
of the U.S. claim to Tokelau.” 
 
Despite Beeby's plea for a “practical” response and not one backed by historical “nostalgia”, 
the Tokelauans were reluctant to give up their cultural claims to the Swains. The Fono were 
almost unanimously against abandoning their claim to Olohega in principle practice.58 
 
The views of one outspoken member directly challenged the New Zealand interpretation of 
international law. Beeby reported: 
 
 “I began to lose conviction largely as a result of an extremely astute 
question about the second of the three judgements I had put before the 
Fono, i.e. that the Tokelauan claim to the Swains was weak and would 
not be upheld by an international tribunal.” 
 
The astute question went as follows. 
 
“The people of Tokelau lived for many years cut off from the rest of 
the world. We were in no position to know of the rules of law about 
disputed territory and of the actions that nations and people should take 
to protect a claim to such territory. For us, the sun has just risen. In 
considering our claim would an international tribunal have regard to 
this fact and would it hold us accountable for our actions (or inactions) 
when we still lived in the darkness.” 
 
“This question ... I suspect may prove to be an untested (and highly 
relevant) area of international law relating to the acquisition of 
territory.” 
 
Mr Beeby concluded during the Fono that “we must examine Tokelauan claims”.  One 
possibility was to do so through an international court of law. Such a hearing would assure the 
Tokelauans of a full expression of their views and provide some redress for New Zealand's 
failure to review colonial land disputes in the 1920s. As a former Official Secretary in Tokelau 
pointed out:59 
 “By today's standards at least and as a matter of political appreciation, 
Tokelau can rightly regard itself as having been badly done by.” 
 
Upon Mr Beeby's return to New Zealand he discussed the Tokelauan claims, and a proposal for 
a third party hearing, at a meeting with senior Foreign Affairs administrators.60 It was decided 
however that there was little to be gained from such an exploration of the position in 
international law, while failure to conclude a treaty with the United States would undermine 
New Zealand's plans for securing revenue from the Tokelauan EEZ at an early date. The treaty 
was therefore agreed, and signed on 2 December 1980 on Atafu, by the three faipule acting for 
New Zealand. 
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The Administrator presented New Zealand's approach to the issue in terms of the usual 
formula:61 
 
“The negotiations were consistent with our policy of encouraging the 
people of Tokelau to make decisions for themselves.” 
 
From the Tokelauan point of view, this does not seem a fully accurate representation of what 
had occurred. The “decision” ultimately taken was Tokelauan acquiescence in New Zealand's 
strongly expressed wishes. It went against the grain of Tokelauan wishes, produced a good 
deal of resentment and distrust of New Zealand, which still lingers, and highlighted in 
Tokelauan minds the eternal issue of where the malo (real power) resides. New Zealand 
officials assumed throughout that Tokelauans would accept the New Zealand order of priorities 
(in which financing 5% of the annual budget from fishing licence fees ranked above retaining 
the Olohega claim). New Zealand officials no doubt felt that the claim was an anachronism, an 
unnecessary source of future friction with the United States, and something the Tokelauans 
would be better off without. They failed, however, to take sufficient time to persuade 
Tokelauans of these arguments in Tokelauan terms; and they showed themselves unwilling to 
accept the strong Fono objection to the proposed treaty. 
 
Tokelauans now question whether the signing of the treaty may have been a mistake. Within 
the TPS there is a feeling that the elders in the Fono, deprived as they were of any independent 
source of advice, were unable to withstand the pressure from Wellington for signature of the 
treaty. Had TPS members been free to advise the Fono, the battle might well have been harder 
fought. More to the point from the New Zealand point of view, the issue of Olohega has not yet 
been fully resolved, despite the signing of the treaty. In terms of palagi laws the Tokelauan 
claim has been renounced, but it was not done by the free will of Tokelau, and in the nature of 
such claims, the “traditional” claim will not be extinguished until Tokelauans willingly 
relinquish it. The issue may well arise again with the next visiting United Nations mission, if 
there is one. 
 
8.8  Time for a Pause, Rethinking & Improved Communication? 
 
In view of the continually repeated requests of Tokelauan leaders that they do not wish to 
change the present relationship, a policy of taihoa (go slow) seems to be called for, and a 
period of rethinking all aspects of the Tokelau situation and the relationship of the islands to 
New Zealand. The lack of continuity in New Zealand officials, with people arriving 
uninformed and leaving again often after two years, has compounded the problem, confusing 
Tokelauans,62 even although some have attemped “to devise machinery .... consistent with the 
Tokelauan way of managing their affairs” (Corner 1984: 25). It is interesting to note that the 
two New Zealanders with the most intimate knowledge of Tokelauan society - Professor 
Antony Hooper and Dr Judith Huntsman) place the highest priority on establishing good 
communications between New Zealand and Tokelau   in face to face human terms. It is also 
true that New Zealand also gives top priority to improved communications but takes a 
characteristically Western technological approach   of introducing an air service. Professer 
Hooper63 suggests that it is necessary to spend two months on each island in order to establish 
good communication, and to determine then what is feasible for the future in consultation with 
the freely expressed wishes of the Tokelau people. The people might well decide not to devote 
major resources to the development of new political institutions but might attempt to develop 
 
the village from its basic sub structure, complemented by a small super structure on top to deal 
with education, health and the like.  
 - 237 -
NOTES TO CHAPTER EIGHT  
                                                 
1  According to a Tokelauan informant in Apia. 
2  File note, MFA 449/1/1, Part 4. 
3  New Zealand Official Yearbook, 1984, p. 888. 
4  Descriptions of neo traditional Tokelau society are in A. Hooper, “Socio Economic Organisation 
of the Tokelau Islands',  Proceedings of the International Congress of Anthropological and 
Ethnological Sciences, Tokyo, 1968; and A. Hooper, “Aid and Dependence in a Small Pacific 
Territory', Anthropology Department Working Paper No 62, University of Auckland, 1982, pp. 17 
47 
5   AJHR 1926, A4D, p.6. 
6  See, for example, AJHR 1949, A6. 
7  See AJHR 1926, A4D, p.6, and AJHR 1948, A4A. 
8  1948 marks the beginning of the process of disentangling Tokelauan administration from that of 
Western Samoa; the Tokelau Islands Act 1948 brought the islands within New Zealand's territorial 
boundaries, and separate administrative annual reports were made from that year on. Western 
Samoa, as a trust territory, was clearly set to move towards eventual self government 
9  For a useful discussion of Tokelau's demographic history see A. Hooper, and J. Huntsman, “A 
demographic History of the Tokelau Islands Journal of the Polynesian Society, Vol. 82, No. 4, 
December 1973. 
10  Hooper (1982): 12 13. Official sources state that total assisted resettlement was 502 (November 
1976 briefing notes, MFA 449/1/1, Part 2), but this probably includes several dozen people moved 
under pre 1966 schemes. According to AJHR 1966, Al, p.54, the Minister of Island Territories, 
Mr Hanan, envisaged in 1966 the movement of half of the total population. Some voices at least 
argued for total evacuation (see e.g., the article by J. Rowe in the Auckland Star, September 8, 
1970) and there is still a readiness in some official circles to canvass evacuation as an option with 
“a certain harsh logic”. 
11  The Team is not here distinguishing the various local groups of Tokelauans in New Zealand (at 
Wellington, Rotorua and Auckland) as individual “communities' as recognised by the United 
Nations Mission. 
12  On these developments see AJHR 1948, A4A, pp.10-11. 
13  AJHR 1950, A6, pp. 10-11. 
14  Reference to Figure 5.5 shows that in two March years, 1975 and 1980, export earnings briefly 
exceeded the 1950/51 level. The 1975 figure includes most of the 1974 copra crop, which could 
not be exported during that year for lack of shipping. The 1980 figure appears to have been a 
genuine boom year, with 308 tons of copra exported at a price of over $500 per ton. (MFQ 
449/23/1, Cable July 28, Apia to Wellington). 
15  Annual Reports in AJHR carried these estimates. By 1956 the officially estimated population was 
1,875; the census of that year found only 1,619. Starting from this base the estimate rose to 1,938 
by 1961, in which year the census found actual population to be only 1,860. In 1963 the 
Administration began conducting annual censuses to monitor population. 
16  Hooper (1982), p.14; AJHR 1967, A3, p.43. 
17  Hooper, A and Huntsman, J., “A Demographic History of the Tokelau Islands”,  Journal of the 
Polynesian Society, Vol. 82, No. 4, December 1973, p.368. 
18  This is substantially less than the total value of copra exports for the 1971-72 year - $13,000 
approximately. Tax on copra would account for some of the difference; and it is possible that the 
export figures show value in Apia or New Zealand rather than at the beach in Tokelau. Even 
substantial adjustments within the range $6,500-$13,000, however, would make little difference to 
the picture which results in the text. 
19  September 10, 1979, Tokelau Office to Wellington, 449/23/1. 
20  September 21, 1979, Wellington to Tokelau Office, 449/23/1. 
21  A commodity by island breakdown of imports for the 1982 83 year is included in file 449/23/1, 
and detailed stores invoices for 1983/84 are available in the Tokelau Office in Apia. 
                                                                                                                                                  
22  The present pressure for the Tokelau Office to be moved from Apia to the islands appears to be 
motivated largely by the hope that the change would increase the volume of cash incomes received 
onshore, and hence subject to taxation for the Community Services Levy, or spent through the 
village stores. 
23  Apia to Wellington, 1974, 449/1/1, Part 1. 
24  Both expressions are from Frank Corner; interview Wellington April 15, 1984. 
25  Interview with F. Corner, April 15, 1984. 
26  Hooper (1982). 
27  Hooper (1982): p.68; quoting from  Te Vakai. 
28  Hooper (1982): 68-69. 
29  F. Corner, interview, April 15, 1984. 
30  Interview, Apia, May 1984. 
31  This rotation of temporary wage earning jobs is widely preferred also by villagers in Kiribati and 
was recommended by the Victoria University Rural Socio Economic Survey, accepted by the 
Kiribati Government in the 1970s. 
32  See, for example, Ranis and Fei (1964). 
33  Apia to Wellington, February 28, 1975, MFA 449/1/1, Part 2. 
34  Tokelau Office to Wellington, cable of October 11 1977, MFA 449/1/1, Part 3. 
35  Administrator's report on visit to Tokelau, August 28, 1979, MFA 449/1/1, Part 3. 
36  Hooper (1982): 46-47. 
37  A report by an SSC inspector in 1968 made it clear that he viewed the 1967 Tokelau Public 
Service Act as “premature', and that the establishment of a full blown public service was 
warranted only under the pressure of a move to self government. (A.J. Healy, Report on 1968 
Inspection of TPS, in MFA 449/1/1, Part 1). 
38  Cable 11 October 1977, Tokelau Office to Wellington, MFA 449/1/1, Part 3. 
39  Hooper (1982): p.61. 
40  Hooper (1982): p.89; see also Table 8.6 above. 
41  See, for example Wilson: (1980). 
42  Administrator to Tokelau Office, December 9 1977, MFA 449/1/1, Part 3. 
43  Wellington to UN Mission, New York, January 6 1978, MFA 449/1/1, Part 3. 
44  Administrator to Tokelau Office, December 9 1977, MFA 449/1/1, Part 3. 
45  Tokelau Office to Wellington, April 5 1979, MFA 449/1/1, Part 3. 
46  AJHR 1982, Al p 6. 
47  Tokelau Office to Wellington, report on Fono January 21 23, 1978, MFA 449/1/1, Part 3. 
48  Tokelau Office to Wellington, December 12 1979, MFA 449/1/1, Part 3. 
49  Administrator to Minister of Foreign Affairs, August 28 1979, MFA 449/1/1, Part 3. 
50  Tokelau office to Wellington, October 24 1979, MFA 449/1/1, Part 3. 
51  Administrator to MFA, August 28 1979. 
52  Tokelau Office to Wellington, April 14 1980, MFA 449/1/1, Part 3. 
53  In the past year, for example, he has had to refuse repeated suggestions that fares on the boat 
between Apia and Tokelau should be subsidised for all Tokelauans, and not just those resident on 
the atolls. 
54  MFA 449/1/1 (Part 3). 
55  To early 1984 a total of about $5,000 had been received in fees for fishing in the Tokelau EEZ, 
according to the Tokelau Office in Apia (Interview, May 4 1984). Hopes expressed during 1983 
for 25 boats fishing in the zone, and possibly $100,000 per year in fees have so far been 
disappointed, and future projections are now less optimistic following the 1983 signing of a joint 
access agreement for the ATA which included the Cook Islands, Niue, Tuvalu and Western 
Samoa. The current Tokelau budget does not include any fees revenue. 
56  F Corner, briefing for 34th Session of UN General Assembly, 1979. 
57  C. Beeby, speech to Fono, June 1980, MFA 449/1/1, Part 3. 
58  Memo, July 25 1980, MFA 449/1/1 (part 3). 
59  N. Walters, MFA 449/1/1 (Part 3) 
60  Minutes of meeting, 18 July 1980, 449/1/1 (Part 3). 
 
                                                                                                                                                  
61  F. Corner, Review of the Delimitation Treaties between U.S. and Tokelau, 12 December 1980, 
449/4/12/1. 
62  Comment by Dr Judith Huntsman, Workshop, Auckland, May 1984. 
63   Comment by Prof Antony Hooper, Workshop, Auckland, May 1984. 
 
CHAPTER NINE 
 
KIRIBATI 
 
 
The Republic of Kiribati, formerly the Gilbert Islands, consists of 33 islands divided into 
three groups: the Gilberts Group (16 islands), the Phoenix Group and Line Group. The total 
land area of the country is only 750 square kilometres, with over half the total made up by 
Christmas Island, the largest atoll in the world. The main Gilbert group comprises only 285 
sq. kms. However, the islands are spread over a vast area of ocean, stretching over 3,200 
kms from east to west and 1600 kms from north to south, and in terms of marine area, if not 
land, Kiribati is a very large country indeed. Taking into account the 320 km economic 
zone claimed by the Republic, the country is over 3 million square kms in area. Moreover, 
in terms of the livelihood of the people, it is as relevant to count lagoon area as well as land 
area on the atolls: thus while Tarawa has only 21.9 sq. kms of land, it has a lagoon rich in 
fish resources of 117 sq. kms. 
 
9.1 Population 
 
The country has a population of about 60,000. In 1978 41 percent of the total population 
was under 15 years, indicating a youthful population. The crude birth rate was 34.9 births 
per 1,000 of population. The average density of population per sq. km for the country as a 
whole is about 80 per sq. km, although in the main Gilberts Group, it averages 202, with 
the most densely populated islands such as Tamana and Butaritari reaching 336 and 255 per 
sq. km. respectively. In such islands as Tamana which occasionally experiences severe 
droughts, this heavy population pressure on extremely limited resources gives grounds for 
concern. Some authorities believe that the rate of population growth has accelerated 
somewhat since the early 1970s (when a Family Planning Campaign enjoyed some success 
for a while), and figures for a current rate of increase of between 1.6 and 2.2% have been 
mooted (Fifth Development Plan, p.2). However, a rate of 1.7% can be derived from a 
comparison of the population figures at the 1978 and 1973 censuses. The next census to be 
held in December 1984 should reveal whether the growth rate is rather high, or very high, 
and whether top priority should be accorded to a population control programme. 
 
Pitchford (1981) using 1978 Census data, states that one third of women have a baby before 
they reach the age of 20. By the time she is 49, a woman of Kiribati will have an average of 
6.25 living births (slightly more if she is a Catholic, and slightly less if she is a Protestant). 
For every 1,000 births in Kiribati, 87 babies die within the first year. This is a high rate of 
infant mortality for the Pacific Islands. The life expectancy is low for the Pacific; at birth a 
boy may expect to live to the age of 50, and a girl to the age of 54. In Fiji, people live 10 
years longer and in developed countries nearly 20 years longer. 
 
Dr Macrae, Census Commissioner in 1978, made the following projections of population. 
Since there is no migration out of the country, and if we accept there is no major escalation 
of contraceptive acceptance or other factors affecting fertility, then the current situation of 
Constant Mortality and Fertility (Column 3) can be a yard stick for future planning (Table 
9.2).
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 TABLE 9.1 
 
Kiribati: Total Population 1931-1982 
 
 
 
Year De Facto 
Population 
(estimated) 
De Jure Population Intercensal growth 
rate of de facto 
population, annual 
average% 
1931 29,751   
1947 31,513  0.4
1963 43,336  2
1968 47,682 49,086 1.9
1973 51,784 53,549 1.7
1978 56,213 58,512 1.7
1982* 61,000 (est*)  2.1 est
 
*Second Development Plan. 
 
A rough idea of the population problem of the future can be provided by projecting 
population against land area in the Gilberts Group, as indicated in Table 9.3. 
 
TABLE 9.2 
 
Alternative Populations Projections 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Year 
Constant 
Fertility 
Declining 
Mortality 
Constant 
Fertility and 
Mortality 
Declining 
Fertility and 
Mortality 
Declining 
Fertility 
Constant 
Mortality 
Number of 
Years from 
1980 
1978 58,016 58,016 58,016 58,016  
1983 64,957 64,760 64,577 64,397 3
1988 73,597 72,882 71,922 71,245 8
1993 83,573 81,941 79,457 77,945 13
1998 94,815 91,556 86,803 83,882 18
2003 106,979 101,854 93,296 88,933 23
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 TABLE 9.3 
 
Projected Population Pressure 
Year Population
Acres per 
person in 
Gilbert Islands 
Number of years 
from 1981 
1978 58,016 1.189  
1983 64,760 1.065 2 
1988 72,882 0.947 7 
1993 81,941 0.842 12 
1998 91,556 0.754 17 
2003 101,854 0.644 22 
  
Note:Constant fertility and mortality assumed. 
 
 
In 1947 the area of land per capita was just under 3 acres. By 1980 the population had 
doubled with a distribution of land of just over 1 acre. At its present rate of growth, if the 
population doubles again in 30 years, there will be less than half an acre of land per capita in 
the whole group   and this is land that Trewren (1984) has shown to have exceptionally low 
levels of soil fertility including micro element deficiency. Although at the time of the Rural 
Socio Economic Survey it was evident that there was unused capacity for more intensive 
utilisation on all five islands studied and some moderately populated islands probably could 
support a substantial increase in population, these projections do give considerable grounds 
for concern. If the suspected high rate of population growth is confirmed in the December 
1984 Census, two main avenues of population policy deserve close examination: a renewed 
family planning campaign, and possible resettlement to some of the Line Islands. These 
issues are discussed below (section 9.12). 
 
 
9.2   The Economy 
 
Next to Papua New Guinea, the Kiribati economy is perhaps more dominated by the non 
monetised subsistence sector than any other national economy in the whole Pacific region. 
This condition is undoubtedly due to the extreme remoteness from major markets and 
centres of innovation, to smallness, and to the great dispersal of the tiny islands across a vast 
expanse of ocean. Freight rates are thus inordinately high and shipping out produce is 
difficult and very expensive. Freight rates are about A$90 a tonne to Fiji, including costs of 
picking up copra on islands en route. The freight rate from Betio to Europe is about US$140 
per tonne. 
 
Long run trends in foreign trade are set out in Table 9.4. Until the mid 1950s, Kiribati (then 
the Gilbert Islands) exhibited the trade surplus of a classical capital exporting mineral rich 
colony. There then took place a sharp increase in import levels to the point where during the 
first half of the 1960s nearly one quarter of imports were financed other than from export 
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 earnings (largely, one would suspect, from labour remittances from seamen and workers on 
Nauru). Then occurred an increase in the relative price of Banaba phosphate, which sent 
export earnings to extraordinary heights during the late 1960s and early 1970s, while real 
import demand remained on a steady, slow growth path (see Figure 5.3). The fact that this 
extremely rapid rise in export earnings had no perceptible impact on the rate of growth of 
import demand is highly significant, since such low or non existent leverage of export 
earnings on aggregate demand is a standard symptom of mineral exporting economies of 
“enclave” structure. Casual inspection of Table 9.4 indicates that import demand during the 
1960s and 1970s moved in line with the volume of phosphate exports rather than the revenue 
from exports, suggesting that it was the wage and salary bill associated with phosphate 
extraction and export which “drove” the cash economy, while the sharply increased profits 
of the period 1966 1979 accrued as rents to the British Phosphate Commission and the 
Government. During the last few years before Independence, those rents were paid into the 
so called Revenue Equalisation Reserve Fund (RERF) which had an investment portfolio of 
over $80 million by the time phosphate was finally exhausted in 1979. 
 
Also worthy of note is the time profile of phosphate extraction, characterised by a steady 
build up of extraction rates (apart from a slight drop in 1976 79) up to the point where 
operations abruptly terminated. While this may well have corresponded to the most 
“efficient” extraction pattern from the point of view of profit maximisation by the Phosphate 
Commission, it is worth noting the contrast with Nauru where the winding down of 
operations is taking place over an extended period of time, spinning out the remaining 
reserves in order to ease the transition to the post phosphate era. No such strategy was 
contemplated in Kiribati, with the result that both the economic and political orders suffered 
a dramatic “cold turkey” transition in 1980, as exhaustion of the phosphate coincided with 
Independence from the United Kingdom. 
 
TABLE 9.4 
 
Kiribati Foreign Trade Data, 1923 1983 
Annual averages, 1982 Australian $000 
 
Period Exports Imports Trade Balance Phosphate exports: 000 tons 
1923-1937 8,164 3,196 4,968 221
1951-55 9,845 7,571 2,274 284
1956-60 9,810 10,213 403 310
1961-65 10,199 13,190 2,991 331
1966-70 23,385 15,048 8,337 480
1971-75 37,219 16,795 20,424 584
1976-79 30,732 18,796 11,936 575
1980-83 3,446 18,599 15,153 0
 
Table 9.5 shows how this transition affected the balance of payments. The last years of the 
phosphate era were characterised by a strong trade balance and current account balance, with 
very little activity on capital account and a rapid build up of reserves (mainly the RERF). 
The first three post phosphate years saw the trade balance nosedive, with current account 
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 surpluses eliminated and overseas reserves protected only by a brief surge of capital inflow 
in 1980 81 and a doubling of grant aid receipts (which covered US$13 million of the $15.5 
million of current account transfers in 1982; the remainder was migrant labour remittances). 
 
It is immediately obvious that what saved the Kiribati domestic economy from the need for 
truly drastic adjustment in 1980 was the “enclave” character of the phosphate sector during 
its last fifteen years. Living standards and the level of aggregate demand (hence import 
demand) had been unrelated to the level of export earnings from phosphate, and 
consequently the elimination of phosphate earnings did not fall directly upon living 
standards, but rather was absorbed as a fall in government revenue. By the end of the 1970s, 
when imports were around US$17 million annually, the economy's income from non 
phosphate sources (copra exports, investment income on the RERF, philatelic sales, labour 
remittances, and grant aid) had risen to about $13 million, leaving only $4 million of imports 
to be covered from phosphate earnings. Of this, possibly $1 million corresponded to the 
imported requirements for operating the phosphate works1, so that on the basis of the late 
1970s data, the “gap” which had to be filled from increased aid inflows (if local living 
standards were not to fall) was of the order of only $3 million p.a. In the event, imports were 
held steady in real terms through 1980 and 1981, and then fell sharply in 1982 (cf Figure 
5.3) as inflation cut into the purchasing power of the economy's foreign exchange budget. 
 
The present position is that Kiribati living standards in terms of importable goods and 
services now depend directly upon the annual volume of aid inflow; this will remain true for 
the forseeable future unless a migration outlet for Kiribati labour is found to supplement the 
present limited opportunities for offshore employment on ships and on Nauru. Reference to 
Table 9.1 above shows that, in sharp contrast to the three New Zealand associated territories 
(Niue, Cook Islands and Tokelau) the divergence between de facto (Kiribati resident) and de 
jure (including overseas resident) population is only about 2,000   or perhaps 4 5% of the 
Kiribati population. It is this tightly constrained migration position which commits Kiribati 
to the strategy outlined in the Development Plans, of attempting to “provide for the 
economic development of the nation after the end of phosphate mining on Banaba”2, by 
means of onshore (including the EEZ) resource development. As the latest Plan recognises, 
however, (with the agreement of virtually all observers) such independence on the basis of 
the present resource endowment and migration position is attainable only at living standards 
substantially below those now prevailing, especially on the cash oriented island of Tarawa. 
 
National accounts data prepared by the Planning Office (Table 9.6) show the same pattern 
from a different statistical angle. In 1978 Gross National Expenditure (the total of 
Government and private final consumption, plus gross fixed capital formation) was 91% of 
Gross Domestic Product. Two years later in 1980, Gross National Expenditure was 174% of 
GDP. Expenditure on both consumption and investment held steady, while per capita GDP 
fell from US$737 to US$398 (a fall of nearly half). This divorce between domestic product 
and national expenditure is the hallmark of two extreme types of economies: mineral export 
enclave economies (in which product exceeds expenditure) and MIRAB societies (in which 
expenditure exceeds product). In making the transition from one to the other in a single leap, 
Kiribati passed through probably the most abrupt and potentially traumatic jump in the 
world during the past decade or so   bearing in mind that in addition to the end of the 
phosphate era, Kiribati experienced, along with other oil importing nations, the impact of the 
two oil shocks of 1975 and 1979. 
 - 243 -
  
TABLE 9.5 
 
Balance of Payments Data: Phosphate and Post Phosphate 
Millions of US Dollars, at Current Prices 
 
Year Exports 
FOB 
Imports 
CDB 
Servicesa Transfers Current 
account
Capital 
account 
Balance 
(change 
in 
reserves
) 
1978 25.4 -16.2 4.2 6.7 20.1 0.3 20.4
1979 24.7 -17.4 5.1 4.6 17 0.3 17.3
1980 3.2 -19.2 5 8.8 -2.2 3.5 1 0.3
1981 4.6 -23.1 3.7 9.5 -5.3 2.2 -3.1
1982 3.0 -22.4 5.0 15.5 1.1 0.4 0.7
 
a. .Net including philatelic sales. 
Source: Asian Development Bank (1983) p.41. 
 
An important lesson of the Kiribati experience is the resilience of the small South Pacific 
economies under the impact of maco economic shocks which would demolish an economy 
such as that of New Zealand. Because of the large proportion of GDP (now around 40%) 
accounted for by agriculture and fisheries   broadly, the village mode of production   
together with the dominant role in the cash economy of Government (over half of GDP), the 
system is cushioned from swings in export production, at least in the short term, so long as 
Government is able to finance its budget deficits. It is also worth emphasising that even with 
the tight restrictions on out migration imposed by the lack of access to other countries' 
labour markets (Nauru being the sole exception), remittances from migrant workers are more 
or less on a par with post phosphate export earnings (US$2.5 million in 1982 compared with 
exports of US$3 million3), and it seems likely that far greater returns in terms of real 
disposable incomes in Kiribati would be gained from overseas labour market penetration 
than from the current strategy of attempting to boost onshore production in pursuit of “self 
reliance”.  The difficulty, of course, is that Kiribati's development strategy is dictated by aid 
donors, who are willing to finance onshore projects but not to sponsor programmes of 
offshore labour market penetration. 
 
9.3 Consumption 
 
Consumption, in current value terms, continued to increase from 1981 by about 8 percent a 
year, being especially marked for some foodstuffs and durable goods such as motorcycles. 
However, the best index of importing and whether I Kiribati are moving towards a 
“consumption society” is revealed in the data on volume of imports.4 These show that over 
the period of 1970-1981 there was a drop in the import of diesel fuel, little change in many 
foods, a slight increase in flour and canned meat, and a moderate increase in volume of beer 
and sugar, tea, fresh and frozen meat.5 
TABLE 9.6 
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 Expenditure on Gross Domestic Product, 1977-1982 
(At Current Market Prices) 
(A$'000) 
   
  1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 
Government Final Consumption 9,440 7,639 7,900 7,600 8,209 8,996
Private Final Consumption 17,115 20,196 20,996 19,396 20,986 22,707
Gross Capital Formation 2,252 8,150 8,191 9,183 10,377 11,726
Exports of Goods and Services 19,286 21,619 21,203 2,435 3,000 3,500
Less: Imports of Goods & 
                            Services 13,150 18,212 20,000 17,800 19,580 21,550
Gross Domestic Product 34,943 39,392 38,290 20,814 22,992 25,379
GDP per capita (US$) 700 786 737 398 434 436
 
Source:Planning Office, Ministry of Finance 
(Reproduced from ABD (1982)). 
 
There was a large increase in imports of tobacco and cigarettes and the volume of rice 
tripled. Government consumption also increased in 1981 and 1982, reflecting the growth of 
salaries and expenses. 
 
9.4   Development Strategy 
 
The period of the late 1960s and 1970s was a time of intensified planning and rapid 
expansion of infrastructure in the period of decolonisation. Over the course of four 
development plans the emphasis has been on (i) creating new and more diversified sources 
of production, (ii) improving the income earning capacity of the country, (iii) attempting to 
achieve balanced regional growth, and (iv) effecting major improvements in education and 
manpower training to provide skilled people. Even more important than the economic, social 
and political preparations that had to be made for Independence in 1979 were (v) the steps 
required to compensate where possible for the end of earnings from phosphate, when mining 
ceased on Banaba (Ocean Island) in the same year. This latter consideration led to setting up 
the Revenue Equalisation Reserve Fund which involved a portfolio of substantial overseas 
investments from the phosphate royalties (see below) to offset the huge loss of foreign 
exchange and Government tax revenue. 
 
9.5  Diversification of Exports 
 
It has been exceptionally difficult to achieve progress on diversifying the production base in 
ways capable of achieving greater self reliance. Some exports, such as handicrafts, have 
made little if any progress, and are insignificant. However, philatelic sales, increasingly 
since 1978, and fishing since 1979-80 have grown steadily and promise to broaden the 
export base. The major crop in the country, coconut, with its export of copra, has 
experienced its characteristic sharp fluctuations in output, responding to changes in world 
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 price, rainfall and several other factors and overall copra exports have increased only 
slightly over the last 12 years (Table 9.7). 
 
9.6 Incomes 
 
It is difficult to estimate whether there have been rises or falls in rural incomes over the last 
10 or 12 years. In 1972-73 the Victoria University of Wellington Rural Socio Economic 
Survey (RSES) suggested mean incomes per household of $146-424, based on detailed work 
on three islands. However, after the early success of family planning after 1973 the 
programme slackened6 and population growth spurted away to create greater pressure on 
resources. At the same time the expansion of the local public service slowed down (it is now 
about to contract), and the prospects for overseas employment fell sharply. 
 
The ending of phosphate mining, of course, meant a sharp reduction in wage employment in 
Kiribati. In 1977/78 the British Phosphate Commissioners employed 350 I Kiribati and 164 
expatriates   a total of 514.7  Where these workers went after the ending of mining is not 
clear   although the assumption in the Fifth Plan that 500 of them left Kiribati8 seems highly 
improbable. Since Government employment did not expand to compensate, there was an 
increase of unemployment pressure in the Kiribati cash economy in the early 1980s,9 and 
this had the dual effect of encouraging some decentralisation of the economy (as people 
unable to find work on Tarawa returned to their home islands) and of reducing real 
disposable incomes (which the Fifth Plan estimates to have fallen, on average, by 6% 1980 
1982).10  The Plan estimates, on the basis of a provisional set of national income accounts, 
that real per capita incomes declined from A$349 to $347 between 1980 and 1982, and that 
rural cash incomes fell even more. They are, however, likely to be higher than the 
(corrected) figures of A$112 suggested by ADB 1983 (Appendix 1). 
 
Although the availability of basic subsistence foods and the continuing strength of the 
subsistence economy are not in doubt, the decline in the general living conditions of the 
great majority is a matter of considerable concern. Even more serious is the suggestion that 
malnutrition might have increased from the levels (already serious) of 25-33% which are 
often quoted. At the national level the Kiribati Government is in no doubt as to its most 
fundamental task   the economic survival and viability of the country.  
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 TABLE 9.7 
 
Kiribati Copra Production and Exports: Tons 
Annual Average 
 
    -  Production  -   
Period  Smallholders Plantations Total Exports
1923-1929    4,720
1930-1937    6,321
1943-1946    1,606
1947-1952    6,195
1953-1959 5,485 2,033 7,518 7,499
1960-1969 5,867 2,093 7,960 8,072
1970-1974 6,411 2,133 8,544 8,411
1975-1979 6,070 1,798 7,868 7,868
1980-1983 7,504 1,404 8,908 8,909
 
Sources: Gilbert and Ellice Colony Annual Reports; Geddes et al (n.d.) Table 6.2; Asian 
Development Bank (1983) Appendix 4; 1983 data from Planning Office, Tarawa. 
 
 
9.7  Priorities of Fifth Development Plan 
 
The Fifth Development Plan recommended a multiple strategy based on the principle of self 
reliance. It identified six major policy areas of the highest priority: 
 
(i) Maximising the return from existing resources e.g. fisheries, copra and tourism. 
 
(ii) Establishing new foreign exchange earning enterprises, especially those aimed at 
exploiting the resources of the sea. 
 
(iii) Exploiting all possible schemes for import substitution (goods, energy, services, 
people). 
 
(iv) Promoting the development of the Line and Phoenix Islands, in particular the 
resources of Christmas Island. 
 
(v) Restraining the rate of growth of public and personal consumption. 
 
(vi) Continued accumulation and careful management of the remaining phosphate 
revenue (in the RERF). 
 
To these should be added as top priority the re introduction of a family planning campaign. 
Of the above, (v) has been put into effect. With respect to (i) and (ii), tuna fishing and 
licencing of overseas vessels offer some prospects for growth (see 9.14 below). 
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 9.8 Employment 
 
The great majority of the population derives its livelihood from the subsistence sector. 
Probably nearly two thirds of the economically active labour force is however, better 
considered as economically “transitional” between the subsistence and wage working 
sectors, being “part peasant” and “part proletarian” in character, for many adult men have 
engaged in circular migration to work for a year or two on the phosphate islands, on Tarawa, 
on colony ships, Line Island plantations or some other form of off island employment before 
returning to their home villages (Watters and Baribati 1978). 
 
The 1978 Census classified 6,432 people with recorded jobs. Only 13.4% of the total 
population in that year were in formal employment and since then unemployment has grown. 
On present trends it seems likely that at least 85 or 90% of I Kiribati are destined for a 
largely subsistence livelihood in the village environment. 
 
Wage employment is dominated by the public sector, which employs 80 percent of the total, 
almost all of whom are located on South Tarawa. With the inflow of aid in the 1970s and 
preparation for Independence, the public service grew at a rate of 7% a year and created 
rather unrealistic attitudes of dependence on government and excessive bureaucracy. Many 
other forms of employment outside the public service are mission based, so that the private 
sector is very small and weak. Essentially, it is oriented towards servicing; manufacturing 
employs less than 3 percent of the paid work force (20 small firms). On a typical outer 
island, with a population of around 2000, no more than 100 persons would be permanently 
employed. 
 
In 1984 about 1000 young men who have passed through the Tarawa Marine Training 
School (widely believed to be the best in the whole Pacific region) have employment on 
overseas vessels. About 400 men are employed on Nauru. Ullrich Aluminium of Auckland 
employ two men in their aluminium factory for 6 months at a time under a special scheme. 
This leaves a substantial number of people in Kiribati, including some skilled professionals, 
unable to find employment. 
 
Government employment policy for unskilled labour is based on a revolving basis for each 
outer island. Thus people employed for such work as cleaners, night watchmen and drivers 
receive only a three year contract, and cannot be re employed. About 25-40 employees come 
from each outer island, ensuring a fair distribution of jobs. In all, 563 people are employed 
on contract work (147 for the Nauru Phosphate Commission, 270 at the Marine Training 
School and 43 for the police). Manpower planning in theory should enable Government to 
draw up a national plan identifying key skills and appropriate manpower needed for the 
country's future development. But apart from a few departments, submissions have not come 
in and others make quite unrealistic requests (such as the claim by the Abamakoro Trading 
Corporation that they need 25 accountants!) The reality, of course, in the current world 
recession and post phosphate era, is that Kiribati must cut down, not expand, the number of 
civil service positions. Following Henderson's 1983 preliminary report, all vacant posts have 
been frozen and an UNDAT team (including some local members) will shortly study how 
the public service can be trimmed back and functions rationalised. 
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 Only two or three unions exist, with BKTAM representing mostly unskilled workers, the 
Public Employees Association EA) government workers, and the Seamen's Union men on 
ships. But the unions are not very strong. Only one serious strike has occurred, in 1981 when 
BKTAM challenged the government in seeking a wage rise. Eventually they were granted a 
rise but as trouble persisted 400 workers were dismissed. This appears to have prevented the 
development of union militancy. The last wage increase was two to three years ago and 
while the disparity between urban wages and rural earnings still appears to be great, the 
widening wage dualism of the early 1970s may have been arrested by the recession and 
much higher copra prices. 
 
9.9  Balanced Development 
 
The externally inspired development thrust of the 1960s and 1970s has made South Tarawa 
the economic heart of the nation. There public sector employment, higher wages, superior 
amenities such as education and the attractions of urban life are concentrated, in contrast to 
the outer islands which are characterised by low and stagnant incomes, a lack of 
employment and modern amenities, and decreasing land availability. Thus a characteristic 
situation of growing regional economic disparities has emerged, reflecting an uneven pattern 
of spatial development, and accordingly population has migrated increasingly in from the 
outer “periphery” to the favoured “core” of South Tarawa. By 1982 it was estimated that 
South Tarawa had a population of about 20,000 or one third of the national population 
(Table 9.8). 
 
TABLE 9.8 
 
The Pattern of Centralisation in Kiribati 
Census % of Total Population living in Tarawa 
1963 12 
1968 20 
1973 28 
1978 32 
1982a 33 
 
a. Estimated, Fifth Development Plan 
 
The inequities and potential dangers of this trend to overurbanisation and over centralisation 
have earlier been recognised (Watters and Banibati, 1978). “Development” has taken the 
form of the creation of a relatively very large, very expensive bureaucracy, which is largely 
unproductive in an economic sense but which has led to the emergence of a consumer 
society requiring massive imports, especially of nutritionally sub standard foods. Problems 
of sanitation, congestion, refuse disposal, pollution on the over crowded atoll, as well as 
drunkenness and crime became serious in the 1970s. The artificial escalation of incomes and 
prices on Tarawa distorted the whole economy and had the effect of under cutting real rural 
incomes or wages. There was a growing sense of deprivation in the outer islands in contrast 
to the conspicuous superiority of living standards and amenities on Tarawa (per capita 
incomes are many times higher on South Tarawa). 
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During the 1970s realisation of these unfortunate consequences was heightened, emphasised 
perhaps by the cholera epidemic of 1978. Renewed efforts have been made by Government 
to stimulate outer island development by various projects and the Government programme of 
decentralisation that has given greater autonomy to island councils. The current world 
recession, the end of Banaba phosphate and the current review of the size and functions of 
the public service appear likely to rectify the situation a little in reducing the advantages of 
South Tarawa. The impression, from a visit to Kiribati in 1984 after an absence of 12 years, 
was that South Tarawa has been as much “ruralised” as “urbanised” in the interval, in view 
of the style of living of many of the in coming migrants, and the departure of so many 
expatriates. A great deal remains to be done however, and a battery of policies both at the 
macro level and micro levels are needed both to enhance in relative terms the attractions of 
outer island living, to reduce wage dualism, to encourage import substitution, to increase the 
costs (and hence lessen the benefits) of urban living and to bring effective town planning 
policies into operation. 
 
Moreover, as the Decentralisation Report pointed out, the main objectives of rural 
development in the past have been misguided. Rather than being directed at building non 
productive infrastructure or promoting market production which has little value to people 
who are more concerned about where their immediate food supplies are likely to come from, 
it should be aimed primarily at assisting a greater rural population than ever before to obtain 
a regular, balanced subsistence diet.11 
 
9.10 The Copra Industry 
 
The pattern of Kiribati copra production, over the last 12 years displays the usual great 
fluctuations from year to year, reflecting a host of factors, but especially the copra price and 
rainfall. Over the whole period, production is almost stagnant, but shows a slight upward 
trend. On a per capita basis however a decline has occurred. 
 
Copra does remain however one of the major exports of the country and the great 
importance of the coconut palm, both as a major subsistence food and for its many other 
uses, means that very high priority should be placed on ensuring that young bearing palms 
are planted to take over from old, senile palms, 50 years old or more, that are declining in 
yield or going out of production. Although data on the age structure or bearing/non bearing 
ratio of coconut palms of all the islands in the group are generally lacking, there is little 
doubt that a high percentage of palms throughout the islands are not bearing. Thus in 1972 
(when two years of drought may have exacerbated the situation), nearly 56 percent of all 
palms on Abemama were estimated to be non bearing (Watters and Banibati, 1984: 46), with 
new plantings not exceeding senile palms. Moreover, the usual impression of tiny, densely 
populated islands being totally covered in coconut palms is not true: Abemama (though less 
intensively utilised than most islands) had only 55 percent of its total area in coconut palms 
and 36 percent was scrub covered. A considerable percentage of the coconut area on many 
islands represents replanting done with American compensation payments following the 
wartime palm destruction. Currently, these stands are about 35-40 years old and in another 
decade their production can be expected to diminish (Team Report: 62-64). There is no 
doubt that the Government sponsored Coconut Replanting Campaign that began in 1970 and 
ceased in 1983 with the withdrawal of British aid money, was greatly needed. 
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Over the 13 years that it ran, the Coconut Subsidy Scheme planted a total of only 272 ha., or 
8.9% of the area of the Gilberts, in 488 completed and some uncompleted schemes. A 
number of studies have indicated why the scheme achieved such limited success, in spite of 
the payment of $90 per acre. The Coconut Replanting and Improvement Schemes were 
always essentially Government rather than truly island schemes. They were seldom fully 
explained to the people or adjusted to island requirements. The schemes were based on 
erroneous assumptions about the different islands, their social organisation, the meaning of 
land, how land and palms were viewed and used, and how work was performed. At first 
landowners suspected that Government was using the scheme as a front for taking over their 
lands12. Especially in the early years, the minimum area required for registration in the 
scheme was unrealistically large. The basic data used for projections of the copra output 
were faulty and it was not realised that on some islands a hardpan provided a formidable 
obstacle in digging holes for replanting. Inadequate notice was taken of local views that it is 
wasteful to chop down coconut trees and little appreciation was evident of the number of utu 
(clan) members who also share access to lands, even though they are individually owned. 
Since the people did not become greatly involved in the schemes they would spend much of 
their productive time working on their other lands. Trewren has suggested that in fact people 
entered only their worst, and most marginal, lands into the schemes, which explains why the 
new palms planted have proved to be little or no better than the palms they replaced.13 Many 
of the practical factors involved in the limited success of the campaign were documented by 
the Director of Agriculture in the 1970s, Bob Bryden, and recorded in Trewren (1984). 
 
The scheme was based erroneously on the cash motivation provided by the subsidy rather 
than inviting the people to think about replanting in ways meaningful to them. The scheme 
was inflexible and was imposed from above. 
 
Yet the achievements of the scheme should not be ignored, due to the strenuous efforts of an 
efficient Department and their determination to persist in spite of many difficulties. It is 
possible that if the lessons of this earlier campaign can be thoroughly learnt and a new 
campaign designed to fit local conditions, to involve the people meaningfully, and to avoid 
the earlier pitfalls, a new scheme could be much more successful and proceed at a faster 
pace. Commonly, however, new projects ignore the lessons of the past. Certainly the need 
for a relaunching of coconut replanting on a national scale is of high priority; it is believed 
that Government is inviting Australia to undertake this project. 
 
9.11  Low Nutrient Status of Soils 
 
Recently a scientific finding of great importance has been made by Trewren and associates, 
building on international scientific research  (Trewren (1983) Tables 6-8). The results of leaf 
analysis showed that a nutritional problem of very serious magnitude exists in Kiribati soils: 
the levels of no less than five nutrients (nitrogen, potassium, iron, manganese and zinc) are 
believed to be the lowest anywhere recorded. It appears that coconut palms in Kiribati have 
adapted to a most surprising degree to extremely low levels of some trace elements 
(especially manganese and copper). Although the natural nutritional status of the soils is 
thought to be very low, the problem is thought to be aggravated by the common practice of 
burning of undergrowth and fallen fronds, the use of husks as fuel, and the low rainfall of 
some islands. It appears the nutritional problem is not so severe in Tuvalu, where higher 
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 rainfall leads usually to the accumulation of more organic material, and burning of debris is 
not usually practised. 
 
Trewren has suggested a drastic redesign of the replanting scheme incorporating a number of 
new agronomic practices (the socio cultural defects mentioned above have not been 
addressed) and planning to replant a total of 200 hectares per annum. The plan in particular, 
involves heavy dressings with artificial fertilisers for a period of up to eight years after 
planting. The cost of fertilising the estimate half of the existing schemes that are suitable is 
in the region of A$2.8 million over an eight year period. The total cost of fertilisers for 
completion of the existing programme plus a further four year phase of replanting is 
expected to be A$4.3 million over an 11 year period. Of this, $1.38 million would be needed 
over the 1983-86 period. 
 
The actual production of nuts on palms is of course extremely important, but the Rural Socio 
Economic Survey showed that on four Kiribati and one Tuvalu islands, there was 
considerable potential for increasing production from existing palms. The main cause of low 
copra production was the low motivation to actually pick up the fallen nuts and then to turn 
them into dried copra. The high yields of the record year 1974 (and again in 1981) compared 
to the years of 1972 and 1973 when the price was only an average of 2.08 and 2.67/lb is 
illuminating. In 1974 the price doubled to 5.49 and in 1981 it was 11.75 lb.14 It is clearly 
important for the Copra Society to maintain a sufficiently large reserve fund to subsidise the 
price in years when the international price is low, in order to offer a reasonable and stable 
price to maintain grower interest. In years when the price is especially high, reserves can be 
built up.15 
 
Secondly, it is important that marketing points be numerous and of easy access on all 
islands. Incentive to cut copra is also affected by transport from the groves to the growers 
house and marketing point. Thus the numbers of bicycles and hand carts (pulled as trailers 
behind bicycles) on outer islands makes transport of copra easier and less time consuming. 
On larger islands the availability of tractors, trailers or boats would be a great assistance.  
 
In a recent paper, Pollard16 has provided qualified support for Trewren's call for a renewed 
coconut replanting campaign. He points out that many factors are involved in increasing 
copra production, apart from achieving greater nut availability. Another policy that would 
increase grower interest in copra would be a lowering of the internal freight rates on Kiribati 
Shipping Corporation's vessels. Internal seafreight can amount to over 40 percent of the total 
cost of shipping copra from the outer islands to the port of milling (pollard, 1984: 2). In the 
absence of a computer, it was impossible to fully analyse rates of return, and the effects of 
lower yields, copra prices, levels of replanting and higher costs of implementation, but 
Pollard concluded that a replanting programme is marginally economic if a market for 
coconut timber exists, and highly profitable if a market for Millionaire's Salad is created. 
“The programme is also very important socially and developmentally and should therefore 
be implemented” (Pollard, 1984). 
 
Clearly, an effective coconut programme involves a battery of consistent policies on a 
number of fronts: keeping freight rates to moderate levels, stabilising prices to a reasonable 
level to maintain confidence, improving transport on outer islands, a replanting programme 
accompanied by fertilisation. In view of the enormous cost involved in Trewren's proposal, it 
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 is likely that a limitation of fertiliser application to lands close to villages (which are more 
intensively worked than distant lands) would initially be a worthwhile modification. 
 
9.12   Coconut Timber Project 
 
The New Zealand funded Coconut Timber Project has demonstrated the potential economic 
value of coconut timber   a much misunderstood and undervalued timber. In two years of 
experimental milling a semi permanent mill first on Nonouti and later on Abemama 
produced 305m of sawn timber, with 217m delivered to Tarawa. The New Zealand 
sawmiller states that the Gatman Varteg sawmill proved to be a basically sound machine, 
although on this especially tough timber, tungsten carbide insert teeth on the saws are more 
successful and last longer. Chainsaws have a serviceable life of only about one year. Given 
the several weeks needed to assemble the portable mill and inter island shipping holdups, it 
is estimated that a realistic target for annual production is about 600m on a one shift basis. 
 
The major disappointment of the project to date has been the failure of the Government to 
develop an effective marketing strategy. Large stacks of sawn timber have piled up and little 
has been done to encourage sales to local end users. It is widely believed that the timber is 
unsuitable for many forms of construction, is too hard to work with hand tools, or is inferior 
to various imported timber. As the Timber Industry Review points out, it is only fair to 
compare the various grades of coconut timber with the appropriate alternative varieties of 
timbers currently imported.  
 
However, up to the end of 1983 only 90m of the sawn timber available had been utilised 
(mostly on Nonouti). Although a positive attitude to the timber is generally held in all 
sections of Government (the Office of the Minister of Natural Resources demonstrates 
superbly the attractive qualities of the wood), there has been much opposition or scepticism 
among potential end users, including major government departments. An absence of 
“reliable, consistent and fully explanatory information” about the product has meant that 
uncertainties have persisted. Although the Government in fact issued directives to various 
departments to use coconut timber forthwith and to cease indenting overseas supplies of 
comparable timbers, this has not been carried out. 
 
Additional causes for the waste of much sawn timber was poor stacking and inadequate 
shelter, which led to warping, sweating and decay. The total value of imported timber 
increased steadily over recent years to reach A$358,000 in 1981. In 1981 terms the use of 
the normal annual output of coconut timber estimated at 600m, would save approximately 
$200,000 - or 45 percent of current timber requirements. In the longer term, if effective 
promotion is carried out, coconut wood could substitute for up to 80 percent of imported 
timber. Ultimately, with overseas promotion, exports might be conceivable. Thus, the whole 
project is one of national significance and it is important to continue the venture, 
concentrating on effective marketing and making potential end users much more familiar 
with its qualities and price advantages. 
 
While milling operations appear to have been successful on Nonouti and Abemama, it is 
important that the felling of senile palms be done evenly throughout the lands of all villages 
on an island. Thus on Abemama, palms from only the northern half of the island had been 
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 felled and villages in the southern half were rather upset that they could not be involved in 
the scheme. 
 
The whole milling project should be seen as part of an overall coconut replanting scheme, 
with timber milled being senile palms declining in yield that need to be replaced by new 
plantings. Thus any design of a new (and hopefully radically replanned) coconut replanting 
campaign should build in the coconut timber milling as one important component (though 
self contained) of the whole campaign. 
 
9.13  Fisheries 
 
Very little is known about the available resource volume of tuna species in Kiribati waters. 
The SPC tagging programme of skipjack lead by Dr R Kearney suggested that about 28,000 
tonnes per year might be available. The  Te Mautari Corporate Plan (January 1984) believes 
however, that the potential skipjack catch is far in excess of 30,000 tonnes per year, since the 
Japanese pole and line fleet have caught up to 30,000, (mostly in the Phoenix when fishing 
only 9 months in the year) and average sightings of skipjack schools is double the average of 
0.77 schools per hour of other areas of the South and West Pacific. In 1978 the Japanese 
catch alone in the Kiribati area was worth over $15 million (which compares with phosphate 
exports in that year of $19 million). 
 
The Corporate Plan estimates that the available yellowfin catch is over 10,000 tonnes per 
year, and bigeye in excess of 6,000 tonnes per year. The total for all species of tuna is 
thought to exceed 50,000 tonnes and there is no apparent seasonality, since Kiribati straddles 
the equator. 
 
In 1981 the Government founded Te Mautari Ltd (TML) as the national fishing company. It 
is a private company whose major shareholder is the Kiribati Government. At present the 
world tuna market is depressed and price is consequently low. However, the local catch rate 
is believed to be one of the highest in the Pacific and twice that of the Solomons. Moreover, 
the local fat content of the fish in Kiribati waters is slightly better than usual. 
 
In the initial period, before a country can acquire tuna vessels to engage in fishing on its 
own, it is logical to earn revenue by licencing foreign vessels to fish in its EEZ. In the first 
period of 1979 81, Kiribati granted access to Japan for $600,000. Kiribati sought advice 
from New Zealand as to the appropriate licence fees that should be charged, and after a bitter 
dispute with Japan, a fisheries agreement was signed, with Japan paying $950,000. Kiribati 
also signed an access agreement with South Korea for the 1978 80 period. By 1983 income 
from licence fees had become considerable, rising from A$259,000 in 1978 to about $1 
million in 1980 to A$1,500,000 in 1982 (1979 82 Development Plan). Japan had already 
provided considerable aid in building up the tuna fishing fleet. The first vessel, funded by 
Britain, was built in Japan and the next three vessels were provided by Japan. 
 
At present Kiribati has four vessels ranging from 20 to 120 gross tons. Although tuna vessels 
range from 20 to 500 tons, the lower range is preferred for Kiribati conditions, with a pole 
and line vessel about 59 tons judged to have the best potential. Three of the vessels have 
onboard freezing facilities and the fourth holds its catch in chilled sea water. Since Kiribati 
wishes to develop its own tuna fishing fleet rather than rely indefinitely on licence fees, the 
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 current plans are to expand the number of vessels up to eight   the maximum the bait stocks 
are likely to sustain. An entry into purse seining is planned as soon as practicable, but 
vessels cost between $2 and $12 million. Funds for acquiring these vessels are to be sought 
from direct aid, soft loan or commercial loan. If aid is not available, second hand vessels 
would be acquired. 
 
Fleet development is however constrained by lack of shore facilities. In particular, the lack 
of a jetty, of cool storage space, and possible bait limitations mean that plans to expand the 
fleet will be balanced by improvement of shore facilities. A jetty that will cost $4.5 million 
is planned for 1986. The capital costs of adding new vessels to the fleet is A$3,600,00. 
Operating costs rise from a four vessel fleet in 1984 at $2,060,852 to an eight vessel fleet in 
1988 at $4,475,204. Localisation of the crew (at present 97 percent I Kiribati) will be 100 
percent complete by 1986, with training at the Tarawa Technical Institute supplemented by  
some further training overseas. It is planned to develop the shore facilities at once and to 
move to a six boat fleet in 1986. Following 18 months assessment, if the supplies of wild 
bait sustain the increase, the fleet will be increased to eight boats by 1988.While wild bait is 
preferred, the milkfish ponds provide currently 25 tons per year while TML's requirements 
are 33 tons. The volume of exports, it is hoped, will rise from about 2450 tons in 1984 to 
7000 tons in 1988. Lack of fresh water precludes any development into canning or freezing. 
There are the possibilities however, of diversifying into smoking, or drying. It is calculated 
that the internal rate of return is 16 percent from the net cash flow on the capital investment 
proposed. 
 
It is difficult to say at present whether the projections of the Corporate Plan 1984 88 are 
unduly optimistic. It is however, a clearly thought out policy statement with precise goals. It 
would appear that the waters of Kiribati are a good deal more promising than those of 
Tuvalu. It has yet to be seen however, if Kiribati can raise the substantial loans required on 
favourable terms. 
 
 
9.14  Artisanal Fishing 
 
This is developing rapidly on South Tarawa.17 In 1982 an estimated 2800 tons of fish were 
landed; but in 1984 it is estimated to have grown to about 4000 tons. It is indeed fortunate 
that the densely concentrated population of Tarawa has easy access to one of the richest 
lagoons for fishing in the country. There is a need for a small shed on South Tarawa for the 
sale of fish. 
 
Although plans existed 12 years ago to encourage wind tunnel drying of fish on Abemama 
(an island with a productive lagoon) for sale to Tarawa and Nauru, nothing has changed. 
 
9.15  Shipping 
 
On the outer islands the development of artisanal fisheries is proceeding only slowly. While 
some Government Officers believed the internal shipping service was good, since the sale of 
the old Tautuna and  Le Maori in 1983, there have been fewer vessels available. The 
Moanaraoi calls at the central and southern islands often en route to Funafuti and Suva, and 
the main inter island service is performed by the  Nei Momi. A new vessel for the 
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 Government fleet is expected soon. Two very small privately owned vessels also service the 
northern islands. Fisheries officers believed that the infrequent shipping service was 
hampering their efforts to encourage the marketing of dried fish, sharks fin and other marine 
products. 
 
9.16   The Cooperative Movement 
 
The cooperative movement is very important in Kiribati as the main retail outlet, the main 
copra marketing agency, and the principal wholesaler for most goods. As it is ultimately 
controlled by its members, it represents popular participation in the market sector where 
growth in market sales or copra purchases is reflected in increased dividends to members. It 
is also the major vehicle for training local people in business management, in book keeping, 
accounting and other valued skills. In the early 1970s after several years of sustained effort 
and effective leadership by senior Kiribati officers and a few experienced expatriates, the 
cooperative movement appeared to be reasonably strong and in a sound economic state on 
many of the islands. Although it was too early to be completely confident, there were 
grounds for hope that over the next decade or so the principles of cooperation would be 
widely assimilated and localisation of staff would be completed. Unfortunately, the situation 
in 1984 is worrying, with many societies on outer islands in poor shape, with many instances 
of malpractice occurring, and the former healthy profits have now often become quite 
marginal. 
 
It appears that with Independence, localisation might have proceeded rather too rapidly and 
some of the former cardinal principles of management were overlooked. Thus, Managers or 
Auditors were posted to their home islands rather than to other islands where the absence of 
relatives would remove the pressures to issue secret credit, or to write off unpaid debts etc. 
Thus the Society collapsed on Butaritari, disputes became common, and since the societies 
on Abaiang, Marakei and Tabiteuea South couldn't agree as to the composition of their 
committees, the Kiribati Cooperative Wholesale Society (KCWS) has provided Managers to 
run them. This situation is another instance of failure to observe “tried and true” methods 
and the continuity necessary for the socio cultural situation of Kiribati, so that newcomers 
have to “reinvent the wheel” again every few years, in returning to basic principles. The 
cooperative movement, now known as the KCWS also believes that in such a small economy 
as Kiribati it is a mistake for Government to believe that effective competition can be 
introduced to promote efficiency. Following the collapse in the late 1970s of the over large 
Gilbert Islands Development Authority (GIDA) which had amalgamated wholesaling,  
shipping and public works, these functions again became separate departments. But a firm, 
Atoll Products, was set up to handle importing, only for it later to go into liquidation. 
Wholesaling then returned to the old situation in which the cooperatives had in effect 
monopoly control. At the insistence of one Minister, however, Government regarded the 
KCWS as “too big an empire” and decided to introduce competition by setting up the 
Abamakoro Trading Company. Although the Government, through the Loans Board, had 
invested A$932,000 in the Cooperatives Federation, it also became a 70 percent shareholder 
in Abamakoro. 
 
Cooperatives officers complain that in a semi subsistence country of only 60,000 people, the 
volume of merchandise is too small to warrant two major enterprises. They duplicate 
unnecessarily a number of functions and split bulk buying between them. There are 
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 additional problems of two organisations trying to compete for limited space on the few 
inter-island ships. The KCWS complain that the Abamakoro Company goes in only for 15 or 
16 fast flowing items and their narrow commercial focus precludes adopting a wider, more 
socially desirable role. Thus when the Cooperatives had a monopoly and were economically 
strong, there were some grounds for hope that the trend to create a “consumer society” by 
purchasing larger and larger quantities of “European foods” that are dietically inferior 
(sugar, refined rice, flour, biscuits, tinned meat), might be ameliorated somewhat by greater 
attention to nutritious foods such as milk powder, stocking valuable capital items (e.g. 
bicycles) and the like. Now both competitiors must pursue a narrow, strictly commercial 
policy. However, at the Annual General Meeting in 1983 the KCWS rejected a proposal to 
amalgamate with Abamakoro. Currently the KCWS has sales of about A$7 million annually 
(two thirds of the total) and Abamakoro about A$3 million, but the latter appears to be 
growing at the expense of the former. 
 
It would appear that it would be wise for the Government to undertake a fresh review of the 
wholesaling and retail field. Much of the analysis providing the basis for a sound policy 
undoubtedly already lies in the files and such excellent reports of the 1960s and early 1970s 
as the two Youngjohn reports and the Howarth Report. This is another instance of 
overlooking the wisdom (often painfully acquired) of a decade or more ago. 
 
Secondly, it is worth reiterating the recommendation of the Rural Socio Economic Survey 
that the I Kiribati continue to show a dynamic grass roots interest in small business 
enterprises (mronrons) and island associations on Tarawa that form their own cooperatives 
(outside the official movement). The continued success of a Nikunau Island cooperative 
(another collapsed) after the earlier spectacular success of a Tamana cooperative on Betio 
illustrate this continuing theme. It is logical to provide such spontaneous groups with 
training in management and business skills rather than to restrict it only to the official 
cooperative societies; after all it takes no more time to teach 50 people as it does five! 
 
9.17   Telecommunications 
 
Recently the EEC offered Kiribati assistance to introduce a modern system of 
telecommunications. At Independence the main concern in the country had been to improve 
the system of internal communications between Tarawa and the outer islands. However, 
there appears to have been suggestions from Britain and Australia to accept the EEC offer 
which was on favourable terms for a A$5 million facility which will be the most modern in 
the Central West Pacific region. The new technology involves internal communication via 
satellite with the introduction of a Standard “B” Earth Station due to be commissioned about 
July 1984. The digital exchanges in three main centres on south Tarawa are due to be inter 
connected by means of multi channel PCM Multiflex radio links. 
 
The transfer of technology in Kiribati is very dependent on the level of expertise of the local 
staff. With the introduction of digital exchanges and use of satellites the country becomes 
dependent on foreign expertise for a good number of years to come. Training of local staff to 
an intermediate level is done through the Regional Telecommunications Training Centre and 
Fiji Institute of Technology in Suva. More basic training is carried out at the International 
Telecommunications Union (ITU) Basic Training Centre in Suva and about 35 staff in the 
country have passed through the course.  This is considered adequate but much more 
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 specialist training in areas like digital techniques and switching, satellite engineering and 
radio transmission are now considered essential. It will be important to develop the 
organisation on the maintenance of common systems in use, but heavy reliance for these 
sophisticated skills on bilateral and multilateral aid is likely to occur for many years. Since 
the world's first communications satellite Intelsat 1, or Early Bird, was placed in orbit in 
1965, the rapid advances in telecommunications technology seem to have been accompanied 
by a modish mystification process of the perceived benefits and by increasing acceptance of 
or commitment to the sophisticated technology associated with “modernisation”.  Much of 
this process seems to be linked to the promotion of science and technology in advanced 
countries such as the United States or the countries of the EEC, and agencies such as 
International Telecommunications Union. The East West Centre publishes jointly with the 
Pacific Islands News Association the  Pacific Islands Communication Journal which is most 
active in the promotion of telecommunications and other modern communications systems. 
While sophisticated modern benefits are frequently emphasised and assumptions are 
continually made about what is good for Pacific Island nations, the journal is conspicuously 
silent about the relevance and precise economic benefits that the costly innovations are 
likely to bring. It was sad to note that local officers in Tarawa could not justify or explain 
precisely just what real benefits the costly new systems would bring. And in the meantime, 
while the Government favoured making improvements in internal communications between 
Tarawa and the outer islands by an integration of satellite and terrestrial systems, this seems 
to have been left aside because of the concentration on international links. While 
metropolitan powers, international agencies and banking and business interests appear to be 
the chief promotors, Pacific Island elites are also behind it, as illustrated by the Pacific 
Islands Prime Ministers' request in 1972 for technical and financial assistance from the ITU, 
and the charging of SPEC by the Forum in 1973 to assist in the “coordination of the 
development of Regional telecommunications”18. “Coordination of the development” of 
telecommunications has a strong suggestion of external pressure on small nations to fit in 
with broader regional or international needs. 
 
Of course, there are some substantial, precise benefits, such as the deployment of the ATS 1 
satellite to combat a cholera epidemic in Kiribati, or the University of the South Pacific 
educational extension services carried out through the satellite.19 But the strategy, or even 
the cult of “wiring” little island societies into “planetary culture”, of “leap frogging” from a 
subsistence economy to a modern information era of the post industrial society, of creating 
an “information economy” in which information becomes the engine of growth   not the raw 
muscle power or energy that had characterised the industrial society   may create as many 
problems as it solves. It certainly raises a number of questions. How does the “information 
revolution” meet the real needs of the 99 percent of Kiribati people for example, compared 
to the one percent in finance, business or banking? And while it might be a highly effective 
strategy for Lee Kuan Yu to use telematics (telecommunications infrastructures and 
computers) to turn Singapore into a new, dynamic world financial centre, how does it fit in 
Kiribati conditions where a modern business sector doesn't exist? And the cult associated 
with the global information and telematic revolution almost inevitably carries with it the 
danger of ignoring or rejecting all the other small scale, down to earth appropriate 
technologies of the Schumacher type. 
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9.18   Christmas Island 
 
In recent years growing attention has been focussed on the potential of Christmas, both as an 
outlet for surplus population, but more particularly for a number of revenue generating 
projects. Earlier in the 1970s attention focussed on the possibility of developing copra 
production on an efficient, Government managed plantation basis, but output has varied 
markedly. In the last year or two the steady increase in the number of American tourists 
from Hawaii visiting the island primarily because of its excellent fishing has attracted 
attention to the need to expand the hotel. Promotion of the island in Honolulu seems to have 
been successful, and it is interesting to speculate whether the same agent could promote 
Kiribati millionaire's salad (a luxury food for hotels) as another possible source of income. 
Air Tungaru, which is losing about $1.5 million annually on its international flights (the 
internal air service is said to break even) has reached agreement with New Zealand for 
landing rights in Rarotonga, enabling flights along the Hawaii Christmas Rarotonga 
Auckland route. Another attraction for tourists is the bird life, and here it would seem 
important that the increase in the numbers of visitors needs to be managed in a way that does 
not conflict with the preservation of this resource; possible establishment of a wildlife 
sanctuary is being considered. 
 
Another project, funded under New Zealand aid, is solar powered salt production. The 
experimental work was proceeding well until the heavy floods occasioned by the El Nino 
climatic oscillation caused a temporary setback to the project. The immediate aim is to 
provide the local market with all its requirements for salt.  
 
9.19  The “Modernisation” of the Abemana Economy:The Growth of Dependency 
 
If we attempt to view the evolution of the islands' economy over time, what characteristics 
can be discerned? Studies carried out by the Rural Socio Economic Survey on four islands 
show clearly enough that the “economy is an accretion of separate, poorly articulated 
traditional activities: fishing, the collection of coconuts, toddy, gathering fruit such as 
pandanus, breadfruit and  te bero, and babai growing in pits dug down to the fresh water 
lens. In modern times money earning activities have been grafted on to this loose 
assemblage through circular migration to places of employment such as the phosphate 
islands, Tarawa, the Line Islands plantations, or work on ships. A little unskilled labouring 
may be done from time to time on outer islands such as stevedoring, working for the island 
council or the Cooperative Society. A major feature of participation in the cash economy is 
the remittance back to spouses, parents or other close relatives of sizeable sums of money. 
Indeed, this is now so important in the economy of outer islands as to represent a very 
substantial part of total island income, and in many cases household income, so that we can 
talk of the subsidisation of islands by off island earnings. Other local sources of money may 
be earned form time to time by the sale of dried fish, doughnuts, sweets, sour toddy, bread or 
other items to supplement the sale of copra, which in years when the copra price is high, 
might make up to two thirds of the income in some outer islands. In short, detailed study 
over the course of a year of households' sources of income, of employment histories and of 
household economic strategies as revealed in the allocation of time, show islanders to be 
rational opportunists who are very situation bound in their response to conditions, depending 
often on two, three or four sources of money income as well as a variety of sources of 
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 subsistence income.20 They are “part peasant”, “part proletarian”, part time traders, partly 
dependent on remittances from relatives and partly dependent on subsistence gardening, 
gathering and fishing. 
TABLE 9.9 
 
Empirical Indices of Dependence 
                                                                                                                                              
 
1. Decay of subsistence economy    - decline babai 
       - loss of traditional skills 
       - fishing 
       - toddy 
       - babai 
2. Large % senile palms 
 
3. Bypassing traditional socio political structure 
 
4. Rise in money incomes done little to enhance human welfare 
 
5 .Decline in nutrition 
 
6. Educationally and culturally, an uncritical imitation of western standards - 
verbalistic, non technical school curriculum 
 
7. Government   benevolent paternalism & non involvement of people 
 
8. Developing regional disparities (core periphery) 
 
9. Developing class formation 
 
10. Developing elite. 
                                                                                                                                                                      
 
At the same time, when viewed over time, a number of empirical indices of growing 
dependency become apparent. These are set out in Table 9.9. There is a slow decay or 
weakening of the subsistence economy, marked by the abandonment of babai pits and skills 
of babai cultivation, a loss of traditional skills in fishing, sailing canoes and toddy cutting, 
and a passing away of valuable traditional home activities based on local ecological 
conditions. On Abemama, and perhaps in some other islands, there is a large percentage of 
senile palms and the rate of replanting is low. While there has been a rise in money incomes, 
this has been accompanied by a growing dependence on the store and imported starches, 
with all the consequent dependence on world prices, inflation, shipping services, freight 
rates and other external circumstances which villagers are powerless to control. In short, the 
acquisition of money incomes has done little to enhance human welfare (except perhaps 
spending on school fees) and has been accompanied by a decline in nutrition. 
 
At the same time traditional socio political structures and the sanctity of the maneaba 
(community meeting house) have weakened over time or been by passed and the authority of 
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 elders has declined. New decision making bodies with no legitimacy in traditional terms 
have emerged. Educationally and culturally, there has been a rather uncritical imitation of 
western standards, and school curricula notably lack emphasis on practical or technical skills 
that would be useful for living on outer islands. A pattern of Government evolved in the 
colonial era in which “Tarawa” was seen as a foreign source of authority, characterised 
perhaps by policies of benevolent paternalism but also by the non involvement of the people. 
(There might have been some improvement in this area with Independence). The 
pronounced and flagrant regional economic disparities between Tarawa (the “core”) and the 
outer islands (the “periphery”) that existed in the 1950s and 1960s became even greater in 
the 1970s. Accompanying this changing spatial pattern of the country which reflects 
fundamental changes in its economic structure is the emergence for the first time of new 
classes (permanent wage earners, civil servants and technocrats) which ends forever the old 
equality. And within the newly emerging classes can be identified a new elite, comprising 
the better educated senior civil servants and politicians who are now the key decision makers 
and power wielders. However, a close examination might well reveal growing dependence 
of the new classes and the new elite on overseas ideas, capital, skill or technology. In short, 
the pattern of “development” reveals, on close examination, a process of breaking down as 
well as building up and many new forms of dependence emerging. 
 
9.20   Population Policy 
 
A common tendency of countries afflicted by rapid population growth is to search for empty 
regions to accommodate population overspill, or for “safety valves”.  While this is logical 
enough, it is not always widely appreciated that officially sponsored planned colonisation 
schemes are frequently enormously expensive (usually much more so than the original 
projections) and in many cases are either failures, or achieve only a limited degree of 
success.21 While planned colonisation might play a part as an adjunct to a coherent 
population control policy, they can be less than useful if they divert attention away from the 
central issue. 
 
The central issue in Kiribati is the control of the natural rate of increase and a widely 
publicised birth control programme in the Gilbert and Ellice Islands from about 1969 to 
1973 showed convincingly that considerable success could be achieved without great cost. 
In this case the central issue was tackled rather than seeking a diversion such as resettlement 
of the Line Islands. Government gave highest priority to the Family Planning Campaign; a 
team of dedicated volunteer nurses were trained and an enviable reputation was built for 
professional competence and effective extension work. The team visited villages in the outer 
islands in a carefully planned campaign, supported by the media, and concentrating on the 
use of the loop as the major contraceptive. Over the four year period one third of all eligible 
women were using a reliable method of contraception and the 1973 census shows that the 
growth rate had dropped to 1.71 percent. At that point the World Health Organisation took 
increasing influence over the campaign, which was absorbed into the general Maternal and 
Child Health Service. The carefully selected, trained and dedicated unit of family planning 
nurses was disbanded. WHO suggested that receptors should have more options as to 
technique, including use of deprovera injections and the pill. At the same time, the 
opposition of the Catholic Church to artificial contraception appeared to have stiffened. The 
use of deprovera, pill or safe period of the month do not appear to have been effective under 
Kiribati conditions. By 1978 it appears that only about one eighth of eligible women were 
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 using a reliable method of contraception and the population growth rate had risen again to 
2.24 percent. In spite of their experience in population control in other countries the 
approaches advocated by WHO were not successful in the Gilbert and Ellice. Moreover, 
their interference was uncalled for when the campaign had fully proven itself. Indeed, any 
new revived family planning campaign would be well advised to model itself on the 
successful organisation and techniques of the 1969-73 campaign.22 
 
9.21 Resettlement 
 
As suggested this is best viewed as an adjunct to, rather than a substitute for a family 
planning programme. The possibilities and potential of under exploited areas of land, lagoon 
and coastal waters in the Line and Phoenix Groups have been discussed by Pitchford (1981) 
and the Resources Survey Team (1983). 
 
The settlement of the Phoenix Islands (Orona, Manra and Nikumaroro) was undertaken by 
the Government of the G.E.I.C. in the mid 1930s, and its final abandonment in 1955 is often 
attributed to the severity of drought and/or the high cost of the scheme. Pitchford (1981) 
asserts however, that fishing was better there than in the Gilberts and there were adequate 
supplies of coconuts for subsistence and for making copra. Indeed, he states that the real 
reason for the abandonment of the settlement had never been committed to paper before: the 
settlers heard that the Government was acquiring better and larger islands in the Solomons 
for resettlement and as an official evaluation party appeared over the horizon they 
deliberately stripped palms of their nuts and polluted the wells to ensure that the visitors 
recommended their removal to more favoured islands! This indeed is what happened. 
 
An expedition to the Line and Phoenix Groups in 1976 stated that some of appeared to have 
the most potential. In 1978 a survey team went to Nikamaroro and also confirmed the view 
that it would have no difficulty in sustaining a resettled community. The 1979-82 
Development Plan also identified Caroline Island and proposed that some islands that 
already had inhabitants   Christmas, Fanning and Washington Islands   could take additional 
numbers. The 1983-86 Development Plan repeats the national concern over land shortage, 
the lack of outlets for population overspill and the possibilities for resettlement. 
 
The Resources Survey Team found that the potential for resettlement of Fanning and 
Washington is quite limited. The need to replant coconut palms on Fanning is incompatible 
to some extent with resettlement. They believe that only about 5000 to 6500 settlers could be 
safely accommodated on these two islands and that any relocation of settlers should be done 
gradually and cautiously. Even if ecological conditions are as encouraging as they seem (and 
this warrants further research in depth), the greatest difficulty of all is probably the extreme 
isolation of the islands from Tarawa, 2000 miles away, and from shipping lanes. At the 
moment, these islands are visited only about twice a year and the estimated annual 
production of copra of about 500 tonnes (declining) for Fanning and the high yield of 
between 500 and 1000 tonnes for Washington are not likely to lead to much incentive for 
new shipping services given the enormous distances involved.  
 
Some major new inducement, such as opening up a new lucrative market for Millionaire's 
Salad in Hawaiian hotels, 1500 miles to the north east, is probably needed. The Resources 
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 Survey Team (1983) does, however, provide useful documentation. Further research is 
probably called for. 
 
9.22   The Future : A Retreat into Subsistence? 
 
Few countries in the Third World face such a grim future. With the loss of 90 percent of its 
exports, and the likely cessation of British budget support after 1986, it seems inevitable that 
Kiribati will have little alternative but to retreat into the subsistence economy and the 
associated traditional practices and culture that are likely to sustain it. It is sadly ironic that 
so many development projects have achieved so little or have failed abysmally in these 
remote, tiny fragments of land that lie widely dispersed in the vast Pacific Ocean. This is 
really scarcely surprising, for it is extremely difficult to achieve economic growth on a coral 
atoll, so that the main legacy of decades of development is a society that has been shaped by 
alien influences, nurtured false hopes and unrealistic expectations, and beguiled by spurious 
prophets to follow often the wrong paths of development (see “The Future of the Gilberts 
and Tuvalu”,  Geddes et al (1982), Chapter 15). In sum, overseas aid has tended to “muck 
up” Kiribati as well as to weaken the old socio economic structures. But on the whole, 
British colonialism was benign and paternalistically protective, so that many of the 
traditional skills, so essential for survival on an atoll, fortunately still survive   in sharp 
contrast to the totally transformed and dependent juke box culture nearby in American 
Micronesia. The force of the old social pattern   often cursed by expatriate innovators   might 
yet reassert itself, enabling the society to survive with dignity and without self pity, though 
in a state of impoverishment. Aid policies in the future should accept this simple fact and not 
try to weaken subsistence23  - as if it is a mere relic of an inferior past - but indeed attempt to 
strengthen it. 
 
In considering initiatives for the future, three policies stand out as of paramount significance, 
in addition to the importance of the subsistence economy. A new and radically reorganised 
coconut replanting campaign is needed   both to provide adequate food supplies for a rapidly 
rising population, and to ensure copra production in the future. In the cash economy, the 
plan to build a larger fleet of tuna fishing vessels served by the appropriate shore facilities is 
of great importance, enabling the country to exploit as fully as is currently feasible, its 
richest current asset   large schools of skipjack tuna. And finally, in view of the apparently 
rapid rate of population increase, currently believed to be growing at 2.2 percent annually, a 
renewed family planning campaign closely modelled on the successful approach of 1969-73, 
would appear to warrant high priority. 
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CHAPTER TEN 
 
TUVALU 
 
Tuvalu, a country of 8,000 living in an area of less than 10 square miles, is one of the 
smallest colonies ever to achieve independence. This was a bold decision and one which has 
major consequences, not only for Tuvalu, but also for her Pacific neighbours, in view of the 
nation's dubious economic viability. 
 
10.1  Society 
 
The Tuvalu people are a strongly cohesive, missioned society, with a strong ethic of sharing, 
equality and community support. They are a proud, friendly people with a sense of their own 
superiority - even at times, a touch of arrogance. Outer islands contain a considerable 
reservoir of skilled people. The Ekalesia or body of Church members is a very strong 
community and the church guides the direction of island affairs. Tuvalu people have for 
several decades shown a lively interest in the outside world, in achievement orientation and 
in the acquisition of more Western goods. Whether this can be attributed to the influence of 
early missionaries, the early establishment of secondary education on Vaitupu, or more 
probably to Tuvalu value orientation, is not certain. One possibility, advanced by Chambers1 
is the “pouliuli myth”, an attitude that assumed that traditional Tuvalu culture was inferior to 
western, that local customs belonged to the days of darkness (pouliuli) and must be 
discarded in favour of enlightened ones from European culture. At any rate, Tuvaluans often 
seek to transcend the limitations of their habitat by welcoming social change, education and 
embracing most Western culture traits. 
 
Situation at Independence 
 
10.2 Resources 
 
What was the situation of Tuvalu at independence in 1978? The nine tiny islands have no 
land resources of any significance and offer only the most limited and bleak prospects of 
agricultural production. On some islands the sandy or stony coral soils suffer from a serious 
mineral deficiency: on Vaitupu up to three quarters of the coconut palms do not bear nuts. 
 
Nanumea is a typical atoll, with a lagoon. Nanumaga, Niutao and Niulakita are reef islands, 
consisting of a single islet made up of sand and coral material thrown up by wind and wave 
action. They lack open lagoons but have internal salt lakes. Vaitupu is the largest island with 
20% of the total land area of Tuvalu; it is intermediate between an atoll and reef island, 
having a virtually land locked central lagoon. Funafuti, the capital island and Nukufetau are 
the only islands to have lagoons that are navigable by ocean going vessels. Water is one of 
the scarcest and most important resources and improved water catchment and collection are 
major objects of public works programmes. 
 
Population densities are amongst the highest in the Pacific, varying in 1979 from 156 to 405 
per square km. on the outer islands and averaging 307 per sq. km. On several islands, the 
whole population is concentrated on a single islet.
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Apart from the coconut palm, the only crops produced are pulaka (Cystosperma chamissonis), 
taro, pandanus breadfruit, papaya, bananas, sugar cane and sweet potatoes. The output of 
copra, the only export, is very small, and extremely variable on these densely populated 
islands. Palms grow on lands usually less than 0.5 hectare in size and the erratic and 
unpredictable production of copra reflects the interaction of a set of factors such as cash 
demands, alternative money sources, the price of copra, rat damage, rainfall variability and 
other adverse factors. In the years 1973 and 1974 during which the price of copra varied from 
$59.7 to $110.1 per tonne, copra production varied from 65 to 559 tonnes. Again in 1976 only 
60 tonnes were produced, while in 1979 723 tonnes were harvested. Mean production is 381 
tonnes. 
 
It is clear that the greatest hope for the future lies in the sea. The vast distances that separate 
the individual islands make internal communication difficult and costly, for the islands span an 
expanse 600 kms in width, and Funafuti is itself 600 sea miles from Fiji. But with the 
establishment of the 200 mile E.E.Z., an area of 778,000 sq. kms. became available for 
exploration. Only a tiny fraction of this huge area can be used by Tuvalu fishermen and 
effective exploitation of skipjack tuna and other pelagic resources requires a great increase in 
the capital resources needed to develop the industry, whether for catching fish (boats, nets, 
gear), storage and handling (freezers etc.) and the many skills involved in all branches. 
  
10.3 Political Resources and Constitutional Factors 
 
At the political and governmental level, it has been said that Tuvalu was most ill-prepared for 
independence. There was a striking shortage of experience and skill and in one Ministry, 
neither the Minister nor Permanent Secretary were educated beyond primary level. This quality 
must not be exaggerated however, for Tuvaluans excelled in many Government posts in the 
former Gilbert and Ellice Colony and many men have gained skills overseas before returning 
to village life. More serious is the lack of continuity in public service positions, a 
determination of the first Government to scrap procedures begun in the colonial era simply 
because it was the colonial era (e.g. a completely new Public Service Commission was 
appointed) and frequent replacements have sometimes been made of the heads of government 
departments. 
 
Moreover, the process of political development was inordinately rapid: the country was 
required to compress “fifty years of history into five”-  the period from separation from the 
Gilberts to political independence, and the period of internal self government was only six 
months. Small wonder that some political problems have emerged. Moreover, as an 
experienced Colonial administrator has remarked it was perhaps unfortunate that the 
Constitutional Committee's recommendation that the orthodox Westminster system be slightly 
modified to allow the Governor-General rather more powers than is usual, in order to provide 
“a valuable safeguard against possible abuse of power” was later over-ruled, with the 
Governor-General's powers reduced and the Chief Minister's increased. The Sidney Gross 
affair, which stripped Tuvalu of much of its reserve funds, caused a financial crisis, and 
eventually brought down the first government of the independent country, illustrates perhaps 
the folly of dispensing with constitutional safeguards against the exercise of great power by 
any individual minister. 
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In spite of the seriousness of these problems, the Tuvalu nation has in other respects an 
enviable record. This proud and happy people manage their affairs without riots, bloodshed or 
unseemly publicity. Once a decision has been taken, people are usually loyal to their leaders, 
and tolerant of their actions. The desire to avoid confrontations or any loss of face leads to a 
remarkable constancy in political life. This pays dividends in terms of political stability. 
 
10.4  The Independence Settlement 
 
Many observers considered that at independence Tuvalu was generously endowed with aid 
money. It is perhaps unfortunate that the United Kingdom did not agree to Tuvalu's proposal at 
the independence conference for a once and for all lump sum, to be invested as a reserve fund 
to provide a steady income in place of periodic budgetary aid. Such a step would have given 
the country a greater chance of financial as well as political independence, and accorded with 
the first Chief Minister's laudable determination to become progressively less reliant over time 
on overseas aid. Admittedly, with the wisdom of hindsight, we can see the sense of an 
experienced colonial administrator's comment that “those who have to deal with the affairs of 
Tuvalu in London, Canberra and Wellington in years to come, will regret the decision” to opt 
for periodic budgetary aid in preference to a lump sum reserve fund: “For the level of 
budgetary aid granted has been high enough for the country to take on recurrent commitments, 
the cost of which will inevitably escalate with inflation”. Instead the country veered over a 
three year period from an embarrassment of aid moneys to a liquidity and financial crisis. 
Indeed, the country has been beset by powerful contradictory influences. Apart from its grant 
aid allocation of up to $1 million p.a. Britain granted a special $5 million fund, and the United 
Nations made an independence grant of $1.5 million. Over the early period, before and after 
independence, the country was constantly beset by donor countries, who exhorted Tuvalu to 
think of ways in which to spend the various grants. New Zealand too was upset that the 
country was only using a quarter or so of its allocation of aid funds. This situation was strongly 
reminiscent of Tarawa and Guadalcanal at the beginning of the 1970s when the inflow of 
overseas aid was embarrassingly large and “development performance” was often equated with 
the capacity of the administration to “absorb” those funds and dispense with them in ways 
acceptable to the accountants. The confusion between improving administration to handle aid 
and achieving genuine development is unfortunate. When viewed in a longer perspective (and 
a few years later, at the time of the financial crisis) this situation is sadly ironic. The question 
hinges fundamentally on two crucial issues: the direction (or directions) in which Tuvalu is 
headed as a country, and the matter of scale. 
 
10.5  Goals of Development 
 
In the period leading up to independence, two opposing philosophies predominated amongst 
planners and politicians: the local view that Tuvalu should be equipped, as rapidly as possible, 
with a modern infrastructure comparable to that existing in neighbouring countries and the 
opposing external view that the territory should be set up cheaply along traditional lines of 
yesteryear as “a settlement of happy smiling natives living in leaf huts and lavalavas”.  
Inevitably in such a period of rapid change the former view of the local people, supported by 
the developmental ideas of visiting aid personnel, won the day, at least in Funafuti. It may well 
be that such an outcome was inevitable: “a stoneage oasis in the modern world is just not 
practicable”.  But it also appears that the full implications of creating a machine age twentieth 
century oasis in a remote atoll economy were not fully thought-out. It is now becoming 
  - 267 -
apparent that the rapid development of infrastructure on Funafuti has created a situation where 
recurrent costs are becoming a major problem. The aspirations of the people (already much 
higher than in neighbouring Kiribati) have been fanned, the infrastructure has not generated 
economic growth, and great economic and social disparities have been created between 
Funafuti and the outer islands. 
 
Per capita GDP is estimated (1982) to be A$763 for Funafuti, but only $209 for the outer 
islands (subsistence food production is not included). The growing over-population problem on 
Funafuti is becoming intense: Fongafale, the main islet of Funafuti, has a population density of 
1,640 people per sq. km. With increasing drunkenness, crime, illegitimate births, it is feared 
that social stress and health hazards will be magnified if Fongafale's population density 
increases much further. This tendency of growing disparities between the centre and outer 
islands, which occurs in many Pacific Island states, is especially marked in Tuvalu; it leads to 
tension and internal disunity, reflected to some extent, for instance, in the abortive movements 
for the secession of Nanumea and Funafuti (P.I.M.). Too often donor countries appear to take 
little account of the pace of change and the need of islanders to fully accept and accommodate 
the new innovations, which include new systems of organisation and life ways. 
 
Attempts at modernisation, moreover, must come to terms with the essential fragility of life in 
an atoll environment and the delicate adjustments that populations have worked out after 
centuries of trial and error adaptations to one of the most limited and difficult environments in 
the world. It is vitally important that aid does not disturb or threaten this adaptation. Secondly, 
in a country of less than 10 sq. miles, the question of scale must never be overlooked in aid 
programmes. Closely related to this are innovations that are appropriate to an atoll 
environment and a distinctive and cohesive Polynesian culture. 
 
10.6  Economic Viability 
 
In view of the goals that have been accepted of equipping Funafuti at least with a modern 
infrastructure, the concept of national viability, alluded to above, requires definition. An 
acceptable definition is that used in the Kiribati decentralisation report to mean “the capacity 
of a country to feed and look after its population from its own resources” (Green, Bukhari and 
Lawrence, 1981). It is clear however that “looking after” a population in the modern world 
involves overseas training, maintaining diplomatic posts, membership of regional organisations 
which have substantial subscription fees, and numerous other commitments. It is clear that in 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs memoranda and in Government circles generally, the term 
“viability” implies a nation's ability to meet all such costs as well as to provide basic needs 
such as food, water, housing and education for its population. While Tuvalu can perhaps be 
regarded as “viable” according to the former, more limited definition, it is certainly not viable 
in this wider sense. For instance, it has been dependent on overseas aid to make up the 
$226,000 operating loss on the air link to Fiji, which it sees as its main link with the outside 
world. Tuvalu is a member of the Forum and South Pacific Commission but is less than 
enthusiastic about some other regional bodies, partly because of the cost of membership in 
relationship to perceived benefits. Thus, it requested that New Zealand pay the $70,000 fee 
owing to the University of the South Pacific. And maintenance of the internal air service, 
which Tuvalu politicians regard as essential for preserving harmony and unity, cost $400,000 
annually, supported by British aid. In August 1983 this ceased and since then only the rare 
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charter of an amphibious plane from Fiji for special occasions has occurred; normal inter 
island communication is a month long voyage on the decrepit Nivaga. 
 
10.7  Population 
 
The total population was estimated to have reached 8,364 by 1983. An unusual characteristic 
about the population is its sex composition: at the 1979 census there were only 87 males per 
100 females. This clearly reflects the absence of young men overseas in employment. The age 
structure shows 33.5 percent of the population to be under 15 years. The crude birth rate was 
23.7 per 1000 total population and crude death rate 15.0 per 1000. (Infant mortality rate 42 per 
1000 live births). The expectation of life at birth is 57 years for males or 60 years for females. 
 
The recent acceleration in the growth rate of the population gives grounds for concern. The 
population has been greatly affected by the unique historical events of the last 10 years, with 
substantial inflows of Tuvaluans occurring from the Gilberts immediately before and after 
Separation in 1975 and Independence in 1978 (see Fig. 8.1). However, the most significant 
figures are those on the rate of natural increase, which is estimated to have grown from 1.83% 
in 1980 and 1.07% in 1981 to 2.15% in 1982. While too much emphasis should not be put on a 
high figure for a single year, there appears to be an ominous steady upward trend in the period 
since 1979 (Table 10.1). At this rate of 2% per annum increase the population would double 
every 35 years - i.e. reach 17,000 in the year 2008. Moreover the situation is likely to worsen 
when the 800 Tuvaluans currently living in Nauru return home. The Third Development Plan 
suggests several reasons for the accelerated population increase. Improved health care has been 
a benefit, lowering the death rate. The fertility rate has increased due to several factors, 
including a growth in the number of women in the child bearing age groups since 1979, the 
great concentration of working age and child bearing age groups in Funafuti, the optimism and 
higher expectations following Independence and the expenditure of large aid grants, and the 
apparent failure of the Family Planning Programme to achieve a significant impact. 
 
In view of the extremely limited resource base of the country it is essential that the population 
does not grow at a faster rate than the supply of resources; accordingly, the Third Development 
Plan rightly assigns crucial importance to the Family Planning Programme. Assistance in 
achieving this objective, should Tuvalu so desire it, would be a worthy aim for overseas aid 
donors. 
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TABLE 10.1 
Population 
 
Year Total de facto population Estimated de jure population 
1866 2600-2800  
1876 2497  
1881 2630  
1883 2687  
1884 2815  
1885 2902  
1887 2952  
1892 3196  
1895 3226  
1896 3245  
1901 3543  
1909 3128  
1911 3080  
1922 3202  
1931 3994 4089 
1947 4487 5066 
1963 5444 6763 
1968 5782 7465 
1973 5887 7694 
1979 7349 8652 
1983 8364  
   
 
TABLE 10.2 
Population of Funafuti versus the Rest 
Year Funafuti Other Islands Total 
1866 100 2600 2700 
1876 146 2351 2497 
1881 180 2450 2630 
1883 175 2512 2687 
1884 190 2625 2815 
1885 208 1694 2902 
1887 210 2742 2952 
1892 231 2965 3196 
1895 224 3002 3226 
1896 227 3018 3245 
1901 257 3286 3543 
1909 205 2923 3128 
1911 228 2852 3080 
1922 218 2984 3202 
1931 413 3581 3994 
1947 528 3959 4487 
1963 687 4757 5444 
1968 826 4956 5782 
1973 871 5016 5887 
1979 2120 5229 7349 
1983 2620 5744 8364 
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10.8  The Tuvalu Economy 
 
The economy of the country is characterised by its extreme openness, even when compared 
with other South Pacific countries, and hence lack of control that Government can normally 
exert on it. In spite of its very small size, external factors over which Government has little 
control (though it can of course exert an influence) are very dominant: the role of foreign aid, 
variability in international prices for fish and copra, and uncertainty over sources of overseas 
employment which lead to remittances entering the country. Moreover even the largest export 
in terms of revenue, philatelic sales, is critically affected by extraordinary events which are 
rather rare in their occurrence, such as a royal visit. In normal years after such an event sales 
can be expected to drop dramatically. 
 
Since the statistical data base of the country has been altered and improved since 1977, it is 
somewhat hazardous to estimate growth rates with much precision. The Third Development 
Plan however, estimates a Gross Domestic Product at current producers” prices of 
A$3,516,000. Overseas aid over the period of the Second Plan (1980-83) totalled A$12.5 
million, of which the United Kingdom contributed 4.7 million, Australia 2.5, Japan 1.6, New 
Zealand 1.5 and U.N.D.P. 1.0. The 1982 aid moneys received totalled $4.8 million or 122% of 
GDP at market prices; in 1977 and 1981 the aid totalled 57% and 81% respectively. 
 
Another major source of income is remittances, and it is likely that official estimates are very 
rough, since money and gifts are sent back in various ways apart from post office and banking 
channels. However, official figures, for what they are worth, suggest remittances of about 
$643,000 in 1982 (Third Development Plan 1984-1987: 5-10). 
 
In a country which officially espouses a “liberal capitalist” approach, but in which the basic 
production and consumption units are fragmented individual households, any attempts at 
raising monetary incomes are likely to result almost immediately in increased imports. Almost 
all households have access to at least one source of income - usually more. Most households 
derive income from one of three main sources: local wages; remittances and gifts, whether 
solicited or not; and copra, which is the income source in the main for the poorer group of 
households. It is ironic that Government efforts to raise money incomes on the outer islands, 
through promoting copra production, handicrafts and other rural enterprise is at once translated 
into a heavier import bill, worsening the country's overseas exchange situation, since savings 
and investment are almost nil. In Chambers' sample households, 77% of all expenditures were 
spent on store goods, mostly imported food such as flour, rice and sugar. 
 
At the national level imports grew rapidly in the 1977-1980 period, when the optimism of 
Independence, the inflow of substantial aid funds, and the construction boom appear to have 
fanned rising aspirations. Thus imports of food, beverages and tobacco, already high in 1977 at 
$485,000 or almost 39% of all imports, nearly doubled by 1979 to reach $909,000 or 49% of 
all imports. Over the same period commodity export earnings have been extremely low, and 
foreign exchange earnings have been dominated by the great variability of philatelic sales. The 
trends of imports and exports are shown in Table 10.3 and Figure 5.6; imports vastly exceed 
commodity exports and the two bear little relationship to each other. This pattern has, of 
course, major implications for shipping. Vessels bringing cargoes of imported goods to Tuvalu 
have little in the way of exported goods to backload. As we will note below, there is no 
apparent commercial basis for providing shipping services to countries like Tuvalu. 
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These facts, taken in conjunction, largely explain the extraordinary economic problem of 
Tuvalu. Production is largely unrelated to the level of cash activity or income, given the large 
aid flow, substantial remittances and wages and salaries provided by public service 
employment.  
 
Hence the incentive to produce goods for export is very low and the domestic multiplier (i.e. 
the amount of economic activity generated by spending each extra dollar of income) is very 
low, as most spending “leaks” out of the economy through purchase of imports. The Third 
Development Plan suggests that for each extra dollar of income earned at least 80 cents is 
spent on imported goods. While the increased cost of imported fuel is hard to avoid (it grew 
from $173,000 in 1978 to $478,000 in 1982), import substitution in foods will be unavoidable 
if aid ceases. However, such is the marked preference for “European” foods that this would be 
very hard to achieve. 
TABLE 10.3 
Tuvalu Balance of Payments Data 
1982 Australian dollars 000 
Year 
Commodity 
imports 
FOB 
Commodity 
exports 
Philatelic 
income Remittances
Change 
in 
reserves 
Balancing 
item 
(including 
aid) 
1977 1,989 74 n.a. n.a.   
1978 2,309 52 n.a. n.a.   
1979 2,481 325 1,395   
1980 3,842 86 739 500? 232 2,749
1981 2,877 32 2,339 550? 527 483
1982 2,890 27 1,077 643 1,679 2,822
              
 
The strategic objectives of economic policy, as set out in the Third Development Plan (p.1-1) 
are threefold: 
1) The continued development of a sense of national identity and commonness of purpose 
amongst all the peoples of Tuvalu. 
 
2) The strengthening and diversification of the Tuvalu economy as a means towards 
achieving ultimate self reliance. 
 
3) To continue to improve the standard of life of the people to reasonable levels that will 
ensure secure, healthy and productive family life within the traditional social system and 
customs in all islands. 
 
Obliged to work within these parameters, the planners have assembled the usual list of projects 
which might be undertaken (basically with finance derived from aid), but were able to avoid 
the question of whether the central goals of policy, listed above, are either feasible or sensible. 
Some notes of caution are sounded on pp.1-3 and 1-4; 
 
“Recurrent budget support from external sources will be required 
until new sources of revenue are developed. Government recognises 
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that if self-reliance is to be achieved it can only be done by the 
careful management of the country's finances ... 
 
(In connection with “the National objective of self reliance”): The 
economy of Tuvalu is very open and policies to manage the 
country's finances and economic affairs may need to be introduced 
to govern, inter alia, trade and foreign exchange. 
 
The Government recognises the ambitiousness of some of the 
objectives which it has set for the nation and is fully aware of the 
problems and constraints which will need to be overcome in the 
achievement of the objectives. 
 
It further realises that the achievement of some of the objectives 
may make the achievement of others more difficult. For example the 
cultural traditions of the community could be eroded by continued 
economic development...” 
 
A glance at Table 10.3 shows that if “self reliance” is taken seriously (which in fact it probably 
isn't by any of the actors) and if the third objective (continued improvement of the standard of 
living) is adhered to, then the country is aiming to generate an additional $3 million or so of 
foreign exchange income per year. If achieved, this would permit the maintenance of more or 
less the present standard of living without external aid. The “gap” which is supposed to be thus 
filled amounts to nearly three times the earnings from Tuvalu's main bonanza to data - stamps - 
and five times the income from migrant remittances. (Not to mention, one hundred times the 
existing total level of commodity exports). The only undeveloped commercial resource of any 
significance identified in the Plan is fisheries, which were expected to yield about $200,000 in 
licence fees from foreign vessels in the EEZ during 1982 (Plan: 10-5). This substantial return 
in the form of a rent on the country's EEZ is only one fifteenth of the amount required to reach 
“self reliance” at existing living standards; and the history of attempts during 1980-1982 to 
establish a Tuvaluan fishing sector, with the  Te Tautai, suggests that the potential for future 
increases in fisheries revenues should not be overestimated.2 The prospects of philatelic 
operations are brighter.3 
 
All in all, the evidence from the Plan is that self-reliance on the basis of domestic resource 
development is not a feasible goal, unless living standards are cut dramatically. Present living 
standards are derived from the MIRAB system, with aid the dominant component but 
remittances varying significantly. It is apparent that the ostensible pursuit of self reliance is 
really a rhetorical device to maintain credibility in the world of so-called “development aid”.  
Tuvalu's present and future living standards hinge crucially upon continued success in 
attracting external financial assistance and in securing offshore employment opportunities for 
Tuvaluan workers. The first of these receives no direct discussion in the Plan, which is a 
logical consequence of the rhetorical commitment to phasing out recurrent grants-in-aid as a 
source of government revenue (p.4-5) and of the pretence which therefore has to be maintained 
in Chapter 40 (“Financing the Plan”) that all external aid will be directed towards 
“development” as distinct from the on-going subsidisation of living standards. 
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The second key issue, migration opportunities, is recognised in passing among the secondary 
Plan objectives, which include4 
 
 (iv) “To develop employment opportunities both locally and 
overseas for those who wish for regular employment.” 
 
The question of overseas employment openings, however, is dealt with in only three 
paragraphs (pp.6-9 and 6-10) and is treated as something largely outside the control of the 
Tuvaluan Government. 
 
The Plan document, like its predecessors, is unable to come explicitly to grips with the 
problems of managing the Tuvalu economy. It provides merely a checklist of spending 
opportunities for the benefit of present and potential aid donors. Many of the spending 
opportunities are worthwhile as contributions to the enhancement of the quality of life in 
Tuvalu, but it is sheer delusion to suggest that as a package they contribute in any way towards 
“increased self-reliance”; on the contrary, many of the additional services proposed will 
impose an increased level of on going need for external funding. 
 
The “trade-offs” delicately alluded to by the plan authors boil down, in fact, to the simple fact 
that increased self reliance means lower living standards unless there is a breakthrough in the 
external labour market, which would enable Tuvaluans to raise their overseas earning power, 
and hence the level of remittances, towards the level typical of the Cook Islands. (Remittance 
flows from New Zealand to the Cook Islands are roughly NZ$250 per capita p.a.; Tuvaluan 
remittances are A$75. A trebling of remittances would go far towards eliminating the financing 
gap in the Tuvaluan balance of payments). In fact the external labour market has been closing 
in on Tuvalu rather than opening out; the return of former civil servants from Tarawa in the 
1970s was followed by a decline in employment on Nauru (which will cease altogether in 
about ten years) and no major improvement of opportunities on foreign shipping lines, which 
are a major source of jobs for Tuvaluan seamen. “Underground” movement of Tuvaluan labour 
to New Zealand and the USA has not yet reached the proportions necessary to make a real 
impact on the balance of payments; and Tuvalu has refrained from putting major diplomatic 
effort into any attempt to gain “above-board” access to the New Zealand, Australian, or US 
labour markets. 
 
Lack of progress (or even policy initiative) on the labour market front, combined with the 
declared UK policy of running down the recurrent grant in aid to the Tuvalu Government, 
leaves the Tuvalu population confronting a steady squeeze on real incomes, unless aid donors 
can be induced to maintain a high level of financial inflows to Tuvalu under the notional 
heading of “development aid”.  In fact, austerity has been the keynote of recent government 
policy; real import levels have been held below the 1980 level (Table 10.3) and a tight rein has 
been kept on Government spending. The percentage of recurrent revenue financed from local 
sources has risen from 65% in 1979 81 to 73% in 1982-84 (Fig. 5.11). The phrase “There is no 
money” has become a standard response to requests for Government services for some years. 
And in the last four years, when inflation was averaging between 9.5 and 9.6% there have been 
no wage rises for the Public Service, with three submissions turned down. In this period of 
1979-82 the gap between the “core” and “periphery” represented in the imbalance in the 
average per capita income of Funafuti compared to the average outer islands income, narrowed 
from a ratio of 1:4.8 to 1:3.6 as incomes in Funafuti fell from $801 to $763 while outer islands 
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incomes increased from $165 to $209 (Third Development Plan, Table 5.6). Such tight 
economic management may have to pay a price in political popularity of the Ministers 
concerned, and it is not surprising that some relaxation occurred at the beginning of 1984, with 
a 5% wage rise for public servants (which will cost $220,000) in the offing. Given the financial 
crisis that the first government of independent Tuvalu plunged the country into with the Sidney 
Gross affair, the continuing effects of the World recession and the oil price rises and the inbuilt 
weaknesses and contradictions of the Tuvalu economy, the economic management of the 
country will of necessity continue to be tightly controlled, dampening down imports while 
encouraging the propensity to save and invest and integrating internal elements that might lead 
to production linkages. Apart from these reasons, early steps to revitalise a meaningful Family 
Planning Campaign and a clear policy toward fishing and marine resources that could 
maximise Tuvalu involvement and returns are needed, unless the MIRAB economy is given a 
new lease of life by New Zealand and/or Australia. 
 
10.9   Fisheries 
 
Tuvalu's EEZ encompasses approximately 3/4 million km2 of oceanic waters. The only surveys 
done in Tuvalu waters suggested that skipjack were in “reasonable abundance” during the June 
July survey periods of 1978 and 1980. Available statistics for Japanese distant water pole and 
line vessels show that in some years, high average daily catches, in excess of 8 tonnes per day, 
have been taken between August and December (Ellway et al., 1983, p.31). Roughly two thirds 
of the tuna resources appear to be skipjack. 
 
In 1981 the country acquired a tuna fishing vessel, the Tautai, through Japanese aid. It has a 
Japanese captain and engineer and has provided training to the crew of 26 Tuvaluans. In the 
first year, however, it generated quite a large loss on a catch of 237 tonnes worth $191,000. 
Last year it caught more fish and made up most of the earlier losses  (catching 293 tonnes 
worth $214,000), but prices fell. To attempt to make up the financial losses made to date, the 
Fishing Corporation (NAFICOT) has agreed to the Tautai being used purely for research in 
Fijian and Tuvalu waters in 1984 and 1985. All costs will be borne by Japanese aid but any 
fish caught will be profit. 
 
The Tautai is based in Fiji where there are shore facilities, and it also fishes for much of the 
year in Fiji waters, paying, in effect, a fee. The vessel returns to Tuvalu each year to lay up, 
and at that period fishes in Tuvalu waters, where catches are just as good. It is now realised 
however that at 170 gross registered tonnes, the Tautai is too large, and has operating costs that 
are far too high. A smaller boat of about 50 tonnes could employ just as many pole and line 
fishermen, yet be much more economical. Although there is some thought of the desirability of 
attempting to acquire a small vessel to complement the existing one, there are no firm plans 
within the next two or three years. 
 
In sum, Tuvalu has not adopted a particularly effective strategy in developing its fisheries. The 
Fisheries Corporation, like most fishing corporations in other countries, has lost money, though 
not as much as most. The view was expressed that Te Tautai had been a “grandiose scheme” 
and the country was “trying to run before it could walk”. 
 
The Prime Minister regards marine resources as an area of the highest priority. However, he 
pointed out that there are many gaps, with Tuvalu lacking the human resources. The country 
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needs masters, engineers, skilled fishermen and scientists. Education is needed to capitalise on 
the resource that undoubtedly exists. But what type of fishing will be most beneficial? Long 
line tuna fishing is no use, according to the experience of Taiwan. Pole and line is 
unpredictable. Everyone at the moment is opting for purse seining, but this method is 
extremely expensive. He doesn't want to start, utilising one particular approach, only to find 
that it is obsolete. We must see “what a careful study of options will produce”. 
 
Australia has indicated it is willing to be involved in fisheries development and the 
Government of Tuvalu has allocated 10 15% of Australian aid (A$5 million over the next five 
years) to fisheries. The Australians wish to appoint a project manager to take over, and there 
are some misgivings that the job specification might emphasise planning and project 
projections rather too much at the expense of practical fisheries experience and ability on the 
marketing side. Although the Tuvalu view has been reiterated, the Australians have not 
accommodated it. 
 
Unlike Kiribati, the prospects for baitfish farming in Tuvalu do not appear to be promising. 
However Fiji and Tuvalu waters do not appear to be short of baitfish. In April 1984 a survey 
began on the abundance of blue backed sprat, a baitfish attracted by light. At times when these 
are plentiful, the vessel could be called up from Fiji waters. 
 
The Division undertakes the promotion of small scale fisheries and uses a diesel powered 
catamaran (which frequently breaks down) to undertake extension visits to outer islands. 
Islanders are encouraged to market shark fin and beche de mer for export and salt fish for local 
sale, but the output has not been encouraging. There is enthusiasm in the division for a scheme 
to export schnapper to Fiji. The United Kingdom approved a smaller project in this area; the 
intention now is to build a wholesale and processing market with freezer. 
 
The new jetty on Funafuti, opened in March 1984, is seen as a major asset. This was provided 
under New Zealand aid and took only 3 months to assemble. Prospects for the development of 
a small scale artisanal deep bottom fishery in Funafuti, to supply the local market, appears to 
be very good.5 
 
Even if Tuvalu does develop more effective capacity to catch commercial quantities of fish, the 
transport bottleneck, both internally in the group and with the outside world, is seen as 
frustrating attempts at marketing it overseas. Indeed, “anything Tuvalu can do, Fiji can do 
better”. 
Agriculture 
10.10  Copra and Motivation 
 
A major characteristic of agriculture in Tuvalu is the relative lack of interest that Tuvaluans 
display in cutting copra, in contrast to their northern neighbours, the I-Kiribati. Thus the 
Tuvaluans who seem to depend more fully on a variety of other sources of income cut an 
average of only 291 tonnes in the 16 year period 1968-83, which represents a per capita figure 
of only 42kgms each. The comparable figure for Kiribati is 125kgms per head (average of 
1972-83).6 
 
A major scientific advance has recently been made in Kiribati with the analysis of large 
numbers of soil and coconut leaf sample material. This work which has also been paralleled by 
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experiments on Viatupu, suggests that great increases in nut yield occurs with the application 
of micro elements. The results, presented in Trewen (1983) will shortly be followed by a 
similar study on Tuvalu. The problem, however, is not primarily one of increasing nut 
availability, but of encouraging the actual collection and cutting of the nuts. It is believed that 
in general, people only collect nuts to make copra when some particular “target income” is 
needed - e.g. for the payment of school fees - and when the money is not already available 
from some other source. 
 
There is little doubt that motivation to raise money or to work is enormously increased if 
community pride is involved, if the Government can launch a campaign to which the Ekalesia 
(Church members) can lend its support, or if the element of competition can be introduced. 
Competition on a group basis for what the community regards as a worthy goal, leads to 
healthy rivalry, lifting production greatly. This can be illustrated over the Stabex subsidy rate. 
 
As part of the Treaty of Lome agreements by which CAP countries (including small Pacific 
countries) achieved access for their exports to the EEC, the resulting STABEX subsidy was 
calculated on a 4 year moving-average of copra production. The last year of the current four 
year term is 1984 and it was felt desirable that a “big push” be made to increase copra 
production this year to lift the moving average to a point that will govern the subsidy for the 
next four year term. It was believed that with the help of the Fusi, the way to achieve this 
would be to organise a competition on the outer islands for copra production, with a prize 
awarded to the winner. 
 
The Coconut Replanting Scheme which began in the late 1960s has not achieved significant 
progress to date, with only 55.5ha being replanted by 1980. From 1980-81 a further 22ha were 
planted. 
 
10.11  Soil Nutrient Deficiencies 
 
For several years a small number of British agronomists have been working in Tuvalu, mainly 
undertaking experimental work on Vaitupu (mean annual rainfall of 3170mm). Though most of 
their work to date does not appear to have produced results of great significance, the recent 
replicated trials on 10 20 plots of sweet potatoes have produced most encouraging and 
important results. Begun to encourage underplanting beneath coconuts, the trials have revealed 
that a basic dressing of trace elements lacking in the soil followed by fertilisation with major 
elements give excellent crop growth. Harvests of up to 16 tonnes per hectare of sweet potato 
have been recorded, and although this is low compared to high islands such as in the Solomons 
(20 or more tonnes), it is very high for atoll soils. Unfertilised plots on Vaitupu yield 1 tonne, 
half a tonne or no crop at all. The basic dressing (mix no. 1) applied pre planting is: 
  500 units of ferrous sulphate 
  75 units of manganese sulphate 
  30 units of copper oxychloride 
  (or 60 of copper sulphate) 
 
Mix no. 2 of major elements, applied one month after planting and again two months later, 
consists of: 
 192 IBDU (nitrogenous slow release) 
 201 Triple super phosphate 
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 300 Potassium sulphate. 
 
Although final costings have not yet been completed, these dressings seem to be quite 
economic, with trace elements costing 70 cents per kgm or 7 cents per square metre. 
 
10.12  Local Cash Crops 
 
The Department is anxious to promote the production of sweet potatoes, and later pumpkin, 
taro, bananas and pulaka (giant taro or babai), for the local market. There is a little interest in 
raising chickens and more in egg production. The Department is starting to establish nurseries 
of sweet potato cuttings on each island and hope a few local producers will soon start sweet 
potato gardens of up to ¼ acre in size. Producers can expect to receive about 70c per kgm, 
leaving the crop in the ground before harvesting on the arrival of the Nivaga. The Cooperative 
(Fusi) which purchases it adds about 15% for handling and freight charges, and it is likely to 
sell in the Funafuti market for about 82c kgm. Although the Department is hoping that outer 
islanders can afford the fertiliser costs without aid, it might be advantageous to consider 
support, if costings are a little higher than anticipated, on a trial basis under the New Zealand 
supported Small Projects Fund. 
 
The bees project has been successful in that a good output of honey is being produced. 
However in the moist climate with the deterioration of internal transport, fermentation occurs 
unless it can be sold within a month. The arrival of a sterilising unit from New Zealand is now 
urgently wanted so that supplies can keep and be sold over a longer period in Funafuti. 
 
Given the small size of the country it is not surprising that an unfavourable report has been 
received on the prospects of a portable coconut timber mill to serve the local timber market. 
But as senile coconut palms are removed in the on going replanting scheme it is planned to 
burn the trees to produce charcoal. In Funafuti population pressure means that there is an acute 
shortage of timber or husks for household fuel. Sale of locally produced charcoal would 
substitute for imported kerosene. 
 
With a recurrent budget of only $39,000 for 1984 the Agriculture Department is heavily reliant 
on capital aid. 
 
10.13  Natural Resources 
 
Within the Department of Commerce and Natural Resources, fisheries and agriculture are the 
prime concern of the area of natural resources. In a country so dominated spatially by the 
oceans, it is appropriate that Tuvalu has recently joined the United Nations committee for joint 
prospecting of offshore areas in the Pacific (the CCOP). There have been some indications of 
manganese nodules around the Ellice Basin and the Government recently has asked the 
Japanese to undertake a seabed resources survey. 
 
10.14  Philatelic Sales and Handicrafts 
 
The unpredictability of life in a small atoll country is illustrated by philatelic (stamp) sales, 
which have fluctuated greatly, peaked after Royal visits but recently slumped badly (see Table 
10.3). However, now the prospects for 1985 look excellent with “Leaders of the World” and 
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“Trains of the World”7 stamp issues from a British company.  It appears too that large overseas 
firms who want to offer sponsorship might include Tuvalu stamps etc., in cornflakes packets or 
other products that they wish to promote. The prospects might even reach $10 million over 6 
years, according to one source. Tuvalu coins might also be a source of revenue. 
 
Handicrafts have been an insignificant product in the past few years. Annual production did 
rise substantially however from $8,549 in 1982 to $21,803 in 1983. However only about half 
of these sales appear to constitute exports. 
 
10.15 Employment 
 
The subsistence sector still dominates the economy, with only 13 percent of the total 
population in full time wage employment ( Third Development Plan, Table 6.8). Of all forms 
of employment, the public service is easily the most important, accounting for 62% of all jobs 
in 1983. One of the most striking changes that has occurred in the last 10 years is the 
accelerated growth of Funafuti as centre, capital and “growth pole” of the country. This is 
illustrated in Table 10.4. 
TABLE 10.4 
THE GROWTH OF FUNAFUTI 
 
Year Population of Funafuti % of Total 
Total 
Population 
1973 871 15 5,887 
1979 2,120 29 7,349 
1983 (mid) 2,620 31 8,364 
        
 
From a little more than one seventh of the national population ten years ago, nearly one-third 
of the total population is now living on the main island where almost all of the cash sector is 
concentrated. 
 
The average income of permanent wage and salary earners is estimated to be $2,200 to $2,500. 
Income tax begins only above $2,500 (30 cents in the dollar) which means that less than 40% 
of wage earners are taxed. Higher salary earners are taxed at 40 cents in the dollar. 
 
Indirect taxation is a major tool for raising revenue. A sales tax (which is really an import duty 
surcharge) exists of 5% on most goods. In recent years an increased tax has been levied on 
liquor, cigarettes and sugar, both to raise revenue and to discourage expensive imports. 
 
10.16   Export of Labour 
 
Given such limited resources and a tiny modern sector almost entirely consisting of the public 
sector, the export of labour remains one of the few options available for earning a cash income. 
 
Earlier, great reliance was placed on the remittances that several hundred Tuvaluans employed 
on both Nauru and Banaba sent back to their home islands. Since the final repatriation of the 
last Tuvalu workers from Banaba in 1979 there have been 300-400 employees, plus their 
dependents, on Nauru for six year contracts. 
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The major strategy of the country in attempting to secure access to overseas employment was 
the establishment of a marine training school (MTS) using the vessel Amatuku, in emulation of 
the very successful marine training school in Tarawa, Kiribati. Currently up to 400 Tuvaluans 
who have been through the South Pacific Training School, Tarawa, are employed on overseas 
ships. The Tuvalu MTS began operating in 1980, and takes on about 20 trainees each year. So 
far about 100 young men have graduated from the school with A B qualifications. At the 
moment the only available destination for the trainees is the Swire Pacific Ship Management 
Ltd of Hong Kong, which employs 6 Tuvaluans as crew on each of five tugs, with a further 
cargo vessel taking 14 seamen. Currently a German firm, Gunther Schulz of Hamberg is 
considering the possibility of taking on 50 Tuvalu seamen as crew for two new 6000 ton 
vessels. 
 
Regrettably, the opportunity of a few Tuvalu workers to enter New Zealand to work in the 
aluminium industry for E. Ullrich, Auckland, has been almost eliminated by rising 
unemployment. In the late 197os Ullrich took 12 Tuvaluans in a special work scheme by which 
the Department of Immigration granted entry; in 1984 only one Tuvaluan works in the firm. 
The American Tuna Association employs three Tuvaluan seamen in their fleet based on Pago 
Pago. The arrangement was finalised by a New Zealand citizen. There is some prospect that a 
new, privately owned ship operating in Papua New Guinea might employ a few Tuvaluans as 
crew members. 
 
Although the Secretary for Labour contacts many overseas shipping lines seeking employment 
opportunities, a major obstacle, apart from automation, is the distance of Tuvalu from major 
shipping centres. It costs $900 to fly a Tuvalu crew member to Singapore, $1300 to Bangkok, 
and nearly $2000 to Dubai. 
 
10.17  Overseas Labour and Remittances 
 
The Government, through its Labour Officer, exerts remarkable power over the actions of its 
overseas seamen, which speaks volumes about the continuing strength of the authority of 
recognised leaders and the strength of the ethic supporting family and the community. In the 
first place, selection of young men to enter the MTS or to proceed to employment on overseas 
ships is very strict. The Swire Pacific Ship Management pay their Tuvalu seamen A$401 cash 
each month. The seamen are only allowed to pocket $25 in cash; the rest is deposited in a bank 
account. After six months or a year overseas, a seaman is allowed to draw the savings to use to 
help the family, to build a house, water tank or outboard motor boat purchase. If any seaman 
wastes the money earnt, or attempts to stay indefinitely on Funafuti rather than return to his 
home island, his name is never forwarded again to any overseas employer. Only two or three 
people have had to be so punished; the rest comply with the expectations of the community to 
use the savings for the benefit of the family and community. As the Labour Officer puts it: 
“This is part of our culture that has been integrated into Government policy.” 
 
One of the major sources of money is remittances both from overseas, and from Funafuti to the 
outer islands. Remittances are sent in at least four ways: through the bank, the post office, as 
money sent in letters and as gifts taken by individuals when returning home. The volume runs 
into the hundreds of thousands of dollars (perhaps more), but it is impossible to estimate with 
any certainty.8 It is undoubtedly a remarkably effective form of redistribution. 
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It was suggested that it was appropriate that a worker receiving say $60 in a pay packet would 
send $20 to his family on the home island, spend $20 for his own cost of living and keep the 
remaining $20 for his personal use. 
 
10.18  The Absence of Trade Unions 
 
It was suggested that when Tuvaluans were part of the Gilbert and Ellice Islands Colony “we 
learnt the problems of unions.”  No doubt the lessons of Tarawa's first painful general strike in 
197 were not lost on Tuvalu. After Separation, trade unions were not welcomed in the new 
country and about 1977 the Tuvalu Government issued an edict “abolishing any trade unions”.  
The seamen of the country, encouraged by the Seamens Unions of Kiribati and Fiji have tried, 
without success, to set up a union in Tuvalu. The people have accepted the Government's 
ruling and no other attempt to establish unions has been made. 
 
The remarkable discipline of the community and its loyalty to its chosen leaders, even if their 
actions might be unpopular, is shown in the restraint displayed over possible wage rises. The 
word “pressure” e.g. for a wage rise, is inappropriate in the Tuvalu context. People may 
“apply” for, or “request” a wage rise, and several applications have been made without success 
since 1980, in a period of high inflation. A 5% rise was granted at the beginning of 1984, but it 
was unthinkable that people would attempt to apply pressure. And there was a feeling of 
national solidarity, even sacrifice in the face of the country's precarious economic situation: 
“At Independence, Tuvalu had a debt of $1½ million. So Government and the people fought 
together to overcome our obstacles.” 
 
10.19 Enterprise 
 
With monetary sector activity dominated by the role of the Government and the Tuvalu 
Cooperative Society, there is only a very small private sector. The latter is, however, not 
dominated by part Chinese or part Europeans as in the case of Kiribati. A major 
recommendation of the Rural Socio Economic Survey of the Gilbert and Ellice was that the 
teaching of business skills, book-keeping, management and other practical and mechanical 
skills should not be monopolised by the Cooperative movement and confined purely to its 
officers and committee members. Tuvalu has made an excellent start in emphasising the 
importance of these skills through the community. 
 
Another important body, established only in 1981, is the Business Development Advisory 
Bureau (BuDab). After doing preparatory ground work in 1982, the activities of the BuDab led 
to a massive upswing in business promotional loans in 1983. Up to July 1983 24 business 
development loans and 5 business overdraft guarantees have been given, making a total capital 
guarantee committed by BuDab of $132,558. Of the 29 guaranteed transactions, 26 are fully 
operational guarantees. It is estimated that only 11% of the $132,000 outlaid is at high risk. 
The nature of enterprise in Tuvalu and the role of BuDab is indicated in Table 10.5. 
 
Although business lending is a large part of BuDab's role, it plays a valuable part in a purely 
advisory and servicing role as well. 
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It can be seen in the table that most enterprises in Tuvalu are not economically productive in 
the strict sense of adding to the total stock of capital in the country, but merely recirculate 
existing capital. However, there are some exceptions, as industries 1, 5 and 9 indicate, while 
others are useful in adding local value through processing or providing an essential service. 
 
TABLE 10.5 
Loans Granted to Enterprises in Tuvalu by Business Development Advisory Bureau (up to July 
1983) 
  Type of Industry No Total Value 
% of 
availabl
e funds 
1 Fishing Industry 11 A$10,908 2.18 
2 Retail 3 25,000 5.00 
3 Cinema 4 11,700 2.34 
4 Ice Cream Parlours 2 10,500 2.10 
5 Poultry Farms 2 5,800 1.16 
6 Bakery 1 5,500 1.10 
7 Bus Service 1 9,750 1.95 
8 Cafes 1 8,000 1.60 
9 Coconut Oil Expellor 1 35,000 7.00 
10 Mobile Disco 1 1,500 0.30 
11 String Band 1 3,500 0.70 
12 Pool Hall 1 5,000 1.00 
13 Construction 2 12,500 2.50 
14 Screen Printing 1 3,500 0.70 
15 Tailors Shop 1 8,500 1.70 
           
  33 $A156,658 *30.33% 
          
      *These are the total amounts granted 
 
10.20  Cooperatives (Fusi) 
 
The Cooperatives, or Fusi, play a crucial role in the economic life of the country. The country 
inherited a sound system of separate, island based consumer and marketing societies from the 
former Gilbert and Ellice Islands Colony and the system was not changed till a year after 
separation. By 1977, however, the societies had degenerated somewhat and were losing a lot of 
money. Amalgamation then occurred into one overall structure. Each island still has a primary 
society and store but the control has been unified. The consumer side consists of eight 
branches (3602 members) on the eight islands with a representative each on the management 
committee. This makes up the Tuvalu Cooperative Society Ltd. A parallel organisation (the 
Tuvalu Cooperative Copra Society) manages the copra side, with three members representing 
the copra cutters. Since the amalgamation the movement appears to be healthy; on the 
consumer side the number of members has grown although on the copra side, the number has 
fallen a little. 
 
The whole organisation represents control by the members and their management committee to 
a remarkable degree as permanent staff are very few. An auditor travels around the islands 
  - 283 -
every two months to check the state of the primary societies. Apparently little embezzlement, 
double selling of copra, issuing of secret credit to relatives, or other malpractice occurs. The 
only recent case that has occurred involved the manager of the Funafuti warehouse, who had to 
be dismissed. 
 
The Cooperatives Officer visits each island for two weeks or so each year for training in 
management and book keeping and brings staff in to Funafuti for training courses. Committee 
members visit Funafuti at least three times each year. The main problems are lack of staff and 
lack of finance. 
 
People of Vaitupu, assisted by a loan from the Business Development Advisory Bureau and a 
Peace Corps volunteer, formed the Vaimoana Oil Cooperative Society in October 1983 for 
extracting coconut oil and making coconut meal. The former is intended for cooking, the latter 
is feed for pigs and goats. While production is initially for the local market, there are hopes for 
export to Fiji if the venture is a success.  
 
The Fusi has also performed a very valuable role in assisting with the marketing of local 
vegetables in the Funafuti market. To date some success has been achieved in encouraging 
outer islanders to grow taro and fresh coconuts for Funafuti. Small quantities of tomatoes, 
cucumbers and pumpkins have also been produced. The T.C.S. has been reluctant to buy 
pulaka to send on to Funafuti because of problems of storage, but has now agreed to purchase 
it. While the local produce marketing scheme is still in its early stages (see section 10.15 
above), it is making an encouraging start. Some people in the outer islands may currently be 
making $50-$100 annually from vegetable growing. 
TABLE 10.6 
SALES OF TUVALU COOPERATIVE SOCIETY LTD 
(1/4/82  - 31/3/83) 
  
Societies' sales 2,027,850 
Warehouse sales 305,544 
Total Gross sales 2,333,394 
  Less discount allowed (10%)          5,857 
Total Net Sales 2,327,537 
  
  Less Cost of Sales  
Gross cost of sales 2,822,294 
Less closing stock 1,006,009 
Net cost of sales 1,816,286 
  $511,251 
    
 
Sales thus represented a mean of $142 per member. The total of societies' share deposits in 
1982-83 was $153,411 or a mean of $43 per member. 
 
10.21  The Fusi and Nutrition 
 
In spite of the business sense that the Fusi inculcates, the services that it offers and opportunity 
that it provides members to earn a dividend, the broader social role of the Fusi must be 
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questioned. Essentially the main aim of the movement is to make money and this will 
inevitably lead to policies that emphasise fast moving retail lines. Thus the role of the Fusi 
over time is to promote the evolution of a “consumer society” and an increasingly import 
dependent country. This entails the increasing dependence of Tuvaluans on a poor quality diet 
of “European foods” such as flour, rice, biscuits and sugar instead of their more nutritious 
traditional staples. “Development” then increasingly means “under development” in the sense 
of the decline in nutrition and health standards that must result. It is to be hoped that the 
Cooperative movement will recognise this problem and the responsibility the organisation has 
and attempt to promote sales of nutritious goods such as milk powder, and capital items needed 
in the outer islands. 
 
10.22  Importing and Procurement 
 
When importing peaked in 1980, it appeared that per capita imports were running at nearly 
$390 per capita. The UNCTAD (1983) study9 on import planning and procurement recorded 
the 1981 volumes per capita as follows: 
Sugar  38 kgs 
Beer  6 litres 
Fish  4 kgs 
Motor Spirit  32 litres 
 
The UNCTAD study found that Tuvalu's location, far away from the principal trading centres 
with small quantities required for procurement and also lack of regular and adequate shipping 
facilities cumulatively makes the effective and efficient supply of goods a demanding and 
difficult task. 
 
The Tuvalu Cooperative Wholesale Society (TCS) handles approximately 50% of the country's 
total imports, with most of the rest procured by the Government Store Keeper (GSK). The TCS 
has four purchasing agents overseas - one each in Sydney, Suva, Auckland and Osaka. 80 per 
cent of TCS imports originate in Australia and Fiji. 
 
The UNCTAD study found that piecemeal buying was a common practice instead of long term 
contracting with physical deliveries spread over the period. Even for bulk commodities like 
rice, flour, cement, whose prices differ widely, no judgement is exercised in determining the 
most appropriate time to cover estimated annual requirements. 
 
At present, bulk items like flour, rice, cement and timber are being imported separately by 
either TCS or GSK or the private sector. Instead of achieving co ordinated procurement and 
shipping by one agency, fragmentation of procurement occurs, with small quantities and high 
shipping costs raising their cost. More serious is the fact that most purchases are made by 
indicating favoured brands without quoting the usual specifications; hence it is very difficult to 
evaluate the competitiveness of offers received through agents. The UNCTAD study 
recommends that TCS and GSK should identify essential items or those of high value and then 
invite at least three quotations from each of the purchasing agents to determine the most 
appropriate source. Although the danger of possible transfer pricing might have to be guarded 
against, it might be advantageous for TCS to consider pooling their imports of some key items 
with the Fijian Cooperative Society to gain the price advantage from larger quantities.10 
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10.23 Shipping 
 
The system of shipping services for Tuvalu improved considerably about 1977-78 and has not 
changed substantially until early 1984. Table 10.7 shows the list of shipping which visited 
Funafuti in 1983. The list shows that the link with Australia (4 visits) and New Zealand (5 
visits) is about the same. However, the most important service of all is provided by the Pacific 
Forum Line vessel Moanaraoi (chartered from Kiribati Government) which does the Tarawa-
Funafuti-Suva and return run. In 1983 this vessel made 10 calls to Funafuti. In the view of the 
Manager of the TCS the Moanaraoi is about the right size for Tuvalu's import needs (392 
tonnes) with about the right freezer capacity. With respect to exporting, a cargo of 100 tons of 
copra is the minimum inducement for the Moanaraoi to call at Funafuti during its Tarawa-Suva 
run. 
 
The most important external link was the Karlander Line from Australia which sent a vessel 
about every 90 days. There was the occasional call of a Warner Line vessel from New Zealand 
(Vili) and the basic service of the PFL feeder line vessel Moanaraoi. There is the view that the 
TCS and GSK probably spread their imported cargoes amongst these four or so vessels that 
visited Funafuti, and so diluted the tonnage as to make the position unsatisfactory from the 
viewpoint of the shipping firms. TCS can only fill 200-250 tons and Government and private 
importers another 50-70 tonnes. 
 
The Karlander Line stated that they regarded 500 tonnes as their minimum acceptable cargo 
for their vessel. In fact they had been carrying substantially less, and early in 1984 they 
announced suspension of their April sailing. This would be a serious blow to Tuvalu, if it were 
to remove the direct Australian link, reducing options, and making the link with Fiji and only 
dependable connection with the outside world. 
 
The alternative option is that the Australian line will reduce the frequency of its shipping 
service, or press for a greater proportion of Tuvalu's imports to come from Australia. The latter 
would be stoutly resisted by Tuvalu which finds many New Zealand products (especially 
building materials) substantially cheaper than the Australian. 
 
Before the firm in Auckland that processed coconut oil closed down, Tuvalu valued the 
shipping link with Auckland. However, this ceased after the firm's closure. The Vili (887 
tonnes) which plies from Auckland to Suva, brings cargo but double handling is involved in 
trans-shipping on to the Moanaraoi in Suva. The Minister of Finance has asked the PFL to look 
at the handling costs involved. The Vili takes sugar back to New Zealand from Fiji. 
 
The freight rates between Australia and New Zealand to Funafuti are shown in Table 10.8. It 
shows that freight rates to Tuvalu are a little cheaper from New Zealand than from Australia 
for general cargo and substantially cheaper for cement. 
 
10.24  Health and Nutrition 
 
In general, standards of health are quite good. With a per capita expenditure on health of only 
$33, a reasonable basic health service is provided. Each outer island (except Nuilakita) has a 
Dresser and Nurse to cater for the population (one nurse per 280 of population). The water and 
sanitation project is going well and currently about 75 percent of all houses in the country are 
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provided with latrines. The continuing high incidence of diarrhoea (with influenza the most 
common illness and main  
TABLE 10.7 
SHIPPING VISITING FUNAFUTI, 1983 
 
Date Ship Shipping Line Capacity in tonnes 
28 Jan. Te Marui Kiribati Govt 72.5 
28 Jan. Tautuna Kiribati Govt 72.5 
2 Feb. Kyosei Maru Karlander Line (Aust.) 5,446 
16 Feb. Moanaraoi PFL 392 
15 Mar. Vili Warner Line (N.Z.) 887 
20 Mar. Moanaraoi PFL 392 
23 Mar. Pacific Explorer Oil Tanker 595.6 
2 Apr. Nivaga Tuvalu Govt 163.5 
5 Apr. Windorobo (Yacht) 6.7 
6 Apr. Mosman Star Karlander not known 
20 Apr. Moanaraoi PFL 392 
24 Apr. Vili Warner Line 887 
13-May Nanook (Yacht) 8.2 
13-May Tiki (Yacht)  5 
21-May Slow Dancer (Yacht) 12.5 
28-May Maonaraoi PFL 392 
29-Jun Pacific Explorer Oil Tanker 595.6 
8-Jul Te Tautai (Tuna vessel) Tuvalu Govt. 53.1 
11-Jul Moanaraoi PFL 392 
11-Jul Moanaraoi Survey vessel  
21-Jul Asia (Yacht)  13.5 
24-Jul Vili Warner 887 
27-Jul Nivaga Tuvalu Govt 163 
29-Jul Don Antonio Nauru 3120 
17 Aug. Moanaraoi PFL 392 
3 Sept. Nei Nomi Kiribati Govt 143 
20 Sept. Te Tautai (Tuna vessel) Tuvalu Govt 53 
20 Sept. Vili Warner 887 
26 Sept. Le Maripier (Yacht) 22.5 
30 Sept. Aena (Yacht)  9.5 
23 Oct. Moanaraoi PFL 392 
31 Oct. Pacific Explorer Oil tanker 595 
3 Nov. Lake Star Karlander 13,338 
7 Nov. Moanaraoi PFL 392 
8 Nov. Tanaroa (Survey ship) 296 
8 Nov. Fourth Division (Yacht) 14 
18 Nov. Sintra (Yacht) 51 
20 Nov. Moanaraoi PFL 392 
12 Dec. Moanaraoi PFL 392 
16 Dec. Vili Warner 887 
18 Dec. Nivaga Tuvalu Govt 163 
        
 
cause of death) suggests however that not all people use the new latrines. Health education 
programmes are well catered for by a team which visits outer islands almost every month and 
by medical broadcasts twice a week. 
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TABLE 10.8 
FREIGHT RATES IN TUVALU, 1984 
 
  
Commodity 
description Australia-Funafuti Karlander Line 
New Zealand-Funafuti 
Warner Pacific Line 
1 General Cargo 
A$166/m + 8.39% BS + 5.92% 
CAF NZ$160/m + 9.5% CAF 
2 
Refrigerated & 
Chilled Cargo 
A$210/m + 8.39% BS + 5.92% 
CAF NOT KNOWN 
3 
Hazardous 
cargo 
A$230/m + 8.39% BS + 5.92% 
CAF NOT KNOWN 
4 Cement 
A$166/m + 8.39% BS + 5.92% 
CAF NZ$120/m + 9.5% CAF 
5 Timber NOT KNOWN NZ$120/m + 9.5% CAF 
        
BS=Bunker surcharge, added when oil price increased. 
CAF=Currency Adjustment Factor, due to revaluation of Australian  
dollar. 
 
Although sanitation appears to be generally satisfactory and most households scrupulously 
sweep their compounds to keep them tidy each day, a long incidence of hook worm affecting 
20-30 people on Nuilakita in 1983 has given cause for concern. 
 
A growing cause of death in 1983 was tuberculosis (8 deaths) and heart disease (11 deaths). 
Although a good nutritional study has not been done in the country, the Medical Officer 
accepts that there is a steady rise in illnesses or poor health induced by a poor diet and greater 
reliance on imported starches and sugar instead of traditional staples. These are the classic 
diseases of Westernisation of the lifestyle. Obesity and hypertension are growing problems. A 
survey of diabetes carried out in 1976 in Funafuti revealed that of a sample of 579 people 
tested, 45 people (7.8%) had diabetes and 34 (5.9%) were borderline cases. Of the 45 diabetics 
only 5 were previously known to have the condition (Zimmet, 1976). 
 
While the situation has not reached the epidemic proportions seen in Tahiti, Hawaii, Nauru or 
the New Zealand Maori, the question of the effects of urbanisation on Polynesian and 
Micronesian populations needs to be studied in depth. The solution lies within the whole 
programme of socio-economic development of the nation. 
 
10.25  Current Government Strategy 
 
A strong note of restraint, austerity, even sacrifice, is apparent in current policies and this was 
emphasised by the Prime Minister and Minister of Finance in interviews. The Prime Minister 
stated that “As a Government, we have to tell the people what is good for them. If they don't 
like it they can look for someone else.”  The feeling of relative deprivation appears to be strong 
in Tuvalu, as illustrated by the loss of the internal air service. The air service was said to have 
“boosted the morale of the people” and made them feel that “they were the same as other 
countries which can afford an internal air service.” 
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The accent above all of the Minister of Finance's statements, is on the necessity for control. 
The country suffers from an acute lack of resources and it is a very great struggle to make ends 
meet. Tuvaluans will have to decide themselves what they can and cannot afford, and face the 
consequences. It is important for people to work hard, to improve their own gardens and only 
call for imports when absolutely necessary. There was an implication that Tuvaluan wants and 
aspirations had expanded faster than the local capacity to satisfy them. There was a need to 
make people more productive but traditional habits of people on outer islands changed only 
slowly. The Minister of Finance concluded his 1984 Budget speech with a message for 1984: 
“We must rise up and face the challenge to survive through our own efforts.” 
 
10.26  Revenue and Expenditure 
 
Not only has the United Kingdom cut its budgetary aid by $25,000 to $925,000 in 1984 but the 
U.K. Minister of Overseas Development wantedhalf of the current budget surplus for 1982, 
amounting to $106,762 to be paid into the Development Fund as opposed to reducing its 
budgetary aid by this sum. (Such action does of course reduce the Tuvalu incentive to make a 
surplus). Thus Tuvalu had to find an additional $131,762 for 1984 although inflation has been 
running at 9.6 to 9.8 percent. 
 
An additional setback, after the earlier success of philatelic sales capitalising on Royal events, 
was the lower stamp sales. The net profit for 1983 was about $250,000 lower than anticipated. 
On the other hand, a new agreement with the American Tunaboat Association is expected to 
bring in higher licence fees from 1985. Company tax was increased from 25% to 30%. Another 
factor is the return of Sidney Gross moneys; high hopes are held that Gross will at last fulfil his 
promise in early 1984 to return several hundred thousand dollars of the former reserve funds. 
 
The major sources of revenue are the charges of Government services such as 
telecommunication, electrical and marine divisions; philatelic revenue; customs duties, 
fisheries licence fees. Fees, charges, fisheries licenses and philatelic profits represent about 
half of the Government revenue base, with the balancing being provided by the grant-in-aid 
(26%) and taxation (22%). 
 
The estimate of Government recurrent expenditure for 1984 is almost $3.6 million. 
 
10.27  Import Substitution 
 
Government has undertaken policies designed to stimulate local industries, especially fisheries 
and agriculture by achieving greater import substitution. Duty on petroleum was reduced by 
50% in the 1984 Budget. Oil is duty free, as are outboard motors, fishing boats and equipment 
and fishing gear.  Duty on tinned fish was raised from 40-75%, imported fish from 59-75% and 
sugar from 9c to 12c a kg.11 
 
The Prime Minister stated that the main task of his Government was to distribute more 
resources to outer islands. He saw an over concentration on the development of Funafuti as a 
major reason for the defeat of the last Government. Local production must be encouraged on 
the outer islands, and the Government was delighted to hear of the recent spectacular increase 
in sweet potato production achieved experimentally on Vaitupu by the Department of 
Agriculture as a result of applying trace elements as well as major elements of artificial 
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fertilizers. Dr Puapua was concerned that people of both sexes and all ages should have access 
to cash earning on the outer islands. Young men could cut copra or apply to the MTS to be 
trained as overseas seamen. Older men could plant taro and pulaka, increasingly, he hoped, for 
sale to the “town” of Funafuti. The girls and older women could make handicrafts (mats, fans 
etc.) for sale. He was pleased that the Fusi had organised the marketing of outer island produce 
for delivery to Funafuti. He saw that it was important for him to regularly visit the outer 
islands, for talks with the island councils, the Fusi and the people. If the policy was successful, 
more people would remain in the outer islands rather than migrate in to the already over 
crowded Funafuti. He saw that social and cultural factors were also important; thus Island 
Nights, dances and movies operated by the Fusi played their part in helping to make the outer 
islands more attractive places in which to live. The current new housebuilding, water tank and 
sanitation programmes (new latrines) were making major contributions toward this goal. 
 
 
10.28   Aid 
 
As we mentioned, overseas aid to Tuvalu represents a very large proportion of total revenue, or 
anything from 50% to over 120% of GDP. In 1982, Tuvalu received A$8 million in all forms 
of aid, which for a population of 8000 people represented $1000 per head. 
 
Aid does, of course, involve questions of power and indeed ethics. It is asserted at a high 
Government level that donors such as Britain, Australia and New Zealand do at time push their 
ideas too strongly, and sometimes, Tuvalu is forced to accept their terms. (See the topic of 
future fisheries aid, 10.11). The visiting aid mission of one country in 1983 was criticised for 
taking “too global a view” on aid and for dismissing small projects that were believed to be 
adjusted to Tuvalu's distinctive conditions. All countries can be guilty of this at times; for 
instance over the Community Training Schools project, it is asserted that New Zealand tried to 
insist that certain materials ordered were not needed. “But the local people insisted that spades, 
forks etc. were needed.”  But on the whole, New Zealand's record is very good. “Where other 
donors insist, New Zealand only discusses, and never imposes.” 
 
Even in these post-colonial days, not all expatriates adjust fully to the Tuvalu scene. While 
most are well accepted, some are criticised; it was asserted for example that “there are some 
expatriates who don't invite any Tuvaluans to their houses, but only entertain other 
expatriates.” And senior Tuvalu leaders are critical of overseas “experts”, who only come for a 
week or two and who make little effort to get to know the country in depth: “Tuvalu people 
know their own problems   they are the experts. We only need overseas experts to tell us what 
is available in overseas technology that is appropriate to our conditions.” 
 
Tuvalu leaders are determined to use aid moneys wisely and in ways that are less likely to 
induce dependence. Thus, in 1978 the Chief Minister expressed the view that Tuvalu would 
prefer that New Zealand technical assistance concentrate on one or a few projects rather than 
run the risk “of spreading the butter too thinly.”  It has become increasingly obvious to the 
Tuvalu Government that capital aid projects that incur substantial recurrent costs through 
maintenance or upkeep costs fail to tackle the “viability” problem: 
 
“While aid from the United Kingdom, Australia and New 
Zealand is greatly appreciated, other than A$950,000 from the 
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United Kingdom, all aid is for capital projects. Tuvalu's main 
financial problem is however with its recurrent budget. Aid 
projects that take pressure off the recurrent budget are therefore 
of great value to Tuvalu...”. (NZHC, Suva to SFA 3/2/83, 
118/13/115/17). 
 
The Hon H Naisali, Minister of Finance and Deputy Prime Minister is only interested in what 
he calls “effective aid” or aid that will not serve to aggravate Tuvalu's problems at a later date 
through maintenance costs. The Minister of Finance regards all aid as tied in some way or 
other. Not all aid is good and most projects bear costs, not always foreseen. He is very cautious 
over aid and before any proposal goes out on a project he asks, “How much revenue will it 
generate?”  But he cannot stop social and administrative projects, for the country still needs to 
build up its infrastructure in spite of the transformation of Funafuti over the last 10 years. 
 
Unfortunately, the heavy costs involved in overcoming isolation are inescapable if Tuvalu 
wishes to live in the modern world. Thus Tuvalu has on a number of occasions requested New 
Zealand aid to pay for transport costs. The case of the internal air service illustrates many 
aspects of Tuvalu's dependence and some of the intractable problems involving aid to a remote 
and tiny island archipelago. 
 
 
10.29  The Internal Air Service  
 
Promotion of a sense of national unity and identity and the balanced development of all islands 
are important objectives for the nation as a whole. This involves a system of internal transport 
enabling access to and from the main island of Funafuti. However, the Government ship 
Nivaga on which the internal shipping system solely depends, was already aged when acquired 
at the Separation settlement and has since become so decrepit as to be barely sea-worthy. 
Perhaps the extension of the internal air service in neighbouring Kiribati to almost all islands 
encouraged Tuvalu to follow suit, although the possibility that it would pay for itself was even 
less likely in the case of Tuvalu. 
 
Negotiations began with Sea Bee Air in 1977, and after the firm pruned its proposals to the 
limit, an agreement was reached so that a service using a Grumman Goose amphibian aircraft 
began in 1981. It operated initially for a trial period supported by British aid funds. The service 
was popular and greatly appreciated by the Tuvalu people, but extremely costly. The biggest 
single problem was under-utilisation and thus heavy losses were incurred. 
 
For a considerable period it became obvious that the Government would have to secure aid 
funds to cover the losses, the cost being of the order of $400,000; indeed, it was stated that it 
was a “question of life or death” politically for the Minister of Finance to secure such support 
from either Australia or New Zealand. While New Zealand considered assisting by purchasing 
a Sea Bee Goose plane on a joint financing basis with the United Kingdom, such a step was 
seen as perhaps deepening Tuvalu's dependence:12 
 
 
“We would be very reluctant to be drawn into supplementing 
operating costs as we think support of this nature can serve to 
  - 291 -
create dependence and obscure the true costs of such an 
operation.” 
 
When support from Australia and New Zealand was not forthcoming, and it was apparent that 
British support would not continue beyond August 1983, the Government considered for a 
time purchasing a Goose aircraft and operating it under charter. This also was too costly and 
finally the Minister of Finance took the sensible, but politically unpalatable decision to 
suspend the internal air service, since the two and a half year trial period had shown 
conclusively that the service was beyond Tuvalu's financial resources.13 The Minister of 
Finance declared that he was “doing what was good for his people in the long run, knowing 
that he would not care two hoots if he was not re-elected”.  In taking this tough decision he 
said, “In reality I know I have to be practical. I am the silliest person under the sun if we can't 
pay for the service.”  In March 1984 the Minister of Finance told the Team that “he was almost 
blown out” of Parliament when he announced the decision and members shouted for him to 
resign. But he reiterated that he would do what had to be done in the nation's benefit even if it 
meant defeat in the next election. 
 
At the same time Tuvalu has tried to press ahead with all possible speed to consider setting up 
a land-based air service which would be considerably cheaper. On two islands, airstrips were 
built during the War; on others, it is envisaged that only very basic airstrips would be needed. 
Britain has agreed to finance a feasibility study in 1984 which will study all aspects of a land 
based air service. The Government fears that this too will not prove to be economic.With the 
cessation of the air service the woeful inadequacies of the internal shipping service provided 
exclusively by the Nivaga, has been emphasised. The Nivaga can sail only in fine weather; in 
1982 it made 31 voyages, carried 1323 tonnes of cargo as well as several thousand passengers, 
and had a time utilisation ratio of only 41.5%. The annual operating subsidy (excluding the 
cost of annual overhaul) paid by the Government is approximately $100,000. Although Britain 
offered some years ago to provide a replacement vessel, specifications were not completed in 
1983 and funds for the vessel are not likely to become available till late 1985. In the meantime, 
there is always the possibility that a disaster may befall the decrepit “Nivaga”.  New Zealand is 
reported to be agreeable to assist with the costs of chartering a vessel should one become 
necessary at around A$1000 a day. 
 
It is likely that a new comprehensive transport study will assess the likely costs and benefits of 
a one or two ship transport system, complemented perhaps by an internal land-based air 
service. 
 
Although Tuvalu has escaped the fate of growing “dependence” through the financial millstone 
of a costly seaplane service, this has been achieved only at the price of increased isolation. And 
the option of a land based air service, if this way out is chosen, may plunge the country again 
into further debt and financial dependence. 
 
 
10.30  International Air Transport 
 
Regional co operation in a commercial sense is not always smooth as illustrated by the 
decision of Air Pacific in 1982 to withdraw the Fiji Tuvalu air link with only two months 
notice, a period that Tuvalu found to be too short to make alternative arrangements. As the 
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Third Development Plan states (p 22-5), “without an international air service the development 
of this country would be almost impossible.”  The threatened cessation of the two flights a 
week link with Fiji would have left the country with no direct link to the outside world, except 
for the once weekly link with Tarawa in the north, provided by Air Tungaru. Yet Air Pacific 
were suffering a loss of F$226,000 a year, the Bandeirante plane was expensive to operate, and 
fares would have needed to double with no loss of patronage for the firm to break even. The 
1100 km route was taken up by Fiji Air for the expensive fare of F$450 (NZ$636) return and 
the Tuvalu Government was expecting to have to pay A$120,000 after 15 months operation 
($1000 on each return flight). The Minister of Finance was seeking an aid donor to pay this 
sum. 
 
In 1984, however, a U.K. advisor pointed out that the earlier Kingair and Bandeirante planes 
had been too expensive to purchase or to operate. A much more appropriate plane was the 
Cessna 404 currently operated by Fiji Air on the Suva-Funafuti run. It cost only about 
$300,000 and took about 6 passengers on the three flights a week. Fiji Air are reported to have 
made a profit of about $80,000 on the run last year. 
 
 
10.31  Technological Change, Training and Self Sufficiency 
 
Underlying issues of development assistance is the matter of scale, and very often the matters 
of efficiency or waste, of training, continuity and self sufficiency. These issues are illustrated 
by the case of the Funafuti power station, constructed with the help of New Zealand aid. In 
1980 a New Zealand consultant reported on the poor fuel efficiency of the power station. The 
power station had been run with two machines, but when the demand for power dropped, two 
machines were running when only one was required. Such an operational problem, very 
common in developing countries, was likely to worsen with the addition of an extra machine. 
But issues of training and continuity were also involved:14 
 
“In essence the problem is caused by the yearly replacement of the 
technician. During the term of one year, the technician does not 
gain sufficient confidence or experience in the operation of the 
equipment to enable him to train the power house operators in 
good machine management. The technician in his second year 
would be competent and confident to train operators to the stage 
where the training function would become self sustaining with the 
operators training their own new staff. The current situation will be 
completely unsatisfactory with the additional fifth machine, as 
proper management will be essential if fuel efficiency is to be 
maintained. The recommendation should be that either this 
technician stays a further year or the proposed position of an 
electrical officer on the island be filled before the new machine is 
commissioned.” 
 
This problem, in varying forms, reappears frequently in developing countries. It is of course 
obvious and essential that the introduction of new technology not outrun the capacity of the 
local society to operate and service it efficiently. But the new technical skills must be passed 
on rapidly to more than one operator, so that the whole enterprise can quickly become self-
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sustaining. If this is not achieved technological dependency, and dependency on specific skills 
deepens. Of course sophisticated technology, for all its great technical efficiency, brings 
problems of its own, apart from costs of maintenance, training, continuity in technical skills 
and the like. The very scale of the innovation can cause difficulties and it can upset the local 
scene, encouraging unrealistic local demands and expectations. Electric power has no doubt 
been regarded as a great asset on Funafuti, but users were upset in 1979 when the charge for 
power was increased from 14 cents to 18 cents a unit. It became a politically sensitive issue. 
However it is interesting to note that such an expensive facility (over $2 million worth of 
equipment) is operated by a technician who received in 1983, a salary of only 71 cents an 
hour.15 
 
 
10.32  Pattern of N.Z. Aid and the Local Context 
 
Since New Zealand has had only limited funds available, there appears to be little overall 
pattern in the New Zealand aid programme to Tuvalu. The Prime Minister, Dr Tomasi Puapua 
in March 1984 pointed out that Tuvalu doesn't like a fixed pattern in aid: “Our needs are so 
unpredictable.” (The vagaries of the country's source of revenue, whether from philatelic sales, 
changing policies of donors, or employment policies of overseas shipping firms, certainly 
support this). But the country is certainly very appreciative of development assistance: “New 
Zealand has been very sensitive to our needs.”  A considerable effort has been made by visiting 
aid missions and by visits from the Suva High Commission to appraise local needs and to tailor 
aid to the distinctive conditions of these tiny, remote islands. Thus the bilateral aid programme 
(BAP) recommended for the 1977-79 period comprised the following: 
 
“(i) Provision of tractors, trailers, boats and motors to assist with 
development of copra production. 
 
(ii) Continued assistance with the supply of rat poison to reduce 
coconut losses. 
 
(iii) The provision of fish freezers to improve marketing of fish. 
 
(iv) The supply of vocational training equipment.16 
 
Reef passage construction was one of a number of forms of assistance provided under the 
South Pacific Regional Programme. The above programme was appropriate and sensible on the 
whole, though full evaluation of the effectiveness of an aid programme involves many factors. 
Not least is an understanding of the full context - environmentally, socially and economically -  
in which the aid innovations will have to fit. Thus while rat poison (ii, above) brought some 
benefits in eliminating rat pests and perhaps in increasing nut supply, the real problem in 
lifting copra production is to increase the incentive to harvest the large numbers of nuts that are 
often left on the ground. Transport assistance such as the provision of handcarts, and tractors, 
trailers and boats as in (i) above, and opening more buying points, might provide such an 
incentive and so be a much more effective form of aid.17  
 
New Zealand aid is much appreciated in that it is quicker arriving compared to that from 
Britain or Australia. British aid is said to require very detailed planning and accounting and 
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Australian aid is also regarded as bureaucratic. Tuvalu is still waiting for a fish market which 
Britain promised to fund as long ago as 1979. New Zealand is believed to be most responsive 
to Tuvalu's situation. The New Zealand High Commission in Suva was described as “very 
good” and officials came in for high praise. At the time of Tuvalu's acute liquidity crisis in 
1981, although New Zealand was not able to provide budgetary aid, the sympathetic support of 
the retiring Minister of Foreign Affairs, Hon. B. Talboys, was very much appreciated. 
 
The view was expressed that the New Zealand High Commission in Suva should be given 
more autonomy and authority to approve projects, say up to $50,000. The position should be 
“that if I trust you to be High Commissioner in Suva, I can trust you to make a sound 
decision.”  There is merit in the suggestion, though in practice, projects up to $50,000 might 
often involve technical issues that need to be checked by an appropriate Government specialist 
in New Zealand. 
 
An excellent feature of the BAP to Tuvalu is the Small Projects fund of the Tuvalu New 
Zealand Development Corporation which considers small grants which are appropriate to this 
scale of activity:  
Criteria 
 
“Projects under the Small Projects Fund should maximise involve  
ment of villagers themselves through financial and/or other local 
contributions to ensure a significant self help element. They need 
to meet as many as pos-sible of these objectives: 
 
(a) Promote economic or community development with 
preference for projects in outer islands, but not excluding 
projects of benefit to Funafuti village communities. 
 
(b) Encourage the introduction and use of appropriate or relevant 
technology. 
 
(c) Provide facilities which improve the standard of life on outer 
islands and/or provide jobs. 
 
(d) Utilise the supervisory services of existing government or non 
government agencies.” 
 
This list of criteria is indeed exemplary. The objectives are admirable but in practice it is very 
hard to find projects which do in fact contribute in a substantial way to attaining these worthy, 
if very generalised, ends. How can jobs be created? What intermediate technology works and 
is acceptable on an outer island? Whose definition of development (New Zealand or Tuvaluan) 
are we using? And, as we have noted above, “improvement of the standard of living” may be 
something of a two-edged sword, for income gains in the short term increase the import bill. 
There is a clear need to harmonise personal and national needs over time. 
 
New Zealand does need to ensure that a greater proportion of its aid is spent in outer islands. 
To date an overwhelming proportion would have been spent in Funafuti, and while the initial 
needs to establish infrastructure are understandable, this should not continue indefinitely. It is 
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surprising that only about 50% of the Small Projects Fund, which would appear to be more 
suited to outer island conditions, has been spent on the outer islands compared to Funafuti. 
However, willingness to build a labour cost into small project fund schemes seems to be 
worthwhile, providing a greater inducement for people to remain in outer islands. 
 
With the British announcement that its 1984 allocation to Tuvalu is reduced by $25,000 to 
$925,000, and that a further $50,000 reduction is expected in future years (Budget Speech, 
1984), there will be increasing pressure on Australia and New Zealand to do more. More 
requests will come for rather larger projects, often in the $75,000-$100,000 range. This has 
already begun with requests over the fisheries complex, housing on outer islands and water 
tanks for outer islands. 
 
 
10.33  The Question of Budget Aid 
 
In late 1981 the financial situation in Tuvalu became critical following the Sidney Gross affair 
and the effects of the world recession. Tuvalu was expected then soon to reach its overdraft 
limit of $1.5 million and help was needed if it was to be able to continue paying salaries and 
meeting normal government expenditures. The Minister of Finance made an appeal to Britain, 
Australia and New Zealand for assistance. 
 
At this time this request was viewed by New Zealand as “a gloomy portent of things to come”, 
for W. Samoa had approached Australia for assistance over their balance of payments and Niue 
was also in a parlous financial situation. It was expected that Kiribati and Tonga as well as the 
Cook Islands would, over time, seek increasingly non-project support of this kind. 
 
The Tuvalu Government has argued that New Zealand should give Tuvalu special 
consideration, on account of its unique circumstances, and therefore increase our aid and 
administer it more flexibly. To date, however, New Zealand has always declined to provide 
budgetary aid, confining this to the three countries which have a special constitutional 
relationship with New Zealand: the Cooks, Niue and Tokelaus. Tuvalu sees it as a matter of 
misfortune that she has had historical ties with Britain, which is now withdrawing its presence 
and its aid funds from the Western Pacific. The Tuvalu Minister of Finance has argued that 
although New Zealand's ties with the Cooks, Niue and Tokelaus warranted some special 
treatment of them, it was discriminatory nonetheless for New Zealand to say it could not help 
other small South Pacific countries appealing for budgetary aid merely because of our 
historical ties. He was not asking for equivalent amounts, merely flexibility. 
 
The New Zealand Minister of Foreign Affairs has declined to grant budgetary aid, seeing that 
it would constitute a precedent to extend it to a country to which New Zealand does not have 
special obligations because of a constitutional relationship. There appears nevertheless to be a 
good case for budgetary aid under special conditions which would not be regarded as a 
precedent. As the New Zealand High Commissioner in Suva argued:18 
 
“The answer to the question of whether or not to provide Tuvalu 
with budgetary aid depends on a prior determination of what form 
of external assistance will be of greatest help to Tuvalu. There may 
well be forms of budgetary aid, limited in time and scale, which 
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could be thoroughly justified, and which would serve to enhance 
sound financial management. ... there are already grounds for 
confidence on this last point.” 
 
It is important, of course, that countries such as New Zealand assist with the provision of key 
specialist positions, such as economic planning and training, to ensure that the current sound 
financial management is fully maintained. But Tuvalu's budgetary problems are aggravated not 
only by its extreme poverty and precariousness as an economy, but by the spirit of enterprise 
and achievement orientation, which it appears to exhibit to a more pronounced degree than its 
rather more traditional neighbour to the north, Kiribati. These may be admirable qualities but 
they do raise the possibility that aspirations are developed that outrun the “nation's” capacity to 
satisfy them, leading ultimately only to frustration and a sense of impotence. In the years 
leading up to Independence the liberal policies of aid donors and the general optimism of the 
time fanned unrealistic hopes that were later doomed to be dashed. Indeed perhaps the best aid 
in the long run is assistance which does not fan implausible hopes and unrealistic goals. 
 
 
10.34 Conclusion 
 
Early in this chapter we put the essential question posed at Independence of the kind of country 
that Tuvalu should try to become in the years ahead: a traditional settlement of yesteryear of 
“happy smiling people living in leaf huts and lavalavas” (termed a “stoneage oasis” by an 
expatriate administrator) or a nation equipped with a modern infrastructure comparable to that 
in neighbouring countries. The Tuvaluans and their expatriate advisors opted for the latter, but 
the question was, of course, unfairly polarised. And it is not at all clear that the British who set 
up the procedures that led to the separation referendum and later self-government and 
independence, spelt out sufficiently fully and carefully what the full costs of independence 
with a modern infrastructure would involve. There is no doubt that the Tuvaluans wanted 
separation from Kiribati, but they could hardly foresee that British aid, after the large grants of 
the Independence period, was likely to sharply contract in size. In supporting this goal, it can 
be argued that the British at least implicitly underwrote for many years to come, and perhaps 
permanently, the costs of creating such a machine age oasis - indeed the costs of becoming 
modern. 
 
Of course, it is overly simplistic to contrast the goals as a “stoneage oasis” on the one hand, or 
a “machine-age oasis” on the other but only Tuvaluans can decide whether the costs of 
becoming “modern” are worth it in an atoll environment. The resources of the sea and tuna 
fishing provide the best economic hopes for the future but it is highly unlikely that the local 
resource base could ever support a “machine-age oasis”.  Tuvaluans evince a healthy desire to 
improve their education and to send considerable numbers of their youth overseas for tertiary 
education, but even here the country cannot afford to pay its subscription to the important 
regional university, the University of the South Pacific. We have seen what store the society 
placed on maintenance of the internal air service; this service, appropriate no doubt to a 
machine-age oasis, was however, unaffordable. In the case of higher education and transport 
then, the costs of being modern, of establishing a “machine-age oasis” are too great. 
 
Tuvalu's dependence on aid is likely to continue indefinitely in spite of its capable 
bureaucracy, recent able and responsible leadership and tight management of the economy. As 
 
one Tuvalu leader put it: “This place will never change, or stand on its own feet, no matter how 
much money you pour into it.”  New Zealand should never overlook this fact.
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PART  THREE: 
 
 
 
SOME POLICY AREAS 
 
CHAPTER ELEVEN 
 
POLITICAL AFFAIRS 
 
 
11.1  Introduction 
 
It is salutary to review political factors in the five small states in the context of the broad pattern of 
social change especially over the last 30 years. This period was the era of decolonisation and nation 
building, of the operation of the new constitutional arrangements for the Cook Islands and later Niue 
under the Special Relationship, of the build up of massive aid flows, of intensified economic and 
social planning, of mounting streams of migration between the Cook Islands, Niue and Tokelau and 
New Zealand. 
 
Relatively large bureaucracies appeared in the island states, remittance income returning to the 
islands became substantial and surprising new invisible sources of revenue such as philatelic sales 
made their appearance, indicating that a new peculiar “species” of economy   the mirab economy   
was emerging, instead of the expected continuance of the classic colonial export economy based on 
the export of copra and minerals or one or two other tropical products. To the west Tuvalu seceded 
from the Gilbert and Ellice Islands Colony in a search for its national identity, and in the same year 
in which the basis for its colonial economy was lost forever (with the exhaustion of its phosphate 
deposits) Kiribati too became “independent”. The predicament of these latter two countries is of 
course infinitely worse than that of the New Zealand linked states. The cry “Find us an island” met 
no response from the colonial authorities since the ill fated Wagina resettlement scheme of 
Gilbertese in the Solomons in the 1960's, and both countries have been denied a migration outlet and 
a special relationship with a metropolitan power. The world and New Zealand's role in it changed 
greatly in this period and the process of integrating island economies more fully into the 
metropolitan economies occurred with the New Zealand linked territories as well as with the island 
groups associated with the United States and France. 
 
It is of course only to be expected that the working out of these major social and economic changes, 
of which the role of mounting aid flows was probably the most significant, would have political 
consequences, as well as the impact of world and regional events (such as international strategic 
rivalry, the nuclear free Pacific movement, the foundation of the Forum and the growth of 
regionalism). 
 
 
11.2   Political Situation 
 
In all five small states it was unthinkable that radical political change would occur with 
independence, for relatively benign, welfarist colonial  policies and the strong stamp of 
missionisation had produced generally acquiescent if not passive societies and relations with New 
Zealand or the United Kingdom have remained good. 
 
In the Cook Islands and Niue the traditional structures and sanctions had long gone1 or like the ariki 
system of chiefs retained only a vestige of their former authority. In the Cook Islands the virtual 
absence of any effective system of local government was a problem that worried the authors of the 
Belshaw Stace Report in 1955. Little elan or social purpose existed and grievances were expressed 
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by the Cook Islands Progressive Association.2 There, the aim for New Zealand was to create astable 
and responsible authority structure in a disorganised and rather rootless society. Although there have 
been many positive achievements in the political field in the 30 years since then, the political 
instability of 1983-84, with the two major political parties almost equal in representation is 
unsettling. The rivalry between the personalities of the politicians dominates the scene. And one 
cannot yet report the existence of a particularly stable authority structure or “broad stable 
communities of economic and social interest”3. 
 
The egalitarianism, individualism and distinctive village structure (comprising often hostile, 
mutually suspicious societies) of Niue has had different political consequences. The “demographic 
haemorrhage” of out-migration has undermined morale and confidence, but consensus style politics 
under the lead of Sir Robert Rex and his wife, supported by an able Government Secretary, Terry 
Chapman, has predominated, so that no opposition party had begun to emerge up to the election of 
March 1984. (Since then there is an opposition of two in the 20 member Assembly.) 
 
In Tokelau, in spite of persistent New Zealand efforts to accelerate the pace of political and 
constitutional change and the construction of a large Western public service that is separate and 
unassimilated into the neo traditional structure4 the village structure has remained largely intact, 
stubbornly resisting further change until current problems can be worked through. 
 
In Kiribati too a proud reassertion of the neo traditional structure, of emphasis on egalitarianism, and 
of maneaba style consensus approach to decision making occurred, which was imaginatively 
encouraged by the constitutional adviser D. Murray within a broad Westminster system.5 However, a 
history of paternalism and non involvement of islanders was reflected in the apathy of people to 
government, which they regarded as foreign in nature.6 Local government had always been weak. As 
Betsy Sewell points out: “the local concept of government is frightening, government is nothing less 
than an arbitrary, external and thoroughly dictatorial power whose purpose is to force the people into 
obeying its command”.7 
 
In Tuvalu too, political independence meant confirmation of the existing social structure, with 
leadership enjoying the respect and support of islanders, with emphasis on service to the community, 
proud conformity, social solidarity and sharing in accordance with Tuvalu's values and the principles 
of the Ekalesia (body of Church members). As in many other Pacific societies kinship and 
reciprocity can greatly affect voting preferences and have political consequences.8 
 
 
11.3   Modernisation and Political Development 
 
Despite the widely differing situations in the territories, New Zealand approached the task of 
decolonisation and nation building in its three territories in a familiar way (Chapter 3). Like other 
countries in the 1950's and 1960's we too were infected by modernisation theory that sees island 
states developing progressively, economically, socially and especially politically, towards greater 
political maturity and responsibility. Thus self government was thought by some to be perhaps a 
preliminary stage during which a young island country learnt “to stand on its own feet” and with 
greater experience the country might later be ready for independence. Yet it can be strongly argued 
we believe, that some of the island states have made only moderate progress in this political sense in 
the years since self government began and “responsible government” has not always behaved in the 
proper, accountable ways according to Westminster theory (see section 11.12 below). Since much of 
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our aid has been closely associated with the process of decolonisation, it is hardly surprising that it is 
also strongly imbued with concepts of modernisation. It was assumed from the Belshaw Stace Report 
on and by constitutional advisers, that progress would occur in equivalent fashion, economically, 
socially and politically. 
 
However, it is interesting to observe who the “new men” were who inherited and operated the 
precise, bloodless clauses of the new constitutions. Of course, even in African or Asian countries 
where economic growth is possible, the world has seen many examples since World War II of the 
failure of economic growth along liberal capitalist lines to promote democratic political 
modernisation on the British or United States models. In mirab economies where economic growth 
has proved impossible a different kind of society again has of course emerged. Politics is managed 
by a small political elite, and while they do not exhibit the corruption or excesses of African or Asian 
elites, and they do show concern for the needs of the people, their management of their countries in 
some cases hardly accords with the fully representative, responsible and accountable democratic 
model according to constitutional theory. 
 
Of course the founding of new states, and the adoption of new constitutions do not occur in a social 
or political vacuum. In the period in which the new constitutions were adopted, the underlying socio-
economic bases of the different societies were becoming more or less amorphous and homogenous 
and more class structured over time. Power belonged primarily to the dominant personalities   the 
Albert Henrys and Robert Rexs   who could seize the opportunities of the new era. In a broader sense 
power belonged to that social group who were created by and who best understood the new forces at 
work   the aid and remittance flows, the link with New Zealand, the workings of the expanded 
bureaucracies and the formation of other organised groups that were the basis of political life. This 
social group, while comprising only about one to five percent of the populations of the Cook Islands 
and Niue, clearly is a political elite. Since its role, like that of other political elites in many other 
newly independent countries, was quite crucial in determining the direction of island politics and the 
style of government, its characteristics need to be examined. 
 
 
11.4   Political Elites 
 
In most countries of the South Pacific social differentiation has now occurred to a degree that in a 
very broad way we may now discern the beginnings of class formation. Traditional elites9, except in 
Tonga, Fiji and Samoa, have largely disappeared or been absorbed in the new loose grouping that the 
French would call évolu, and which is broadly middle class. In comparison to the villagers, the 
middle group is now clearly discernible  - those people usually in public service positions, teaching 
or commercial life and more aware of the political process. At the head of the évolué are the loose 
grouping that can be termed an elite, comprising sometimes old or middle aged but mostly young, 
relatively highly educated individuals on moderate incomes. In most countries (and especially the 
Cook Islands and Niue) they are a bi-cultural group for they have spent usually many years living in 
a metropolitan country and possess an experience and sophistication that is an important ingredient 
in their political success. In some cases they have acquired local power and prestige through being 
successful traders in the colonial period.10 But most have evolved from being among the more 
outstanding or determined scholars of an early group educated abroad11 where they have developed 
something of a syncratic (though predominantly Western) model of development for their particular 
country. Many have experienced a long education abroad, up to perhaps the age of 30, and many 
have been teachers or clerks for a period. Some with varied careers like Albert Henry, have been 
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determined to succeed; others less ambitious but with a keen sense of community duty, have almost 
been thrust into public duties - becoming in Tony Hooper's words an “inadvertent elite” (e.g. 
Tokelau). In some cases they have been selected by colonial authorities for responsible positions in 
the period leading up to self government, in other cases they have been instrumental in organising 
and building up grass roots movements, discussion groups12, trade union movements, or embryonic 
political parties.13 In several cases encouraging an element of nationalism and accusing the 
metropolitan power of “colonialism” has payed an important part in this process. 
 
While fully aware that the village mode of production provides the essential basis of island life, most 
Pacific elites are fully “modern sector” in outlook, spending nearly all their lives in offices or clubs, 
mainly in touch with bureaucrats, urbanites and other politicians. However the smallness of size of 
island nations and the informality of life means that it is still easy for politicians to retain relatively 
close links with the villages and in spite of their urban or metropolitan bias and lengthy separation 
from village life, they are by no means alienated from the village populations. The expansion of 
administrative structures on top on near subsistence economies and the almost absence of a private 
sector apart from a few trading firms has meant that the new elite has had considerable experience of 
public sector activity, visiting aid missions and the like but little experience of industry, commerce 
or modern agriculture. 
 
As in all newly independent countries, the political elite attempt to “engineer the consent” of the 
populace to its policies. Appeals to nationalism and the use of symbols of national identity, while 
often genuine in themselves, form part of a broad strategy of legitimating the government or party or 
justifying the arrangement of power. 
 
 
11.5   Political Strategies 
 
The power of the elite in small, remote island societies hinges on the ability to persuade and 
manipulate the village populations. Since resources are so limited and finite, power resides largely in 
the hands of those who promise security, through safeguarding New Zealand citizenship in the case 
of Niue and the Cook Islands and access to the New Zealand labour market for migrants. No 
politician who threatens this link would enjoy the support of his electorate. Beyond this point, 
political leaders who promise access to additional or new resources - which, apart from the resources 
of the sea, necessarily must come from outside the island micro-economy   might attract some 
support if plausible (see 11.6 below).  
But ensuring that every effort is made to maintain or increase the level of aid is perhaps the greatest 
task of politicians in the mirab economies. One way of pursuing this aim is to emphasise the “client” 
mini state's loyalty to New Zealand, her trust in New Zealand's good intentions, to be ready to 
“tighten the belt” when economic conditions in New Zealand are difficult and generally to fit in with 
the metropolitan country's thinking. This strategy seems to have been the one employed by Niue in 
the last 15 years, and since New Zealand's subventions have not declined, the islands' politicians 
could point to good socio economic conditions on the island. In spite of his advancing years, Sir 
Robert Rex and most of the other leading politicians continue to enjoy political success and were 
comfortably re-elected in the March 1984 elections. 
 
The alternative political strategy to emphasising a small country's “client state” role, its loyalty, 
perhaps even its forlornness and dependency as part of an international tactic in “diplomatic 
reciprocity”, is to seek new resources offshore. It is no accident that so many political leaders in the 
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South Pacific can count millionaires from the United States, Australia and elsewhere among their 
friends. Factors other than the lure of the “South Seas Paradise” have sometimes interested people 
like Raymond Burr in attempts to purchase an island. Of course the introduction of powerful 
foreigners and great wealth into the political ecosystem of an island state is a very dangerous and 
desperate tactic likely to outrage nationalistic feelings unless the odds are correctly calculated. Thus 
Jimmy Stephens' link with the Phoenix Foundation of Texas to establish a tax haven in his break 
away “state” in Vanuatu was always doomed to failure, because it challenged national unity as well 
as Melanesian nationalism14 in the interests of narrower nationalism. 
 
Sometimes it is argued that such political adventurism is purely the result of the erratic, extravagent 
political behaviour of people like Albert Henry, who in contrast to the Niuean tactic of “don't rock 
the boat”, rock the boat quite strongly in a way calculated to extract more resources or favourable 
polices from the metropolitan power. It is true that the personalities of island politicians do play 
some part, but this explanation will not account for the widespread and frequent examples of 
political adventurism, or of “Henryesque” behaviour. Thus the cautious welcome given by the King 
of Tonga in 1976 to Soviet overtures to help develop industry, including fisheries and civil aviation, 
coming at a time of Soviet naval and fisheries expansion in the Pacific, provoked a speedy reaction 
from New Zealand.15 New Zealand doubled its aid to Tonga and securedwithout dissent at the Forum 
meeting in Nauru a declaration calling for regional cooperation in managing the 200 mile EEZs and 
negotiating with long distance fishing nations. But it appears that the real issue for Tonga was not 
Soviet aid in return for its bases, but dissatisfaction with New Zealand policies, especially over 
migration (remittances are crucial for its economy) and aid and disquiet about New Zealand's attitude 
to Pacific needs and concern. 
 
Indeed this example illustrates the very limited room for manoeuvre that island politicians have; the 
constraints of orthodox development strategies and the impossibility of achieving much through 
“bootstrap” development leads to deep frustration and feelings of national impotence. In this 
situation acts of political adventurism are born (see Section 11.6). In this case the lesson of the 
Soviet episode for the Tongan Government was that New Zealand could be effectively pressured. 
 
It would be foolish to condemn all unorthodox political strategies simply because they are novel. 
Thus Albert Henry might have been duped by Milan Brych's claims to cure cancer, but in a mirab 
economy where “invisible” earnings like philatelic sales are all important, setting up an international 
cancer clinic made a lot of economic sense. 
 
 
11.6   Political Adventurism   The Sidney Gross Affair16 
 
Given the extreme limitations of the resource base, and the various options available in attempting to 
develop marine resources such as fishing, the “room for manoeuvre” available to political leaders in 
mini states provides an interesting field of study. With external countries competing to offer capital 
investment or technology often on their own terms, leaders anxious to modernise in a hurry can, at 
times, engage in “political adventurism” or fall for “instant solutions” offered by unscrupulous 
foreign businessmen. Such a case is the Sidney Gross affair. 
 
Sidney Gross has been described as a successful, well heeled American businessman with a good 
reputation in business circles. Perhaps like Raymond Burr and Forbes he was bored and sought the 
stimulation of a venture in the exotic islands of the South Seas. Although he apparently had no 
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previous experience of fishing he did his homework on the fishing potential of Tuvalu. Early in 1979 
two men who were probably agents of Gross appeared in the South Pacific. An “American” 
Toleatasi alias Bulter O'Brien, who Prime Minister Toalipi Lauti claimed to be a relative - “the only 
Tuvaluan to be an American citizen” - offered through Collateral Investments Ltd. a $20 million loan 
to Tuvalu to purchase three fishing boats. The firm intended to promote the sale of land in the United 
States in five acre lots at $6,000 each. About this time Lauti visited Honolulu, a visit that may have 
been sponsored by O'Brien, who was described only half seriously by Lauti as his “investment 
adviser”.  The other agent of Gross was Adrianus Holgan, a Dutch citizen who had been involved in 
a land deal in the New Hebrides which had become the subject of litigation. He had also apparently 
been involved in a company called GIC which “sold land in Vietnam to GI's”.  Holgan introduced 
Lauti to a firm in Dallas called Success Associates, whose educational systems guaranteed the 
removal of frustration, the development of leadership qualities etc. Lauti bought U.S. $50,000 of 
materials from them. 
 
By March there was an exchange of information between London, Washington, Canberra and 
Wellington because of growing fears that Tuvalu might be “ripped off”.  They had heard in February 
that Lauti planned to invest Tuvalu's Reserve Fund in these land deals. The Foreign and 
Commonwealth Office had not heard of Collateral Investments Ltd. but identified Gross' company as 
Blue Chip Realty Investments of California. The FCO wrote to Lauti pointing out that his planned 
investment would not be a proper use of the country's reserve funds. At the time that the United 
States Tuvalu treaty was about to be signed, the FCO expressed concern to the United States that one 
of their nationals might be “ripping off” the Tuvaluans. The Americans agreed to check out Gross 
and his company, but the checks confirmed that to date Gross' actions appeared to be legal. Later the 
FCO learned that Lauti did not invest reserve funds in land deals but that “the American” (probably 
O'Brien) had left Tuvalu with $70,000 in two suitcases. The money had apparently come from at 
least two island councils. 
 
Lauti then took up Gross' offer to establish a fishing industry in Tuvalu and made over the reserve 
fund (apparently A$525,000)to this project. Gross was apparently contemplating providing a loan to 
purchase two fishing boats and also the establishment of a canning factory and an ice making plant. 
To the British, the whole thing appeared to be a con  - possibly a tax dodge on Gross' part. They 
were most concerned about the consequences of such a large and expensive venture on Tuvalu's 
economy, given the lack of facilities, equipment or crews and the poor marketing prospects for their 
fish. 
 
The Foreign and Commonwealth Office were seriously concerned about what was going on in 
Tuvalu. It was estimated that about $525,000 of the reserve fund was revenue from the philatelic 
bureau. The FCO was told in confidence that Lauti's cheque to Gross had bounced and Lauti then 
appealed to the British for assistance. Rumours were circulating in Tuvalu that there was not enough 
money to pay civil service salaries.  
 
It was believed for a time (incorrectly), that the Tuvalu Minister of Finance, H. Naisali, who had 
consistently opposed the action taken by Lauti, had been sacked for his pains. Two British financial 
officials were despatched urgently to Tuvalu to assess the situation. 
 
In the assessment of outside observers, Toalipi Lauti was naive rather than dishonest in his dealings 
during the affair, and that he showed some penchant for following the rather autocratic and irregular 
techniques of Morimer de Roberts' Government (having spent several years on Nauru). Lauti had 
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acted impulsively and imprudently when he disregarded advice to engage a lawyer while in the 
United States, and in writing a letter while in Los Angeles purporting to appoint Sidney Gross as 
Tuvalu's representative in the United States. 
 
In the campaign leading up to the September 1979 elections, the main issue was the decision to 
invest the reserve funds with Sidney Gross and Dr Papua and Hon. Henry Naisali led criticism over 
the fate of the investment (P.I.M., November 1981). Following the election Toalipi Lauti was 
defeated by five votes to seven in a parliamentary vote for the prime ministership by Dr Tomasi 
Puapua. The fact that some interest on the investment had been paid was not sufficient to save Mr 
Lauti. Toalipi Lauti had been chief minister and then prime minister since October 1975. 
 
Late in October, Mr Lauti wrote to Gross saying he wished to withdraw the $500,000 plus 
accumulated interest on the first anniversary of it being handed over in March 1980. At that time he 
was reasonably optimistic of recovering the money. Gross had become uneasy at F.B.I. interest in the 
affair but wrote pious letters couched in religious phrases asserting that he was Tuvalu's genuine 
friend and benefactor. 
 
In November the Tuvalu cabinet rejected Gross' plan to sell Tuvalu citizenship to foreigners. Gross 
also wanted the elimination of all exchange restrictions and sought a tax haven in the country, 
proposals that were rejected by the Tuvalu assembly. 
 
Lauti was crestfallen at the affair, thinking wistfully that the promised $10 million loan (not the $20 
million already touted) could have been invested at 15%. The interest would have covered the 
recurrent budget. The New Zealand High Commissioner pointed out that such a deal would have 
seriously damaged Tuvalu's international reputation. 
 
Apparently it was feared that a good deal of private money (much from the Tuvalu Church) was 
invested in Green Valley acres. The whole affair led to a good deal of acrimony at a Honolulu 
conference, but by September it appeared that the whole affair was over. At that stage it appeared as 
if Tuvalu might get its money back, but at the time of writing (March 1984) it appears that Gross has 
made no further substantial repayment of the $525,000 investment. As the New Zealand High 
Commissioner said, Mr Lauti was “beginning to learn that there are no instant solutions to national 
penury and no short cuts in setting up a viable fishing industry”.  The case is in principle not an 
isolated one, for political leaders in the Cook Islands and Tonga in the 1960's and 1970's have at 
times found their lack of “room to manoevre” particularly irksome and have resorted to various 
forms of “political adventurism”.  But then this is certainly not confined to mini states. 
 
A postscript needs to be added. In March 1984 it was generally believed by the Tuvalu Government 
that Sidney Gross was about to pay back all the Government money owed. He had already paid back 
$100,000. This they saw as the result of intense diplomatic pressure on Gross (the Prime Minister 
paid special emphasis on the role of the U.S. Ambassador to Fiji, Urquhart, whom he described as a 
personal friend of Ronald Reagan), backed up by visits by the F.B.I. Gross had promised in a letter 
to return the money (estimated to be $523,123 of capital and accumulated interest) by 16 February 
when his agreement with the earlier Tuvalu Government expired (Budget Speech 1984). As this 
report went to press, we heard in July 1984 that Gross paid back all moneys owing after a visit of 
Henry Naisali to the United States.  
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11.7  The Security of a Reserve Fund 
 
Acts of political adventurism like the Gross Affair serve as a warning to metropolitan governments 
as well as to island politicans. Such strategies are not likely to be employed if long term budget 
support by metropolitan countries were ensured. A case in point was the desire of Tuvalu at 
independence to receive a single, large lump sum rather than an annual aid grant over successive 
years. The point was reinforced in August 1984 by Henry Naisali, Deputy Prime Minister, who 
thought that Tuvalu's long term future would be ensured if a revenue equalisation reserve fund (like 
that of Kiribati) could be built up to about A$20 or 30 million17.  Such a fund, deposited in a safe 
portfolio of investments, would mean that the country could live on the interest. He declared that the 
inviolability of the principal would be assured by an arrangement whereby 100 percent of the 
Assemblymen and the assent of the donors would be necessary before drawing on it. Such an 
arrangement would give greater autonomy as well as greater security to the small states. 
 
 
11.8   Political Systems 
 
In very small island societies the supply of political talent is very limited, so the choice between 
politicians and parties is equally limited. This is illustrated by the relatively long political careers of 
Albert Henry, Sir Robert Rex and Sir Tom Davis in marked contrast to some of the larger Pacific 
countries, such as Papua New Guinea where the number of évolués is relatively large and there has 
been a marked turnover of some of the politicians. 
 
With the growing dominance of a colourful, charismatic politician like Albert Henry, and the 
victimisation of opponents18, the development of party politics became inevitable and necessary, 
given the intensity of political feelings (e.g. the burning down of the Nikao Social Centre in 
Rarotonga just before the South Pacific Conference in 197419) and the infringement of individual 
rights. While a party political system as in the Westminster model does have several advantages, it is 
rather new in the South Pacific where consensus politics of “The Pacific Way”20 type have 
predominated (cf. Niue up to 1984, Tokelau, and the near consensus situation in Kiribati and 
Tuvalu). Consensus political systems do have great advantages and appear to be appropriate to the 
neo traditional social system21, although they do have some major disadvantages, which still have to 
be solved (see 11.13 and 11.14 below). In fact there appears to be no conventional basis for party 
politics in mirab economies for the economic policy (normally the basis for distinguishing between 
parties) is not a point of issue. However the basis for distinguishing political parties is a matter 
which islanders will determine. The real basis for party politics would appear to be on the 
relationship with donor countries, and on alternative strategies of attracting external resources as 
indicated above. The disadvantage of party politics is that there are often not many competent people 
available and it is a waste to have some excluded from government because of party affiliation.  
 
The differentiation of parties in the islands as in any other country revolves around personalities and 
the kind of basic goals and philosophies - and the relative trade offs between them - presented in 
Table 11.1. Some of the preferred choices and combinations of these goals can be presented as 
predominantly private sector oriented favouring foreign investment, while others are more socially 
and community oriented. In reality there is little in the islands to attract foreign investment. The 
biggest hotel in the five small states, the Rarotongan, was only built when Air New Zealand and the 
New Zealand Tourist Hotel Corporation joined with the Cook Island Government. And “more 
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market” oriented policies such as the abolition of fertiliser subsidies by the Davis Government led to 
a greater fall in agricultural output. 
 
 
TABLE 11.1 
 
Development Goals of Ordinary People1 
 
                                                                                                                                                                            
 
1. Future wealth and happiness of the people. 
2. The earning power and hence the real standard of living of this generation and the next. 
(Note that “earnings” include the results of both subsistence and market activities.) 
3. Preservation of some of the comforting and well known features of past life. 
 4. Freedom, security and independence. 
                                                                                                                                                                        
 
1. Adapted from Hughes' development goals in South Pacific development planning (Hughes, 
1972). 
 
Three major weaknesses of consensus systems have to be solved for mirab economies. In the area of 
massive aid inflows it is important that the expenditure of funds accord with the government's 
approved pattern of expenditure. While it is unacceptable that aid donors should attempt to apply 
political leverage it is essential that moneys be expended according to the government's programme 
which is understood by and can be evaluated by the electorate. An efficient and honest 
administration is essential but it is equally essential that the executive of government be held 
accountable (in some locally acceptable political way) to the population. As we discuss below the 
accountability of consensus type governments (or even of “Westminster” type ones that don't 
perform as they are meant to, according to the constitution) is a crucial question. With massive aid 
inflows, the possibility of corruption remains very real, and there is a danger that potential critics of 
government might be “bought off” or gradually and insidiously receive perks so that in turn, they 
too, become corrupted. 
 
Secondly, the importance of kinship and reciprocity in small scale bonded island societies remains 
great and can lead to nepotism and bias in carrying out the business of government. Gift giving and 
receiving and on going relationships of reciprocity are an integral part of island life, but at times 
when political considerations are involved, the Judiciary might consider such instances as bribery or 
treating. Since internal politics inevitably reflects the social organisation in the islands while formal 
government business and external relations are carried on according to international standards, there 
is occasionally conflict; no simple or short term solution is in sight. 
 
Thirdly, while consensus decision making has proven itself at the village and island levels, it has yet 
to be seen whether it can work adequately at the national level. When questions of foreign policy, 
involving issues of power or novel international relationships are involved, it is not clear whether the 
extension of local principles to handling the broader questions will prove adequate. For example, 
currently the Tokelau Fono understandably wants a pause to work out what kind of accommodation 
might be required for the neo traditional system to deal with the issues to be faced in the future. 
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11.9   Ambivalent Policies 
 
In reviewing the last 15 to 20 years of political evolution in the islands it is clear that the role and 
composition of the state has been rather ambiguous and the observed planning strategies over time 
inconsistent and contradictory. Basically this has been because of misunderstandings and wishful 
thinking, both in the metropolitan country and in the islands of what really could be achieved by 
“development”. Moreover, insecurity has been caused by the lack of a  long term+ commitment by 
New Zealand to aid to the Cook Islands and Niue or by Britain to aid Kiribati and Tuvalu. Thus 
Kiribati is trying to soldier on as if it were still a classic colonial export economy, yet in the post 
phospate era it inevitably becomes a mirab economy that is aid dependent. Tuvalu is painfully 
learning the same thing as it is paying the price for “independence”. 
 
We have noted that the “room for manoeuvre” of politicians is very greatly circumscribed. Although 
appeals to island nationalism, to cherished symbols of national identity are good politics up to a 
point, no island leader dare risk jeopardising the link with the metropolitan country. At times of 
political strength however, when optimism for the prospects of autonomous development ran high, 
politicians have actually embarked on bold policies. Thus in 1966 Albert Henry increased taxation 
partly to pay for a $1 a week old age pension and partly in an effort to reduce dependence on the 
New Zealand subsidy. He cut the number of scholarships for students destined for collar and tie 
education , brought in a bill to restrict emigration to those with a house and job waiting in New 
Zealand, and he had plans to reduce the size of the public service.22 
 
Sir Tom Davis too, like Albert Henry, has believed in the reality of autonomous, bootstraps 
development. Both men subscribed to the national goal of the Cook Islands “to achieve the greatest 
possible degree of economic, social and political reliance consistent with the resources available”.  
Unlike any other politicians in the Cook Islands, both men seemed to genuinely desire full 
independence, though they stopped short of jeopardising the New Zealand link. In an interview on 
New Zealand television in late 1978 Sir Tom Davis described the relationship with New Zealand as 
being more of a commercial than political one. And the relationship would involve “... more of us 
doing our own thing successfully than relying on New Zealand to pay the piper”.23 In fact, he 
envisaged New Zealand aid “diminishing in about two years   maybe less. Or better still I would 
expect that the aid would not diminish but assist us in further expanding our capabilities”.  (This is 
identical to statements in the Belshaw Stace Report 23 years earlier.) He declared that he was 
“absolutely sure” that the stage would come when the Cook Islands were not financially dependent 
on New Zealand. 
 
In 1984 the ambivalence of attitudes towards autonomous development and more independence on 
the one hand (with all the appropriate political policies required) and acceptance of greater 
economic, social and political integration with New Zealand on the other as the mirab society model 
postulates, was evident during fieldwork. In Table 11.2 the responses of 12 leading Cook Islanders 
(including several current or ex cabinet ministers and senior public servants) are presented on issues 
relating to the constitutional relationship and economic “development”.  The table is not meant to 
suggest the illogical or woolly headed thinking of the islanders (responses in Wellington would 
probably be similar) but the  
ambivalence of the constitutional and economic situation as it has evolved. Indeed, in spite of the 
unreality of the goal of autonomous development at acceptable living standards, New Zealand must 
take responsibility for promoting it. 
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11.10   Current Concerns 
 
This chapter has indicated that there is enough evidence of the extreme frustrations and feelings of 
impotence among the small island states as to suggest that unorthodox political strategies or political 
adventurism may be adopted from time to time if there is persistent dissatisfaction with New Zealand 
policies. While understandable, such acts might incur heavy costs, undermine stability or threaten 
established relationship. In Chapter 3 the issue was discussed of the movement of the Cook Islands 
in the early 1970's towards “as if” independence. While much of the initiative for this may have 
come from the Cook Islands, it was received more sympathetically by Norman Kirk than by the 
preceding National Government. Although under the special relationship responsibility for foreign 
affairs and defence lay with New Zealand rather than with the island government trends that 
developed in the 1970's had the effect of moving the Cook Islands closer to full independence. 
 
Henry wrote to the Minister of Island Territories in October 1971 asking that the two functions of the 
High Commissioner (as “head of state” and representative of the New Zealand Government) be 
separated.In May 1973 Kirk and Henry agreed in discussions that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
(and not Island Territories) should become the direct channel of communication between the two 
governments.24 This had the obvious advantage for Henry of giving him access as of right to Kirk,  
who was Minister of Foreign Affairs as well as Prime Minister, on all matters (not merely on foreign 
affairs or defence), instead of to Mr P. Amos, Minister of Island Territories, who was a junior 
minister. This direct access continued in the 1970's and 1980's as Sir Robert Muldoon in effect acted 
as  de facto Minister for South Pacific Affairs, while David Lange is also Minister for Foreign 
Affairs. 
 
At least since 1975 the Ministry of Foreign Affairs had accorded the Cook Islands the status in effect 
of a full sovereign nation. This attitude of mutual respect between equals is admirable, even if 
existing power relationships mean that in reality many islanders in 1984 still see the relationship 
with New Zealand as essentially a paternal (rather than fraternal) one.25 The question arises, 
however, of whether New Zealand has fully thought through the implications of this new 
relationship in which the islands are acting as fully free agents. 
 
Current issues which could sorely test the relationship, and which illustrate trends alluded to earlier 
in this chapter, include: 
 
(1) The wood fuel project in Rarotonga; 
 
 (2) The unaudited accounts of philatelic revenue in Niue; 
 
(3) The current proposals in the Cook Islands to raise the salaries (including allowances) of 
members of the Assembly by approximately 100 percent; 
 
(4) The Niue Assembly Members Superannuation Bill, 1984. 
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TABLE 11.2 
Cook Islands: Constitutional Relationship and Economic “Development” 
 
Name 
In favour 
of special 
relationsh
ip with 
N.Z. 
In 
favour 
of 
N.Z. 
aid 
In favour 
of 
“indepen-
dence”1 
In favour of 
Independ-
ence (no 
free entry 
or aid 
guaranteed) 
In favour 
of 
autonom-
ous 
develop-
ment 
In 
favour 
of 
increasi
ng 
internat-
ional 
associat-
ions 
In favour 
of 
consider-
ing 
integrat-
ion with 
N.Z. 
In favour of 
possible 
constitute-
ional 
change 
Father-
son 
relation-
ship 
Husband-
wife 
relationship 
           
Hon. Tangaroa Tangaroa ● ● ●  ● ● ●  ●  
Vince Ingram ● ● ●  ● ● ● ●   
Joe Caffery ● ●   ●  ● ●   
Henry Puna ● ● ●        
Father George ● ● ●  ●      
Ka'a Henry ● ● ●  ● ●     
Reema Brown ● ● ●  ● ●     
William Estall ● ● ●  ● ● ● ●   
John Hermann            ● ● ●  ● ● ● ●  ●2 
Mana Strickland ● ● ●  ● ● ● ● ●  
Terepai Maoati ● ● ●    ● ●   
Ngereteina Puna ● ● ●   ●     
           
2.  In 1965, seen as a domineering husband (N.Z.) to his wife (Cooks'); now the wife is feeling increasingly “liberated”. 
 
1.  “Independence” meaning self government with virtually unrestrained freedom of action. 
 
 
 
 
11.11  Wood Fuel Project 
 
Although in May 1984 the Cook Islands' attempts to be recognised as a separate sovereign entity by the 
European Economic Community in order to receive the benefits available to associate members under 
Lomé II provisions was backed by other South Pacific states (including New Zealand), the application 
was turned down. Membership would have permitted access to soft loans etc. not otherwise available. 
It is understandable that the Cook Islands Government wishes to deal directly with third party 
governments to conclude treaties or negotiate loans. (This issue had become real at least as early as 
1978 on the occasion of the Taiwan fishing deal,) However currently Sir Tom Davis is anxious to take 
up a $8.6 million loan to finance a controversial wood fuelled electric power plant. The objective, of 
obtaining cheaper power by burning the fast growing species  Leucaena, is laudable but in the opinion 
of many observers it will prove impossible to acquire the minimum area of land from the landowners 
on Rarotonga (500 to 800 hectares on flat land, or more on hill slopes) for tree planting to make the 
project viable. Other serious problems also exist. There appears to be a strong possibility if not 
probability, that if the project goes ahead, it will fail dismally26, and the Cook Islands will be unable to 
repay the debt incurred. New Zealand would then be expected to pick up the tab. 
 
 
11.12  Unaudited philatelic revenue 
 
For no apparent reason, the declared philatelic revenue in Niue is $400,000 less than in the Cook 
Islands. Mr Finbar Kenny of the United States handles sales of stamps for both countries. Each year 
since 1978 the Auditor General has reported that the gross revenue for the sales has not been inspected; 
indeed only one inspection had ever been carried out (see also section 7.19). 
 
The more important issue is constitutional rather than ethical. It is the clear duty of the Assembly under 
the Niue Constitution Act 1974, Clauses 56-60, to carefully consider the Auditor General's Report each 
year and to hold the Executive to account for all revenues received and expenditures made of behalf of 
the Niuean Government.  
 
The reason that this does not happen on this and in other instances, it has been alleged, is not because 
of inexperience or incompetence on the part of the Assemblymen, but because of fear of the ruling 
elite. 
 
 
11.13  Rise in salaries and allowances of Members of the Assembly 
 
Recently in the Cook Islands it has been proposed that the salaries, allowances and other expenses of 
members of the Assembly be sub-stantially raised   in fact to a total about percent above their existing  
level. While it has been argued that the current salary is inordinately low, the rise comes at a time of 
acute recession in the islands as well as in New Zealand. An objection seems to be legitimate not 
because of the fact of the increase proposed but because of its very great amount. Moreover the 
proposal is bipartisan, for with the exception of Vince Ingram and a few other members,the move is 
supported by the two major parties. The very great size of the increase proposed opens the members of 
the Assembly to the charge that they are indeed acting very much like the political elite of other 
developing countries, in that they are greatly concerned with their own self interest and enrichment.  
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11.14  Niue Assembly Members Superannuation Bill 1984 
 
This bill, passed in January 1984, had the intention of establishing a superannuation scheme for 
Members of the Assembly and to ensure that the cost to Government is a “known factor at all times”. 
 
However, Clause 8 of the Bill, section (3) states that:- 
 
“Cabinet may in consultation with the Speaker and the Secretary to the 
Government, grant a qualified member upon his ceasing to be a member such 
payment in addition to that paid (under the terms of the superannuation 
scheme) ... as it sees fit where it is felt that the  qualified member has 
rendered exceptional services to the Government of Niue”. (Our underlining). 
 
 
Furthermore Clause 9, section (2) states that: 
 
“Where in any year the money in the Superannuation Account is insufficient 
to meet all payments required to be made, Cabinet may, without further 
appropriation than this section make an advance from the Niue Government 
Account sufficient to meet the deficiency”. 
 
 
 
11.15 Policy Proposals 
 
In reviewing political affairs the Team does not wish to present an unbalanced picture. Undoubtedly 
there have been many excellent achievements by island governments in managing the affairs of the 
island states, in ordering their own lives and in dealing with their problems. But in the last 15 to 20 
years a new historical era has arrived - the era of large aid projects, of massive aid flows, the 
temptations offered by powerful and plausible foreign companies. It is well known that corruption has 
increased dramatically in countries (e.g. in Asia) that have received large aid flows. While it is believed 
that the South Pacific countries with their background of missionised cultures, honest leadership and 
correct colonial government procedures have been in the past immune from this tendency, there has 
been mounting evidence from some countries in recent years that corruption has begun and is 
increasing. While the desire of politicians to be re elected ensures that they continue to have regard for 
the people, the social distance between the political elite and the villagers is growing steadily wider, 
the power they wield is becoming greater and the awe (even at times fear) in which they are held by 
members of the public is becoming considerable. While in the main they have served their countries 
well, the dangers of self enrichment or of abuse of power are clearly there. 
 
In view of the delicacy of such matters and the perils that face the relationship between New Zealand 
and the island states urgent action is recommended now. (A neo-colonial backlash from the uninformed 
New Zealander taxpayer could be disastrous.) The danger of not putting in place procedures to deal 
with this situation now, is that much more expensive “bailing out” exercises might be required later, or 
it would be difficult to act in a way that didn't appear to be an over reaction by Big Brother. 
 
Fortunately, relations between the island governments and the New Zealand Government are friendly 
and open. Accordingly, it is suggested that a Select Committee be appointed to deal with the 
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relationship in each case with Niue and the Cook Islands. There would be an equal number of 
members, from Parliament and the Assembly on each side. Later it might be appropriate to appoint one 
also for Tokelau. Under high quality, delicate Chairmanship these issues which involve constitutional 
matters, integrity and ethics, accountability, and the wisdom of government policy (especially when 
countries are entering new, uncharted waters) could be soundly dealt with in an amicable way. In such 
a forum the New Zealanders too would learn much that is richly rewarding.  
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CHAPTER TWELVE 
 
DEFENCE 
 
 
12.1   Continuity and Change 
 
The fall of Singapore in 1942 was a decisive event in the history of New Zealand's foreign policy, 
shattering the myth of Britain's imperial defence supremacy and destroying the country's confidence 
in Britain's ability to protect New Zealand in time of war. The threat by Peter Fraser to pull the New 
Zealand division out of the Western desert to protect the homeland (as Australia earlier had done) 
brought the request from Churchill to Roosevelt that led to the despatch of marines to the South 
Pacific. The American victory in the Battle of the Coral Sea underlined New Zealand's reliance on 
the United States to protect it from invasion by a hostile power. After the War it was felt that some 
dependable relationship with the United States in the Pacific was essential for its long term future. 
Recognition of this fact by both New Zealand and Australia was the basis for the ANZUS Alliance. 
The Canberra Pact between Australia and New Zealand in 1944 was extended into a tripartite treaty 
with the United States in 1951. For 30 years successive governments have recognised ANZUS as 
the cornerstone of New Zealand's security and defence policies.  
 
While New Zealand's ties of friendship and allegiance with Britain and the Commonwealth have 
not greatly diminished (as illustrated by the loan of a frigate to Britain during the Falklands War) 
even although New Zealand exports to Britain have dropped from 84 percent to a mere 14 percent 
in the last 45 years, the dependence on and close alliance with the United States, as well as with 
Australia, has become the paramount factor in the nation's defence in this period, creating at times 
(as in the Suez crisis) some ambivalence when Britain and the United States are opposed. As the 
Chief of the Defence Staff, Air Marshall Jamieson points out, “defence is a long term business   
there is no place for the quick fix merchant”.1 Continuity too, is a reflection of the “mindset” of 
New Zealand's political and military leaders; their attitudes on defence and strategy very much 
reflect views formed in the Second World War. Thus, leaders of the armed forces have, until 1983, 
been men who fought in the War,2 and many of the political leaders (e.g. Sir Robert Muldoon, Jack 
Marshall, David Thomson, Duncan McIntyre, Frank O'Flynn) were also people who saw active 
service in the last war.  
 
In mid 1984 as this report went to press, the possibility of some moderately substantial change, or at 
least change in emphasis to the pattern of unbroken continuity presents itself. The accession of the 
Fourth Labour Government to power, espousing a nuclear free South Pacific policy, raises the 
possibility of change, though its avowed commitment to the ANZUS Treaty (however paradoxical 
that might appear) is said to be as strong as ever. This policy is interesting in a number of ways: it 
illustrates the thinking of new men and women who are nearly a generation younger than the last 
government's rulers, and whose mindset has not been conditioned by World War Two military 
strategy; it illustrates the determination of New Zealand as a small South Pacific nation to attempt a 
foreign policy that at least has a measure of independence, and it exemplifies thinking that is deeply 
disenchanted by the progressive deterioration in United States Soviet relationships.  
 
The international setting in which policy makers have to operate is extremely gloomy and 
foreboding. The relations between the superpowers have not been worse since the early 1950s. The 
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United States claims that the prospects of detente have receded because of the Soviet invasion of 
Afghanistan, the Polish crisis, Soviet involvement in Third World issues and the build up of Soviet 
naval forces in the Indian Ocean and Pacific. The USSR on its part is aggrieved at United States 
reluctance to resume disarmament talks, its interference in Central America (such as mining 
Nicaraguan waters, the Grenada invasion), and angered at the recent deployment of medium range 
nuclear missiles in Europe. Indeed as George Kennan argues, there has been a deterioration in 
superpower relationships since 1983 and in recent years a continued failure of internationalism is 
apparent. The leaders of both sides are old men, whose rigid attitudes seem to be based on fear, 
ignorance, crude stereotypes of their adversaries, shallow notions of national pride, or simplistic 
analysis of international events. 
 
More generally, the two superpowers, along with many rich nations of the “North”, repeatedly 
disregard the desperate plight of the “South” and there is a continued lack of communication 
between North and South on how to deal with the debt crisis and how to formulate a better 
international monetary system. Most of all, with the deployment of intermediate range nuclear 
missiles by both superpowers, there is growing cynicism on the part of public opinion in many 
countries. There is a feeling that the world is increasingly trapped and helpless in the face of 
events. Even as late as 1983, although there were growing doubts as to the success of the American 
policies of nuclear deterrence, there were some hopes that with the deployment of the missiles, 
President Reagan might take an initiative on disarmament prior to the November 1984 Presidential 
elections. As 1984 nears its close these hopes are becoming ever more remote. Rather than 
observing a successful policy of nuclear deterrence, we appear to be witnessing another version of 
a pre World War One arms race, except that this time the adversaries are equipped with a vast and 
horrifying arsenal of nuclear weapons.  
 
At the time of writing the defence policy initiative of the new Labour Government offers a small 
gleam of hope that New Zealand will not continue to be, in effect, an accomplice to its ally, the 
United States in its current nuclear arms race and will, without endangering its own vital interests, 
be able to exert a measure of independence in its foreign and defence policies in the South Pacific. 
It is by no means certain however, that the new Government will gain even majority support in the 
South Pacific - the region in which New Zealand's influence could be expected to be greatest. 
Currently Fiji, Tonga and the Cook Islands support the more conservative Australian stance on anti 
nuclear issues, while the position of Papua New Guinea appears rather ambivalent.3 
 
 
12.2  Collective Security : From Forward Defence to Regional “Self Reliance” 
 
New Zealand argued vehemently for the rights of small nations at San Francisco in 1946. The 
country's defence policy has always reflected concern over its smallness and isolation. These 
intractable geographic factors have led to a foreign policy in which New Zealand, fearful of being 
expendable in great power rivalry, has tried to earn the regard and support of the great powers by 
helping to contribute to collective security.4 New Zealand's prompt intervention in the Korean 
War, assistance in the Malaya emergency, the Confrontation crisis with Sukarno's Indonesia, 
membership of SEATO, and support to the United States (in spite of considerable misgivings) in 
the Vietnam War, illustrate the point. The nation has also contributed to international peacekeeping 
forces. As Dennis McLean has stated:5 
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“New Zealand has not the weight to hope to exercise profound 
influence in the comings and goings of international affairs. But it 
has accepted long since that there is no “free lunch” in inter-
national relationships and has therefore made its costly 
contributions to collective security. In the process wide ranging 
relationships with Western powers have been built up which help 
serve underlying interests, particularly economic. Moreover such 
relationships spring naturally from the history and present make 
up of New Zealand life and culture”.  
 
McLean mentions that in recent decades, the facts of geography, the influence of Polynesia on New 
Zealand and strategic and regional realities have made the South Pacific vitally important to New 
Zealand, so that today it is in fact “a country of two worlds”.  
 
Involvement in action overseas shows that the area of concern has widened since 1951 from a 
defensive agreement primarily centred on Japan to potential intervention on the Asian mainland in 
an attempt to contain communism. As in its earlier Euro centric policy, in which New Zealanders 
fought in the Boer War and two World Wars, the country's defence policy essentially became a 
matter of support for collective security and forward defence. Appreciating that the essence of a 
treaty relationship is the obligations ensuing, the country's politicians have consistently been 
prepared for New Zealand to pay its price, often painful, in fighting other people's wars or being 
involved in distant trouble spots. The reward would be trade access and other benefits (difficult for 
a small, insignificant and remote country otherwise to acquire) and protection by the United States 
in time of war.  
 
However the Vietnam War led to considerable misgivings within New Zealand about forward 
defence. Many people believed, rightly or wrongly, that the Domino Theory had been proved 
wrong, that the Vietnam War was purely an internal matter for the north and south of that country 
to fight over, and that our defence policy had merely led to an entanglement in a war of dubious 
moral or political value. With the demise of SEATO the Nixon (Guam) Doctrine drew attention to 
the limitations of the United States' power, calling for a greater effort at self reliance on the part of 
its allies. Hence New Zealand transferred much of its attention to the South Pacific region, the area 
for which she had responsibility under ANZUS, and instead of forward defence a new “close to 
home” policy was enunciated in the 1978 Defence Review.6 Five years later, from New Zealand's 
point of view, many of the economic and geopolitical factors remained unchanged. Again it was felt 
that no manifest external threat existed to New Zealand's security. With the evolution of 
communications and weapons technology since the Vietnam War and the lessons of the Falklands 
campaign, the country became more and more conscious of rapidly escalating defence costs, given 
the deep economic recession and plight of the New Zealand economy. These factors re emphasised 
the 1978 thinking in the 1983 Defence Review, in which “close to home” issues of the South 
Pacific region again took precedence. The attempted secession in Vanuatu in 19807 underlined the 
importance of the need for regional co operation in the case of threats to stability or national unity 
and this regional self reliance met American concerns under ANZUS. The result was the creation of 
a small flexible force able to operate immediately to deal with a trouble spot in the region -  the 
Ready Reaction Regular Force (R3F).  
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Despite the priority attached to the South Pacific, forward defence is not entirely abandoned 
however. Thus the end of the New Zealand force in Singapore, presaged in the 1978 White Paper, 
was revoked. For political reasons it was considered “not timely” to bring the Force home8 and the 
Minister of Defence indicated that New Zealand would remain for “at least another 10 years” in 
Southeast Asia9.  
 
In 1984 on the occasion of the snap election, defence matters became a major election issue for the 
first time for many years, expressing public disquiet at a defence budget of over $700 million and 
disillusionment at the nuclear arms race and the superpower impasse. In the campaign the Labour 
Party renewed its promise to ban the visits of nuclear armed or nuclear powered vessels, while the 
New Zealand Party presented itself as a “Peace Party” that would scrap defence spending.  
 
 
12.3   The Cost of Defence 
 
With the rapid development of new weapon systems and changing military tactics revealed by the 
experience of the Vietnam and Falklands campaigns, the cost of modernising defence forces and 
adapting them to the new requirements has placed a very heavy burden on all countries, except 
those who opt for unarmed neutrality. The burden that has fallen on New Zealand is indicated in 
Table 12.1. The table, which shows defence spending in the last 13 years, reveals a moderate 
increase in real terms in 1974-75. The only substantial increases in real terms occurred however in 
1980-81 and 1981-82 when New Zealand seems to have responded, no doubt to American 
prodding, to improve and modernise her defence forces.  
 
Column 4 of Table 12.1 shows the defence expenditure as a percentage of GDP. In the last 13 
years, defence spending has varied between 1.53 and 2.2 percent of GDP, growing slightly over the 
period. This is small in comparison to most countries. Norway, though somewhat richer, spends 
three times as much per capita as New Zealand and Singapore (though a little poorer) half as much 
again.10 In 1981 Australia spent more than double per capita (3.3% of GNP) and the other ANZUS 
partner, the United States, six times as much. Of course these figures really reflect the fact that New 
Zealanders, living “at the edge of the world” don't feel greatly threatened, and hence are not very 
security conscious.  
 
It would be wrong to assume however, that the country's relatively modest defence spending 
indicates the strength of neutrality or isolationism as policies. The history of the country, as Dennis 
McLean has said, is indeed one “of reaching out to the wider world in a determined attempt to 
overcome the problem........ of 'the tyranny of distance’”.11 We have noted above the many 
occasions on which New Zealand has fought in other people's wars in order to earn the regard and 
support of great powers that might accept the role of protector.  
 
The question of cost effectiveness of defence spending is of course a specialist matter, but the 
present ambivalence of defence policy (combining a forward defence capability with a policy of 
regional self reliance) seems to be reflected in a growing debate over the composition of New 
Zealand's arms purchases. One defence writer has claimed that the cost of one second hand frigate 
could have bought and equipped 48 Nomad type aircraft with improved avionics and an armoury of 
Sea Eagle, Exocet, Harpoon and Swedish RB40E missiles12. It does seem logical that some 
concentration should be developed on anti submarine, anti ship capabilities and fisheries protection 
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vessels. And while the traditional pride of the individual services and their units is not to be 
discarded lightly, is it logical to persist with the old three fold structure? Are traditional attitudes 
slowing modernisation in the form of radical restructuring? Rapid deployment calls for integrated 
structures and in general our military forces must be developed in a close and complementary 
relationship with the Australian military forces.  
 
 
Table 12.1 
 
NEW ZEALAND : DEFENCE EXPENDITURE AND GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT 
 
Financial 
Year 
Total Gross 
Defence 
Expenditure 
Rate of 
Increase % 
Relationship to 
GDP % 
Defence 
Expenditure in 
real terms3 
(1982 $ 
million) 
1970-71 109.01  1.94 420.4 
1971-72 121.17 11.1 1.76 414.2 
1972-73 129.83 7.1 1.66 401.5 
1973-74 140.51 8.2 1.53 398.8 
1974-75 166.85 18.7 1.65 462.9 
1975-76 193.46 15.9 1.66 476.8 
1976-77 214.83 11.0 1.53 445.8 
1977-78 252.17 17.4 1.65 449.1 
1978-79 299.51 18.7 1.69 465.5 
1979-80 346.09 15.5 1.66 456.2 
1980-81 455.94 31.7 1.91 537.8 
1981-82 593.65 30.2 2.06 593.7 
1982-83 652.13 9.8 2.21 581.5 
1983-84 709.35   602.3 
          
 
Notes: D. McLean, “The Case for Defence”,  N.Z. International Review, VIII 3, 
May/June 1983, p.16.  
1. Estimated.   
2. Deflated using the implicit GDP deflator.  
                                                                                                                                              
 
 
12.4  The Nuclear Issue and Arms Control 
 
The Americans argue that the policy of nuclear deterrence, backed by collective security, has been a 
success. Thus Mrs Jeane Kirkpatrick, United States Ambassador to the United Nations points out 
that NATO, a voluntary defensive alliance of 16 sovereign and mostly democratic countries as 
disparate as Norway and Turkey, the United States and Luxembourg, has presided over the longest 
 - 317 -
period of peace in modern times.13 It is true that 39 years of peace from a major war (even although 
there have been about 50 small wars, mostly in the Third World in this period) is a substantial 
achievement and it is possible to argue that stable deterrence, backed by a defensive collective 
security treaty, in the period after 1949 in which the United States had a virtual monopoly of 
nuclear weapons, has been one cause of this peace. But the situation today is greatly changed from 
1949, the United States no longer has nuclear superiority, and the situation of deterrence now 
appears to be much more unstable and unpredictable. A number of strongly nationalistic countries 
in the Third World are not compliant with the wishes of Washington or Moscow and the possibility 
exists that they could engage in hostilities that could escalate, involving their allies and even the 
superpowers.  
 
The American strategic assessment has, in effect, recently been challenged by the view of the Select 
Committee on Disarmament and Arms Control of the New Zealand House of Representatives. The 
Committee noted the depth of concern of the individuals and groups who made submissions to it 
about the mounting dangers to world security posed by the continuing arms build up of recent 
decades. It reported alarm at the continuing trend in nuclear weaponry throughout the world which 
remains open at any time to the destablising effects of technological development: 
 
“The course of human affairs to which the world seems charted 
defies wisdom, commonsense and rationality. It is also depressing 
that to date the collective institutions and efforts of the international 
community seem to be unable to adjust this course. The threat to 
global security, and the individual threat to each citizen on this 
planet is beyond doubt the greatest challenge before mankind and 
the most pressing political issue facing any nation. The Committee 
felt that New Zealand, as a small and well respected country, could 
play a particularly valuable role in promoting international moves 
towards disarmament.”14 
 
In reviewing the world security system today, the Committee on Disarmament and Arms Control 
considered that the deterrent effect of nuclear weapons was the central factor that affected not only 
the balance of power between the superpowers, but also to some extent the security situation in 
every part of the world, including the South Pacific: 
 
“The international community now possesses roughly 47,000 
nuclear warheads with a destructive power of over 12,000 megatons, 
the equivalent of not far short of one million Hiroshimas. There are 
five acknowledged nuclear weapon states, one state with a 
demonstrated nuclear explosive capability, and others with a 
suspected nuclear weapon capability. The number is likely to grow. 
The arms race, with all its technological and political push and pull, 
continues unabated. .....The fundamental question remains, however, 
whether sufficient progress is being made to avert the likelihood of a 
global nuclear conflict.”15 
 
This argument has of course been put before by many thinkers on international strategy. As George 
Kennan says, referring to hardliners in the United States: 
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“They want more armaments, of course, nothing like this pittance of 
a hundred billion dollars for defence. The defence budget, they 
demand, should be much larger than that and, with it, the national 
budgetary deficit and our inflation. But suppose they get a much 
larger defence budget; suppose we arm to the teeth; suppose that 
instead of having 15,000-20,000 nuclear weapons, we make 
ourselves happy by having 35,000. The fact of the matter is that 200 
would make life impossible anywhere we wanted to live.  
 
But suppose we found some comfort in these vast figures, suppose 
we achieved a much stronger stance, and then sat back and hurled 
imprecations at the Soviet leaders and their system - where would 
we go from there? I don't see much future in this; I can't see how 
anyone would benefit. I suppose some naive people would then want 
us to say, ‘Now we are very strong - we have 35,000 of these 
weapons, you have only 28,000; we will put our terms to you, and 
you do what we want you to do, or else.'  I don't think this would 
work and blackmail can act both ways.”16 
 
Lord Solly Zukerman, himself a former “nuclear baron” and Chief Scientific Adviser to the British 
Ministry of Defence in 1960-67 also demolishes most of the assumptions on which British nuclear 
weapons policy has been built since 1946.17 He argues that for 20 years now both the United States 
and the Soviet Union have possessed arsenals far larger than could be justified by any rational 
strategy of deterrence. He dismisses the concept of tactical nuclear warfare, and suggests a concept 
of “minimal deterrence”.  Neither superpower, he suggests, need have forces any bigger than those 
of Britain or France in order to achieve a rational deterrent. While this intermediate position might 
not satisfy those who seek a much more complete ban on nuclear weapons, it is an attractive step in 
the right direction. However Zuckerman has no illusion that his proposals are likely to be seriously 
considered: 
 
“The men in the nuclear weapons laboratories of both sides have 
succeeded in creating a world with an irrational foundation, on 
which a new set of political realities has in turn to be built.”18 
 
Indeed the whole concept of relative advantage, as Kennan argues, is illusory, for when you are 
talking about preposterous quantities of overkill, the comparative sizes of arsenals have no serious 
meaning. The real danger lies, not in the possibility that someone else might have more missiles 
and warheads than we do, but first, in the very existence of these vast arsenals of “super” weapons, 
and secondly, in their existence in hands “as weak and shaky and undependable as those of 
ourselves or our adversaries or any other human beings.” 19 
 
Certainly the mutual distrust that exists between the superpowers is believed by Sir Neil Cameron, 
ex Chief of Defence Staff in Britain, to be so deep 
 
“that neither is willing to take the slightest risk of being perceived as 
having a “window of vulnerability”.  This is the reason why the 
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United States is determined on a hard target force [i.e. a force 
capable of hitting Soviet missile sites]  it is not really about nuclear 
war fighting   it is about closing the window of vulnerability. Both 
superpowers have more than enough nuclear effort to destroy the 
other several times over, but in the complicated manoeuvring and 
the interplay of nuclear strategies and politics, no weakness, which 
might possibly be exploited, can be countenanced in their respective 
deterrence postures.”20 
 
The Committee on Disarmament and Arms Control considered that the maintenance of a stable 
deterrence relationship among the nuclear weapon states was becoming more doubtful. Moves 
which could lead to a pre emptive first strike capability would undermine stable deterrence. 
Moreover, doubt is cast on the continued forswearing by each side of major defence measures 
against the other side's strategic offensive forces by the vast research programmes underway. Thus 
research and development is being undertaken into anti satellite weapon systems, new anti ballistic 
missile defence weapons, submarine detection and location systems. If the latter is perfected by one 
side, it would render the other's retaliatory force vulnerable and hence remove the cornerstone of 
stable deterrence.21 
 
At the close of the Second World War national security for a small, weak country like New Zealand 
inevitably involved the idea of protection from a hostile power. It was this view and fear of an 
aggressive power like Japan that led to ANZUS. But today security is no longer attainable in this 
way alone. If survival is to be assured, countries are bound not only to look to their defences and 
perhaps to an alliance that will give protection, but also for means of controlling weapons and for 
exercising mutual restraint. Thus arms control and disarmament, perhaps through a policy of 
progressive mutual “build down”, are just as important as defence for ensuring national security or 
even survival in today's world. Rather than rely on a defence treaty alone for her safety, New 
Zealand should actively promote arms control and disarmament as well as defence through 
collective security. It is sadly ironic that the country that New Zealand looks to for protection and 
the defence treaty to which both the United States and Australia are party, provide respectively the 
strongest opposition and the biggest obstacle to a policy (such as the creation of a nuclear weapons 
free South Pacific) that would actively promote arms control. 
 
 
12.5  A “Nuclear Free” Policy In The South Pacific? 
 
On the accession of the Fourth Labour Government to power in July 1984 the Prime Minister David 
Lange announced the exclusion of all nuclear weapons systems from New Zealand and its territorial 
waters. This was existing Labour Party policy that had been promised in advance of the election.22 
Reaction from American Secretary of State G. Schultz that the denial of port facilities to American 
vessels that were nuclear armed or powered, might mean the end of the ANZUS Treaty, has led to 
considerable speculation in Australia, the United States, New Zealand and the South Pacific as to 
the fate of the Treaty and alliance.  
 
The term “nuclear free zone” really means a nuclear weapon free zone - it doesn't ban all things 
nuclear. Up to 1984 New Zealand has continued to observe the policy it first announced in 1957   
that it will not acquire or store any nuclear weapons on its territory. Since 1969 New Zealand has 
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been bound, through its adherence to the Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT) not to acquire nuclear 
weapons. (The 118 NPT states also include Nauru, Papua New Guinea, Solomons and Tuvalu.) 
New Zealand's policy up to July 1984 has been very similar to that of Mexico which in 1962 
formally declared that it had decided neither to possess nor to admit to its territory nuclear weapons 
or delivery vehicles. (Subsequently Mexico has however accepted visits by nuclear capable 
warships as it is entitled to do under the Treaty of Tlatelolco.23) 
 
A regional nuclear weapon free zone would deal with three central issues - the non possession of 
nuclear weapons, non deployment of nuclear weapons and non use of nuclear weapons. The first 
step would be to establish “a zone which would prohibit the acquisition, storage, dumping of waste, 
basing or testing of nuclear weapons”.24 The purposes of establishing a nuclear weapon free zone in 
the South Pacific would be twofold: it would be a mechanism, supplementary to the NPT, to 
prevent the further spread of nuclear weapons; and it is a regional measure of arms control. It is 
possible that a regional zone in the South Pacific may serve as any example that will advance the 
cause of disarmament in other areas of the world.  
 
Many New Zealanders appear to be unaware of the major limitations that would apply to a regional 
nuclear weapon free zone. Far more countries than those of the South Pacific region are affected 
and the five nuclear powers must be willing, at least over a period, to accept restraints on their 
existing freedom to introduce nuclear weapons into it. Most pertinently as the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs point out: 
 
“the United States, under whatever Administration, will not accept 
zone proposals which would restrict the exercise by the United 
States of its high seas freedoms, which would restrict the right of 
zone states to give transit privileges to U.S. vessels and aircraft, 
which were unverifiable, or which disturbed existing security 
arrangements. It is by reference to the last factor that the United 
States has refused (and will presumably continue to refuse) to have 
anything to do with a nuclear weapon free zone in Europe where 
nuclear weapons have been located for many years and where its 
vital interests and those of its allies are heavily engaged.”25 
 
One bright spot, on the other hand, is 
 
“the fact that the U.S. is a party to a security treaty which the 
countries of Latin America (the Rio Pact of 1947 which is 
comparable to ANZUS but rather more far reaching in the 
obligations it imposes) has not prevented successive US 
Administrations from giving their support to the creation of a Latin 
American zone or from accepting obligations under the Treaty of 
Tlatelolco. The Reagan Administration at the end of 1981 ratified 
Protocol I of the Tlatelolco Treaty and thereby committed itself to 
the inclusion of U.S. territory   Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, the 
U.S. Naval base in Guantanamo, Cuba   within the Latin American 
zone.”26 
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China has been the most encouraging of the nuclear states on nuclear weapon free zones. It was the 
only one of the five to vote for the 1975 General Assembly Resolution 3477 concerning a South 
Pacific Zone. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs suggests that it alone of the five nuclear states might 
be ready to support proposals going much further than the Treaty of Tlatelolco and purporting to 
place restrictions on the exercise by the nuclear weapon states of their high seas freedoms.27 
 
 
12.6  American Policy In the South Pacific 
 
The United States interests in the South Pacific are concerned overwhelming with security.28 They 
are essentially indirect, deriving from their interests and objectives elsewhere. They view their 
defence treaties in an interlocking way, Casper Weinberger, U.S. for Defence, has noted that five of 
the seven defence treaties to which the United States is signatory are located in the Asian/Pacific 
region. They include bilateral treaties with Japan, South Korea and the Philippines, the Manila Pact 
(which adds Thailand as a partner) and ANZUS. Weinberger has noted that U.S. trade with Asian 
Pacific countries was valued at US$137 billion in 1981 or 28 percent of all U.S. foreign trade - 
more than for any other region. The sea lanes of the Pacific on which key raw materials and this 
trade flows are seen to be a security matter of great importance.  
 
The major American bases in the Pacific are of course in the Philippines (Subic Bay and Clark Air 
Base), Hawaii and the Territories of Guam and American Samoa. Guam has been built up as a 
major defence base from which American air and sea power could range to Asia or thrust into the 
North Pacific and link with U.S. strategic forces in Japan, Philippines and South Korea. With the 
Micronesian states moving in to a relationship of free association with the United States, in their 
acts of self determination continued economic and security links with the United States are assured 
in a special political relationship. The United States has leased land in the Northern Marianas for 
possible future use by military forces. The United States has denied Soviet allegations that it is 
building up Palau as a military base but retains contingency rights in Palau to do so if required.  
 
In the event of war with the USSR, the U.S. lines of communication in the North Pacific would 
shift to the South and run through or near the Micronesian islands, out of range of Soviet ships and 
aircraft operating from the Kuril Islands or Soviet Asian mainland. The United States has also 
concluded defence arrangements with the Northern Marianas, Palau, Federated States of Micronesia 
and Marshall Islands which ensures American protection and denial of these islands as bases to any 
potential adversaries.  
 
It is interesting to note that a problem in the political relationship with the United States was posed 
in the Palau constitution which prohibits access by nuclear powered ships and transit of nuclear 
weapons.  
 
It has been pointed out that the USSR now have an ability to interdict shipping through the South 
China Sea from their bases in Vietnam and to close the Indonesian straits and the Strait of Malacca 
with mines. If such contingencies eventuated in any regional or global war, Pacific lines of 
communication would shift to the South Pacific, the Tasman Sea, the Bass Strait and thence 
westward across the Great Australian Bight to the Indian Ocean. A shorter but more difficult route 
would be through the South Pacific and shallow Torres Strait between Australia and Papua New 
Guinea. 
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In general, American policy in the South Pacific is not to adopt a high profile but to encourage 
Australia and New Zealand to play leading roles in the region. The USA also places considerable 
importance on regional institutions such as the South Pacific Forum. The new self governing 
Micronesian States are expected to soon join the Forum.  
 
12.7   Threats to Stability in the Wider Pacific Region 
 
Currently the threats to peace or stability in the Pacific area are few and mostly small scale, or 
internal affairs, such as the possibility of a serious internal challenge to Marcos in the Philippines. 
Disputes on the border between West Irian and Papua New Guinea and the independence 
movement in New Caledonia could conceivably lead to bloodshed but they will probably be 
problems of only local significance, while the possibility of racial violence in Fiji appears to have 
receded considerably compared to 20 years ago. A recent Colloqium of Pacific states concluded 
that they faced no identifiable military threat; in the event of internal trouble that they could not 
contain alone, they would request assistance from their friends and nearest neighbours.29 
 
Perhaps the largest threat in the Pacific region could come from trouble between the superpowers in 
the Indian Ocean, and the routes to that zone lie well to the north of New Zealand, though passing 
through and over the South Pacific region.  
 
 
12.8  Anzus   the Case Against 
 
Treaties are usually made to last for only a few years, to apply to circumstances that usually apply 
only for a time. General de Gaulle likened treaties to young girls and flowers   they only last for a 
while.30 Yet global strategy and the perceived enemy have changed drastically over the last 30 
years. Japan, the perceived enemy in 1951, is peaceful today, and reluctant to rearm. Under present 
circumstances, one cannot envisage the Soviet Union wishing to attack the South Pacific; the only 
conceivable threat might come, as Hunn suggests, from a reincarnation of Sukarno in Indonesia.31 
Such a dim prospect would be primarily a threat to Australia and New Zealand would respond 
immediately even without ANZUS.  
 
It has been noted that the actual scope of the ANZUS Treaty is very narrow. It is a short, simple, 
but rather vague statement, and if it is interpreted literally, it is limited to “the Pacific area”, “the 
common danger” and “constitutional processes”.  As Desmond Ball has noted, the parties are bound 
only to “consult together”, action by any party is conditional on approval on constitutional 
processes, and the treaty strictly interpreted applies only to threats or attacks in the Pacific area.32 
Various commentators have speculated whether in fact the United States would be bound to defend 
New Zealand under the Treaty. Alley quotes Foster Dulles' statement of 1951 that the arrangement 
was based on sea and air power...... “There is no question at all of the United States ever sending 
troops to Australia and New Zealand.....”  According to Dulles, the Australians and New Zealanders 
wanted “to have some appearance at least of a shield around them at home of sea and air power.”33 
The word “appearance” casts some doubt on the actuality of substantial military assistance. The 
degree of help provided would in the last resort, be at the discretion of the United States Congress.  
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There is abundant evidence to suggest that the value of ANZUS in American eyes is its ability to 
further facilitate and accommodate military developments in nuclear weapons, and to accommodate 
important information gathering and communication links that are part of the United States' global 
defence communications network (e.g. the American facilities in Australia at North West Cape, 
Pine Gap and Nurrangar).34 The Americans are also probably glad to have their airforce base at 
Christchurch for the Operation Deep Freeze Antarctic Programme. And one can speculate that it 
helps to complete the global alliance systems that the United States has encouraged as part of its 
anti Soviet policies.35 
 
The Americans repeatedly interpret ANZUS as going beyond its original geographic scope defined 
in the treaty as being “in the Pacific area”.  Thus Paul Wolfowitz, Assistant Secretary of State for 
East Asian and Pacific Affairs, has suggested that the various alliances to which Australia, New 
Zealand and the United States belonged were interlocking. At a U.S. Australia defence conference 
he specifically mentioned the Five Power Defence Arrangements (FPDA) closely linking Australia, 
New Zealand and Britain to the security of Malaysia and Singapore. There were, he mentioned, no 
direct political or legal linkages between ANZUS and the FPDA, but “any potential aggressor in 
South East Asia must take into account that ANZUS alliance interests would be threatened by an 
attack engaging Australia and New Zealand forces there.” 
 
It is clear that the objections of New Zealanders are not primarily to the Treaty as such, but to much 
of the “bag and baggage” or host of understandings that seem to go with it: 
 
“The reason why ANZUS is regarded as such valuable property by 
the three governments concerned is not what it says, but what it has 
flexibly allowed, legitimised, justified and sustained, much of this 
falling within the broad rubric of acting 'within the spirit of 
ANZUS'“.36 
 
The real problem is that ANZUS has helped legitimate the continuing growth of United States 
nuclear weapons capability in the Pacific. As party to the Treaty New Zealanders are seen to 
endorse these policies and hence are at least in part morally culpable. Since ANZUS “dances to the 
tune” of the arms race as Alley points out, New Zealanders have got the ANZUS arrangement that 
they deserve, as long as the public and the governments that they elect accept without real demur 
the growing costs and risks of arms unlimited. 37 
 
 
12.9   The Case for ANZUS 
 
The usual arguments made over the last 30 years have been based on three assumptions: 
 
(1) That New Zealand cannot defend itself alone; 
(2) That “collective security” is our only defence; 
(3) That ANZUS is therefore indispensable. 
 
While a little simplistic, this is a powerful argument. It has been noted that any power attacking 
New Zealand would have very extended communication lines that would be easy to attack; 
however, the country has a small military force to defend a very long coastline.  
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With respect to the lack of certainty over American willingness to protect her allies in times of 
danger, the Falklands war did illustrate President Reagan's determination to show the United States' 
NATO ally, Britain, that she was a reliable ally and partner. Her assistance with supply, 
communications, intelligence, ordnance and other help was made available to Britain even although 
the United States was not committed by a treaty to do so, and although such action cost the United 
States dearly in her relations with several Latin American countries. Recently Paul Wolfowitz has 
noted this fact in reassuring Australia that the Reagan administration would stand by Australia in 
the event of any future direct conflict with Indonesia that could not be settled by peaceful means.38 
Wolfowitz's statement, which was understood to have been cleared at the highest levels of the 
Reagan administration was a strong and specific assurance to Australia and New Zealand about the 
extent of the American commitment: 
 
“Speaking for the United States, I can say that Australians and New 
Zealanders should rest assured that if any emergency confronts 
them, the American system is capable of decisive action   and 
willing to render it.” 
 
Earlier in his speech he is reported as saying: 
 
“Let there be no doubt in the mind of any potential adversary that an 
armed attack on an ally would require, and would receive from the 
allies, full and prompt fulfilment of the ANZUS security 
commitment including, when necessary, military support.” 
 
It is true that much of the criticism of ANZUS totally overlooks the essential element of reciprocity 
that any alliance necessarily involves. In return for the supposed benefits of American protection, 
New Zealand must contribute in various ways. Mr Warren Cooper, Minister of Foreign Affairs in 
1983, noted this point: 
 
“We get our security pretty inexpensively ..... Surely it would be 
wrong to say to our friends and allies: please protect us - but don't 
expect us to make a contribution by agreeing that your nuclear ships 
can come here. That's not the New Zealand way.”39 
 
Defence officials and services personnel assert the very great value of ANZUS in  practical terms.40 
The regular exercise that are held with the military forces of the other two partners are invaluable 
for training, for upgrading the skills and competence of the country's forces. Intelligence and 
foreign policy co operation also brings benefits, with much that is of advantage rubbing off on to 
New Zealand, the smallest and poorest of the three allies.  
 
The defence establishment must always be on its guard given the unpredictable world in which we 
live. There is no immediate discernible threat at the moment. However, as Dennis McLean argues: 
 
“One of the quickest ways to ensure that a threat did arise would be 
for regional countries to abdicate their regional responsibilities. On 
the one hand, this might cause the United States to believe that it 
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had to demonstrate its interests. On the other hand the USSR would 
be tempted by the very absence of any presence to take its own 
initiatives. The one could readily lead to the other.” 41 
 
This report argues for fuller recognition of our regional responsibilities rather than any abdication 
and the Mutual Assistance Programme (see below) prevents any vacuum occurring in the region.  
 
But the real case for the alliance, and one which puts it into proper perspective, was provided by 
McLean on another occasion: 
 
“There can be no doubt that Australia and New Zealand are firm 
allies of the United States, the leader of the West in the principal 
issue of our times   the confrontation between the free world and 
Soviet communism. But of course all of a superpower's 
preoccupations do not automatically transfer to two smaller regional 
countries. Equally in a situation where there is no perceptible direct 
threat to New Zealand or Australia it cannot be supposed that their 
more localised concerns will always be seen in the same light by the 
United States. If this leaves unclear questions to do with the scope of 
the ANZUS commitment or its firmness in particular hypothetical 
circumstances, so be it. The single most important fact about this 
alliance is that it provides the structure within which each and every 
issue bearing on the strategic interests of the partners can be 
broached. The essential question that should be asked therefore is 
whether that structure helps or hinders the members in seeking 
satisfaction on the matters that concern them. Successive New 
Zealand Governments have made it clear that it is not only helpful 
but invaluable as a means by which a smaller regional country can 
gain the ear of a superpower.  
 
Those who would have a regional partner such as New Zealand 
repudiate ANZUS generally have nothing to say as to how otherwise 
we might hope successfully to conduct our strategic relations with 
the United States and Australia. It should be as plain as a pikestaff 
that the conduct of those relations will have to go on inside the 
ANZUS or out. The clear cut set of national interests involved in 
dealings between countries, the complex inter play of issues in the 
Pacific, the questions of military preparedness, will all be there 
requiring attention regardless of whether an alliance exists, is active 
or has crumbled. Those who would have it crumble have to ask 
themselves what they would put in its place to handle these basic 
practical day to day issues between the partners, since they will 
always be there.”42 
 
In view of the Team it is for reasons such as these that successive New Zealand Governments 
choose to keep ANZUS. It is noteworthy that the new Labour Government, while declaring that the 
visits of nuclear armed or powered vessels will no longer be acceptable, state a desire to retain 
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ANZUS, even although annual Labour Party Conferences vote for New Zealand leaving the 
alliance. 
 
Moreover there would appear to be considerable truth in the statement of the previous Minister for 
Foreign Affairs, Warren Cooper, that if a nuclear free New Zealand policy is followed, the country 
is likely to find it more difficult to gain market access and other economic benefits in the United 
States. To the extent that New Zealand foreign policy is primarily concerned with trade, the nuclear 
free policy and any attempt to withdraw from ANZUS would probably be detrimental. While no 
overt “blackmail” would occur, doors that might previously have been opened to New Zealand 
would now probably be shut. 
 
 
12.10   Assessment 
 
In sum there is value in retaining a treaty link with the United States, partly because of the many 
practical benefits that it brings and because it enables a small power to gain the ear of a superpower. 
Although most of Hunn's cogent arguments are sound, few analysts would go so far as to abandon 
entirely collective security as the basis for New Zealand's defence. The essence of the task is to find 
ways of reciprocity with the United States (and Australia) which are real and valuable, yet allow 
New Zealand to work actively for nuclear disarmament and arms control. (Retention of the U.S. 
base at Christchurch for Operation Deep Freeze is one example). This is a diplomatic task, and 
doubtless one of great difficulty. Is compliance with United States policy on nuclear weapons and 
admission of its allies' nuclear capable vessels the conditions that New Zealand must adhere to if a 
defence alliance with the United States is to survive? If so, many New Zealanders would prefer to 
end the alliance. It may well be that a relationship like that between the United States and the Latin 
American countries who have signed the Treaty of Tlatelolco is possible for New Zealand. It is 
encouraging to note however, that pursuance of an anti nuclear policy would be fully in accord, if 
not, one can say ironically, with the “spirit of ANZUS” but with the actual letter of the Treaty. The 
preamble reaffirms their faith of their parties in their purposes and principles of the United Nations 
and the desire “to strengthen the fabric of peace in the Pacific Area”.  It is encouraging too that 
New Zealand's unwillingness to accept the Omega navigation station in New Zealand led to its 
installation in Australia instead. Moreover, although the truth is not yet fully known about New 
Zealand's role in the Vietnam War, it is encouraging to learn that Mr. Holyoake was at times a 
dissenting voice, in spite of his hardline policy against anti Vietnam protest groups (including 
Church groups) within New Zealand.43 In spite of this honourable and courageous action we must 
not lose sight of the fact that New Zealand aided and abetted American intervention in an unjust 
war. Will the same story happen again over nuclear weapons? 
 
 
12.11   New Zealand's Security Role in the South Pacific 
 
For many decades New Zealand has been involved, in one way or another, in the defence of what it 
considered to be its vital interests in the South Pacific. An unfortunate episode was the over 
reaction of New Zealand rulers and the use of military forces to deal with the Mau movement in 
Western Samoa in 1929 when New Zealand was the trusteeship power, an event which culminated 
in the death of the High Chief Tamasese and at least seven other Samoans.44 New Zealand's larger 
allies gradually accepted that New Zealand could play a military role in the region and in 1938, a 
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year before World War II, New Zealand forces were asked to go to Fiji to assist the colony with its 
defences. The islands were seen to be the outer perimeter of New Zealand's defensive system   a 
kind of buffer zone (such as the Solomon Islands in the Japanese attack) through which any 
invading force would first have to penetrate. This concept still has some relevance, though less with 
inter continental ballistic missiles. After the War, New Zealand continued the role in the region of 
the South Pacific north of New Zealand, assisting with training programmes the two island groups 
that had military forces - Fiji and Tonga - and providing surveillance and protection for the other 
island groups that did not. New Zealand has the statutory requirement to defend Niue, the Cook 
Islands and Tokelau. 
 
This role calls for a wide ranging capacity on the part of a country with small defence forces, yet 
which might be required to operate over vast areas in island societies that vary greatly. This role has 
led to the development of the R3F as a flexible, highly mobile group that could respond 
immediately to all kinds of problems with the region. It is intended that this role could also apply to 
civic disasters, such as the occurrence of hurricanes, volcanic eruptions and the like. 
 
The Review of Defence Policy in 1972 contained almost nothing on the South Pacific except: 
 
“In the Southwest Pacific, two of New Zealand's closest neighbours, 
Fiji and Tonga, have become independent since 1966. In the next 
decade more will follow suit, notably the territory of Papua New 
Guinea. Like countries in Southeast Asia, some of these independent 
states are likely to have to cope not only with acute problems of 
economic underdevelopment, but also with a shortage of 
experienced administrators, unsettling social changes, and possible 
communal and tribal tensions. Developments in the area might 
attract the competitive rivalry of those great powers which in the 
past have tried to exploit similar weaknesses elsewhere for their own 
benefit.”45 
 
This statement suggests that New Zealand remained vigilant and perhaps played a slightly 
proprietorial role over the region. 
 
New Zealand now has the capacity to communicate with all Islands by radio. Once every three 
weeks a flight travels right around the island groups. New Zealand and Australia have gone to some 
lengths to gain this surveillance capacity (currently Australia is proposing ocean going patrol boats 
as part of an aid package). The assistance that New Zealand provides through the flights of RNZAF 
Orion aircraft, while on routine security patrols, have been invaluable to the island states in 
monitoring the numbers of fishing vessels and noting those trespassing in island exclusive 
economic zones. 
 
 Mutual Assistance Programme (MAP) 
 
The programme aims to support New Zealand foreign policy objectives by strengthening bilateral 
relations in defence with countries which share common strategic interests with New Zealand, and 
to increase the effectiveness of the Armed Forces. MAP is maintained with 8 Pacific and ASEAN 
 - 328 -
countries (Fiji, Indonesia, Malaysia, Papua New Guinea, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and 
Tonga).46 
 
The main advantage of MAP to New Zealand is the access provided to train New Zealand forces in 
a variety of difficult tropical environments and deployment opportunities in these countries. Jungle 
survival training, for example, can be carried out. In return New Zealand provides training in the 
host country and also a variety of forms of training, and company sized joint exercises in New 
Zealand. 
 
In addition to military training, trade training is provided to Fijian and Tongan forces. A trade 
training scheme was established in 1974 for the Royal Fijian Military Forces (RFMF) and a rural 
development unit in the following year. In addition to the usual trades, training has been provided 
in such fields as diving. In 1983 177 members of the RFMF attended courses or received on the job 
training under MAP and 32 members of the Tonga Defence Services (TDS). In the period 1973-
1983 1,463 Fijians and 220 Tongans came to New Zealand for training, which occasionally 
involves apprenticeships. 
 
Civic action programmes are an extremely valuable spin off role of New Zealand tropical training 
exercises. Thus the Report of the Ministry of Defence in 1979 notes that exercises in Fiji that 
involved over 500 personnel also led to the construction of foot tracks, a small cattle yard, a 
concrete water tower, a mosquito eradication programme, the drainage and clearing of water 
sources in several villages and the collection of blood samples for the Fiji health authorities. In 
1978 in Tonga two Army field hospitals helped the local hospital, provided refresher training for 
nurses, and undertook a typhoid carrier detection programme. To improve access for shipping, 
Army engineer teams have carried out reef gapping tasks in Tuvalu and Tonga. An 800 metre 
causeway was constructed between two Tongan islands in 1979. Aerial reconnaisance surveys, 
search and rescue, and delivery of materials to remote villages by helicopter are other tasks 
performed. 
 
In 1980 New Zealand forces were deployed for five months to the Solomon Islands, carrying out 
tasks on the islands of Guadalcanal, Makira, Malaita and Gizo. They constructed bridges and a 
wharf extension, provided a water supply for various villages, surveyed a site for an airstrip and 
assisted in dealing with unexploded wartime explosives. 
 
The Annual Report for 1978 described the tasks undertaken by New Zealand military personnel for 
that year: 
 
“...RNZAF Hercules aircraft transported dairy factory machinery 
and building materials, together weighing 58,000 lb., to Katmandu 
in June and August. An RNZAF Hercules carried an Iroquois 
helicopter and 16 RNZAF personnel to Honiara (Solomon Islands) 
on 19 May. For the next 20 days this detachment undertook disaster 
relief operations made necessary by a devastating earthquake which 
had hit the island in April, delivering food to villages whose 
supplies had been destroyed by the earthquake. RNZAF aircraft also 
carried emergency diesel supplies weighing 35,000 lb. to Rarotonga 
in February and 48,000lb. of technical equipment to Burma for the 
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Myitkyina Technical High School in March. In September 1977 the 
RNZAF transported a joint Army/Department of Health medical 
team and 25,000 lb. of emergency medical supplies to Tarawa in 
connection with the cholera outbreak in the Gilbert Islands. It also 
evacuated a patient from Hastings Hospital to Rarotonga and a 
casualty patient from Norfolk Island to New Zealand.”47 
 
Help provided at times of natural disasters is especially valuable: 
 
“In June Iroquois, Andover, and Sioux aircraft were used to provide 
assistance for the Fiji Government in the wake of Cyclone Wally. 
Within 12 hours of receiving the call an RNZAF Hercules carrying a 
helicopter, Army tents, and blankets was on its way to Fiji landing at 
Nadi only an hour or so after it became operational again after the 
storm. In 84 hours of flying operations over a period of seven days, 
two RNZAF helicopters delivered over 100 tonnes of food, blankets, 
tents, and medical supplies to the victims of the flooding, and 
carried 500 passengers, including sick and injured villagers and 
medical and survey parties.”48 
 
Later RNZAF engineers supervised the building of a number of hurricane relief houses in the 
Navua district of Viti Levu. During a similar relief operation during Hurricane Oscar in Fiji in 1983 
a RNZAF Andover became the first large transport aircraft to land on the tiny coral airstrip at 
Kadavu to deliver tents to homeless villagers. 49 
 
These examples show that New Zealand military forces contribute effectively to civic action in the 
South Pacific in numerous peaceful ways. Such action makes the role of military forces much more 
acceptable and palatable. It is, however, a two edged sword, for such worthy activities could be 
used to disguise New Zealand's alliance with and participation in action that contribute to a nuclear 
arms race. 
 
 
12.12   Conclusion 
 
It is ironic to reflect that New Zealand, a small, weak, and remote country on the world stage, is 
considered a big country by the small states of the South Pacific. Just as New Zealand seeks to 
avoid abject dependence or sycophantic clientism in its defence and economic policies, so it is 
equally important that the small states should not have to play the same kind of role vis a vis New 
Zealand. 
 
The increasing emphasis on a “close to home” defence role especially since 1978, has strengthened 
links with the South Pacific but the fact that New Zealand continues to “belong to two worlds” 
introduces a schizophenic or even ambivalent character into her defence and foreign policies. This 
could lead to a lack of decisiveness about the precise role and nature of New Zealand's defence 
forces in the future and the weaponry that would accordingly be most appropriate. It is stressed 
however that the security of the citizens of New Zealand and the South Pacific require dual policies, 
emphasising disarmament and arms control as well as defence through collective security. Since the 
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United States retains American Samoa as their rest and recreation port of call in the South Pacific 
for nuclear capable vessels (a base they would be most unlikely to relinquish in a nuclear free South 
Pacific) the Americans might accept New Zealand's refusal to continue this role. Preservation of a 
degree of independence in pursuit of such goals will not be easy in the alliance with the United 
States and Australia. The defence interests of the latter are very different from New Zealand and 
even before the present government it has usually been “hawkish” for Australia adjoins the Indian 
Ocean and lies closer to Southeast Asia. There is no question of Australia not retaining close 
bilateral defence arrangements with the United States. Dissent within the alliance will not be easy 
for New Zealand would usually be out voted two to one by its larger and more powerful allies and 
dissent can often be represented as “bloody mindedness”.  But an encouraging start has already 
been made by the Fourth Labour Government in stating an independent yet moderate and reasoned 
position.50 In essence it is similar, yet rather less doctrinaire than that of Norman Kirk's Third 
Labour Government: 
 
“The government which I lead is determined to find and hold to a 
firm moral basis for its foreign policy. It may be said that the only 
basis for a sound foreign policy is the national interest. I see no 
contradiction. I believe that to base our foreign policies on moral 
principles is the most enlightened form of self interest. What is 
morally right is likely to be politically right.” 51 
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CHAPTER THIRTEEN 
 
SHIPPING, INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT AND TRADE ACCESS 
 
13.1  Introduction 
 
During the past decade, New Zealand has taken a number of institutional initiatives in the field 
of South Pacific economic development. The Pacific Forum Line (1978) was a response to the 
desire of Island Governments to secure regular cheap shipping for their exports (and, of course, 
their imports); the SPARTECA agreement of 1980 provided non reciprocal duty free access for 
islands' producers to the Australian and New Zealand markets; and the Pacific Islands 
Industrial Development Scheme IIDS) of 1976 extended to the Pacific Islands the type of 
investment incentives which were common in New Zealand's own regional development 
policies in the 1960s. All three programmes were the product of a particular vision of the 
development process, which placed emphasis upon industrial development as an employment 
creator, and export production as the desirable leading sector. The popularity of such models 
world wide followed the impressive performance of a few newly industrialising East Asian 
economies in the late 1960s and early 1970s1; and although observers recognised that “no 
Island nation in the Pacific is close to becoming a Taiwan or Hong Kong”2, there were obvious 
political gains to be made from first promoting, and then acceding to, demands from Island 
Governments for a more suitable environment for industrial development. Reliable shipping, 
unrestricted access to the Australian and New Zealand markets, and investment aid for 
promising industrial projects, added up to an attractive looking package. 
 
From the point of view of the larger Pacific island nations, whose economic future hinges 
unavoidably upon success in export promotion, the PFL/PIIDs/SPARTECA package 
represented a clear gain, putting in place some of the necessary preconditions for economic 
development. Those larger nations, however, are not the focus of the present study. In relation 
to the five micro economies with which we are concerned, the importance of such 
“development promoting” reforms is far less, firstly because the prospects for “development” 
of this type are slender, and secondly because several of the micro economies already enjoyed 
special status so far as shipping and market access were concerned. The three New Zealand-
associated economies (Niue, Cook Islands and Tokelau) have always had duty free access to 
the New Zealand market and subsidised transport links, particularly shipping. They have also 
had over the past three decades strong aid inflows from New Zealand which would have made 
possible the establishment of major industrial projects had such projects made commercial 
sense. It should be noted, furthermore, that in the one industrial activity which has shown real 
“viability” over the long run   namely clothing manufacture on Rarotonga   the financing of 
necessary investment has never been a constraint, given the benefits to New Zealand 
merchants of having cheap clothing produced offshore in a country which was closely 
integrated to the New Zealand market. Hence, although PIIDS has certainly been involved in 
the financing of a couple of recent ventures in the apparel area it is by no means evident that 
the PIIDS scheme was a necessary condition for the establishment or success of those ventures. 
In another area of industrial activity in the Cook Islands - fruit juice canning - the existence of 
the PIIDS scheme appears to have supplied no significant leverage to offset the brutal realities 
of economic decline. 
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The PFL/PIIDS/SPARTECA package may have had more impact in the cases of Tuvalu and 
Kiribati. The function of the package there was to turn the economies of those two countries 
increasingly towards New Zealand; the dominant element in this increased integration at the 
level of trade has been a rise in New Zealand's share of imports to the two countries, 
attributable partly to the PFL feeder service, and partly to the increased orientation towards 
New Zealand of traders and politicians in Tuvalu and Kiribati. To date no PIIDS ventures have 
got off the ground in either, and the end of the Banaba phosphate trade has sharply reduced 
New Zealand's imports from Kiribati; SPARTECA, while welcome, has little to offer a copra 
producing atoll economy. 
 
Overall, it is necessary to separate the evaluation of the three programmes themselves from the 
evaluation of their impact in the five mini-states. With the sole exception of the PFL feeder 
service to Tuvalu and Kiribati, it must be said that the PFL/PIIDS/SPARTECA package has 
been of only the most marginal significance to the economies covered by this study. The real 
targets of the package have been elsewhere   the larger Pacific nation states such as Western 
Samoa, Fiji, Tonga or Papua New Guinea; and the improvement of the New Zealand 
Government's political image in the forums of the region and the world. The Cook Islands 
Niue Joint Shipping Service - a sub regional parallel to the PFL - merely extended a long 
tradition of New Zealand Government provision of shipping services for those two economies; 
its establishment however implied some stabilisation and improvement of the existing service, 
and therefore merits some discussion under the heading of this chapter. 
 
 
13.2   Shipping 
 
In communities as isolated and scattered as the Pacific Islands, sea and air transport are 
inevitably of paramount importance in the widening of economic and social horizons. Nearly 
thirty years ago, the Belshaw Stace Report devoted a chapter to shipping, which noted the 
deterioration of shipping services since the 1930s and the problems posed in the 1950s by 
infrequent and irregular services:3 
 
...The shipping service to the New Zealand market is a matter for 
concern on all sides. Insufficiently frequent, and often uncertain, 
shipping has led to wastage, frustration and disincentives to produce.... 
 
Even with a better ship than the “Maui Pomare”, the probability must 
be faced that shipping will operate at a loss. We consider a subsidy in 
the form of meeting such a loss as equally desirable with others for 
which the Government is responsible... 
 
They argued for two ships, rather than one, on the New Zealand run, to provide sufficiently 
frequent services to meet the needs of producers of perishable fruit; and for improved inter 
island shipping, including a Government owned vessel. 
 
Similar issues were recognised during the 1950s in Tokelau, where the end of the pre World 
War II era of private trading schooners left the Group dependent upon vessels chartered, and 
paid for, by the Administration. The charter cost of shipping amounted to a substantial 
proportion of the value of total exports and store goods carried. 
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TABLE 13.1 
 
Tokelau Shipping Costs and Trade 
Annual averages, 1982 NZ Dollars 
Period 
(March 
years) Charter fees
Value of total 
private trade*
Charter fees as 
% 
1954-63 54,137 138,987 39 
1964-73 73,246 306,994 24 
1974 67,563 391,490 17 
1975 181,568 660,000 28 
1976 184,424 458,000 40 
1984 226,698** 482,187 47** 
  
*Excluding government imports for which we have no data; includes export earnings 
and shore- goods imports. 
**Including cost of fuel. Excluding fuel the percentage is 32%. 
 
Sources:    Annual reports 1954 1976; Tokelau Office for 1984. 
 
It can be seen from Table 13.1 that although there has been considerable variation, shipping 
costs between Apia and Tokelau have seldom been less than 25% of the value of trade carried, 
and the impact of the mid 1970s oil shock brought a distinct increase in the cost of shipping a 
dollar's worth of Tokelau trade. Under these circumstances, it seems clear that shipping 
subsidies will continue to be an inescapable part of the Tokelau budget. 
 
13.3  Current Issues 
 
Present discussions of shipping generally start from the difficulties of placing either internal 
(inter-island) or external shipping links of the mini economies on any sort of commercial basis. 
Small tonnages and long distances mean that commercial shipping services tend to be 
infrequent and irregular. In Tuvalu, for example, the Karlander Line has operated roughly four 
voyages per year, but with vessels of 13,000 tonnes or more which require cargoes of at least 
500 tonnes to make the trip economic4; at least one recent sailing has been cancelled for lack 
of cargo. The subsidised Pacific Forum Line feeder service to Funafuti carries cargoes 
averaging less than 200 tonnes on a fortnightly basis, and contributions to the PFL subsidy 
absorb a large proportion of Tuvalu's bilateral aid allocation fro 5m Australia.  
 
In the case of the Cook Islands and Niue, the Joint Shipping Service operated by the New 
Zealand Shipping Corporation absorbs subsidies of the order of about $5 million annually, 
operating two ships (in order to assure Aitutaki banana growers of a fortnightly service if 
needed). The existing level of service seems adequate to meet the (low) expectations of both 
importers and exporters in Niue and the Cook Islands; the former dissatisfaction with shipping 
schedules has largely been replaced by worry that the present subsidy level may not be 
politically sustainable over the long haul. 
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13.4   The Cook Islands Niue Joint Service 
 
From 1960 to 1970 the main shipping service between the Cook Islands and New Zealand was 
provided by a purpose built ship, the “Moana Roa”.  Towards the end of the 1960s, losses 
mounted, and in 1970 there was a sharp increase in freight rates, to which the Cook Islands 
Government objected. The outcome was the establishment in 1970 of the Cook Islands 
Shipping Company, in which the Cook Islands Government held a half share (raised in 1972 to 
100%). The new company bought a second hand ship, the “Lorena” with a New Zealand crew, 
and ran it in competition with the “Moana Roa”, with the result that both lost money. Repair 
bills for the “Lorena” proved heavy, and the New Zealand Government was unwilling to pay; 
in 1974 the Cook Islands Shipping Company's shares, assets and debts were transferred en 
masse to the New Zealand Shipping Corporation, and the Cook Islands Government 
abandoned its attempt to operate its own shipping venture.6 
 
The shipping issue remained politically contentious, however, and New Zealand's wish to 
defuse it led in June 1975 to the formal establishment of the Cook Islands/Niue/New Zealand 
Joint Shipping Service, by a meeting of Ministers from the three Governments. The stated aim 
of the new service was to ensure “regular and adequate shipping services to ensure the 
optimum economic development of the three countries”, and the New Zealand Government 
agreed to meet the operating losses,7 although by 1977/78 when these losses reached $2.45 
million New Zealand began to press for increased freight rates to keep the losses within 
limits.8 Between 1977 and 1982, the freight rates for Cook Island and Niuean exports to New 
Zealand were periodically adjusted to keep them more or less constant in real terms,9 and 
operating losses remained virtually unchanged in real terms also, although in current dollars 
the loss had risen to $5.2 million by 1983/84. 
 
The JSS was operated for the three participating Governments by the New Zealand Shipping 
Corporation, initially with the “Lorena” and the “Toa Moana” (which had replaced the “Moana 
Roa” in 1974); then with the “Toa Moana” and the “Luhesand”.  In 1978 these were replaced 
with two secondhand ships, the “Tiare Moana” and the “Fetu Moana”, the purchase of which 
appears with the benefit of hindsight to have been commercially very dubious. Both ships were 
older than the “Toa Moana”, both were due for their twelve year surveys and were in poor 
condition. The purchase price of $3 million each was high, and was compounded by the need 
to spend $3 million more on repairs during their first three years. By 1982 both ships were 
coming up for their 16 year surveys in 1983, were showing their age, and incurring rapidly 
rising costs. The impact of inflation on both freight rates and operating losses caused alarm 
among the three governmental partners, and led to the commissioning of the 1982 study by 
Fletcher Consulting Services. 
 
The Fletcher Report presented a large amount of statistical data on the service, and a 
comprehensive critique of its operations. The basis of the service, the Report pointed out, was 
“an implied aid mechanism within New Zealand's commitment to assist development in the 
Cook Islands and Niue”.  The aim, therefore, should be to achieve the desired level of service 
at minimum possible cost. Having evaluated the JSS, the Report reached the following view:10 
 
The two vessels currently operating in the link under the 
management of the Shipping Corporation of New Zealand are both 
due for expensive 16-year (quadrennial) surveys early in 1983 and 
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in any case are nearing the end of their useful lives under the New 
Zealand flag. 
 
The capacity of the vessels is more than sufficient to accommodate 
the dominant northbound trade. There is a severe trade imbalance 
with a ratio northbound to southbound of almost 4:1, thus causing 
a significant under utilisation of available shipping space. 
 
It is considered that the present service is: 
 
Technically Deficient, because the ships are outdated, costly to run 
and maintain,  
have excessive manning, and suffer from poor stability. 
 
Operationally Obsolete, because it is outmoded and unable to 
adopt less labour intensive and more highly productive cargo 
handling methods and management systems. 
 
Commercially Acceptable, because it provides the required level of 
service and customer satisfaction, particularly in relation to island 
exports. 
 
Financially Disastrous, because annual losses are roughly equal to 
gross annual revenue and because of the highly imbalanced cargo 
flows. 
 
Politically Inadequate, because it is not a joint venture in practice, 
and the Cook Islands and Niue governments have so far been 
unable to make a maximum contribution to policy making and 
management. 
 
Few advantages will accrue by retaining the service in its present 
form. 
 
A number of strong recommendations flowed from this appraisal. The Report recommended 
(a) the prompt replacement of the two ships before their 1983 surveys came due; (b) the 
separation of management and accounting systems for the JSS from the general activities of the 
New Zealand Shipping Corporation (which would enable the partners at least to have before 
them systematic accounts for the service), (c) that one of the replacement vessels should be a 
Cook Island flag vessel with an island crew; (d) that freight rates should be stabilised by 
linking them to cost of living increases in the three countries; and (e) that Aitutaki should 
continue to receive calls roughly every fortnight. The Report considered that the amount of 
operating loss could be halved (from $4.5 million to $2.2 million), partly through the greater 
efficiency of newer vessels, and partly because of the lower crewing cost of a Cook Islands 
flag vessel. 
 
Data contained in the Fletcher Report strongly suggested that the crewing requirements and 
wage rates enforced by the New Zealand maritime unions accounted for most of the subsidy 
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required for the service. For a service run on the “optimum frequency” schedule (“Schedule 
A”), the annual subsidy required for two secondhand vessels with New Zealand crews was 
estimated to be $4.3 million; for one New Zealand and one Cook Island vessel $2.2 million; 
and for two Cook Island vessels “assuming no industrial constraints” $0.5 million.11 The clear 
implication appears to be that well over 80% of the subsidy required to meet operating losses 
on the JSS corresponds to the extra costs incurred as a result of applying New Zealand award 
manning scales. 
 
The New Zealand Government's willingness to subsidise the JSS over the past decade thus 
appears simultaneously to defuse two potentially difficult political issues: the provision of 
regular shipping to the Cook Islands and Niue at freight rates comparable to those ruling 
elsewhere in the South Pacific; and the avoidance of confrontation with the New Zealand 
maritime unions over the possible replacement of New Zealand by island crews. (The latter 
issue had come to a head in 1973 in the case of the Nauruan ship “Enna G”, whose low 
manning scales and wage rates caused a major industrial confrontation. A meeting at Waitangi 
between New Zealand and Island politicians, officials and the maritime unions resulted in an 
agreement that the position of New Zealand crews in the islands trade would be protected, and 
so called “cross trading restrictions” enforced. In this context, the subsidisation of the Joint 
Shipping Service was a relatively cheap way for the New Zealand Government to avoid 
possible industrial disruption in major ports.) 
 
It is, therefore, not difficult to identify the problems of the Joint Shipping Service from a 
commercial or economic point of view. At the same time, none of the parties involved has 
much incentive to press for changes in the status quo. The Cook Islands and Niue 
Governments, although largely excluded from effective decision making by the Shipping 
Corporation management structure, are the beneficiaries of a service which seems quite 
satisfactory from their point of view; their only worry is that New Zealand might cut back its 
subsidies at some future date. In 1982, at the time of the Fletcher Report, the Cook Islands 
Government obtained quotes from several private sector shipping firms to demonstrate that a 
cheaper service could be provided if the New Zealand Government were prepared to take the 
necessary political decisions. Faced with the prospect that a cut in the subsidy would provoke 
confrontations with both the Cook Islands Government and the New Zealand unions, the New 
Zealand Government opted to accept the continuation of the subsidy. There seems no reason 
for that calculation to change in the near future; the subsidy brings real political returns in 
island goodwill and industrial peace, and leaves the New Zealand Government free to 
concentrate on other more important areas of shipping policy such as the Tasman and trans 
Pacific routes. 
 
In addition to this straightforward political basis for continuing the status quo, other more 
detailed reasons have contributed to the lack of action to date on the Fletcher Report. An 
official committee in October 1982 prepared an options paper based upon the Report, and this 
was discussed at a Ministerial meeting of the three partner Governments in November 1982. 
The outcome of that meeting was a decision to stick with the status quo for the time being. 
Harbour works at Avatiu on Rarotonga were running seriously behind schedule, and a new 
ship of the type recommended by the consultants would have been unable to use the port until 
the works were completed, according to officials. In addition, the extent of the collapse in 
Cook Islands citrus and Niue passionfruit production was beginning to register, and Aitutaki 
banana output also looked shaky for a time in 1982-83. The Fletcher Report had used 
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optimistic official projections of Cook Islands and Niue agricultural export production in 
preparing figures on the expected southbound cargoes12, and those projections looked 
increasingly overstated. Thirdly, while the Cook Islands Government was happy with the 
prospect of having a Cook Islands flag vessel on the route, the Niue Government was opposed 
(even if the vessel were “island manned”, as distinct from “Cook Islands manned”). 
 
In summary, the Joint Shipping Service was from the outset more a political than a commercial 
venture, and in the absence of compelling political reasons to change the basis of the service, 
the path of least resistance is to ratify the status quo. This involves the New Zealand 
Government in payment of a subsidy of $4 million or more per year, which could be reduced 
only by attacking one or more of the vested interests involved in the trade. Most of the subsidy 
payments return directly to the New Zealand economy via crew incomes, and by far the 
greatest beneficiaries from the service are New Zealand exporters selling in Niue, the Cook 
Islands and French Polynesia.13 The strong official commitment to provide a service to 
promote “economic development” in Niue and the Cook Islands involves political rather than 
economic calculations; total exports from these islands to New Zealand are valued at around 
$5 million FOB, more or less equal to the subsidy required to run the shipping service on the 
present basis; and the Aitutaki banana trade, which dictates the need for a fortnightly service 
(and hence accounts for a fair proportion of the operating losses) generated in the early 1980s 
only $684,000 of annual incomes to the 230 growers, plus some employment in packing and 
loading the crop.14 The importance of the service to real living standards in the islands lies 
really in the carriage of imported consumption goods at rates which are competitive with 
alternative sources of supply; the subsidy thus benefits simultaneously the New Zealand 
suppliers of these goods, and the island consumers. 
 
13.5  The Pacific Forum Line 
 
As with the Joint Shipping Service, the Pacific Forum Line was more a political than an 
economic initiative, and its major achievement to date has been an improvement in the political 
climate surrounding shipping matters. The Line was, and is, an important symbol of New 
Zealand's regional commitment to the South Pacific; commercial and technical problems have 
therefore never been allowed to stand in the way of the political momentum. 
 
Proposals for a regional shipping line arose in the early 1970s, at a time when the Pacific 
Islands Producers' Association IPA) and later the South Pacific Bureau for Economic 
Cooperation (SPEC) were active in promoting the expansion of regional trade, and in opposing 
the rapid increases in freight rates at that time (particularly the rates charged by the Union 
Steamship Company)15. Proposals for a regional shipping council were overtaken by the 
preference of Island Governments at the first Forum meeting in 1971 for an independent 
regional shipping line, despite expert warnings that such a line might not be able to charge 
“economic” freight rates if it were to be commercially viable, especially if inappropriate 
vessels were used. 
 
The New Zealand position during a long series of preliminary meetings and studies during 
1973 and 1974 was one of strong rhetorical support for the regional shipping line proposal. 
New Zealand politicians and officials seem to have begun from the (unproven) assumption that 
a regional shipping line was the answer to the perceived problem of high freight rates and 
irregular service, and that only strong political commitment was needed to make the venture a 
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success.16 Implicit in this position was a willingness to subsidise operating losses, and also a 
willingness to proceed even if expert recommendations on type of ships and schedules could 
not be met. (It was, in other words, more important to New Zealand to have a regional shipping 
service come into being, than to ensure that any such service was commercially viable). 
 
A Ministry of Transport memorandum of 3 February 1976 set out the reasons for New 
Zealand's support of the proposal:17 
 
 - a viable regional shipping operation would encourage our already substantial trade 
with South Pacific countries; 
 
- New Zealand's help in establishing such a line is a practical way of assisting the 
Islands' economies, and would be seen as a measure of our concern to promote 
economic integration on a regional basis; 
 
- contribution of New Zealand tonnage would reduce possible problems of 
employment for New Zealand maritime unions. 
 
The expectations of Forum member countries were also set out: stabilised freight rates, 
improved balance of payments positions, employment; and trade promotion by concessional 
rates. With Australia lukewarm at best, New Zealand support (both financially and with 
tonnage) was clearly crucial for the success of the project; and as time went by the political 
stakes were increasing   especially after the 1976 “overstayers' affair” in New Zealand, which 
made it necessary for New Zealand to mend fences in the region by a full commitment to 
“regional development” projects such as the Forum Line and PIIDS. 
 
From the outset, Australia took a more hard headed and sceptical position, preferring the idea 
of a regional shipping council to regulate private shipping operators. At the 1975 Forum 
meeting Australia made clear that its participation in the PFL would be conditional upon the 
venture being commercially viable; and when the Pacific Forum Line Ltd was established in 
1977 Australia was not among the original eight members. 
 
During 1976 the final arrangements for setting up the PFL were pushed through under steady 
political pressure, and against a background of self interested manoeuvering by the intending 
participants. The outcome was the establishment in 1977 78 of a service on the trunk routes in 
the South Pacific, making steady operating losses to which New Zealand has contributed by 
financial support. The New Zealand subsidy amounted to $3.8 million in 1983/84 (less than the 
subsidy on the Cook Islands Niue Joint Service). Hope continues to be expressed that the Line 
will eventually break even. The relevance of the PFL to the present study is limited to the 1982 
establishment of a feeder service to Tuvalu and Kiribati, funded by New Zealand and 
Australia. This has substantially improved shipping to those countries, especially Tuvalu, and 
has assisted the recent very rapid expansion of New Zealand exports to Tuvalu. 
 
13.6  Shipping Policy 
 
In the context of the five mini economies covered by the present study, the nature of the 
shipping problem has changed very little in the last three decades, but the role of the New 
Zealand Government in coping with that problem has increased. Since the 1920s, New Zealand 
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Government steamers have played a key role in the provision of shipping to the Cook Islands 
and Niue; the 1960s and 1970s brought a strengthening of this service and an increase in the 
levels of subsidy. The provision of shipping services for Tokelau has since the late 1940s 
depended upon vessels chartered and paid for by the Administration; repeated proposals that a 
ship should be bought for this route have come to nothing, but the present charter arrangement 
appears to provide an adequate service. In the case of Tuvalu and Kiribati, the 1982 
introduction of a Pacific Forum Line feeder service from Fiji has brought New Zealand 
directly into the provision of shipping in that area of the Pacific, a role complementary to 
expanding New Zealand trade interests. 
 
At the heart of the shipping issue in our five case studies lies the reality of the MIRAB 
economies. Large scale commodity imports, and stagnant or falling commodity exports, imply 
heavy imbalance in cargoes northbound and southbound. The lack of southbound cargoes 
renders shipping commercially unattractive, given the great distances involved, and renders 
subsidisation likely over the long term if freight rates are to be held below politically sensitive 
thresholds. There are at present no grounds for expecting southbound cargoes to increase 
significantly, despite the recurrent rhetorical references to “economic development” in the 
islands. The 1979 cessation of phosphate shipments from Kiribati removed the only really 
profitable export commodity from the scene and significantly reduced the attractiveness of 
shipping between New Zealand and Kiribati. 
 
While the growing volumes on the trunk routes served by PFL give some grounds for hoping 
that the Line may at some stage become self supporting it is clear that the provision of regular 
shipping services to the five mini states will have to remain subsidised for the foreseeable 
future, with the degree of subsidy a matter for political negotiation between the New Zealand 
Government and the beneficiaries   the island communities, the New Zealand maritime unions, 
and New Zealand exporters. The issues in islands shipping appear now to be well understood 
by officials in Wellington, and the status quo seems unlikely to change much unless the New 
Zealand Parliament balks at the cost. Considering the political and trade benefits accruing to 
New Zealand from its shipping subsidies, that seems unlikely to happen.  
 
13.7   The Pacific Islands Industrial Development Scheme 
 
The Pacific Islands Industrial Development Scheme IIDS), begun in 1976, grew out of a 1974 
initiative by the Third Labour Government, the Pacific Islands Employment Opportunities 
Scheme. Both proposals owed more to political imperatives than to economic analysis; and 
insofar as economic analysis was forthcoming, it suggested that industrialisation in the Pacific 
Islands was likely to be limited by lack of comparative advantage, diseconomies of small scale, 
distance from export markets, and problems of access to the New Zealand market in the face of 
resistance from manufacturers and unions. The subsequent SPARTECA agreement removed 
the last of these problems, but left the first three untouched. The origins and evolution of the 
PIIDS scheme have been studied in detail by Stockwell (1984), and much of what follows is 
based upon his work, supplemented by our own quick survey of the relevant files in the 
Ministry of Trade and Industry. 
 
The economic rationale, such as it was, offered for promoting manufacturing was becoming 
decreasingly competitive in New Zealand because of local full employment and rising real 
wages, and that rather than attracting Pacific migrants into New Zealand to fill unskilled 
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labouring jobs, it might be allocatively more efficient to move the factories to the workers in 
the Islands.18 This chimed well with the developmentalist philosophy which was very 
influential at that time both among Island Governments and New Zealand officials (especially 
Foreign Affairs). Rapid and successful “economic development” in the Islands would, it was 
hoped, mop up their labour force and thus dampen the incentives to migrate to New Zealand.19 
 
It was the issue of migration that dominated the politics of PIIDS and its predecessor. Both the 
Labour Government in 1974, and the National Government in 1976, mounted police 
campaigns against illegal “overstayers” from some of the Pacific Islands   mainly Western 
Samoa, Tonga and Fiji. Apart from possibly a few Tuvaluans posing as “Samoans”, the 
overstayers issue had no direct impact on the five small states covered in the present study. The 
New Zealand Government's response, however   especially the attempt to promote employment 
opportunities in the Islands in order to halt or reverse the flow of Polynesian migrants into 
New Zealand   did flow over to our five, most notably in the context of the 1975 aid mission to 
the Cook Islands, discussed in Chapter 5. 
 
In promoting industrialisation in the islands, the New Zealand Government could of course 
point to the desire of the island governments, expressed at the 1972 Pacific Forum meeting, to 
move into manufactured exports with access to the New Zealand and Australian markets. The 
PIIDS scheme, as it emerged, thus fitted well with the emerging political consensus among 
island elites in favour of industrial promotion. The main initial obstacle to the scheme was 
again essentially political   the objection of New Zealand unions and manufacturers to any 
weakening of protectionism. This objection, however, weakened steadily during the 1970s, 
partly because of a growing realisation that island industrialisation was unlikely to occur on 
such a scale as to offer much threat to established New Zealand producers. 
 
The political returns from the PIIDS scheme, thus, were immediate and very real. The scheme 
was and remained a concrete demonstration of New Zealand's commitment to regional 
development and cooperation; it served to deflect Islands criticism of New Zealand policy on 
overstayers and on the general question of Polynesian immigration; and it meshed well with 
the domestic concern of some New Zealand Government departments to open up New Zealand 
manufacturers to more outside competition. The scheme utilised measures already familiar 
from New Zealand's own regional development policies   tax write offs, suspensory loans, and 
administrative support. Experience with the limited impact of such incentives on the locational 
structure of New Zealand manufacturing probably contributed to the modest expectations held 
by many officials, especially in the Department of Trade and Industry. 
 
The Pacific Islands Industrial Development Committee, headed by Jack Luxton, MP, was set 
up in March 1976. In an early report to that committee, officials from the three departments 
involved (Treasury, Foreign Affairs and Trade and Industry) drew attention to the factors 
likely to limit industrialisation in the islands setting. As Stockwell summarises the argument:20 
 
The fears of unions and manufacturers were to some extent, it was 
noted, based on the substantial difference between Island and New 
Zealand wage rates. This was counterbalanced, to a significant 
degree, by low productivity in the Islands and other disabilities 
under which manufacturers had to operate, in particular freight 
costs. These disadvantages were illustrated by the reluctance of 
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New Zealand manufacturers to start ventures in those Islands 
which already enjoyed unimpeded access to the New Zealand 
market. 
 
The last point goes straight to the heart of the matter   but was generally ignored in subsequent 
public discussion of the PIIDS scheme. For some Pacific Island economies such as Tonga and 
Fiji, it was possible to argue that free access to the New Zealand market would be a necessary, 
and perhaps sufficient, condition for rapid industrial expansion. (Hence the subsequent 
SPARTECA negotiations). For the Cook Islands, Niue and Tokelau, however, no such case 
could be made   these economies already enjoyed free access to the New Zealand market. 
 
The absence of any mass migration of New Zealand manufacturers to those small island 
economies could not, therefore, be accounted for by market access barriers in New Zealand. 
The key problem was rather the lack of relative competitiveness of manufacturers in the 
islands, as compared with manufacturers in New Zealand. Since the integrated market New 
Zealand-Cook Islands-Niue-Tokelau was all enclosed within the prevailing New Zealand 
protection barriers, it was immediately obvious to the casual observer that low wage rates in 
the islands were more than offset by the disadvantages of distance, low productivity and small 
scale. In order to persuade New Zealand manufacturers to migrate offshore, therefore, either 
island wage rates would have to be further lowered, or profitability would have to be enhanced 
by measures such as increased transport subsidies, assistance in raising productivity, price 
supports, tax write offs, or investment subsidies. 
 
The PIIDS scheme, as it emerged, rested crucially upon investment subsidies and assistance 
with productivity. Approved ventures locating in the islands qualified for suspensory loans up 
to 30% of the cost of their fixed investments, and up to 50% of the costs of staff training. The 
scheme did not include any provision for ongoing subsidies to maintain the profitability of 
ventures.21 It thus rested on the assumption that commercial viability could be attained simply 
by reducing the setting up costs (and hence the ongoing level of overheads). No statistical 
work on the island economies was done to establish the realism of this assumption; instead, the 
approach adopted was one of “suck it and see”   i.e. put the setting up incentives into place, 
and see whether private enterprise responded. The scale of the response has thus been the only 
measure of the realism of the scheme's design, from an economic point of view. 
 
In interpreting the evidence of success or failure of PIIDS, there are several difficulties in 
interpreting the record. The first is that the PIIDS incentives to locate in the islands were very 
similar in kind and degree to the regional development incentives already available to 
manufacturers within New Zealand itself, so that in order to attract projects island locations 
had to be preferable to areas in New Zealand where regional development incentives already 
applied. The second, related problem was that New Zealand export incentives could be claimed 
on goods produced in New Zealand and exported to island markets, which substantially 
undercut the attractiveness of the PIIDS incentives   especially since the export incentives were 
ongoing subsidies to manufacturers' profitability, whereas the PIIDS incentives were restricted 
to setting up costs. 
 
A third problem, and the one which poses most direct difficulties to the observer, is that Trade 
and Industry officials consistently attribute to PIIDS the existence of all ventures, and all 
employment, in which PIIDS funds have been involved. The statistics issued by the PIIDS unit 
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for the period from 1976 to the end of 198322 claim 51 operating ventures23, 800 jobs, $1.3 
million of funds paid out or approved, and 100 applications approved in total. Of these figures, 
the most reliable appears to be that for total expenditure on loans and grants under the scheme 
to date.  (The internal costs of administering the scheme within the Department of Trade and 
Industry have been considerably in excess of the $1.3 million of funds disbursed   possibly 
double).  
 
The figures for number of operating ventures, and number of jobs created, are open to serious 
question, as Stockwell's work has shown. Trade and Industry officials appear to rely upon the 
original estimates of jobs to be created, made at the time of approval for assistance under 
PIIDS. Such estimates, made by proponents of ventures seeking aid, naturally tend to be biased 
upwards and are seldom realised in practice. Data in Stockwell24 indicates that the official 
figures for “jobs directly created” are overstated by 112% for the Cook Islands and about 90% 
for Niue. Overall it seems unlikely that ventures assisted under PIIDS have created more than 
half the direct jobs claimed; and the net contribution of PIIDS itself would be considerably 
lower than this. Official data on numbers of ventures approved and operating are also prepared 
and presented on a basis which biases the results upwards. 
 
Table 13.2 brings out both the very limited total impact of PIIDS during the seven years 1977 
1983, and the small share of this from the point of view of our five small economies: 20% of 
total ventures, and 16% of total funding. Of the five, only Niue and the Cook Islands obtained 
operating ventures under PIIDS; 1978 discussions on a possible knitwear venture in Tokelau 
were quickly dropped, and the scheme has not yet affected Tuvalu or Kiribati. It is important, 
therefore, not to overstate either the significance of PIIDS in the small state setting, or the 
priority assigned to the very small economies by the PIIDS scheme. 
 
Also in evaluating the impact of the PIIDS programme, it must be borne in mind that there is 
no clear evidence available to demonstrate that any of these ventures would have failed to 
emerge in the absence of the PIIDS incentives   in other words, it is impossible to assess the 
true net impact of the scheme. Information on individual cases strongly suggests that in  
many cases, entrepreneurs have treated PIIDS as a source of concessionary finance after they 
have already decided to embark upon a venture. Anecdotal evidence of Trade and Industry 
officials acting as genuine “marriage brokers” and thus setting up activities which otherwise 
would not have emerged can be produced in a few cases, but to date there has been no 
systematic case by case assessment, to our knowledge.25 
 
The PIIDS programme has attracted a number of recurring criticisms relating to level of 
funding, requirement for New Zealand equity participation, slow procedures, poor 
management, lack of annual reporting, disincentives to labour intensity, and lack of integration 
with other aspects of the New Zealand aid programme.26 These all relate, in essence, to points 
of detail which can readily be coped with by altering the detail of the policy. None of them 
relate to the premises on which the programme was ostensibly based   namely that industrial 
promotion in the Pacific Island economies is worth doing. On the basis of our analysis of the 
economic characteristics of MIRAB systems (Chapter 5) we would be inclined  
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TABLE 13.2 
 
PIIDS DATA FOR OUR FIVE SMALL ECONOMIES 
 
Economy Number of PIIDS ventures 
PIIDS 
funding 
paid out to 
Dec 1983 $
Number of jobs 
  
Operatin
g Dec 
1983 
Failed by 
Dec 1983   
Official 
estimate
Actual
* 
Cook Islands 7 2 173,448 142 67 
Niue 3 3 38,259 49 26 
Tokelau  -  -  -  -  - 
Tuvalu              -  -  -  -  - 
Kiribati               -  -  -  -  - 
PIIDS TOTAL 51 13 1,308,000 800 546 
         at most     
 
Sources: Department of Trade and Industry PIIDS Unit statistical releases; Stockwell (1984) 
Appendices E and F. 
* On basis of Stockwell's detailed analysis of actual employment in several specific 
ventures. His adjusted total for PIIDS is upper bound, since ventures which he did 
not analyse in detail were included at their “official” level of employment creation. 
 
to suggest that the PIIDS scheme (more by accident than by design) fits in rather well, so long 
as excessive expectations are not held nor aroused. The scheme provides concrete help on a 
small scale to marginal ventures set up to colonise the small niches of profitability that emerge 
from time to time in such economies. To this extent it facilitates the low level diversification of 
the village economy which, we have suggested, is a legitimate goal of policy. The scheme 
provides also a most useful barometer of the existence or otherwise of such profitable 
investment opportunities in the islands. The message from the PIIDS record in our five small 
economies is quite straightforward on this point: profitable industrial investment opportunities 
are few and far between, and very limited in scope. They are far below the “threshold” of 
project size for the mainstream aid programmes of most donors, and they are almost without 
exception marginal to the local economy27, with little influence either for good or ill. There 
isno harm in supporting new ventures in these niches, and there are major political gains from 
being seen to take a constructive interest in economic development at the micro level. Indeed, 
there can have been fewer more cost effective public relations exercises in New Zealand 
diplomatic history; at a fraction of the cost of New Zealand's commitment to, say, the Pacific 
Forum Line, goodwill has been built up in a wide range of Pacific islands. 
 
Surveying the first seven years of the PIIDS scheme, several overall comments seem 
appropriate, in qualification of the earlier observation that the scheme has on the whole been a 
positive exercise. It is important to bear in mind that the original motivation, and continuing 
rationale, for the programme are New Zealand's political goals rather than any clearly defined 
Islands goals, and it would be quite incorrect to portray the scheme's design as a passive New 
Zealand response to Island Government's wishes. Similar comments apply to a large number of 
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New Zealand aid projects of one sort or another, and it is hard not to sympathise with 
influential Islands leaders who feel “patronised” by New Zealand officials' practice of 
defending Wellington's development priorities by reference to “the wishes of the Islands 
people”.  The focus on manufacturing, the use of investment subsidies rather than profit 
subsidies, the insistence on New Zealand equity content, the absence of any systematic 
reporting or evaluation framework, the recent loss of momentum and underspending of the 
annual budget, the failure to translate relevant documents into Island languages, and the lack of 
any properly argued rationale for the programme, are all criticisms which belong at 
Wellington's door, not the Islands'. It is, in addition, not clear that the Department of Trade and 
Industry had built up enough specialised expertise in the South Pacific to enable officials of the 
department to respond creatively to the specific problems of the region; as already pointed out, 
PIIDS in essence transferred industrial assistance mechanisms originally devised to meet New 
Zealand internal problems, to the very different setting of the small island economies. 
 
Island Governments certainly welcome the scheme and are pleased to see projects advance 
under it. It is generally true that individual projects are obliged to go through the motions of 
being considered and approved by Island Governments. It is also true that a number of PIIDS 
projects have resulted directly from initiatives taken by Island Governments. None of this 
alters at all the basic fact, clearly perceived by all participants, that in the final analysis the 
initiative, the finance and the power reside in Wellington, and will continue to do so. 
Evaluation of the operation of the scheme, thus, is a task for Wellington, and cannot be 
delegated to the Island Governments as some officials suggest. Those Governments may 
indeed have useful input to offer, but are not in a position to undertake a full and frank 
evaluation of a programme which they do not control. 
 
13.8  Sparteca 
 
The South Pacific Regional Trade and Economic Cooperation Agreement (SPARTECA) was 
opened for signature at the Eleventh South Pacific Forum meeting at Tarawa in July 1980, and 
after some hiccups (particularly in respect of Fiji's push for access to the New Zealand market 
for orange juice) attracted signature and ratification from the countries participating in the 
Forum. The agreement arose out of ten years of debate and negotia-tion over access for Pacific 
Island economies to the markets of New Zealand and Australia. Island Governments, observing 
their large trade deficits with the two dominant economies of the region, had been inclined to 
blame those deficits on quantitative restrictions and tariffs in the New Zealand and Australian 
markets, and hence to argue that the unilateral removal of such restrictions on Islands trade by 
the two large countries would be a necessary, and possibly a sufficient, condition for the 
reduction of this trade “imbalance”.  The debates and negotiations occupied a vast amount of 
diplomatic time and energy during the 1970's and culminated in the agreement by New 
Zealand and Australia in 1979-1980 to open their markets, with very few restrictions on 
specific commodities. 
 
The most important contribution of SPARTECA to the policy analysis of South Pacific trade 
and development problems has been to remove a red herring which had obsessed many 
politicians during the preceding decade - namely the notion that restricted market access was 
the key explanation for trade imbalances in the region. Having disposed of this, the Forum 
countries are now left in a position to confront the more fundamental causes of their trade 
deficits. We have already indicated in the case of our five small economies that the trade 
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balance is merely a manifestation of the underlying balance of payments position, with import 
demand providing the balancing item to offset large current account invisible “earnings”.  In 
those economies, we have suggested, it was and is erroneous to view the trade deficit with 
New Zealand as a “problem”.  For the larger economies of the region   particularly Fiji   the 
familiar mercantilist notions of the undesirability of trade deficits carry more conviction; those 
economies, however, lie outside the scope of the present study. 
 
The record to date on the impact of the SPARTECA agreement on regional trade is 
summarised in Tables 13.3 and 13.4. The first shows New Zealand's trade with the Forum and 
Non Forum Pacific economies since 1978-1979; SPARTECA came into force during the 1980-
1981 June year. The high inflation of the period renders the absolute numbers of very limited 
use as a guide to trends; but percentages are indicative. From Table 13.3 it can be seen that in 
terms of current dollars, New Zealand imports from Forum economies rose substantially, with 
Fiji and Nauru the main “beneficiaries”.  Since the greater part of Nauru's exports to New 
Zealand consists of phosphates, it seems fair to suggest, as does Stockwell in his recent study 
of SPARTECA28, that “Fiji has been the major beneficiary of SPARTECA, followed by Papua 
New Guinea, Tonga, and the Solomon Islands”. 
 
The standard table used in the analysis of the impact of SPARTECA by the Department of 
Trade and Industry (Table 13.4) shows that of the $9 million increase in New Zealand imports 
from Forum countries 1980 1982, nearly $4 million was increased imports from Fiji, and a 
similar amount was expansion of imports of goods whose entry to New Zealand had been 
restricted prior to SPARTECA. Considering the double digit inflation which prevailed during 
those years, the 10% average annual growth of nominal import values probably did not 
correspond to any significant increase in the volume of goods sold to New Zealand; but the 
doubling in two years of the value of imports formerly restricted certainly does imply strong 
volume growth; it therefore seems clear that SPARTECA has performed a trade creating role, 
which is certainly good news. (The apparent fall in calendar 1983 imports is due to a dramatic 
fall of $18.5 million in reported imports of Fijian sugar, according to the data supplied  
by Trade and Industry; excluding this, the total imports from Forum countries would show a 
modest increase in nominal value for 1982 to 1983 in Table 13.3.) 
 
On the other hand, it is important not to overstate the impact of SPARTECA. As with PIIDS, 
this is a scheme which relaxes one of the perceived constraints on economic growth in the 
region, and therefore can be expected to open up (especially in the first few years) a limited 
number of profitable niches for new investment and production for export to New Zealand and 
Australia. There are real gains to several Island economies, but those gains are in no case 
sufficient to make significant inroads into the perceived problem from which Island politicians 
began   namely the trade deficits with the large economies. 
 
As Table 13.3 indicates, in 1978 79 (before SPARTECA) New Zealand's imports from Forum 
countries stood at 44% of New Zealand exports to those countries   an “imbalance” of more or 
less two to one in “favour” of New Zealand, to use the unfortunate mercantilist expression 
which has been common in the debate. In 1982 83 (after SPARTECA) New Zealand's imports 
from Forum countries were 33% of exports to those countries   an “imbalance” of three to one. 
The notion that SPARTECA would in some way lead to a closing of the recorded “trade gap” 
was thus revealed as a chimera, which should cause no surprise considering the economic 
forces at work in the regional economy (especially the strength of aid flows into the Forum 
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economies, which naturally generate as their counterpart a flow of increased import purchases 
by those economies). The impact of SPARTECA, thus, needs to be recognised as limited 
mostly to a once for all increase in Island exports to New Zealand, giving benefit mainly to 
manufacturers in Fiji. The Agreement on its own is unlikely to produce significant dynamic 
effects in the Forum economies, though it may open the way for Government policies in the 
Islands to promote growth of new lines of economic activity. The belief that SPARTECA 
would be sufficient to generate growth in the Islands was and is without foundation.  
 
It remains, however, to focus on the question of what SPARTECA may have implied for the 
five small economies which are the subject of our study. In the case of three of them   Niue, 
Tokelau and the Cook Islands   access to the New Zealand market had always been 
unrestricted (except for informal obstacles, such as those posed by the New Zealand clothing 
unions to apparel imports from the Cook Islands). The SPARTECA agreement thus added 
nothing to the market position already enjoyed by those economies, but had a clear negative 
impact, since other Pacific economies which had not traditionally been able to compete in the 
New Zealand market with the Cook Islands or Niue now had unrestricted access. In the early 
years of SPARTECA New Zealand maintained protection for certain specified products of 
those two economies   notably passionfruit pulp and citrus juice   but the decline of export 
production of the protected lines in both Niue and the Cook Islands led to the dropping of 
several such items from New Zealand's “negative list”, to the point where virtually the only 
remaining protected corner of the New Zealand market is that for some Cook Islands 
airfreighted vegetables. 
 
SPARTECA thus offered no benefits, and threatened some losses, for the small economies 
which had been traditionally associated with New Zealand; but it is of course important not to 
overstate the negative impact of SPARTECA as such, since the declining export performance 
of the Cook Islands and Niue was already resulting from the dynamics of the mirab economy 
well before the advent of SPARTECA. 
 
Turning to Tuvalu and Kiribati, Table 13.3 indicates that neither shows any sign of building up 
a dynamic export trade to New Zealand. New Zealand exports to both economies have risen 
sharply (especially to Tuvalu); but this trend is unrelated to SPARTECA and may be partly or 
largely a statistical illusion, since an unknown volume of New Zealand goods destined for 
ultimate sale in Tuvalu and Kiribati used to be exported in the first instance to Fiji and re 
exported from there; whereas since the advent of the PFL feeder service, it is more normal to 
state the final destination at time of export from New Zealand. It appears, however, that the 
feeder service has also generated an increase in the total volume of New Zealand goods being 
imported to those two economies, despite difficulties of measurement.29 
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TABLE 13.3 
NEW ZEALAND TRADE WITH THE PACIFIC ISLAND COUNTRIES 
JUNE YEARS 
Exports NZ$fob;   Imports 
NZ$vfd           
FORUM ISLAND COUNTRIES          
 1978-1979 1979-1980 1980-81 1981-1982 1982-1983 
 (Exports) (Imports) (Exports) (Imports) (Exports) (Imports) (Exports) (Imports) (Exports) (Imports) 
Cook Islands 11,245,543 3,662,610 13,049,969 4,510,118 11,618,446 4,275,737 12,757,278 4,643,923 17,822,030 5,093,136 
Fiji 49,027,737 11,546,880 64,144,422 26,948,998 76,632,688 22,008,587 82,181,518 22,539,471 103,862,999 29,687,022 
Kiribati 1,322,286 1,517,010 809,064 3,511,457 1,003,996 7,369 1,599,582 27,791 3,197,626 6,990 
Nauru 962,079 20,876,793 1,137,254 18,607,958 1,475,825 18,345,880 1,046,807 30,355,052 899,521 35,083,259 
Niue 1,784,740 300,436 2,244,190 359,594 2,660,580 299,359 2,616,554 518,873 2,707,610 546,140 
Papua New Guinea 21,839,309 5,500,891 34,189,071 7,049,246 54,427,697 4,163,969 64,263,344 6,442,118 79,285,661 7,229,667 
Solomon Islands 2,703,486 226,794 4,515,143 594,649 6,501,193 1,064,613 5,767,043 1,561,003 7,111,299 1,023,948 
Tonga 8,305,249 1,652,620 9,762,459 2,413,043 12,019,609 2,821,358 16,010,011 2,711,502 18,113,529 2,849,343 
Tuvalu 62,439 1,284 99,493 2,443 109,236 5,730 101,985 16,132 417,7 953,339 
Western Samoa 15,037,396 5,008,889 17,356,404 4,185,256 18,486,292 4,987,002 19,059,815 7,084,909 17,091,796 4,151,157 
Vanuatu 2,921,692 33,850 3,945,316 23,210 3,551,267 3,135 4,208,929 8,855 6,150,274 3,721 
TOTAL                     
           
FORUM ISLANDS 115,211,956 50,328,057 151,252,314 68,205,972 188,486,829 57,982,739 209,612,866 75,909,629 256,660,140 85,677,722 
           
NON FORUM ISLAND COUNTRIES          
 1978-1979 1979-1980 1980-81 1981-1982 1982-1983 
 (Exports) (Imports) (Exports) (Imports) (Exports) (Imports) (Exports) (Imports) (Exports) (Imports) 
American Samoa 11,343,478 6,706 12,877,125 719 19,545,203 26,227 9,242,550 116,738 10,643,000 33,905 
French Polynesia 14,353,565 61,245 21,615,939 39,510 27,380,905 78,419 30,222,127 279,768 37,849,000 266,186 
Guam 927,947 10 1,027,633  1,654,793  1,883,855 14 2,598,000  
New Caledonia 10,346,341 26,989 14,024,280 2,970 17,320,340 39,731 19,686,082 373,936 19,539,000 142,882 
Norfolk Island 1,522,996 3,447 2,141,442 7,789 2,807,657 14,177 4,890,713 31,036 4,175,000 5,625 
Pacific Island Trust Territories 4,615  1,338,534 8,075 1,290,065 3,680 265,774 40 649,000  
Pitcairn 39,416 100,808 84,695 3,275 59,772 4 474,000 382   
Tokelau Island 2,388 12,656 18,705 92,569 18,465 37,963 51,360 67,138 28,000 2,987 
Wallis and Futuna 105,053  125,184  228,088  179,370  335,000  
TOTAL                      
           
NON FORUM ISLANDS 38,745,799 111,053 53,269,650 151,632 70,330,211 203,472 66,431,603 868,674 76,290,000 451,967 
TOTAL PACIFIC ISLANDS 153,957,755 50,439,110 204,521,964 68,357,604 258,817,040 58,186,211 276,044,469 76,778,303 332,950,140  86,129,689 
 
 
 
TABLE 13.4 
 
SPARTECA : TRADE EXPANSION 
 
New Zealand Imports from Forum Island Countries 
Calendar Year 
 
  1980 1981 1982 1983
Totals NZ$CDV NZ$CDV NZ$CDV NZ$CDV 
     
Cook Islands 4,465,869 4,717,357 4,917,881 4,507,461
Niue (Imports from the Cook Islands 
and Niue are normally free of 
duty and exempt licence) 290,909 471,466 502,834 588,524
Western Samoa (Imports from 
Western Samoa are normally 
exempt licence) 4,601,101 5,111,776 6,326,756 6,435,183
Fiji 29,131,680 23,534,865 32,761,829 15,485,602
Kiribati 1,967 27,054 10,658 4,636
Papua New Guinea 4,879,438 5,152,329 6,761,337 9,237,655
Solomon Islands 759,541 1,374,233 1,647,243 902,286
Tonga 2,559,821 3,307,472 2,877,369 3,673,689
Tuvalu 4,699 15,123 6,485 5,315
Vanuatu 678 9,723 2,703 3,175
         
TOTAL 46,695,753 43,725,398 55,815,095 40,843,526
 
Trade Expansion Under SPARTECA: 
 
- Free entry prior to SPARTECA - 
total 37,786,886 32,475,863 41,405,796 
- Restricted prior to SPARTECA 3,294,995 5,214,683 8,708,265* 
   -7,212,468 
 - Schedule 3 5,613,822 6,016,675 5,701,034 
 
*The figure includes items of non traditional exports from W. Samoa, e.g., (an aircraft 
worth$1.5m).A more realistic figure should be approximately 7.2m, an increase of 38 percent 
from 1981. 
 
Source: Dept. of Trade and Industry, Wellington, New Zealand 
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CHAPTER FOURTEEN 
FISHERIES 
 
14.1 Introduction 
 
In recent years a good deal of interest has been generated by the apparent scope for fisheries 
development in Pacific Island countries, particularly in the wake of the 1976 Law of the Sea 
Treaty which embodied the right of states to establish 200 mile Exclusive Economic Zones. 
Within these zones, it was intended that a coastal state "shall determine its capacity to 
harvest the living resources of their EEZ' and, to the extent that they are unable to do so 
themselves, "shall ......give other states access to the surplus of the allowable catch"1. 
 
Table 14.1 sets out the most recent available FAO data on the size of the total fish catch in 
Fishing Zones 71 and 77 (Western Central Pacific and Eastern Central Pacific). These zones, 
unfortunately, extend over a wider area than merely the South Pacific island countries, (see 
Figure 14.1) and the FAO does not produce figures for total catches within the EEZ's of 
individual countries. Consequently, it is not possible to say with any certainty what the size 
of the catch within the area covered by the South Pacific Commission (SPC) actually is.  
 
It is, however, evident from Table 14.1 that recorded catches by island countries in the SPC 
area are miniscule relative to the total catch for the FAO fishing zones in which they are 
situated, and that despite a 37% increase in reported catches by SPC countries over the seven 
years 1975 -1982, there has been no upward trend in the island countries' share of  the 
Central Pacific total catch, which remains around 1.2-1.5%.  
 
The two island countries which have exhibited most rapid expansion of their fish catches 
during the past decade are Fiji and the Solomon Islands and the apparent success of the latter 
is of particular interest for other small island states. Of the five small states covered by the 
present study, only Kiribati figures as a significant fishing nation, with around one fifth of 
the SPC catch.  
 
Fisheries development in the small island states involves decisions at two levels. At the 
small-scale level of supplying the local market from inshore fisheries there arise issues of 
import substitution and the organisation or promotion of locally-oriented commercial fishing 
ventures. At the large-scale level of tuna fisheries, island governments are confronted with 
the issue of how to organise and oversee the exploitation of a world-scale industry based on 
a migratory resource. This chapter focuses on the second of these issues, since it is in the 
area of tuna fisheries that the main policy issues of direct concern to New Zealand arise.  
 
14.2   The Tuna Fishery 
 
Table 14.2 summarises the FAO data on historical development of the world tuna fishing 
industry, and Figure 14.2 provides a graph of the detailed figures. Figures for the last decade 
and a half appear reasonably consistent; data for the regional breakdown of the catch for the 
second half of the 1960s exist but are of doubtful quality; and prior to 1965 we were unable 
to locate any usable regional catch data for tuna type species.  
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TABLE 14.1: FISH CATCHES IN PACIFIC BASIN ZONES 71 AND 77, WESTERN CENTRAL PACIFIC/EASTERN CENTRAL 
PACIFIC 
 
  1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982
Total Central Pacific 6,407,464 6,805,271 7,645,837 7,871,880 7,864,257 8,311,298 8,425,361 8,308,700
Non SPC Catches         
Non SPC Catches in the Pacific 6,326,110 6,698,084 7,564,489 7,749,091 7,739,028 8,191,886 8,309,478 8,197,367
SPC Catches 81,354 107,187 81,348 122,789 125,229 119,412 115,883 111,333
SPC % of Total 1.20% 1.50% 1% 1.50% 1.60% 1.40% 1.30% 1.40%
SPC Western Central         
     Fiji 4,824 5,230 6,707 8,423 19,743 18,008 23,547 11,348
     F.S.M. 7,926 6,437 6,386 11,574 6,720 5,478 5,581 5,581
     Kiribati 
a
16,280 16,580 16,976
0
17,935 18,338
0
18,925 19,861 19,540
     N  uru 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 20 10 15 15 18
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
     New Caledonia 973 872 1,425 2,326 1,920 2,061 2,061 2,061
     P.N.G. 34,824 50,700 26,764 52,177 29,758 37,456 26,932 26,932
     Solomon Island 8,711 18,600 15,776 20,673 28,332 26,835 27,029 33,418
     Tuvalu 0 0 0 80 100 150 180 200
     Vanuatu 2,610 2,710 2,816 2,825 2,819 2,937 2,715 2,715
         
SPC Eastern Central         
     American Samoa 136 113 352 377 383 398 403 430
     Cook Islands 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,091 830 830 830 830
     French Polynesia 
Niue
2,169 2,826 699 2,987 2,406 2,406 2,406 2,247
      
     Samoa (Western) 
kelau
1,000 1,100 1,250 1,090 1,890 1,990 3,095 4,020
     To  
     Tonga 901 1,019 1,197 1,210 2,000 1,993 1,993 1,993
 
Source: Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations, Yearbook of Fishery Statistics, Vol. 52 (1981), 
Table C 77, Table C 71, p. 264 266 and Vol 54 (1982). 
The use of FAO Species Group 36 ("Tuna, bonito and billfish') in preparing Table 14.2 means 
that the figures do not permit us to determine whether the obvious increase in the relative 
importance of the central Pacific fisheries in the period since the 1960s has been due to a 
transfer of fishing effort in the pursuit of particular species, or an increase in the relative 
importance of skipjack tuna and yellowfin tuna (the two major species in the central Pacific)2. 
 
From the point of view of Pacific island governments, what is important is that nearly half of 
the total world tuna catch (and over half the yellowfin and skipjack catch) now comes from the 
central Pacific compared to only a quarter in the 1960s; and that the Central Pacific tuna catch 
doubled in volume between 1970 and 1982. How much of this increase corresponded to fish 
caught within the 200-mile zones of island countries is hard to judge. Some observers have 
tended to suppose that the bulk of the central Pacific catch comes from Island waters, and then 
to produce estimates of the economic potential of tuna fishing on this basis. One often quoted 
figure is an estimate of $600 million as the whole of the annual total tuna catch in the region. 
However, 1976 data reported in a recent study3 and reproduced in Table 14.3 indicate a total 
"foreign catch' within the waters of the Pacific Island countries of only 155,000 tonnes, 
compared with the total tuna catch for FAO zones 71 and 77 for that year of 1.1 million tonnes, 
 
 
 
Table 14.2 
CATCH DATA FOR FAO SPECIES GROUP 36 (TUNA, BONITO, BILLFISH ETC) 
Annual averages 
 
Period World Catch 
Central 
Pacific* 
SPC 
countries Kiribati   
 000 tonnes 000 tonnes % of world 000 tonnes 000 tonnes 
      
      
1938 390 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
1948-49 420 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
1950-54 636 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
1955-59 966 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
1960-64 1,192 n.a. n.a .  n.a. n.a.
1965-69 1,532 401 26 n.a. n.a.
1970-74 1,947 767 39 43.7 n.a.
1975-79 2,324 1,110 48 63.8 7.3
1980-82 2,580 1,180 46 74.3 8.5
 
Source:  Collated from FAO  Yearbook of Fishery Statistics, various issues.  
*FAO zones 71 and 77.  
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TABLE 14.3: POPULATION, SEA AREA, AND FOREIGN CATCH 
 
  Pop. (mid-1980) 
Sea Area 
(000 
km2) 
Foreign 
Catch 
(mt) 
Catch/pop Catch kg/capita 
American Samoa 32,400 390 416 1.07 12.8 
Belau 12,200 615 3,408 5.54 279.3 
Cook Islands 17,900 1,830 2,876 1.57 160.7 
Fiji 634,100 1,290 1,786 1.38 2.8 
Fr. Polynesia 148,100 5,030 7,264 1.44 49.0 
FSM 73,750 3,051 25,436 8.34 344.9 
Guam & CNMI 122,700 473 na na na 
Kiribati 58,600 3,550 27,919 7.86 476.4 
Marshall Is. 31,400 2,061 22,167 10.76 705.9 
Nauru 7,300 320 10,069 31.47 1,393.0 
New Caledonia 139,400 1,740 1,858 1.07 13.3 
Niue 3,400 390 293 0.75 86.2 
PNG 2,996,300 3,120 16,845 5.4 5.6 
Solomon Is. 225,200 1,340 19,957 14.89 88.6 
Tokelau 1,600 290 2,095 7.22 1,309.4 
Tonga 97,400 700 834 1.19 8.6 
Tuvalu 7,500 900 9,497 10.55 1,266.3 
Vanuatu 117,500 680 1,105 1.63 9.4 
Wallis & Futuna 10,800 300 541 1.8 50.1 
Western Samoa 156,400 120 184 1.53 1.2 
   
 
*1976 Tuna longlining and Japanese pole and line figures are used 
 
Source: Resource Use Arrangements in Southwest Pacific Fisheries, Penelope J. Ridings; 
Pacific Islands Development Program, East West Centre, 1983, P.4 Kearney, 1981; 
Klawe, 1978; Office of the Trust Territory, 1981; South Pacific Commission, 1982; 
U.S. Bureau of Census, 1980.  
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attributing thus only about 14% of the total catch to island waters. While this low figure may 
be partly due to under-reporting or non-reporting by vessels fishing those waters, it provides a 
worthwhile note of caution about the size of the likely sustainable yield of tuna from island 
EEZ's. Kiribati, for example, supports a catch of between 30,000 and 40,000 tonnes per year 
on what appears to be a sustainable basis,4 and the Kiribati EEZ may prove capable of 50,000 
tonnes per year5. Fish exports (basically tuna) from Kiribati in the early 1980s appear to have 
had an FOB value in the vicinity of A$1,000 per tonne6 which would indicate a rough 
valuation of the current total catch of over $30 million (comparable with the value of 
phosphate exports at their peak in the mid-1970s). However, in contrast to phosphate (which 
was characterised by onshore, controllable production and extremely high profitability) the 
tuna fishery is widely dispersed over a vast area7, difficult and expensive to police, and not 
extraordinarily profitable, since the international industry and tuna market are highly 
competitive. Consequently, the net foreign-exchange returns to Kiribati from the country's tuna 
fisheries are never likely to replicate the performance of phosphates. Fish accounted for 
$700,000 of Kiribati's total exports of $4 million in 19818 while fishery licence fees brought in 
$1.3 million of government revenue in the same year9, giving the Kiribati economy a return in 
the vicinity of 5% of the $30 million value of the total catch. This seems to be more-or-less par 
for the course in the current saturated world market environment, and it is not clear what gains 
can be made now by either more stringent licensing fees or expansion of the locally owned Te 
Mautari tuna fishing operation (see section 9.14), at the expense of the Distant Water Fishing 
Nations. The current Development Plan envisages a possible increase in the level of fees 
revenue to $2 million per year10, which can be compared with the present budget deficit of 
about $9 million on expenditures of over $16 million. Investment appraisals conducted by the 
Kiribati fishing venture Te Mautari Ltd forecast a 16% internal rate of return, with annual 
gross surpluses before depreciation rising to $1.8 million annually in the late 1980s.11 Read 
together with other data in the report, the company's projections seem to imply total projected 
returns to the local economy from its operations (net profits, payments of wages and bonuses, 
and other costs of purchasing locally-produced goods and services) of between $1 million and 
$1.5 million annually, on assumptions which are almost certainly optimistic.  
 
The implication seems to be that tuna fishery development in Kiribati is likely to bring fishery 
earnings up to a level comparable with, or a little above, those of copra. This certainly 
represents a worthwhile gain for the country's economy, but by no means provides any 
prospect of making the economy "self-reliant'.  
 
Similar comments apply to Tuvalu, where the disappointing experience with the "Te Tautai' 
(see Chapter 10) has already dampened earlier excessive hopes. The Third Plan provides no 
estimate of the size of the stocks or catch in Tuvalu waters12. Revenue from fishing fees is 
estimated as $200,000 for 1983, while the gross value of tuna caught (in Fiji waters) by the Te 
Tautai during that year appears to have been roughly another $200,00013. Full implementation 
of the Tuvalu 200-mile EEZ may raise the level of licence fee revenues somewhat, but it will 
take a considerable effort to bring tuna fisheries in Tuvalu up to the level of economic 
contribution presently provided by philatelic sales.  
 
In the Cook Islands, the local tuna catch remains insignificant, and the foreign catch appears to 
be well below the potential level (at least if Table 14.3 provides any guide). The Development 
Plan estimates the value of the present foreign catch in the EEZ at US$12 million, from which 
the Government derives licence fees totalling US$190,000 (less than 2%).14 The Plan 
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envisages no locally-based development of offshore fisheries, and foreshadows no major drive 
to raise the level of fee revenues.  
 
In Niue also the Development Plan provides a very low key treatment of the potential for tuna 
development. Catches by foreign boats in the first half of the 1970s are estimated to have been 
between 100 and 200 tonnes annually15 (compare the 293 tonnes estimate for 1976 in Table 
14.3) and there are no prospects for a local deep water fishing industry. The SPC skipjack 
survey indicated lower sighting rates for tuna schools in Niue waters than the Kiribati, and the 
fishery is further disadvantaged by distance and the lack of baitfish for pole-and-line vessels.  
 
In Tokelau, despite the pressure by New Zealand for early signing of a maritime boundary 
treaty with the USA to permit negotiations with the ATA over access fees for the EEZ, licence 
fees do not appear in the Budget for the current year. Although an agreement with the ATA 
was signed in December 1983 by Tokelau together with Niue, Western Samoa, and Tuvalu, 
providing for a fee of $25 per registered ton for up to 25 licensed vessels in the Tokelau EEZ, 
early expectations that this might yield revenues of WS$100,000 per year have proved 
unfounded to date. Six vessels are licensed as of mid-1984, with likely revenues for the year 
not more than $5,000. Future prospects remain uncertain, although the 1978 SPC survey drew 
attention to the technical feasibility of purse seining in the Tokelau EEZ and the advantage of 
proximity to the canneries in Pago Page.16 
 
On our five small states, therefore, only Kiribati has to date established a significant track 
record in tuna fisheries. Niue and the Cook Islands are located too far from Japan to have 
attracted intensive fishing effort by the Asian fleets, and are still unproven in terms of 
sustainable catch. Tokelau and Tuvalu have resources proven to some extent and already being 
exploited to a degree, but have not to date established any really lucrative licensing regime and 
may not be able to do so. The most successful fisheries development to date, and the main 
international incidents over fishing by unlicensed US vessels, have occurred in more westerly 
areas, particularly the Solomon Islands and Papua New Guinea, and the focus of the Forum 
Fisheries Agency and other regional initiatives has tended to be on the needs of those 
countries.  
 
For the immediate future, therefore, four of our five small states are likely to participate only 
marginally in the benefits from the tuna fishery, and the degree to which they benefit will be 
heavily influenced by the licensing regime established on a regional basis by the Forum 
Agency, and the nature of the deals struck by other island states with more attractive resources 
to offer to the foreign fishing fleets. From New Zealand's point of view it is unlikely that the 
net returns to Niue, the Cook Islands and Tokelau from licensing arrangements will be 
sufficient to offset the costs of surveillance in their extensive EEZs, and that surveillance must 
therefore be justified as much as region-wide grounds (e.g. enforcement of a credible regional 
stance vis-a-vis the Distant Water Fishing Nations(DWFN)) as on grounds of contributing 
directly to economic development of these small states.  
 
14.3   Regional Fisheries Policy 
 
In the long run, the very large size of the sea area covered by the five small states may come 
into play to raise their share of the returns from regional tuna fisheries. As Table 14.3 
indicates, the Pacific island nations together control 28.2 million km2 of sea, of which the five 
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small states in this study control 7 million km2 or 25%, compared to their 2% share of total 
population and 28% share of the 1976 foreign catch (this last figure due mainly to good yields 
in Kiribati and Tuvalu).  
 
The success of the Forum nations in working out a harmonious licensing regime for foreign 
vessels has to date been somewhat limited, although efforts are proceeding. The establishment 
of a regional register of vessels "in good standing' provides a valuable enforcement 
mechanism, and the recent arrest of a United States vessel by the Solomon Islands illustrates 
an increased readiness to assert local interests against pressure from the USA. There do not 
yet, however, appear to exist any thorough studies of the extent of taxable rents being 
generated in tuna fishing within the Forum EEZs, nor any systematic licensing regime to take 
account of the great differences from country to country in productivity per km of EEZ, 
distance from processing plants and markets, and ratio of local to foreign fishing activity. The 
1982 Commonwealth Heads of Government Regional Meeting in Fiji recognised a "failure to 
co ordinate their policies in issuing fishing licenses to other countries' and it seems fair to say 
that at this stage the fisheries issue is more a political one (involving the recognition and 
definition of regional common interests, and the strengthening of regional institutions and 
cooperation) than strictly an economic one. More intensive research effort on the development 
potential of the EEZs, and any large scale shift from licensing to locally controlled fishing 
industries in the small states, will probably have to wait until the institutional and 
administrative framework for the region's fishery policy have been more fully worked out.  
 
 
14.4   Three Key Policy Areas 
 
With respect to the issue of fisheries development on a region-wide scale, there seem to be 
three areas in which New Zealand has an important role to perform. Firstly, at the level of 
diplomacy and international law, there are considerable problems posed by the fact that at 
present two of the major participants in the tuna fisheries are countries with which it is difficult 
to secure satisfactory negotiated agreements: Taiwan, because of New Zealand's non 
recognition of the government and refusal to contemplate direct dealings with Taipei by New 
Zealand-associated small states; and the United States, because of its refusal to sign the Law of 
the Sea treaty and its unwillingness either to police the fishing activities of its nationals, or to 
tolerate such policing by other sovereign states.  
 
The problem of Taiwan has to date been coped with by tacit agreement to operate negotiations 
through non-governmental channels, and in due course it seems likely that if any substantial 
development of the Cook Island and Niue EEEs is undertaken, Taiwanese and South Korean 
vessels will play a leading role. The problem of the United States is more serious, because of 
that government's willingness to enter into political confrontations with Pacific states in 
defence of the rights claimed by the American Tunaboat Association. In 1982 Papua New 
Guinea arrested the Danica for trespassing, and in mid 1984 the Solomon Islands has also 
impounded an American vessel. What might have been routine case by case policing issues 
thus automatically escalate to the status of international incidents, with consequent threats to 
regional trade with the USA and with spin off effects on the climate of regional opinion 
towards the United States. Small Pacific states find themselves confronting diplomatic 
calculations similar to those which are long familiar to governments in Central and South 
America, where the potential costs of offending the US Government (e.g. by impounding 
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unlicensed fishing vessels)17 must be carefully weighed against the increasingly heavy losses 
which would result from closing of the US market and any tightening up of migration access to 
the USA. (As we note in Chapter 17, the west coast of the USA is now becoming a more 
important migration destination for Pacific islanders than the traditional outlet of New Zealand, 
and this must inevitably colour the extent to which Pacific governments feel able to sustain 
regional solidarity in the face of direct US pressure). 
 
TABLE 14.4 : REGIONAL VESSEL REGISTER 30 APRIL 1984 
 
Country of Registration Longline Pole & Line Purse Seine Total 
Cayman Island --- --- 2 2 
Fiji --- 7 1 8 
Honduras --- --- 1 1 
Indonesia --- --- 1 1 
Japan 633 87 63 783 
Korea 51 --- 8 59 
Mexico --- --- 2 2 
New Zealand --- --- 2 2 
Panama --- --- 6 6 
Philippines --- --- 10 10 
Taiwan 27 --- 9 36 
Tuvalu --- 1  1 
United States --- --- 58 58 
Vanuatu  ---  ----     1      1    
     
 711 95 164 970 
     
Source:      Forum Fisheries Agency    
          
 
Given the disparity in both economic and political/military strength between the Forum states 
and the USA, there are obviously narrow limits on the Forum's ability to sustain an outright 
confrontation over the fisheries issue, and the importance of establishing and sustaining a 
position in international law is increased. New Zealand has contributed substantially in this 
area over the years and will no doubt continue to do so. In helping to establish a regional 
position on the fisheries question, however, it is vital to hold in view the ends to be pursued. 
We have suggested in this chapter that the economic gains from tuna development, while 
significant, are not so overwhelming as to justify the Forum, or New Zealand, sacrificing other 
major long-term interests either by attempting to stand-off the United States, or by seeking 
diplomatic accommodation at high local or regional cost. We have suggested in Chapter 8 that 
in the case of Olohega (Swain's Island) New Zealand may have pursued a maritime treaty with 
the USA too vigorously, at the expense of more important elements in our long-run political 
relations with Tokelau.  
 
This leads to the second major area in which New Zealand may have a significant role to play. 
There seems to have been inadequate research work to date on the political economy of the 
tuna fisheries of the central Pacific; yet decisions on licensing regimes and regional investment 
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options hinge on the economics of fisheries operations at least as much as on the scientific 
issues of the size and migratory habits of the tuna stock. The bulk of the research effort to date 
seems to have been directed to the latter area, partly no doubt because of the "political 
neutrality' of scientific findings. There are, nevertheless, several international agencies which 
should have a role in the preparation and publication of substantial in-depth analysis of the 
regional economies of fisheries development, and it would be appropriate for New Zealand 
both to encourage them to undertake more such work, and to ensure that its results are 
critically evaluated and interpreted. In particular it is important that research work of high 
calibre be promoted, and that the agencies be deterred from devoting resources to second-rate 
or ill directed investigative work.  
 
The third area in which New Zealand has a role is the design and implementation of cost 
effective means of maritime surveillance. The use of Orion aircraft is of fair effectiveness for 
detection purposes, but is costly and lacks any capability for post detection enforcement. 
Moreover Orion flight paths are worked out for security purposes, not primarily for fisheries' 
purposes. Large naval vessels, similarly, incur costs disproportionate to the benefits derived 
from enforced licensing systems. One step towards cost effective surveillance would be for 
Forum Fishing Agency vessels, or national fishing fleets, to be operating themselves in tuna 
fishing, recovering from their earnings the costs of maintaining a presence in the various 
fishing zones. The extent to which such regionally owned and operated vessels would be 
delegated an enforcement role viz-a-vis DWFN vessels is obviously a ticklish issue. recedents 
set by Icelandic trawlers during the "cod war' with Britain might be worth pursuing).  
 
In the longer run, access to satellite intelligence data may solve part of the surveillance 
problem, but will still leave the problem of enforcement to be solved. Having declared its 
willingness to maintain a "rapid deployment force' to cope with onshore political conflicts in 
the Pacific, it may well be appropriate for New Zealand to demonstrate an equal willingness to 
maintain some rapidly-deployable fisheries enforcement capability. How this task might best 
be achieved, however, is a technical and political issue beyond the scope of the present study.  
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NOTES TO CHAPTER FOURTEEN 
                                                 
1  Revised Single Negotiating Text for Law of the Sea, cited by R.E. Kearney, "The Law of the Sea 
and Regional Fisheries Policy', 1977, p.2. 
2  The figures could be obtained from the FAO statistics, but we have not had time to do so. 
3  P.J. Ridings,  Resource Use Arrangements in Southwest Pacific Fisheries (1983): 4. 
4  Kiribati National Development Plan 1983-1986: 104-105 estimates that in the late 1970s prior to 
implementation of the 200 mile EEZ, foreign fishing fleets were catching 5,000-10,000 of longline 
tuna and up to 30,000 tonnes by pole and line methods. The 1976 foreign catch estimate in Table 
14.3 of 28,000 tonnes, added to the FAO estimate of the Kiribati national catch of 7,000 tonnes for 
that year, confirms these figures. 
5  Te Mautari Ltd  Corporate Plan 1984 1988 (1984) Chapter 2 suggests that the 30,000 tonne skipjack 
catch is well within the potential catch, that the yellowfin catch could exceed 10,000 tonnes per 
year, and that bigeye potential should exceed 6,000 on the basis of which the company project a 
sustainable yield of over 50,000 tonnes. 
6  Asian Development Bank (1982): 42. 
7  In early 1984 the Kiribati vessels were catching good stocks close to base in Tarawa; however there 
is no certainty that this situation will last. 
8  Asian Development Bank (1983) p.42. 
9  Asian Development Bank (1983) p.31. 
10  Development Plan 1983-1986 p.105. 
11  Te Mautari Ltd (1984) Chapter 12. 
12  R.E. Kearney,  Final Country Report No. 8, Tuvalu (SPC 1983) is equally unhelpful on the level of 
stocks or the sustainable catch. He draws attention to the shortage of baitfish as the main constraint 
on development of a locally based pole and line operation. 
13  Tuvalu Draft Third Development Plan 1984-1987 pp.10-6 & 10-7. 
14  Cook Islands Development Plan 1982-1985: 70. 
15  Niue National Development Plan 1980-1985: 50. 
16  Skipjack Survey and Assessment Programme Final Country Report No 10 (1983). 
17  In the early days of Exclusive Economic Zones both Peru and Ecuador impounded US tuna vessels, 
and suffered the consequences in terms of US economic sanctions and political pressure. 
CHAPTER FIFTEEN 
 
EDUCATION* 
 
15.1 Introduction 
 
The mini states under study cannot be lumped together even although they have the intrinsic 
educational problems of small states: that is, how to provide enough good quality education of the 
right kind, and how to pay for the resources required.1 
 
The people of the Cook Islands, Niue and Tokelau are New Zealand citizens with strong personal 
and constitutional ties with New Zealand. New Zealand has a responsibility to assist with 
educational development to ensure that her citizens be not disadvantaged. The situation poses the 
long time problem of the best type of education to serve this dual future; a matter now in the hands 
of the people themselves. Kiribati and Tuvalu are simply foreign countries associated with New 
Zealand through membership of the Pacific Forum community. They have a heritage of British 
rule and of Cambridge School Certificate and until lately have had no dependence on New 
Zealand examination facilities. All the countries have limited resources though these differ and, 
except for Niue, have scattered islands with problems of communication and the expense of 
duplicative schools. 
 
New Zealand was responsible for education in the Cook Islands and in Niue from the beginning of 
this century until self-government, in Tokelau since 1925 and, while having no responsibility, has 
been involved in Kiribati and Tuvalu (the former British Colony of Gilbert and Ellice Is.) since the 
early 1950's. 
 
In all cases, the initial establishment of education, was in the hands of missions, particularly the 
London Missionary Society. It was designed to create literacy and to evangelise. When New 
Zealand became politically responsible in the Cook Islands, Niue and Tokelau it became clear that, 
while regulations could be made, it was cheaper to leave education to the missions. There was also 
ongoing argument between administrators as to the type of education. Many reports were made 
during the years preceding World War II and changes in curriculum direction, but liberality was 
generally hampered by the views both of the administrators and of the island people themselves 
who saw education largely as a means to prepare for clerical positions in government. This in spite 
of far seeing men like Sir Apirana Ngata, Minister in Charge of the Cook Islands, who believed 
that Cook Islanders should be educated to meet the world as they were already exposed to it.2 The 
New Zealand Government's policy followed closely that for its Maori schools of which a feature 
was the insistence on English as the medium of instruction. 
 
In those pre-war years it seemed that the Island people would remain in the islands and that too 
much education would be unsettling. Few foresaw the effects of the Second World War with rapid 
technological development, increased travel, mobility and political unrest. The war had an 
important bearing on subsequent development. It occasioned an outburst of nationalism in 
Western Samoa which served to focus the attention of the New Zealand Government under Prime 
Minister, Peter Fraser, on its responsibilities in the islands it administered. From this acceptance of 
responsibility emerged a comprehensive report on education, prepared by Dr C.E. Beeby, 
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Director-General of Education, which set the pattern leading up to self-government.3 Significant 
effects of that report were the establishment of a special section of the Department of Education to 
be responsible for Islands' education, the reintroduction of vernacular in the early years of 
schooling, a more culturally based curriculum, the establishment of secondary schools and teacher 
training and the reintroduction of a Scholarship Training Scheme which had been interrupted by 
the war. The stated aim of education was to enable the people to create a spirit of self-help and 
self-reliance, to work towards their own social and economic betterment. 
 
While scholarship training in New Zealand began immediately, it was not until the mid 1950's that 
secondary schools were established in the Cook Islands (Tereora College) and in Niue (Niue High 
School). The policy for these secondary schools was to provide a sound education for selected 
primary pupils, to supply skilled administrators, teachers and professional people to serve the 
countries' needs. This could never be successful as it was not in a closed society; anyone could 
migrate to New Zealand at any time. The later provision in the Cook Islands of Junior High 
Schools on outer islands, with more practical curricula, before long became victims of their own 
development. Parents, under self-government, wanted equal opportunity for their children and 
demanded courses leading to New Zealand School Certificate, refusal of which by the government 
would be political suicide. 
 
Niue, being one island, at first attempted to have the more able students at the High School and to 
run practical courses for the less able in the upper primary classes. These courses, in the main, 
were of low quality and uninteresting. Parental pressure and the economies of scale resulted, in the 
early 1970's in consolidation of all pupils of Form I and above at the High School, where a wider 
variety of better quality courses could be supplied. 
 
Tokelau is a special case. Its education system was largely neglected and run under the Western 
Samoan Department of Education until the 1960's. The three atolls were the subject of infrequent 
visits by officials. A few brighter students were brought out for further education in Samoa. 
Standards in Tokelau schools were very low, being a little higher in the Catholic mission school 
on Nukunono. It was not until 1969 that three New Zealand teaching couples, as Education 
Officers, were sent to the three atoll schools with the object of up grading education in view of the 
New Zealand Government's plan to resettle Tokelauans in New Zealand. New schools were built 
and very well supplied with equipment, teaching materials and libraries. The brief given the 
advisory teachers was to strengthen and develop the education system including pre school and 
adult education. There was a marked improvement in standards. Regular in service training for 
teachers in New Zealand and in Fiji helped to further raise teacher quality though many of the 
older teachers found difficulty with English language, science, mathematics and social studies. 
 
The reversal of New Zealand Government policy to resettle the people in New Zealand led to a 
change of education policy. The Education Officers were asked to develop syllabuses with strong, 
atoll orientation while containing a basis which could be applied in New Zealand for those who 
moved. Extension of schooling and the enforcement of the school leaving age of fifteen created 
some problems in atoll life. Many of the working-age group of men had left for New Zealand and 
older school pupils, an important part of the work force, were now taken out of it by being in 
school. 
 
Because of the distance apart and people's wishes, it was necessary to triplicate the education 
services. In 1976 the Tokelau Administration decided to phase out New Zealand teachers, who had 
 - 362 -
a high profile and living standard. There followed a marked reduction in educational standards 
especially in such practical subjects as woodwork and home economics as well as in English 
language. In an attempt to regain standards but without a constant presence, it was decided in 1980 
to appoint a New Zealand teacher as an adviser who would regu-larly travel around the atolls, 
staying on each one for several months. 
 
Assistance to the then Gilbert and Ellice Islands began in the 1950's in response to a request for an 
experienced primary teacher to serve as Chief Inspector of primary schools. This led to the 
appointment of a New Zealand teacher to run the small, English speaking primary school for 
expatriate children and then later to several positions in the newly established primary teachers' 
college. Through the teachers, substantial quantities of New Zealand school journals and other 
school publications were provided. New Zealand's assistance was not by financial aid but by 
assistance in the recruitment of a few teachers who made a strong, professional input to primary 
education and teacher training. 
 
During these years private students, sponsored by missions and by the Gilbert and Ellice 
Administration, studied in New Zealand particularly at St Andrew's College and Ardmore 
Teachers' College. They numbered as many as thirty by 1970. The provision locally of more 
senior school education and the development of the University of the South Pacific, reduced the 
demand although some parents still wished their children to study privately in New Zealand. 
 
With the partition of the colony into Kiribati and Tuvalu and the coming of independence, one of 
the major problems of education in island mini states became apparent. Key educational services 
had been heavily concentrated on Tarawa atoll in what is now Kiribati. These included the 
Education Department, inspectors, advisory services, school supplies distribution, the government 
secondary school and the teachers' college. A new infrastructure had to be created for Tuvalu 
including the up-grading by government of the mission secondary school on Vaitupu. 
 
Localisation, increased British aid and British teachers and the use of overseas volunteers reduced 
the demand for New Zealand contract teachers which at no stage had numbered more than eight. 
 
 
15.2   New Zealand's Present Educational Assistance 
 
This is broad in scope as the policy is to respond to requests for assistance by the countries 
concerned. New Zealand is uniquely placed because of its small nature and multi-cultural society, 
to provide a wide range of educational consultancy. The volume is constrained by the finances 
available under Government Aid policy. 
 
 
15.3  Teachers 
 
Some thirty teachers are currently serving, the majority being in the Cook Islands (Table 15.1). 
The pattern of teacher supply has changed through a self-generating development. As primary 
teaching standards improved, more children reached the level of secondary education. With 
primary schools now being staffed by indigenous teachers, most New Zealand teachers are 
working at secondary, tertiary and advisory levels (Table 15.2). Those working in secondary 
(Cook Islands and Niue) are mainly in senior secondary (New Zealand School Certificate and 
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University Entrance) and in science, mathematics and accountancy. Few of the returning teacher 
trainees are qualified in these subjects which they seem to find unpopular in common with 
teachers from the non-Asian developing countries. There seems no likelihood of substantial 
localisation here for many years and it is estimated that the number of New Zealand teachers may 
not fall below fifteen. 
 
There is still a critical situation in teacher supply at all levels. The tendency is for the best Cook 
Island primary teachers to be posted to lower secondary classes thus denuding the primary schools 
with a consequent lowering of primary achievement. Also many students trained as teachers are 
lured into other government jobs as these can be more financially rewarding. Teacher training and 
retraining is essential for educational development as the achievement of quality in education is 
associated with the quality and training of teachers within the system. Their prior scholastic level 
and entry qualifications, the length and nature of their training, all influence their teaching 
competence, confidence and receptivity to innovation and change. 
 
In the countries under study, as well as low material prestige in teaching, there is the factor of 
negative selection. This, coupled with the relatively small number of school students gaining 
School Certificate or University Entrance means that, when other more popular training awards 
are taken up, there are few well-qualified students available for teachers' college. The result is that 
much of the teacher training is simply an extension of secondary school courses. While making 
available School Certificate and University Entrance studies to teacher training institutions, New 
Zealand is consciously encouraging use of University of the South Pacific courses. 
 
TABLE 15.1 
 
 
Numbers of New Zealand Teachers on Government to Government Contracts 
 
 
 1941 1949 1957 1967 1970 1975 1977 1980 1984 
          
Cook Islands 6 13 18 36 36 33 28 28 22
          
Niue 1 2 4 19 16 15 11 8 6
          
Tokelau - - - - 6 6 - 1 2
          
Kiribati - - 2 2 3 8 2 2 - 
          
Tuvalu - - - - - - - 1 - 
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TABLE 15.2 
 
 
Numbers of New Zealand Teachers at Various Levels (1984) 
 
 
 Primary Secondary Tertiary Advisers & 
Curriculum 
Cook Islands  
- 
20 - 2 
Niue - 6 - - 
Tokelau - - - 2 
     
 
The tables do not reveal the true situation as there are some non-Island teachers directly employed 
as well as volunteer teachers from New Zealand, Australia and Britain. There are a number of 
missionary teachers also. In the Cook Islands in 1980 for example, such teachers numbered 26, 
almost equal to the New Zealand contract teachers. Overseas teachers represented 25% of the total 
200 secondary teachers.4 
 
 
15.4  Curriculum 
 
New Zealand teachers and curriculum specialists have been assisting in the Cook Islands, Niue 
and Tokelau for many years helping to produce structured curricula and teaching materials. A 
large volume has been produced, constantly changing in emphasis to reflect general policy, 
educational advances and local desires. Counterpart use has featured prominently but with limited 
ongoing success as too often the achievement of the counterpart has led to promotion out of the 
curriculum field. Indirectly, New Zealand is also assisting curriculum development through its 
support for the University of the South Pacific, the South Pacific Commission and United Nations 
Curriculum Programme, the New Zealand approach being to encourage local needs, ideas and 
materials in curriculum development. There has probably been some misapprehension about this 
in the past both on the part of the specialists provided and of outside critics. It is clear that what is 
studied needs to be "relevant' for the immediate future and provide a skill base for learning for the 
future. It also needs to be specific to individuals and their possible futures and it is neither easy nor 
desirable to select these people at an early age. New Zealand believes, as it has done even prior to 
the Beeby report implemented in 1946, in a broad, culturally based curriculum. This includes, not 
only core subjects such as vernacular, English, mathematics, science, social science, physical 
education, arts and crafts but also agricultural and technical subjects. 
 
Curriculum assistance in the "practical' areas includes technical subjects and home economics in 
the Cook Island secondary schools, Niue High School, the Tokelau schools, locally based multi-
craft centres on the islands of Tuvalu and previously with the Marine Training School in Kiribati. 
Historically, as with agriculture, the success of the courses has waxed and waned with teacher 
expertise and motivation. Current aid in formal agricultural education is largely through support 
for teacher education at Alafua College in Western Samoa. 
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Language, together with social science, presents the most sensitive curriculum area. There appears 
to be an erosion of the vernacular in the countries concerned due to the absence of a clear language 
policy and the vernacular not being an examination subject except in the Cook Islands School 
Certificate. While concerned at having a vernacular support policy, so that English language 
teaching does not erode the vernacular and therefore be seen as an aid disadvantage, New Zealand 
recognises an interest and responsibility in the teaching of English. It is the language of 
commerce, senior school education and of everyday life for those who come to live here. 
 
The Tate Oral English programme was originally designed and prepared by New Zealand for the 
Cook Islands and Niue and is now widespread in the Pacific. New Zealand provides school 
journals and other printed English materials and, through teachers, assists with many local 
programmes. New Zealand has much to offer in the field of language teaching and many 
techniques developed here or by New Zealand teachers working in the Pacific, are in use. The Tate 
Oral English series, designed for teachers whose own grasp on the language is insecure, has 
greatly contributed to the teaching of English but it has, at the same time, narrowed the thinking 
and techniques of many teachers and does not greatly help with reading. Many are of the view that 
it has outlived its usefulness, having been superseded by current methodology. It is, however, still 
widely used in the absence of a suitable replacement which would itself require an integrated 
programme of in-service training. New Zealand is assisting with reading programmes capable of 
supplementing Tate based on book flood, shared book approach, graded reading and story writing. 
At the secondary level the provision of Pacific based alternative papers in English at School 
Certificate and University Entrance levels has been of major importance. 
 
Localisation of teachers over recent years has withdrawn native English speakers as models and as 
travelling advisers, resulting in a marked decline of primary school pupils' English. The products 
of these schools, some illiterate in both English and the vernacular, appear in the secondary 
schools and the amount of remedial work required to raise their standard is much too great. New 
Zealand is providing books, in service training for teachers at such places as the English Language 
Institute in Wellington and Distance Education courses in an effort to assist in raising standards of 
English. 
 
 
15.5  Examinations and Assessment 
 
The chief area of assistance here is the provision of New Zealand School Certificate and New 
Zealand University Entrance examinations. The schools concerned are sent new information and 
receive annual, advisory visits by officers of the New Zealand Department of Education. As a 
result of growing dialogue between New Zealand and the South Pacific countries in the early 
1970's on unsatisfactory aspects of the School Certificate examinations, the prescriptions have 
been made more relevant to the Pacific Islands candidates by the development of South Pacific 
Option prescriptions and papers in English, mathematics, science, history and geography 
beginning in 1976. The same has taken place for University Entrance English. Other areas of 
assistance include aid and advice on evaluation and assessment procedures and training of 
personnel. For example the Cook Islands has developed its own lower Form 5 School Certificate 
for internal use. It is hoped that this, as with other Pacific Island "national' examinations, might 
eventually be incorporated into the validating function of the South Pacific Board for Educational 
Assessment, a body which New Zealand had a large influence in establishing, in the expectation 
that it would enable Pacific countries to disengage from reliance on New Zealand examinations. 
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There seems little prospect of this happening in the Cook Islands or Niue where the New Zealand 
"ticket' is a sought after job qualification within New Zealand. Ironically, the provision of School 
Certificate South Pacific Options rather than causing disengagement, led to Kiribati and Tuvalu 
taking up the New Zealand examination. A recent development has been the participation of 
personnel from the South Pacific states as counterparts in the advisory visits to schools with the 
prospect of a diminishing role for officers of the New Zealand Department of Education. 
 
 
15.6 Libraries and School Publications 
 
Advice on setting up school libraries and public libraries together with funds for book purchase 
have been provided on request to all countries concerned. The school libraries in Tokelau and at 
Niue and Cook Island secondary schools were previously very well stocked and maintained. With 
local allocation of funds less is being spent on these libraries. The administering authorities, 
including those in Tuvalu and Kiribati, receive New Zealand school publications, journals, 
bulletins and resource material on a regular basis. Recent research,5 has reinforced the importance 
of providing a wealth of reading material for developing literacy and language facility. Support 
has been given to local writers to produce culture based material in the vernacular. 
 
  
15.7  Distance Education 
 
The New Zealand Correspondence School, the Technical Correspondence Institute and Massey 
University make study courses available where such courses cannot be locally provided. Often this 
takes the form of supplementing senior school, teachers' college or teachers' courses. The studies 
are provided on request and with the approval of the local Department of Education. New Zealand 
support for the University of the South Pacific helps the expansion and use of that University's 
Extension services including the PEACESAT operation. 
 
 
15.8  Teacher Training 
 
New Zealand encourages and supports local teacher training except in Tokelau where, because of 
its small size, training has been sponsored in Western Samoa, the Cook Islands or in New Zealand. 
In-service training in Tokelau is actively encouraged. A decline in the annual need for primary 
teachers resulting from declining school rolls has led, however, to the suspension of teacher 
training in the Cook Islands. New Zealand programmes are likely to be used for the small number 
of teachers required from time to time. 
 
In service courses are essential for teachers and particularly those in isolated schools. General 
courses, or specific ones, such as a six-month English language course for Tokelauans are run 
from time to time in technical institutes in New Zealand. Increasingly, funds and encouragement 
are being given for courses in third country institutions such as the University of the South Pacific 
or the South Pacific Training Centre in Suva. Short to medium term ad hoc courses have been 
arranged in New Zealand from time to time in recognition of particular training needs. 
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15.9  Technical Education 
 
This has long been a thorny problem and has been supported in one way or another for fifty years 
in the Cook Islands and Niue, for twenty years in Tokelau and more recently in Tuvalu. Whether it 
has succeeded or failed has depended on teacher expertise, the adequacy and maintenance of 
workshop, kitchen and garden facilities, supplies of materials, the appropriateness of syllabuses, 
and subject popularity. Because of the high cost involved, it is vital for both New Zealand and the 
countries concerned to monitor such projects carefully. 
 
In home economics strong support is given locally and to courses held at the South Pacific 
Commission Centre and, in agriculture, to teacher training at Alafua College. It is important to 
realise that, in fields such as electrical and automotive maintenance, standards need to be as high 
as those in New Zealand. Electrical appliances, cars, motor cycles and outboard motors are the 
same as in New Zealand. 
 
During the last three years New Zealand has provided technical assistance through ILO for the 
setting up of multi-craft centres in Tuvalu. These show some promise and are being looked at as a 
possible model for Tokelau and the Cook Islands. 
 
 
15.10 Scholarships 
 
Provision for education and training at all levels in these countries is made under various 
government scholarship schemes. Some of this training is in New Zealand and some in third 
country institutions such as the University of the South Pacific. 
 
The aim of these schemes has always been to provide a pool of trained people who could take over 
the running of their country and develop it in accordance with the wishes of the people. It has had 
mixed success because, being New Zealand citizens, many of the "scholarshippers' failed to return 
home or, if they did, remained for a short period. Such schemes have operated since 1946 for the 
Cook Islands and Niue but only since 1963 for Tokelau. The Tokelau scheme has not been notably 
successful partly because of low primary standards in Tokelau, the intense culture shock 
experienced by young Tokelauans on arriving in New Zealand and no compulsion for them to 
return to Tokelau after training. 
 
There are also a number of students studying privately in New Zealand. 
 
15.11  University of the South Pacific 
 
New Zealand has strongly supported the university since its inception as the major institution for 
tertiary education in the region. Its establishment in 1968 has made possible higher level education 
in a South Pacific setting and cultural environment, minimising the alienation and manpower loss 
that is often associated with prolonged study in a metropolitan country. While located on two main 
campuses, in Suva and Apia, the university has an established presence throughout the region with 
Extension Centres in almost all countries underpinning university activities there, particularly 
distance education by correspondence and satellite communication. University institutes act as 
agencies for in service training and consultancy work and New Zealand has placed strong 
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emphasis on the use of aid to fund in-country projects through the university's Institute of 
Education in particular. 
 
It has always been recognised that the university would not be able to satisfy fully the higher 
education needs in the region. This applies particularly to the more highly specialised courses for 
which study in New Zealand or elsewhere has remained necessary. More recently it has become 
evident that, despite the university's range of sub-degree, as well as degree courses, and its wish to 
be flexible and responsive, priorities in the region do not always coincide and there is an 
increasing tendency to consider establishing national institutions for lower and middle tertiary 
training. The university, nevertheless, remains a key resource in South Pacific education and New 
Zealand continues to support it by ways of buildings, maintenance, staff assistance and 
secondment and supply of books and equipment. 
 
 
15.12  Special Forms of Education 
 
Hearing surveys and training of teachers of the deaf have been provided for the Cook Islands. This 
is a classic case of the problem of training and subsequently retaining specialists. Hearing surveys 
revealed the need for specialist teaching in this field in the Cook Islands. Two Islanders were 
trained in New Zealand but on their return to the Cook Islands both were shortly promoted leaving 
the situation in schools as it was before the training. 
 
Involvement with pre-school facilities in Tokelau, Cook Islands, Tuvalu and Kiribati has been 
quite successful. It has focused on the community and family base which is so strong in Pacific 
societies. 
 
15.13   Future Aim of Education Aid Policy 
 
It is difficult to foresee how the people of these mini-states will adjust to the resource base they 
are developing and to their relationships with other countries in the region. What is clear is that 
New Zealand is committed to continuing to take part in that future in a supportive and interactive 
role. It is a part of the region geographically and politically. This has been emphasised by the 
recent establishment of a Ministry of Pacific Affairs in the New Zealand cabinet. In the city of 
Auckland there is the largest concentration of Polynesian people in the South Pacific. Further, this 
identity is increasing and by the year 2000, one in four of the population under twenty years of age 
will be non-European. For this reason alone, leaving aside the question of aid, New Zealand 
should welcome the opportunity for its teachers and other educationists to work in the Pacific. It 
has two-way benefits: they can assist technically; can be forced to do some basic educational 
rethinking; can, if carefully chosen and briefed, act as ambassadors; and, on return, have much to 
contribute to the New Zealand system to supplement the support given to the education of Pacific 
Islanders through such institutions as the Pacific Islanders' Educational Resources Centre and the 
Wellington Multi cultural Educational Resource Centre. 
 
There appears to be no reason why the New Zealand education policy should differ greatly in 
principle from that at present. That is, its role is to act in a responsive way providing the kind of 
educational services and advice already outlined but within the limits of finance and resources 
available. The underlying aim should be gradual disengagement where possible by strengthening 
the internal resources. In this respect, it is important to work closely with other aid donors to avoid 
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conflict and duplication and in order that education and training can reinforce other aid 
development projects. 
 
Whatever legacy has been left in education by former "colonial' powers, the states themselves now 
need to find the answers to their own salvation in terms of the hopes, aspirations and fears of their 
societies. In order to respond helpfully and intelligently we need to ask a number of fundamental 
questions. Some of these are not educa-tion questions as such; they are questions of policy arising 
out of the political, social and economic needs of society. They are questions such as the matter of 
migration which education alone cannot solve. 
 
In the mini states concerned there are two separate issues. At present the people of Kiribati and 
Tuvalu do not have an emigration outlet and education can be directed towards internal 
development. Cook Islanders, Niueans and Tokelauans, being New Zealanders, must have an 
education which assists with local development as well as with living in New Zealand. There is no 
ignoring this. Education per se cannot prevent migration   its answer lies in economic development 
and social excitement. Life on a small, isolated island can be limiting. One must start from the 
premise that, given the preference of rural youth, the terms of trade are weighted in favour of 
urban Rarotonga or Auckland. Any attempt to deal with this problem must begin with efforts to 
shift these terms of trade in favour of the rural, small islands and not simply with attempts to 
provide a rural or technical curriculum. Young people are leaving the rural areas not because they 
don't know enough about farming and rural life but because they know too much and they do not 
like what they see: low and fluctuating returns, inequitable profit sharing, produce rotting through 
lack of shipping and land tenure difficulties. The whole process of development works against 
retention of rural youth. The media, radio, films, advertising, the lure of exciting places with better 
transport systems and the presence of tourists with their obviously different life style, make the 
young curious and dissatisfied. 
 
Tokelau presents a special problem. There is obviously something wrong with the education 
system. It is reflected in the low achievement at secondary level. Able students brought to New 
Zealand at substantial cost for secondary education have a very low success rate and hence profit 
little from their educational experience. The quality of teaching in Tokelau schools reduces 
through the class levels as subject matter becomes wider and deeper than the teachers can handle. 
English language is hampered through having no native English speakers. It is likely that the older 
the scholarship children are, the further behind their peers they will be on entering New Zealand 
schools and the greater the culture shock. One has only to fly in at night over the fairyland of 
lights that is Auckland beside some wide-eyed young Tokelauans in their leis and Sunday-best to 
realise the effect of culture shock. The reality down there is hard and competitive, the more so at 
higher class levels. 
 
The second fundamental question relates to the kind of education to serve these purposes. This 
topic will continue to dominate educational planning but should become less emotional and more 
practical in discussion. What curriculum and what study materials within it can adequately prepare 
island pupils to develop their own resources, to maintain their ethnic identity, to cope with 
increasing westernisation and if necessary to live comfortably and productively in a metropolitan 
country? What skills and knowledge do students need and how can these be efficiently taught? 
 
The curriculum should be broad based, related to and meaningful in the environment. It should be 
rooted in local traditions but giving a reasoned pathway to other choices and visions. New Zealand 
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should continue to assist in the curriculum support areas, particularly by providing training of 
personnel in writing materials, in illustration, photography and in printing. Continued assistance 
should be given in the assessment field which does more than anything else to reinforce a new 
curriculum. This should aim at developing national assessment standards which have international 
portability. From New Zealand's point of view, while there seems to be no likelihood of a 
reduction in migration to New Zealand, aid should go to ensuring that local, national, paper 
qualifications are recognised in this country and not represent wasted years of education. 
 
In all the mini states, as has already been noted, there is a shortage of teachers of science, 
mathematics and English. The last is easily understood. Each of the states has its own, strong 
mono-vernacular, widely, perhaps solely, used in village and home. There is no need for a lingua 
franca except with the outside world and in the remote islands this rarely happens. English is an 
artificial and difficult language in isolation. The official argument about bi-lingualism continues 
but without firm directions. New Zealand should expand its help in English teaching and 
associated English langauge publications and research and at the same time contribute what it can 
in the field of language teaching. 
 
The continued shortage of indigenous science and mathematics teachers is a source of concern. 
The reasons are complex. Because of the shortage, localisation, at primary and junior secondary 
level has resulted in science particularly, being neglected. There is a tendency for little or no 
practical work to be done although this is undergoing change as awareness of appropriate curricula 
becomes more established. Science concepts, particularly in physical science, are difficult to 
achieve in a limited technological environment where sound science knowledge and imagination 
are required to create, explain and discover. Students graduating to upper secondary and tertiary 
education face a massive backlog with which few can cope. Those who do, find encouragement 
and reward in fields other than teaching. Their skills are in strong demand in economic 
development areas. Much effort has gone into attempts to strengthen science teaching, with 
national courses, UNDP programmes, bilateral specialists and New Zealand funding of University 
of South Pacific science curriculum projects such as the one in Tonga. Still there is little reduction 
in the demand for overseas teachers. Faced with this demand and the likelihood of its continuing, 
New Zealand might well fund research into the problem of science motivation and learning. It 
might also fund science teacher training awards along with every science teacher requested, but, as 
earlier pointed out, it is unlikely that there will be many suitably qualified trainees. 
 
A feature of educational management in the mini-states has been a lack of continuity in personnel. 
This is aggravated by New Zealand teachers supplied on short term contracts. As a result the 
"wheel' has been reinvented many times and curriculum methods and materials evolved from the 
view of individuals, often with a strong New Zealand flavour. There is insufficient supervision of 
new curriculum material. In the Cook Islands, until recently, newly developed syllabuses were 
introduced to schools without requiring Ministerial approval. Fortunately curriculum committees 
now reduce the dangers of the individual approach and practising teachers are increasingly 
involved. A lack of continuity in management, also means a short official "memory', with the 
possibility of repetition of past mistakes. New Zealand has a greater official continuity both in 
personnel and on file. In making aid available it could well be less responsive to projects which 
earlier experience had proved ineffective or even wasteful. 
 
Future aid policy should be flexible because education, while having repetitive needs, such as 
teaching training, is constantly changing as it develops. In the immediate future, New Zealand's 
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aid would seem most useful in the provision of teachers and specialists in English, science and 
mathematics; scholarship training programmes; teacher training including technical; curriculum 
and resource development; training in educational management and the teaching of English; non 
formal education. Some consideration could be given to greater input at the primary level of 
schooling which has been neglected with resultant literacy problems. 
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CHAPTER SIXTEEN 
 
AID IN DEVELOPMENT 
 
 
16.1   Aid in the South Pacific 
 
Aid or “development assistance” in the South Pacific is merely a carry- over of policies designed by 
the industrialised countries for their former colonies and Third World countries. The Marshall Plan in 
Europe and later the Alliance for Progress in Latin America, init-iated the massive transfer of 
technology, capital investment and diffusionist approach that underlie most conventional aid policies. 
In the 1950s, aid became closely associated with the decolonisation pro-cess, the working out of the 
first national income accounts, intensified planning as many colonies in Africa and Asia moved 
towards independence, and independence settlements. The loans granted by the British Colonial 
Development and Welfare Corporation, for example, and the N.Z. Citrus Replanting Scheme in the 
Cook Islands from the 1940s, illustrate both attempts to foster autonomous development and a belief in 
the efficacy of public-sector-led development for the ex-colonies. In the era of post-World War II 
optimism, it was believed that poverty could be banished from the face of the earth in a decade or so, 
that the “emergent countries” really were emerging from poverty and traditionalism, and the hopes of 
the new “modernisation” school were encouraged by the “New Frontiers” psychology1 and the 
“Development Decade” decreed by United Nations organisations. To the many new aid “experts”, 
international bureaucrats and technocrats, the South Pacific islands did not appear as unique or 
distinctive societies, set in a vast, empty ocean, requiring original or appropriate policies. Instead the 
psychology, goals and methods devised for large land masses or large ex-colonies were merely 
extended uncritically to the South Pacific. Old Africa hands applied African models to the Solomons 
and Kiribati. 
 
By the 1960s aid had been thoroughly accepted and institutionalised, so that one could talk of an aid 
industry, an aid bureaucracy operating in the South Pacific with conventionalised procedures, an 
autonomous existence and a powerful momentum of its own. Its assumptions and approaches soon 
became entrenched, creating a great new orthodoxy. New Zealand too runs the risk of institutionalising 
its aid, so that its approaches become entrenched and conventional and the advantages of flexibility and 
fresh thinking are lost. 
 
 
16.2   The Objectives of Policy 
 
Three main actors are involved in the South Pacific in the region covered by this study: the New 
Zealand Government (with its constituent departments, public opinion, and taxpayers), the recipient 
governments, and the aid industry and international organisations. Each of these has vested interests 
and their access to resources determines the degree of leverage that can be exerted. With respect to 
New Zealand, the dominant concerns would appear to be historical obligations, order and stability in 
the South Pacific and the maintenance of friendly relations with New Zealand (see Chapter 1 and 
section 16.3 below). If these conditions prevail, strategic considerations are taken care of, and New 
Zealand's responsibilities in the Pacific under the Western alliance in a wider sense are met. However, 
the best way of ensuring that stability and security are achieved is to support living standards in the 
islands. Even although many funds committed to the region as “development” or “capital aid” may not 
achieve that effect and may meet other purposes (especially for the Cook Islands, Niue and Tokelau) 
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the injection of these funds is important (indeed vital) for maintaining stability and friendly relations. If 
they were to fall much below their current level, at least in the Cook Islands and Niue, there would be a 
great increase in the level of out-migration. Living standards would fall, instability would probably 
ensue and relations with New Zealand would probably be severely strained. 
 
The primary objective of New Zealand's foreign policy as a whole is to promote trade and New 
Zealand exports and this consideration with successive governments has taken precedence over issues 
of aid. For the South Pacific as a whole a good deal of success has been achieved for this primary 
concern, for New Zealand exports to the new island states of the region have grown rapidly in the 
1970s and in 1983 comprised about 4 percent of New Zealand's total exports2. This rapid export 
growth is part of a broader fundamental policy shift in New Zealand's trade and external relations 
generally. We have now moved drastically away from the situation of 1948 when the United Kingdom 
and other European markets took 85 percent of our total exports. In 1980 they bought only 26 percent 
of our goods and countries within the Pacific Basin as a whole received over 60 percent3. Furthermore 
since the late 1960s countries outside the OECD group have increased their share of New Zealand's 
exports from just over 10 percent to nearly 33 percent. While the bulk of our trade is still to countries 
who in the main are part of the “rich, white club” of nations there has been a rapid growth in the 
proportion going to newly industrialising countries and poor countries, especially in the Pacific Basin 
as a whole. These fundamental shifts in trade patterns and concern over overseas markets have been 
emphasised by our growing foreign exchange crisis and the concern of political leaders for a new 
“Bretton Woods” conference and for worldwide action to deal with the debt crisis. New Zealand 
policies to the South Pacific could not remain unaffected by these broader issues and concerns. Thus 
the further expansion of New Zealand exports in the South Pacific countries will involve further 
penetration of these markets by New Zealand businesses. This is indeed consistent with a possible 
policy of integration, economically and politically. If the policy is to promote autonomous 
development of separate independent island states - even if this were realistic - serious (rather than 
token) efforts would have to be made to trade off the effects of New Zealand's expansionary export 
policies with aid policies designed to enhance local autonomy and self\-reliance. 
 
At the moment little effort appears to be made to reconcile the fundamental different effects of New 
Zealand policies or to work out detailed “trade offs” between them. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of 
course is used to “wearing several hats” and adroit in promoting or at least giving lip service to policies 
which in essence are quite incompatible and to papering over the chasm that divides them. The rhetoric 
on aid tends to lead many people and worthy voluntary groups in the community to believe that our 
official development assistance is promoting autonomous development in the South Pacific. While that 
aid meets other worthy needs, the effect of our primary policies - on exporting - and more importantly 
the trend in the macro-economy of the aid- and remittance-led South Pacific region as a whole - is 
increasingly to weaken that autonomy and to integrate them ever more closely into the mainland 
economies. (Thus the rapid expansion of Papua New Guinea imports of cheap New Zealand fish in 
recent years has benefited New Zealand exporters, but undermined a potentially valuable local import-
substituting industry in Papua New Guinea, utilising the rich local fish resources4). 
 
Clear perceptions are needed of New Zealand's different policies, and of their differential effects in 
each separate island economy. If any aid policy is currently geared to enhance autonomous 
development (which really is achievable in Papua New Guinea, perhaps the Solomons, Fiji and 
possibly some other economies) it needs to be seriously considered whether this is still realistic. If so, 
trade-offs or reconcilations need to be worked out wherever practicable, and island governments need 
to be fully informed of the contradictory effects of our policies. It is not sufficient to assert merely that 
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we are providing $12 million in total aid to the Cook Islands: New Zealand firms are receiving in 
exports about $17.8 million per year (and importing $5.5 million). Such a step, of removing pretence 
from the whole business of aid, would be to accord the other important actors in the South Pacific - the 
island governments - their proper role in the region. 
 
16.3   The Size and Distribution of New Zealand Aid 
 
In 1983-84, New Zealand's total bilateral aid totalled $58 million. In addition, multilateral aid, which is 
normally 24-30 percent of our total aid totalled $11.4 million. However, as many commentators have 
noted, New Zealand's performance as an aid donor is rather modest for an affluent nation. Aid has 
always been well below the target of 0.7 percent of GNP endorsed in 1970 and recently it has fallen to 
only 0.28 in 1982. This fall parallels the decline in the rate of growth of the New Zealand economy in 
the recession of the last decade and the loss of the comparative economic advantage that the country 
formerly enjoyed. There is fortunately a great fund of sympathy in New Zealand for doing a great deal 
more for some of the chronically poor or starving countries of this world. Aid in this area, to be 
effective, depends on the communication system, and the actual delivery system   for aid must really be 
accessible to those in need (see section 16.18). 
 
In Table 16.1 New Zealand's bilateral aid expenditure is shown for the period 1975-76 to 1982-83. The 
period marks of course the end of New Zealand's involvement militarily in Vietnam and the 
considerable importance of Southeast, East and South Asia in our foreign policy in the 1960s and early 
1970s, and the growing relative importance since then of the South Pacific. Thus in 1975-76, 40 
percent of our bilateral aid was spent in South and Southeast Asia and about 56 percent in the South 
Pacific. Since then the proportion spent in our own neighbourhood has steadily grown, as the aid total 
in real terms has not expanded, reaching about 75 percent (including emergency and disaster relief) in 
1980-81, and nearly 77 percent in 1982-83. Accordingly the proportion spent in South and Southeast 
Asia has declined to only 21 percent in 1982-83. 
 
The pattern of aid spending then reinforces the view that New Zealand, as a Pacific power, is vitally 
concerned with economic and social conditions, with its obligations, and with stability, in the small 
nations of the South Pacific. Nor does the widely held view, that aid is a response to poverty and 
deprivation in the undeveloped nations of the Third World, receive much support from the data 
presented in the table. Throughout the last decade only about 2.5 percent of New Zealand's bilateral aid 
has gone to such poor countries of the Third World outside the South and Southeast Asia5 and South 
Pacific regions (mostly to two countries in East Africa and to Peru in Latin America). And virtually all 
the countries of the South Pacific receiving collectively three quarters of New Zealand aid are 
characterised by subsistence affluence and by GNP per capita figures which place them in many 
cases6, above the usual category of poor nations of the world. In stating this, however, one does not 
imply that these countries do not need, indeed do not require “aid”.  They do indeed need financial 
subsidies or support to maintain existing living standards and to preserve stability, rather than to 
“overcome poverty” or “backwardness”.  The existence of the Emergency and Distress Relief Fund, 
though small, recognises the need for New Zealand to assist countries (usually in the South Pacific or 
Asia) which periodically suffer disasters caused by natural hazards. 
 NZ Budgetary Support Data $000 
 March Year Cooks Niue Tokelau Total 
1977 3,700 2,696 752 7,148 
1978 3,350 2,764 900 7.014 
1979 3,450 3,582 1,300 8,332 
1980 3,400 2,462 1,350 7,212 
1981 5,700 3,181 1,605 10,486 
1982 5,840 3,870 1,822 11,532 
1983 7,060 3,550 2,100 12,710 
1984 8,376 3,720 2,431 14,527 
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TABLE 16.1 
NEW ZEALAND'S BILATERAL AID EXPENDITURE 1975-1976 TO 1982-1983 
($ 000) 
  1975-76 1976-77 1977-78 1978-79 1979-80 1980-81 1981-82 1982-83 
  $000 
% of 
total 
aid $000 
% of 
total 
aid $000 
% of 
total 
aid $000 
% of 
total 
aid $000 
% of 
total 
aid $000 
% of 
total 
aid $000 
% of 
total 
aid $000 
% of 
total 
aid 
Regional Programmes               
(i) South Pacific                 
     Cook Islands 62,081 18.1 5,900 15.9 6,168 15.8 5,919 14.3 6,732 15.7 9,050 20.2 8,362 17.3 9,880 17.9 
     Fiji 3,135 9.1 3,570 9.6 3,727 9.6 3,498 8.4 4,097 9.6 4,256 9.5 4,047 8.4 3,963 7.2 
     Gilbert Is2 71 0.2 101 0.3 300 0.8 165 0.4 268 0.6 284 0.6 256 0.5 541 0.9 
     New Hebrides 178 0.5 329 0.9 114 0.3 64 0.1 124 0.3 397 0.9 703 1.4 1,045 1.9 
     Niue 2,535 7.4 2,974 8 2,867 7.4 4119 9.9 3,127 7.3 3,310 7.4 4,887 10.1 5,906 10.7 
     PNG 1,110 3.2 1,732 4.7 2,196 5.6 2,571 6.2 2,667 6.2 2,955 6.6 2,436 5 2,696 4.9 
     Solomons 149 0.4 372 1 323 0.8 497 1.2 712 1.7 681 1.5 681 1.4 892 1.6 
     Tokelau 660 1.9 801 2.2 900 2.3 1,300 3.1 1,431 3.3 1,644 3.7 1,917 3.9 2,162 3.9 
     Tonga 830 2.4 1,721 4.6 1,916 4.9 2,452 5.9 2,792 6.5 2,707 6 2,689 5.6 3,593 6.5 
     Tuvalu3 26 0.06 45 0.1 180 0.4 194 0.4 361 0.7 545 1     
     W. Samoa 2,159 6.3 2,689 7.3 3,566 9.2 3,419 8.2 4,158 9.7 4,286 9.6 4,501 9.3 4,872 8.8 
     Regional 2,105 6.1 2,141 5.8 3,153 8.1 4,285 10.3 3,786 8.8 3,752 8.4 3,766 7.8 6,255 11.4 
 19,139 55.6 22,330 60.3 25,256 64.9 28,334 68.4 30,074 70.3 33,516 74.8 34,606 71.6 42,350 76.7 
(ii) S. & SE Asia 13,861 40.3 13,548 36.6 10,856 27.9 10,729 25.9 10,293 24.1 9,160 20.5 12,276 25.4 11,441 20.8 
(iii) Africa 595 1.7 458 1.2 463 1.2 598 1.4 1,094 2.5 1,271 2.8 390 0.8 30 0.05 
(iv)Latin America 406 1.2 401 1.1 363 0.9 385 0.9 331 0.8 404 0.9 374 0.8 180 0.3 
(v) Caribbean 54 0.16 104 0.3 145 0.4 215 0.5 125 0.3 110 0.2     
(vi) Other 8 0.02 82 0.2 34 0.08 21 0 15 0.01       
                 
TOTAL 34,063   36,923   37,117   40,282   41,932   44,461   47,670   54,001   
Emergency & 
Distress Relief 309 0.9 79 0.2 117 0.3 145 0.3 136 0.3 231 0.5 670 1.4 1,046 1.9 
Reserve 
ProjectsFund     1,694 4.3 1,010 2.4 709 1.6       
TOTAL 34,374  37,002  38,928  41,437  42,777  44,692  48,340  55,047  
Source: Estimates of Expenditure of the Government of New Zealand, AJHR, B7 Pt. 1 E. 
 
1 Includes 758,986 spent from C.I. Trust Account Funds. 
2 Includes Tuvalu until 1977-78. 
3 Included in Gilbert Islands as Gilbert and Ellice Islands until 1977-78. 
 
 
Within the list of South Pacific countries in Table 16.1 that receive such a high proportion of New 
Zealand's total aid, several countries are especially favoured. Of these, three of the five countries 
studied in this report receive relatively large amounts: thus the Cook Islands in the last 8 years has 
averaged 16.9 percent of New Zealand's total aid and in 1982-83 was almost 18 percent; Niue has 
averaged 8.5 percent of the total, reaching 10.7 percent in 1982-83, and Tokelau has taken an average 
of 3 percent, reaching 3.9 percent in 1982-83. The three countries together received a total of nearly 43 
percent of all New Zealand's bilateral aid. Moreover in the last few years as the squeeze on the aid 
budget has become tighter, these countries to which New Zealand feels she has special obligations and 
who share New Zealand citizenship, have received relatively more funds, and other countries 
proportionately less: in 1983-84 the three countries were allocated almost 41 percent of all aid. 
 
Furthermore, apart from the Regional vote, the other larger recipients of New Zealand aid in the South 
Pacific (Western Samoa, averaging 8.5 percent, Tonga 5.3 percent and Fiji 8.9 percent) are countries 
which have long had special associations with New Zealand (e.g. New Zealand was the trustee power 
to Western Samoa) and/or are located in the central South Pacific near New Zealand (e.g. Tonga). 
 
The table reveals that large countries in the region that are relatively “undeveloped” such as Papua 
New Guinea or some countries with distinctive and acute problems (such as Tuvalu, for example with 
transport, see Chapter 10) receive small volumes of aid from New Zealand. This is explained not by 
need but by historical factors and the sphere of influence that Australia and Britain have in the region. 
Such so-called anomalies indicate countries where Australia is the major donor and New Zealand 
accordingly is only a minor donor. In the case of Kiribati, Britain has been the principal donor, with 
New Zealand a distant third, behind Australia. However this may change after 1986, when Britain 
might withdraw. The table also shows that over the years there are only small changes in the volumes 
and proportions of total aid received by each country. Theoretically, if aid was designed to fulfil the 
function it is popularly supposed to perform, countries that performed especially well, development 
wise, overcoming their respective hurdles, could expect to receive thereafter a substantial diminution of 
aid, as they became more self reliant. Yet the relatively equal apportionment of aid year by year 
suggests that this is not the real concern (theoretically, it might be argued they were all performing 
equally well, or equally poorly). Clearly the most appropriate interpretation of the table is that New 
Zealand distributes its largesse among the countries of the South Pacific according to its own perceived 
vital interests in the region, its obligations and responsibilities in historical and political terms. And this 
pattern of distribution has a great deal to do with the security of the South Pacific and the sharing 
between Australia and New Zealand (Anzus partners with the United States) of spheres of influence 
within the South Pacific region to ensure that security and stability within the whole Western alliance 
is maintained. 
 
 
16.4   The Role of Aid in Island Economies 
 
It is important to gauge the role of aid in the island economies. Indeed many studies including the 
important SPAS (1980) study of agriculture and rural development have failed to recognise that the 
island states are basically aid- and remittance-led economies; accordingly since the basic diagnosis was 
wrong, the role of agriculture in the economy was mis-judged and the consequent policy 
recommendations are likely at best to be only partially correct and appropriate. 
 
 
TABLE 16.2 
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Official Development Assistance (ODA) to the Pacific, 1977-1979 
(in A$'000) 
 
Country 1977 total 
1978 
total 
1979 
total 
Bilatera
l 
Total 
per 
capita  
(A$) 
A. Samoa 40,520 27,913 27,913 27,913 903
Cook Islands 6,780 5,900 6,700 6,500 362
Fiji 19,070 22,500 27,900 23,100 45
Fr. Polynesia 72,690 78,800 128,500 128,500 889
Guam 13,132 85,739 85,739 85,729 857
Kiribati 4,410 9,300 8,000 7,900 140
Nauru 0 0 0 0 0
New Caledonia 66,630 100,100 132,700 132,200 955
New Hebrides1 11,350 16,300 34,000 33,700 297
Niue 2,970 3,700 4,400 4,300 1,222
Papua New Guinea 222,950 260,000 253,400 240,500 82
Solomon Islands 14,540 23,200 23,200 20,600 105
Tokelau 990 800 1,600 1,600 1,000
Tonga 5,070 8,400 21,000 18,200 219
TTPI 79,700 115,304 99,700 99,200 752
Tuvalu 2,080 2,200 4,000 3,700 541
Wallia & Futuna 3,230 2,200 6,900 6,900 676
Western Samoa 16,670 17,300 27,000 18,500 174
Regional 
Institutions/Projects .. 8,725 12,373 12,300 3
South Pacific Region 582,782 788,431 897,279 867,669 187
  
1 now Vanuatu 
 
Source:  SPC,  Statistical Summary 1979. 
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In Table 16.2 we present data on official development assistance in the Pacific in the period 1977-797, 
since recent comparative data are not available. At that date the average sum of official development 
assistance per head for the countries shown was A$187. Fiji, with only A$45 per head of its population 
was at that stage clearly the least externally assisted of the Pacific countries. Assistance to Papua New 
Guinea (mostly from Australia) amounted to A$82 per head. A group of countries (the Solomon 
Islands, Kiribati, Western Samoa and Tonga) were receiving roughly between A$100 and $200 per 
person, and two others (Cook Islands and Vanuatu or New Hebrides) were in the A$300 to A$400 
range. Above this lie a number of countries which receive over A$500 to A$1000 or more per person. 
In this category lie some of the smallest and most remote island groups and also significantly those 
territories which consciously are more integrated with large metropolitan countries (the United States 
and French Pacific territories) rather than being politically independent. The two with the highest per 
capita aid figures are Niue and Tokelau, whose inhabitants are New Zealand citizens. 
 
Government expenditure and external assistance in the Pacific is presented for 1979 in Table 16.3. 
Column 5 shows the ratio of official development assistance (ODA) to government expenditure (GE). 
Again, Fiji stands out as the most nearly self-supporting of the Pacific economies, with aid from all 
sources contributing about 11 percent of government expenditure. A significant number in 1979 had 
aid equivalent to 40-70 percent of government expenditure (Cook Islands, Papua New Guinea, New 
Caledonia, Guam, Kiribati, Nauru, Tonga, Solomon Islands, American Samoa). The remaining group 
(Wallis and Futuna, Trust Territories of Pacific Islands, Niue, Tokelau and Tuvalu) received very high 
sums of development assistance relative to government expenditure, a recognition of their extreme 
vulnerability. It is interesting to note that this latter group includes one “independent” country, Tuvalu. 
Such data suggests the hollowness of the independent status. 
 
The table does not include remittance data, which, while unknown for most of the countries shown, is 
likely to be high. Moreover it is likely that the proportion of official aid to government expenditure has 
grown in most of these countries since 1979. Even a large country like Papua New Guinea which 
possesses many resources has a high ODA/GE ratio. Thus, it can be asserted, of all 18 Pacific countries 
listed, only Fiji appears to escape from the mirab economy characteristics. 
 
 
16.5   The Scale of Aid 
 
In very small island states the scale of aid reaches a new dimension, dwarfing other sources of income. 
The relevant data on a per person basis are set out in Table 16.3. In early 1983 Kiribati was receiving 
about A$5.9 million in total aid or A$99 per capita, the Cook Islands approximately $13 million or 
$726 per capita, Tuvalu about A$8 million or A$1000 per capita. Niue was significantly more aid led, 
at around $2000 in round terms per person and the tiny Tokelau atolls received about $1800 per person. 
Small wonder that Tokelauans are beginning to take less interest in cutting copra, and the Tokelau 
Public Service is not greatly concerned with the relatively poor performance of the New Zealand Post 
Office in philatelic sales. As Professor Tony Hooper has remarked, if New Zealand were to find a rich 
donor, the figure on the same scale for New Zealand's population would total $5.4 billion! “There is in 
consequence no idea in Tokelauans' minds of development and no need for there to be; the situation for 
them is too good to be true in many ways8“.  In the light of this situation the action of the Fono in 
supplementing copra producers' earnings from the Community Services Levy on public servants' 
salaries, is to be commended. 
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TABLE 16.3 
 
Government Expenditure and External Assistance in the Pacific 
 
 
Country 
Population 
(mid-
1979) 
Govt 
expenditur
e 
Year 
ODA ($ 
per 
person) 
ODA/GE 
ratio 
American Samoa 31,400 1,373 1978 903 0.66
Cook Islands 18,500 803 79/80 362 0.45
Fiji 619,000 427 1979 45 0.11
Fr.Polynesia 144,600 2,777 1979 889 0.323
Guam 100,000 1,759 78/79 857 0.49
Kiribati 57,300 241 1979 140 0.58
Nauru 7,300 241 1979 140 0.58
NewCaledonia 139,000 1,877 1979 955 0.51
Niue 3,600 913 78/79 10,001 1.1
Papua New Guinea 2,944,000 180 1978 871 0.48
Solomon Islands 217,700 178 1979 105 0.59
Tokelau 1,600 885 79/80 1,000 1.13
Tonga 95,800 170 1978 881 0.52
TTPI 132,500 662 1977 6012 0.91
Tuvalu 7,400 253 1979 541 2.14
Vanuatu 114,500 445 1978 297 0.67
Wallis & Futuna 10,200 847 1979 676 0.8
Western Samoa 155,000 288 1978 111 0.38
 
 
1 1978 
2 1977 
3 Data from Table 13 suggest aid per person of A$1,439 and an ODA/GE ratio of 0.52. 
 
Sources:  SPC,  Statistical Summary 1979, Tables 3 and 12. 
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16.6   The Power of Aid 
 
We will now consider the third main actor on the South Pacific stage in the aid drama - international 
organisations. The massive nature of international aid programmes, the large sums of capital involved 
and the sophisticated, elite status of the foreign experts involved ensured the aid machine of great 
power9 and influence in the South Pacific countries. The frequent offer of free trips to overseas 
conferences and other perks, enables aid agencies to maintain their influence. We refer here, of course, 
to some of the larger, international aid agencies and not to New Zealand aid. It is to the credit of New 
Zealand that it has carefully avoided the elitist approaches, the excesses, and the ethnocentric 
preconceived assumptions of some of the international agencies. While the latter have done some 
valuable work, especially in training and curriculum development (by UNDP), and in various technical 
areas, perhaps their worst defect is their failure to adapt to local conditions, to humbly “learn the 
country” they happen to be operating in, and to understand the influence of the macro economy. 
 
 
16.7   Danger of Ethonocentism, Pre Conceived Opinions and Insensitivity 
 
We have already noted the unwarranted interference of a large international organisation in the Kiribati 
family planning campaign which had to that point been successful; the recommended innovations of 
the international organisation were not appropriate to local conditions, contributing to failure (Section 
9.19). Another illustration confirms the point. A New Zealand advisor in 1982 commented to the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs that: 
 
“Much of the input of aid from ........ (a major donor) has in my 
opinion been counter productive for Niue agricultural development. 
This has been partly due to the attitude of the aid personnel involved 
and partly due to scarce Niue technical personnel resources 
available”.10 
 
The adviser goes on: 
 
“There appears to have been a display of arrogance from these aid 
workers towards local Niue experience and knowledge. In turn the 
Niue officers have not communicated local knowledge essential for 
progress in agricultural research and development. The result has been 
constant misunderstanding and a waste of time. These matters would 
cause considerable concern even if the Niue Department of 
Agriculture and Fisheries had staff numbers sufficient to meet their 
commitments, but with the constant drain of experienced staff from 
their organisation and that of the Niue Development Board this 
experience is critical.” 
 
“Mr Smith”11, the ... representative from (overseas) has a genuine 
interest in Niue. Unfortunately his approach to solving the Niue 
agriculture production problem would be to run the whole island as a 
business venture with expatriate management, using Niue people in 
lower supervisory roles and as labour. Mr Smith's current thinking is 
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to once again involve more ... personnel in each aspect of Niue 
agricultural research and development.” 
 
Such examples serve as a salutary warning to New Zealand's External Aid Division. And although New 
Zealand's aid is small compared to the large donors, it too dominates in three of the five states being 
studied. We must be wary of the power we possess, and its potential threat (for latent power is also a 
threat) even if it is not exercised. 
 
In contrast, the practical, down to earth approach of EAD, the relatively good standard of aid 
administration, the sincerity and high work input of many EAD staff are all positive features and the 
very fact that New Zealand is handling relatively small sums of money makes it more likely that less 
waste will occur. And New Zealand has “learnt the South Pacific” to a much greater degree than 
international agencies   though the Team believes there is room for considerable improvement, 
especially in analysing island economies and the functioning of island bureaucracies. 
 
 
16.8   Overseas Aid in Kiribati and Tuvalu 
 
The following are some of the conclusions of the Victoria University of Wellington Rural Socio-
Economic Survey of the Gilbert Islands and Tuvalu, in which one of the present team participated12. In 
revisiting Kiribati and Tuvalu in 1984 we believe the following conclusions are still very largely valid. 
 
(a) Throughout the South Pacific overseas aid has achieved very limited success in the last 20 to 30 
years in overcoming basic problems. The reasons are many, including socio cultural obstacles 
and a lack of political will, but much overseas aid is wrongly conceived and is inappropriate. 
 
(b) Visits of overseas experts are often very short, even though complex problems might be 
involved. Rarely do they learn the country, which involves trying to learn the language, 
understand the local society, institutions and environment and relate effectively to its people. 
 
(c) Most of the largest development schemes in the Gilberts in recent years were at least partially 
unsound in conception, organisation and management, manifesting many of the usual 
ethnocentric and technocratic faults of foreign aid. 
 
Thus they were based on preconceived assumptions about local conditions and how the local people 
would respond rather than being based on knowledge of actual conditions and involving the people in 
planning the scheme. 
 
(d) We challenge the implicit assumption of the western or “dualist” model of development that the 
modern sector can expand to absorb virtually the entire population and that this can be done in a 
fairly short period of time. Unless the sea yields mineral riches or makes a large-scale fishing 
industry possible, there will be no real basis for a vigorous modern sector on Tarawa. Funafuti 
too lacks an economic basis for any genuine modern sector. 
 
(e) Most overseas advisers promote, either consciously or unconsciously, some version of the 
western model of development. Yet this approach is unrealistic for it demands a process of 
jumping rather than a process of stretching. They are also promoting economic dualism with all 
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its faults and imposing foreign models, philosophies or policies uncritically on to a unique 
culture and environment. 
 
(f) We recommend that technical aid should be based on an attempt to learn the country, relate to its 
people, and adopt an inductive rather than deductive approach. It should be flexible and 
empirical, be adjusted to the small scale involved, and attempt to fit the actual conditions of 
village living. A number of examples are given of desirable innovations in intermediate 
technology (see Geddes et al., 1982 : 151). 
 
(g) The Aid Review Task Force in its excellent report More Effective Aid in 1976 found that the 
interests of the more powerful donor country are likely to predominate over those of the recipient 
country. They found that there was a tendency for aid to worsen major defects instead of 
remedying them. 
 
(h) There is a constant danger that bureaucracy will stifle healthy enterprise through regulation, red 
tape, delays and impersonal negative attitudes. Major changes are needed in the role and function 
of the bureaucracy as it changes from its protective policing role of the colonial era to one 
appropriate to the delivery of basic services. 
 
(i) In the era of independence, if self-reliance is to be strengthened at all and a sensible indigenous 
model of development appropriate to local conditions is to be followed the quality of leadership 
becomes crucial. Both Tuvalu and the Gilberts are fortunate in having honest leaders dedicated to 
serving the public interest. There is a great need for these leaders to conduct independently their 
own patient analysis, to remain sceptical of overseas solutions and not to be frightened of making 
bold, original (though not reckless) decisions. Austerity and moderation in life-style are also 
needed and restraint in public spending. Considerable political skill will undoubtedly be needed 
to dampen down local expectations and aspirations that are no longer realistic. 
 
(j) A policy of aiming for greater self reliance could involve weakening the trend towards the dual 
economy by making urban living more expensive and less attractive. This would involve heavier 
import duties or taxes on imported foods, elimination of subsidies in the town and less spending 
on urban infrastructure. 
 
In 1984 the only comment we would make on these recommendations made in the 1970s is that the 
characteristics and consequences of the mirab economy are now more apparent. In the light of this, 
paragraphs (i) and (j) above calling for austerity and self-denial are rather harsh, as self reliance above 
the level of subsistence seems to be unattainable. It will be cruel indeed if overseas aid after 1986 
greatly declines. 
 
 
16.9   Aid and Mythology 
 
New Zealand has unfortunately taken on board some of the illusions and ideas of development 
mythology - the myths of progress and “modernisation”.  Policy has been infected by modernisation 
theory that sees island states developing progressively, economically, socially and especially 
politically, towards greater political maturity and responsibility. Thus, self-government was thought by 
some to be perhaps a preliminary stage during which a young island country learnt “to stand on its own 
feet” and with greater experience the country might later be ready for independence. Yet it can be 
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strongly argued we believe, that the Cook Islands has made little progress in this political sense in the 
19 years since self government began. Since much of our aid has been closely associated with the 
process of decolonisation, it is hardly surprising that it is also strongly imbued with concepts of 
modernisation. It was assumed from the Belshaw-Stace Report on and by constitutional advisors that 
progress would occur in equivalent fashion, economically, socially and politically. In reality political 
modernisation does not occur in a way that produces a replica of a western democracy, and politics are 
managed increasingly by a small political elite. New Zealand aid, in its own small way, has become 
very much institutionalised to fill the widening balance of payments deficit for the Cook Islands and 
Niue, even although we profess to pursue the goal of autonomous development for the islands. 
 
We are either deluding ourselves through failing to understand the real political economy of the South 
Pacific and the function of “aid” in a mirab economy, which is to maintain existing structures, or if we 
do understand it, we are playing an elaborate charade for political purposes to ensure that the standard 
of welfare in the islands is maintained at a high level. The latter course of action, if such a political 
charade has to be played, is well worth pursuing. An understanding of the political economy of the 
small island countries leads to a realisation of the poor prospects for autonomous development - since 
free entry to the New Zealand labour market is more attractive than difficult low paid local effort, and 
the New Zealand taxpayer always makes up the budget deficit   and at the same time provides the 
rationale for income transfers to maintain the standard of welfare. Seen in this light aid has little to do 
with development or the so called development process, but has everything to do with maintaining 
welfare and propping up services in the islands. 
 
 
16.10   The Fate of Convential Aid Policies 
 
Can the transfer of capital, skill and technology to South Pacific societies, whether by international 
agencies or by N.Z.E.A.D., enable them to achieve self sustaining growth? Some of the Schumacherian 
conditions of the Third World seem to apply. European societies, when Marshall Aid was disbursed 
after World War II, can be likened to an iceberg. Much of the top, projecting above sea level had been 
shattered by the war, but beneath the surface all the underlying sub structures needed for economic 
growth - organisation, motivation, discipline, education and skill - were still intact13. With a massive 
injection of capital, economic recovery was rapid. In the South Pacific, as in much of the Third World, 
of course, the iceberg analogy does not fit, for these essential prerequisites were largely absent, and 
indeed the underlying sub-structures of the South Pacific (the village mode of production, descent 
group structure etc.) are still partly intact and should not be destroyed. 
 
We need an aid philosophy that is appropriate to the place and to the time (or stage of development) 
that these societies have reached. We are dealing with post-tribal societies in which urbanisation is 
very recent (since cities did not exist before the arrival of Europeans), in which industry was non-
existent   societies which had not been adapted to, or shaped for decades or centuries by mercantile, 
industrial and modern corporate capitalism, the influences of international trade, the rise of great cities 
and all the institutions and organisations, economic, social and political, associated with them. 
 
Two other qualities have also been very important in shaping the development process - the extreme 
mobility of islanders, and their considerable proletarianisation by European enterprises since the 19th 
century. Given the problems of smallness and remoteness from market, autonomous development 
would have been extremely difficult to achieve in any case and few opportunities existed for large scale 
capitalist development. As the major economic roles were monopolised by European trading firms and 
 - 384 -
a handful of expatriate, part-European or part-Chinese entrepreneurs, few avenues for advancement 
appeared to exist in the islands and the more ambitious migrated in search of regular, dependable pay 
packets - for what the Tahitians call “fast money” of regular wage employment instead of the “slow 
money” received in delayed payments by rural cash croppers14. It can be argued that New Zealand's 
educational policies since the War have not succeeded in fitting people into their island environments 
but encouraged academic schooling and collar and tie occupations of a New Zealand type. In short, 
many decades ago the process was already well underway - rather than a process of autonomous 
development, it was essentially a process of ever greater integration into the developed world and 
closer association (for the Cooks, Niue and Tokelau) with New Zealand. The effects of the injections of 
large volumes of aid and remittances into this situation has been to greatly economically the integration 
process and to undermine autonomous growth. The evidence for this view is presented in Chapters 5, 6 
and 7. If this view is correct, “the stage of development” is merely the degree to which integration into 
the New Zealand economy has occurred, and the appropriateness of policy is to be judged not 
according to criteria of self-reliance, but rather whether it aids integration, increases revenue or helps to 
maintain welfare. If the object of aid is to achieve self-sustaining economic growth, it has clearly 
failed. 
 
 
16.11  Aid In MIRAB Economies 
 
We have already, in Chapter 5, set out the essential characteristics of mirab economies and noted the 
erroneous assumptions about the nature of the island economies upon which much of our aid policies in 
the past and currently have been based. It is quite misleading to confine economic analysis to the 
geographically-bounded island groups, because the “modern sector” of the economy and roughly half 
the population for the Cook Islands, Niue and Tokelau live on the mainland. Thus there is a major flow 
of remittances back to the islands and socially the two halves are organically linked. Moreover aid and 
remittance-led open economies of this type behave quite differently from relatively closed economies 
where standard economic development approaches designed at achieving “bootstraps” development are 
applicable. This is precisely what we mean when we suggest that properly thought out aid policies 
should take the “political economy” of the island states and of the South Pacific as a whole into 
account. 
 
The uncritical and excessively political approach to aid taken by New Zealand is revealed in a 
statement of 1975 in which the Ministry of Foreign Affairs proposed “... the logic of building a 
programme of development cooperation with the Cooks in keeping with the ODA principles and 
philosophy as explained ...” (This is a philosophy of helping, mainly through the transfer of technolgoy 
“at assisting other countries to assist themselves”): 
 
 
“... The application to the Cook Islands of ODA principles and practices 
described above would mean, from the New Zealand standpoint, that the 
situation of the Cooks would be identical, in all respects to that of all other 
countries, in Asia, the Pacific, Africa and Latin America, with whom New 
Zealand has development assistance programmes in operation”. 
 
Yet as this report documents in detail, the Cook Islands economy is fundamentally different in kind 
from that of the other countries in Asia, Africa, Latin America etc. Aid approaches that are appropriate 
for them are likely to be quite inappropriate for the Cook Islands. Indeed, to make the current 
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approaches of encouraging autonomous development work, it would be necessary to turn the Cook 
Islands into a closed economy: in effect to “build a Berlin Wall” around it by denying migration egress. 
 
An extension of this principle to other countries of the Pacific involves essentially the consideration of 
the extent to which the mirab economy effect operates - i.e. to what extent in each case are they aid- 
and remittance-led economies rather than being based primarily on commodity export production. If 
aid is to perform a strategic economic function such an approach, adjusted to each country's particular 
political economy, is highly recommended. On the other hand, this study strongly supports the 
maintenance of “aid” as subsidies to maintain living standards and hence stability as argued in Chapter 
5. Indeed a strong case appears to exist for both particularist aid policies to various countries where it is  
adjusted to their precise circumstances, and attempts to play a strategic economic role, and for “aid” as 
subsidies as required in the three New Zealand-linked states. 
 
 
16.12   Aid and the Public Service 
 
An understanding of the political economy also requires considering the function of the local public 
service. New Zealand has in fact been providing substantial subsidies to the Cook Islands 
administration since the 1920s, and as the Team has already noted, the change of name of the subsidy 
to “aid” with self-government in 1965 has in no way changed its essential role of making up the 
deficits in local revenue. The administration of these aid moneys and the basic services of the country 
required the development of a local bureaucracy. The ideas of the New Zealand Labour Government on 
the role of the public service in development may have increased its size in the period 
 
However, in the last years of the New Zealand administration (1959-64) the public service expanded 
greatly (see pp.97 and 171 above) reflecting perhaps New Zealand's desire to prepare the country for 
self government. After 1965, local perceptions of the public service have been dominant. Whatever role 
New Zealand might expect it to play, in islanders' eyes the bureaucracy was seen as a secure source of 
employment15, providing a relatively large, dependable income. And if the main purpose is to 
maximise the flow of aid, one can hardly expect financial control, frugality and efficiency. 
 
Secondly, the very size (see Tables 5.3 and 7.5) and power of the public service (50 percent of all 
employment in the Cook Islands and 80 percent in Niue) means that it monopolises much of the 
economic activity, discouraging private enterprise. Moreover, the vested interests of the salariate 
ensure that it subverts the rise of successful private enterprise which might in the long run threaten 
jobs. Two examples can be cited: in the Cook Islands, the marketing of copra was carried out by a 
branch of Government employing 18 staff. When marketing was reorganised recently on a producer 
basis under the leadership of a local lawyer, a lower price ($350 instead of $400 per tonne) was paid to 
producers but production went up substantially because of on-the-spot rather than delayed payment. 
And the staff required for marketing was cut to only 1.5 people with the use of efficient methods. In 
Niue, some years ago, a private builder found that his quote for a job of $85,000 was undercut by the 
Government Housing Department's bid of about $83,000. The latter properly was awarded the contract, 
but then applied later for increased subventions from government to make a final cost of about 
$150,00016. In such a situation the private entrepreneur can be excused for thinking that he can never 
win. It is a truism, of course, to point out that the public service of any country should be designed to 
suit the needs of that country. This is also true in the Cook Islands, Niue, Tokelau and the other small 
states -  but in reality the public services have less to do with autonomous development and much more 
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to do with the provision of jobs, the maintenance of services and keeping the tap of aid flowing - after 
all, these are the real needs of the islands, and are fully understood by the islanders. 
 
The situation is most dramatic in Niue. The size and range of public service appointments come under 
the surveillance of the Niue Public Service Commission, two of whose three members are New 
Zealand State Services Commissioners. The Niue Public Service could be cut drastically with little loss 
of performance (see Chapter 7), but no Niuean politician would support this. It appears that over $4 
million is paid in public service wages annually, leaving little money left for development projects.  
Under these circumstances, as Fisk17 has pointed out, the determination of the volume and type of aid 
given to Niue can be quite critical: 
 
“Making the (admittedly over-simple) assumption that aid can be 
divided into (1) infrastructure aid that does not affect internal cash 
incomes directly on the one hand, and (2) budget aid, which does, on 
the other, then one could suggest two propositions that should apply at 
least to a considerable extent: 
 
(a) Infrastructure aid can be allowed without limit,18 provided the 
recurrent labour and other costs of maintenance are not thereby 
increased. Where such increases are involved, infrastructure aid 
can only be considered acceptable in the light of longer term 
projections of labour and finance needs for the Niue economy as a 
whole. 
 
(b) Budget aid provides the most direct means of determining both 
the level of government services to the community (including 
development services such as agricultural extension) and, even 
more important, the level of incomes and local employment. If 
budget aid is too low, emigration will accelerate and the 
depopulation of Niue will continue. If budget aid is too high, 
living standards and incomes on Niue will rise more than 
necessary to hold its people.” 
 
Thus aid is crucial to maintaining the bureaucracy, which provides jobs and lessens potential out 
migration. Aid is therefore very much part of the political economy and part of the mirab society   the 
“a” in our term mirab society, with “b” standing for bureaucracy. 
 
This then is the critical policy issue. While local public services appear bloated in size in New Zealand 
eyes (even allowing for the fact that they combine national government with local government 
functions) they must be adjudged in island terms. Given the power of the mirab economy with large 
volumes of aid flowing into these countries, large public services - the creatures of the aid process - are 
entirely understandable, and in the main, acceptable. There is however a powerful case for applying the 
New Zealand subsidy not to maintain public service jobs but to supplement producers' incomes. 
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16.13   The Strengths and Weaknesses of New Zealand Aid 
 
In general, New Zealand has placed great reliance on the transfer of technology, and especially of 
systems and skills that have proved themselves under New Zealand's temperate climatic conditions. It 
is  
primarily because of this reason that the Puno pasture project in the Altiplano of Peru, which is often 
said to have been the most successful of all New Zealand aid projects, achieved so much. In this 
temperate grassland physical environment, not unlike the McKenzie Country in some respects, it was 
possible to plant ryegrass, lucerne, turnips etc. and to build improved pastures and stock management 
systems for extensive sheep grazing. (It was however much less successful in imparting the skills both 
to Peruvian tecnicos, and to illiterate Aymara peasants where approaches quite different from 
conventional extension work were required).19 
 
In the South Pacific however there has been repeated evidence over 30 years that the transfer of 
temperate, capitalist agricultural techniques into hot, wet tropical environments and into post-tribal 
societies where the village mode of production dominates is often unsuccessful. Indeed that is now 
often tacitly recognised by many aid administrators and was such a matter of concern that a 
confidential conference on N.Z. aid to the South Pacific was held in Wellington in 1978. New Zealand 
however can be much more successful in those areas of aid where the technology to be transferred is 
indeed highly relevant to Pacific conditions, such as forestry. 
 
Although the tree species and growth rates are very different the same basic approaches apply and 
competent but adaptable New Zealand foresters are likely to make a major contribution to those Pacific 
countries where afforestation, forest milling, management and replanting are likely to be important20. 
Indeed New Zealand has already achieved substantial success in the forestry area in Savai'i, Western 
Samoa, and Western Viti Levu, Fiji. She could make an enormous contribution to the management and 
utilisation of the vast forests of tropical Papua New Guinea which currently are being exploited, if not 
ravaged, by some 14 multinational firms that act in ways largely beyond the Government's effective 
control. As Papua New Guinea is destined to become one of the greatest producers of tropical 
hardwoods in the world21, training of the local forest service to manage their own resource competently 
and prudently would be an enormously valuable aid role, if it were undertaken by the N.Z. Forest 
Service by means of New Zealand aid for the Papua New Guinea Government. 
 
The illustration given emphasises the point that if we wish to give effective aid to Pacific countries, we 
should recognise which skills possessed by New Zealanders are relevant and appropriate and that the 
likely contribution of the various Government departments in New Zealand are likely to vary greatly. 
While many departments, private sector firms and especially individuals might be able to provide aid 
on specific technical issues from time to time they will not be able to make major contributions. A few 
departments on the other hand  - such as the Forest Service and Education (see Chapter 15, which 
describes the major role New Zealand plays in the region in education) - are fitted by their skills and/or 
experience to make major long term contributions to development in at least some Pacific countries. At 
present this does not seem to be fully recognised. The Team believes as a conscious policy decision the 
potentially very important contribution of the Forest Service and the Department of Education should 
be fully recognised and that their role in aid programmes be increased. This would imply more 
resources and staff for their international divisions. While a good deal of valuable work is done in aid 
by other departments, it may be that relatively less emphasis and resources should be accorded to their 
roles. 
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16.14   Effective Aid : Innovation Appropriate to Context 
 
The Team argue that the design of effective aid projects and the actual delivery of desired innovations 
are often extraordinarily difficult to achieve on the ground. It is easy to approve some innovation, 
which on the face of things, appears to be appropriate to the situation. It is only however when the 
context into which the innovation will fit is fully appreciated that a clear judgement can be made as to 
whether the proposed innovation is worthwhile or not. An illustration can be given.  In recent years 
New Zealand has aided several small projects of rat poisoning in Tuvalu and Kiribati. Rats frequently 
climb coconut palms and damage nuts. Undoubtedly poisoned bait can reduce the rat population on 
some islands if a programme is properly carried through, but the implication has been that rat damage 
is a major factor in low copra production on these islands. Such an implication is quite untrue for 
intensive fieldwork in the villages and correlation analyses of copra production against rainfall, 
population density and copra price has isolated the critical variables affecting production. The Victoria  
University of Wellington Rural Socio-Economic Survey found that many factors were involved22, but 
low production was not primarily due to low availability of nuts. Indeed the prime need is to increase 
the motivation of villagers to pick up the nuts that do fall from the palms. Thus price stabilisation 
policies in years of low copra price, improved marketing outlets and better transport on the atolls from 
coconut groves to villages and to shipping points (e.g. the provision of more bicycles and “hand carts” 
or bicycle trailers) are likely to be far more effective than rat poisoning programmes. 
 
In short, innovations must be planned to suit the context, and to address the essential issue. E.F. 
Schumacher, author of Small is Beautiful used to make a pun on his name: “a good shoemaker not only 
knows a lot about different kinds of shoes, he knows a lot about the shape of feet”.  The analogy is apt, 
for a good innovation, like a good shoe, will “fit”.  The good aid administrator will know the detailed 
conditions and context of the particular country that an aid programme is designed to assist. 
 
 
16.15   Training 
 
A major feature of New Zealand's official aid is of course its role in training, and this is probably the 
most valuable area of assistance of all, apart from the necessary provision of subsidies (classed as 
budgetary or development aid) to the three New Zealand-linked countries. In 1982 expenditure on 
training amounted to U.S.$3.54 million or 5.4 percent of ODA. There are however problems in that the 
training is for New Zealand type conditions, usually making little allowance for the distinctive 
conditions and smallness of scale of the islands. Again there are major problems of adaptation of some 
islanders who come to New Zealand for training (see sections 15.10 and 15.13 on the Tokelau 
scholarship scheme). 
 
 
16.16   Aid as Conservation 
 
The modern development process throughout much of the Third World often has as much to do with 
breaking-down as with “development” in any building up sense. Development truly is a two-edged 
sword23. Aid policy must concern itself with many social and ecological issues, with the preservation 
of meaningful social and cultural institutions, with the retention of neo-traditional culture. Thus New 
Zealand aid policy must also consider the isolated traditional people who are subsistence cultivators 
and who can only gain access to money or markets by labour migration. Such people, like the pagan 
Kwaio of Malaita in the Solomons, are in Western terms the poorest people in the entire region, yet in 
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their own terms they are the richest. We must be careful that such societies are not caught on the 
“treadmill of development” or thrust into modern situations where they cannot cope, and become like 
the unenviable Goilala of Port Moresby: outcasts of society with a reputation for violence and crime24. 
It is important to maintain for such societies the “traditional balances and harmonies with the 
environment, the continuities between generations, social bonds within the family and community, 
satisfaction with the fruit of one's work, and a measure of safety, predictability and stability in the 
course of human and natural events”25. In such cases only slow and carefully selective incorporation 
into the modern world is called for when they really wish it. Clearly planners must accept the need for 
a plurality of policies even within one country to accommodate the special situation of all societies in 
their various “ecological niches” in the overall change process. Aid is also involved with the quality of 
health, hygiene and medicine, water supplies, nutrition or “dietary colonialism” and many other areas. 
Thus the assistance that New Zealand could provide to Kiribati at the time of the cholera epidemic in 
1977 and the work of a considerable number of New Zealand medical specialists is very valuable aid. 
The avoidance of inappropriate technology, such as discing, or the use of heavy machines on the fragile 
rocky soils of Niue is another example. Protection too is vital, as in denying entry to Mexican citrus 
which might introduce disease to the disease free limes of Niue. 
 
Frequently, Europeans exaggerate the value of externally introduced innovations and tend to understate 
the disadvantages (or destructive effects) resulting from the innovations. A few years ago one of the 
Team members drew up the following balance sheet for the island of Abemama in Kiribati26: 
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 Positive advantages introduced by Europeans Disadvantages resulting from Europeans 
    
1 
Air service, shipping 
1 Decay of babai, traditional skills, 
failure to conserve resources 
    
2 
Hospitals and medical service  resources 
2 Decline of the authority of the old 
men 
    
3 
Iron and steel, e.g. bush knives, fish hooks 
3 Nutritional deficiencies and danger 
of dietary deterioration 
    
4 
Utensils, implements (e.g. mosquito nets), 
cloth, cooking  utensils    
4 Colonial mentality and 
'missionization'  - an apathetic, 
dependent society 
    
5 Some education 5 Partly inappropriate education 
    
6 
Roads, bicycles, motor cycles, trucks  
6 A partially inappropriate political 
structure 
         
7 Peace and order 
8 Impartial system of justice 
7 Economic dualism and wage dualism 
represented in gross “over 
development”, over centralization, 
over urbanization of Tarawa and of 
modern services, coupled with 
neglect of the outer islands, the 
subsistence economy, the traditional 
social and political structure and 
small scale appropriate technology. 
 
Inevitably this reflects our own bias, although all the advantages were identified by local informants 
and most of the disadvantages; other disadvantages (e.g. 4, 5, 6 and 7) were characterised in their 
responses. But “development” only becomes meaningful when considered by the people themselves, in 
their own terms. Their wishes must take precedence. 
 
 
16.17   The Development Plan and the Development Process 
 
How has development planning evolved in the South Pacific?27 In the early days it was obviously 
necessary and useful to put together and coordinate, the different sets of estimates of government 
expenditure, public sector targets and import and export projections. Over time, plans have generally 
become lengthier and more complex. Samoa has now issued its Fifth Five Year Plan and Fiji its ninth. 
As countries have grown in population, the number of economics graduates has increased, Parkinson's 
Law has proliferated in most bureaucracies, the aid industry has vastly expanded, and the ideology of 
planning has spread, so the practice of planning has expanded: from one expatriate planner, other staff 
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have been added and finally a central planning office emerges. The “professionalisation” of the 
function ensues, implying that plans have become more quantitative, complex and sophisticated so that 
the layman has often been “dazzled by statistics”.  This does not mean however, that the plans have 
become any better - indeed with the growth of the mystique of planning it probably implies greater 
technocratic freedom or control wielded by the planner, the high priest of the whole process, and less 
interference from uninitiated politicians. At any rate the process seems to involve less involvement and 
commitment by ministers and politicians who are actually meant to carry out the plan. Tony Hughes, 
an experienced Pacific Islands administrator and ex-development planner has frankly exposed the 
tortuous evolution of planning to a state abounding in illusions and delusions. As he states28: 
 
“Planners fall victim to their own propaganda, national leaders are 
persuaded that development planning can solve problems which are 
essentially questions of power and politics, and we all tend to lose 
sight of the practical value as well as the shortcomings of 
development planning techniques”. 
 
South Pacific plans display the varying changes in fads and fashions among planners as to how 
economic development and growth can best be stimulated, but even a cursory reading usually indicates 
that the report is very much the product of the planning office. Apart from the customary foreword and 
perhaps some involvement in one or two of the early chapters, commitment by government to the goals 
put forward and the strategy espoused appears to be weak or nominal. This fact, also noted by Hughes, 
is of course fundamental: if government lacks the conviction or political will to really carry out the 
national development plan, does the plan really mean much? Is it not, in fact, merely an elaborate piece 
of window dressing? 
 
This is, in fact, the conclusion we must come to - a conclusion also reached recently in a major study of 
development planning in Papua New Guinea and the Solomons by Herlihy29. She concludes that the 
primary purpose of development plans (rather than their avowed purpose) is to assert the legitimacy of 
the government and to catch overseas aid from potential donors. (A coherent plan was often a 
prerequisite required by international development agencies in the 1960s). 
 
One of the greatest problems in development planning, even when it was carried out with sincerity, 
conviction and a real sense of purpose, is the whole question of macro-micro integration, a problem 
that has been pointed out from the Spate Report on Fiji in 1959, through the Victoria University of 
Wellington Solomons and Gilbert and Ellice studies to Herlihy (1981). Before independence it was 
common to blame the metropolitan country or “colonialism” for the failure of various government rural 
development policies. But the persistence of these same problems after independence has shown that 
failure in macro-micro integration is really responsible for the situation: 
 
A “critical factor ... was not the type of government, but the fact of 
government - a macro level authority imposed on the micro level 
organisation of communities whose needs had not yet evolved to a 
proportionate degree”30. 
 
The problem requires a strengthening of local government, more community education and greater 
coordination between local and central government. The popularisation of planning and the demand of 
villagers to participate in the planning process was perhaps a natural outcome of the anti colonialist 
feeling in the Solomons and Papua New Guinea as independence approached. It led to a 
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decentralisation of planning, but as local councils lacked both experience in planning and staff, the 
central governments managed to consolidate and strengthen their position in this transition period. 
Even if there is agreement and understanding between the government and village, difficulties often 
arise in the aggregation disaggregation process which occurs when village aspirations are translated 
into practice via a development plan: 
 
“At that point, however, they pass through a process of generalisation 
and redistribution into the basic components of macro policy. During 
this process a real ideosyncracies are edited out and the essence is 
subsumed under such broad policy goals as improvement of village 
health, expansion of village cash-earning opportunities and more (or 
more appropriate) education. Despite the loss of spatial specificity, the 
broad spectrum nature of these goals is sufficient to ensure an 
apparent relevance to village interests”31. 
 
Although planners are aware of this problem, Herlihy suggests that the constraints on their role tend to 
inhibit use of micro-level analysis and to favour a more superficial but across-the-board approach 
which is less politically vulnerable and places less burden on their scarce resources. 
 
The seriousness or otherwise of attempts at autonomous development can be observed by considering 
development planning and the reasons for producing a development plan. It has become the accepted 
theory that governments of developing countries should formulate their own development goals and 
objectives and work out their strategy to achieve them. These are expressed in the main public 
documents of the country and especially in the National Development Plan. Donor countries are then 
expected to respond to these stated goals and strategies by providing capital and/or technical assistance 
to the recipient country in those areas where it wishes or feels able to help. In practice, however, the 
process is considerably different. In the first place countries in the South Pacific do not have clear 
objectives of development apart from the usual pious, high sounding generalities of achieving increases 
in income, better distribution of income, greater self reliance and the like. As the Deputy Prime 
Minister of one country stated to a team member, “the leaders of this country do not know where we 
are going”.  Nor is there a clearly worked out strategy. 
 
Moreover, the process of development is not determined by donor countries merely “coming to the 
party” and automatically funding projects put up by the recipient governments. Donors and recipients 
each have a “shopping list” and when the two are merged, or discussions occur between aid missions 
and the recipient government, decisions are made about who funds what. 
 
If the whole planning process is to have any reality at all, it requires a clear formulation of 
development goals, an agreed strategy to accomplish them, and a searching analysis of recent private 
and public sector economic performance to be carried out as a basis for determining whether the targets 
set are attainable. Indeed it could be said in theory, that a Government's responsibility and 
accountability to the electorate requires it indeed to do this carefully and seriously as one of the most 
essential tasks of government. The fact that the task is only attempted in a cursory and partial way in 
almost all South Pacific states shows, either the essential weakness of governments as serious, 
determined directors of the development process (and that the whole procedure is something of an 
elaborate charade), or more likely, an implicit or explicit realisation by the politicians that the 
development process is in no way determined by development planning, that they are, in fact, mirab 
economies. The reason that governments in the three New Zealand-linked countries don't attempt much 
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more serious and searching analyses of their economies is that they have never, in the past, found this 
to be necessary. They know only too well that the financial flow comes from New Zealand budget 
support, or the relatively dependable inflows of remittances, taxes, philatelic sales and the like - since 
these sources and New Zealand will provide the necessary resources, why worry? In Kiribati and 
Tuvalu a crisis has only recently occurred with the announcement that British aid, up till now a certain 
source of revenue, might cease after 1986. 
 
These generalisations are borne out by considering recent plans in the five countries. Development 
Planning only began in the Gilbert and Ellice Islands in 1971, with only 8 years to run before 
Independence and the end of Ocean Island phosphate. Under careful British tutelage and employing a 
number of able and experienced British economists, a series of competent development plans have 
been produced for Kiribati and Tuvalu. Technically they are solid documents and considering the 
problems of establishing a reliable data base, reasonably sound, especially for Kiribati. 
 
However, it is interesting to note that the Cook Islands and Niue didn't feel they needed to have their 
first Development Plans till later - until January 1984 and 1979 respectively. As frequently happens, 
the Cook Islands responded to the Asian Development Bank's advice to produce a plan. A plan makes 
it easier to gain aid from donors. It was largely the work of a determined Dutch planner, but shows no 
sign of political commitment or belief in an economy working autonomously, independent of that of 
New Zealand. In a cursory foreword, the Premier, Sir Tom Davis, suggests that the main value of the 
plan is the “comprehensive set of data” on the economy that it presents. He states that the main task of 
government is to get a better grip on the development of the country “in its efforts to augment the well-
being of the people of the Cook Islands”.  These remarks suggest that autonomous development is not 
the primary aim, there is the hint that the development process cannot be controlled by government 
anyhow and the main aim is welfare. 
 
In the First Niuean National Development Plan 1980-1985 produced in 1979, the Premier, Sir Robert 
Rex writes in the foreword that the right that Niue possessed to make her own decisions brings also the 
responsibility to produce as much as possible of the total resources needed. While the leaders of Niue 
recognise that in economic terms the island cannot in the foreseeable future go it alone, a “determined 
effort” must be made locally. He states the main aim of the Plan is “basically to increase Niue's degree 
of self-reliance materially and in the achievement of self confidence in the country's ability to meet a 
substantial share of the cost of maintaining a modern Niue”. 
 
These goals are very worthy and the sentiments sincere, but the political commitment to the Plan 
appears to be slight. It was pointed out to the Team on Niue that development planning evolved on the 
island as a method of seeking aid: “We write Development Plans for the benefit of donors - no one here 
reads the Plan or gives a damn”.  Aid “towards development and mankind” looks good on paper, but in 
essence it is transferred to recurrent expenditure: “The recurrent budget looks more like an open drain”. 
 
 
16.18   Aid : Urban and Class Bias 
 
Almost all aid programmes from the Alliance for Progress to the Green Revolution in Asia illustrate 
that innovations presented to developing regions on a “first-come-first-served” basis of so-called equal 
opportunity don't work out that way in practice. Larger, more affluent, more literate, or more 
entrepreneurial farmers capitalise heavily on the new opportunities while the poorer, more isolated and 
less aware villagers “beyond the tarmac road” receive little or no benefit32. Thus while the new 
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innovations may benefit some favoured regions or classes of people, it also serves to widen the 
economic disparities between classes and regions. For example, it is easier to promote innovations on 
Rarotonga than in the northern Cook Islands. 
 
New Zealand's set of principles guiding the bilateral development assistance programme are given in 
Table 16.4. It can be seen that these are most unexceptionable principles. But in practice New 
Zealand's aid policies run the same risks of urban, centrist and class bias of most aid programmes 
referred to above. While the External Aid Division uses the set of principles as a statement of a general 
approach they are well aware that they are not “the laws of the Medes and Persians” and they might not 
apply, for example, to the Cook Islands, Niue and Tokelau33. Indeed, it was suggested that it was 
possible to argue that “aid” was really not aid at all in the usual sense in these three countries and that 
an exceptional approach was necessary to meet the needs of these the five small countries. That is 
precisely the position taken in this report after the fieldwork phase was completed. 
 
Indeed it is very difficult to meet the particular goals stated in the set of principles, especially section 6. 
The accessibility of people on lower incomes and in the most remote areas or islands of isolated groups 
to new innovations is extremely poor and only determined attempts and specific policies targetted 
specifically at them rather than to the rural population in general are likely to have any success. The 
poor are indeed invisible to observers who rarely travel further than to the main island, who rarely 
leave “the tarmac road”.  Again “safeguarding the interests of women” is extraordinarily difficult to 
achieve in strongly patriarchal societies (e.g. Papua New Guinea) where the people who mediate with 
innovators and change agents are invariably men, and women are often denied the opportunity to speak 
at public meetings. While the position of women is not as inferior as this in most of the five countries 
studied, they do in fact often contribute more than their fair share of the work without receiving 
appropriate recognition34. This problem is so important and difficult as to warrant particular, careful 
attention in project design and implementation by External Aid Division. 
 
 
16.19   The Issue of “Tied Aid” 
 
It can argued that the inputs required in an aid project, should, wherever possible, be purchased in the 
recipient country. However since most projects require high quality or specialised inputs in terms of 
technology, equipment, skills of specialist staff, pedigree stock or other innovations, it is scarcely 
surprising that they are mostly absent from the small countries of the South Pacific which lack 
industrial sectors. It has, moreover been an avowed aim of the New Zealand Government since 1969 to 
provide New Zealand goods and services from within New Zealand itself “wherever this is compatible 
with the principal purpose” (principle 4 of Table 16.4). It is extremely difficult to calculate accurately 
what proportion of total bilateral aid is spent in New Zealand rather than in the recipient countries, but 
a crude estimate reported by Hoadley in 1980, suggested a figure of about 45 percent35. This would 
give a figure of around $20 million currently being spent within New Zealand; clearly the growth of 
aid is good for New Zealand business. Where aid goes to larger countries, such as those in Southeast 
Asia, a much lower New Zealand component and a higher local component should be expected, and 
indeed aimed for.  
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TABLE 16.4 
 
THE PRINCIPLES GUIDING NEW ZEALAND'S BILATERAL DEVELOPMENT 
ASSISTANCE PROGRAMME 
 
1.  New Zealand's development assistance is directed primarily to the Island states of the 
South Pacific and is designed to help meet their specific requirements: the second area of 
concentration is Southeast Asia and in particular the countries belonging to ASEAN.  
 
2.  Bilateral assistance is provided by the Government in accordance with New Zealand's 
capacity and in response to specific requests made by recipient Governments on the basis 
of their own plans and priorities either directly or through regional institutions.  
 
3.  The principal purpose of New Zealand's development assistance is to help promote the 
economic and social development of the recipient countries, by expanding their 
capabilities to raise the living standards of their peoples.  
 
4.  New Zealand development assistance is normally provided from New Zealand itself; New 
Zealand goods and services are used wherever this is compatible with the principal 
purpose.  
 
5.  A project to be assisted under the New Zealand programme should have specific 
development objectives that are to be achieved within a specified time and with specified 
resources: after that time it should be possible for the project to be carried on by the 
recipient country from its own resources.  
 
6.  Considerations taken into account by the Government in deciding what requests to respond 
to include the contributions to be made by a project to: 
 
-  increasing the productive capacity of the recipient country; 
 
-  expanding employment opportunities there; 
 
-  improving the living conditions and welfare especially of people on lower incomes 
and in rural areas; 
 
-  safeguarding the interests of vulnerable groups such as women and increasing their 
capacity to contribute to development; 
 
and also the extent of popular participation in and support for the project.  
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16.20  Aid Advisory Committee 
 
Time limitations permit only a tentative assessment of the role of the Aid Advisory Committee. This 
committee was set up in 1975 by the Labour Government following an initiative of the Second Aid 
Conference of 1974 as a “watchdog” group to review the official development assistance programme 
of the New Zealand Government in the hope that it might succeed in improving the effectiveness and 
help to increase the volume of aid within the context of New Zealand's external relations. Undoubtedly 
the committee has concerned itself with many important issues and addressed many significant 
problems in the aid area36. 
 
In meeting the Team in February 1984 the committee expressed its concern that an increasing 
percentage of New Zealand aid was going only to the three New Zealand countries (Cook Islands, Niue 
and Tokelau) and together they received about 40 percent of the South Pacific aid vote. They were also 
concerned at the lack of certainty in the islands about where these countries were heading: what were 
their long term objectives? The Committee thought that we should be helping the Cook Islands, for 
example, to achieve the goals they had for the future (which are, in effect, the achievement of New 
Zealand standards of living). Members are appreciative of the important role that the Island 
communities on the mainland play and the many strong links they have back to the islands. The 
diversity of islander viewpoint in the communities needed to be recognised. Not only were there 
official committees of the different Pacific Islands communities, but organisations like “Pacifica” with 
20 branches were now playing a significant role. 
 
It is of course an excellent principle that members of the New Zealand community, including person 
who have had a wide experience in and programmes should take a keen or active interest in the official 
aid programme. The members are often well qualified in terms of their earlier involvement or interest 
in overseas aid and some have had considerable experience of Pacific or Asian countries; there is no 
doubting their interest in aid and keen desire to improve New Zealand's aid role. 
 
There do seem however, to be severe limitations to what the Committee can reasonably be expected to 
achieve. Aid questions are complex and difficult; as this chapter argues aid must be judged in the 
perspective of the political economy of a country and its particular process of economic evolution. Aid 
policies should be designed to fit the innovations into the local context, so that a very detailed 
understanding of the empirical conditions of a country as well as of macro-economic trends is often 
essential. Even with prior knowledge of a country, a good deal of reading of up-to-date information 
would be necessary; certainly much more than “reading the papers on the plane” on the way to a 
committee meeting. A major improvement has been the inclusion of some members of the Committee 
on overseas aid missions, which enables them to inspect an aid project on the ground. However it 
would appear that access of committee members to more recent information on countries and particular 
projects (including access to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Library before a meeting) and fuller 
briefing by EAO officials would be a considerable improvement. 
 
Some members of the Committee believe it is not performing a very effective role but are unable to 
identify the changes needed to improve that role. 
 
This comment is in no way intended to disparage the valuable work the Committee is undoubtedly 
doing, and the concerns of the Second Aid Conference for effective monitoring of ODA remain just as 
important today, ten years later. But aid administration, done properly, is a specialised, professional 
job, and it is unlikely that ad hoc, cursory, or very generalised approaches to evaluating it will achieve 
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much real understanding, or provide a serious yet constructive challenge to official policies. While 
there are no grounds for doubting the seriousness of the External Aid Division's approaches, it would 
not be difficult for skilled diplomats to “fob off” the Committee or to side-track them away from 
sensitive areas. The Team recommends that strong efforts be made at assisting the Committee to 
acquire the means to enable it to evaluate aid policies in more depth. 
 
16.21   The Administration of Aid 
 
It can be argued that the effective administration of aid from Wellington requires many ingredients: 
adequate numbers of competent staff (in 1983 EAD totalled 49 persons), experience and knowledge of 
island conditions, continuity of staff to acquire an understanding of island problems and to view project 
performance in some perspective, and good access to key data (such as population, import and export 
trade, copra output statistics etc.), and the best fieldwork analyses of island societies and cultures. As it 
is, a small group of hard working staff do their best to cope with a huge workload, which includes 
among the multitude of trivial tasks, working out and implementing a coherent and meaningful aid 
programme that is designed especially for each country's particular requirements and conditions37. 
 
The following exchange of comments indicate the nature of the problem:  From High Commissioner, 
Suva: 
 
“I am not prepared to go to yet another Western Pacific country 
and listen to snide comments by British officials about the 
inadequacy of our aid performance until the whole Western Pacific 
programme has been pulled together again. I have, therefore, 
cancelled my planned visit to Tuvalu in early May. I plan to come 
to Wellington during May to discuss programme with you: in my 
view, we have reached the point in the case of New Hebrides and 
Gilberts - and perhaps Tuvalu as well - where we either convince 
our government it should provide the manpower to administer the 
programmes adequately or cut them drastically and live with the 
consequences. For the record, the same point has to be made in 
respect of the regional programme. We should not go on raising 
expectations and dashing them in a regular cycle”. 
 
To this, External Aid Division responded:  
 
“More than administrative inadequacies at this end are involved. 
There is a basic issue of priorities. Apart from general protestations 
of goodwill, there are in practice few points of mutual interest New 
Zealand shares with the Western Pacific “little fellows” - Gilberts, 
Tuvalu, New Hebrides and until recently even the Solomons - apart 
from the aid relationship, and aid questions accordingly tend to 
dominate the horizon of post representatives beating the bounds of 
their parishes. But it is a fact of life that these tiny aid programmes 
must take second (or third) place to the maintenance of the 
substantial on-going aid operations with the major Pacific aid 
partners, in terms of priority of staffing and attention here. There is 
no point in talking about forcing Ministers to decide that desirable 
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aid objectives must be supported by adequate capability to 
implement those objectives. The immediate parallel is the question 
of the appropriate level of staffing and support for overseas posts if 
foreign policy aims are to be achieved. On both fronts there are 
unfortunately no black and white answers to either: the Ministry 
must do its best with the resources it is given. 
 
The snide comments of lame duck British colonial administrators, we 
would have thought, are surely something to take in your stride. When 
local Ministers make comments to you that New Zealand aid is so 
erratic or slow that they would rather we didn't try to help at all, then 
will be the time to get worried”.  
 
The aid relationship (with the New Hebrides, Britain and France) is simply a further demonstration of 
the hard lesson:  
 
“we have assimilated in the last four years from Bangladesh, 
Pakistan, Nepal, the Caribbean countries viz. that aid programmes 
in countries where there is no New Zealand post are a waste of 
money, time and tempers. Whether you like it or not, we are 
dependent on visits and discussions like yours for most of what 
little we can do to keep a programme stuttering along”38. 
 
Thus although the immediate problems were inadequate numbers of staff and chronic staff turnover, 
the basic problem was the relatively low priority of aid within the whole Ministry and within the aid 
programme, the low priority of the small aid programmes. In respect to improving this situation, the list 
of suggestions made at the beginning of this section would require more funds, but some involve 
merely reorganisation, more imagination, more continuity, and appropriate specialisation (such as the 
appointment of a Pacific specialist to the Library staff). Willingness of Foreign Affairs staff to say 
spend 10 years of their career within the South Pacific region, rather than alternating between say 
Bangkok, Apia and Ottawa at frequent intervals, is also required if a fully competent and professional 
aid bureaucracy, attuned to the up-to-date needs of the countries of the region, is to evolve. 
 
In spite of the generally effective work output of EAD, some administrative and policy changes would 
enhance its self-image and attractiveness to new recruits39. There is a feeling that staff members of 
EAD are “second class citizens” compared to the diplomatic corps. Entry to EAD is not quite so 
difficult as to the diplomatic corps. In Foreign Affairs, ability at political and economic reporting has 
highest priority; these are seen as the real skills, and aid in general is not considered as being so 
complex a matter. (This chapter has surely indicated the complexity and diversity of aid issues). A 
major problem for EAD in the past is that there has been no real career path to follow. Senior people 
have in the past come in from diplomatic posts to take the top positions   heads, deputy heads and even 
section heads. Only recently have career opportunities begun to appear for EAD appointees. No 
criticism is implied of these diplomatic staff; they are obviously people of considerable ability and 
experience, but the pattern is unfortunate for full time EAD appointees. This policy implicitly suggests 
either that aid is mostly political anyway, or lacks the complexity that demands specialisation, 
continuity and experience in the aid area. Some staff feel that aid has a low status compared to the 
diplomatic work of the Ministry and even within the aid area, the South Pacific region has the lowest 
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status. Certainly there is a high turnover of staff in EAD which suggests that a deeper enquiry is 
perhaps required. 
 
Some staff complain of the lack of continuity and failure to implement ideas already accepted. Some 
important, valuable innovations have occurred. “In house” reviews began with the last director of 
EAD. The introduction of the Planning and Evaluation Section provided the division with the 
opportunity to critically review the work that had been done. There is a feeling amongst some staff 
however that members of the division often “lack a feel” for the Pacific, “don't possess a political over-
view” or fully appreciate the constraints a country really suffers from. There is concern over the failure 
of some of the islands' scholarship schemes in New Zealand; now more of the pupils coming to New 
Zealand to be educated are the children of well educated people. And one of the largest pressures 
placed on staff is to “get the money spent” (e.g. in the Kiribati aid vote). The fact that there are large 
sums of money to spend takes precedence over project design or building up the understanding in the 
“pre-project” phase. 
 
It seems clear that of the six regional divisions of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the role of SPA (the 
South Pacific division) should be considered to be very important. As we have suggested elsewhere, if 
the administration of policy in the small dependent states is not to be transferred elsewhere to some 
other Government department, the scope of MFA's role needs to be widened to include in a thorough 
way the affairs and issues concerning the Pacific Islander communities in New Zealand and their links 
to the islands. And while it might be appropriate for some MFA staff to pass through SPA and move on 
to other diplomatic posts, the Team argues strongly for the development of in depth Pacific competence 
and experience by the appointment for lengthy periods (probably a whole career) of suitably sensitive 
people to the South Pacific Division. Such officers should be expected and encouraged to acquire 
specialised linguistic, cultural and economic knowledge for particular island groups or countries (some 
islanders in New Zealand might perhaps of course themselves be appointed to some of these positions). 
The Team also believes that the competence of the Ministry to analyse in depth the economic problems 
of the South Pacific should be strengthened by the appointment of one or two able economists to the 
Ministry to work on macro economic problems. 
 
While the general standards of professionalism in the Ministry and EAD appear to be high and the 
management competent there would seem to be scope for occasional “brain storming” sessions on aid 
policy, and at critical “watershed” times in islands' evolution (e.g. the 1975 aid mission to the Cook 
Islands) as well as frequent, normal sessions. This is because in any large organisation there is a danger 
that the “official culture” will become rather over-powering, pre-empting constructive thinking on 
alternative policy options, that policy positions will ossify and discourage fresh thinking and the 
possibility of flexible responses from Wellington to changing island needs. Such sessions must avoid 
the danger of “reifying” issues, foisting these on the islands, or “bureaucratising” approaches 
needlessly, but they would provide New Zealand representatives in the islands with more adequate 
back-up, contribute to esprit de corps and further advance the professionalism of the South Pacific 
Division and the External Aid Division. 
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16.22   Conclusions : Implications for Policy 
 
Aid is no longer a new phenomenon in New Zealand and it now runs the risk of institutionalisation, 
with increased standardisation of approaches and a loss of fresh thinking. This chapter has deliberately 
taken a broad comprehensive approach to aid to indicate its complexity and the diversity of issues that 
need to be addressed and the variety of responses that are required. Clearly a plurality of policies is 
needed, often within the one recipient country. It is argued that an empirical approach to aid is 
essential, that particularist aid policies adjusted to the precise circumstances of individual countries are 
needed, as well as aid programmes adjusted to each country's political economy. This calls for detailed 
country knowledge and an understanding of how aid can perform a strategic function rather than 
merely fill a gap. However for the smaller recipients - and especially the five small states studied in 
this report - the prime need is for aid in the form (and preferably relabelled) of subsidies. These policy 
proposals call for a highly professional and component aid bureaucracy with a good deal more in-depth 
knowledge and experience of actual island conditions than has been required of staff hitherto.  
 
It has been thought in the past that the main requirement to improve aid is the allocation of additional 
resources. However increased staff resources in recent years have shown this view to be fallacious. 
Improving the administration of aid is a complex issue, as well as being less important politically than 
was widely believed. A good deal more is needed than additional staff. While EAD is quite effective in 
its administration of aid in terms of spending as much as possible of an allocation in one year on 
reasonably sensible requests coming from the recipient governments, it has remained an essentially 
passive operation which does not encourage country specialisation, innovation or full economic 
analysis.  
 
That in-depth country knowledge is a powerful and rewarding asset that will lead to more effective aid 
can be demonstrated. How, for example, can knowledge of the Cook Islands (see Chapter 6) lead to 
better and more appropriate aid policies to that country? The country chapters (chapters 6 -10) 
demonstrate, we hope, the value of such knowledge. For example, appreciation that the Rarotonga 
Airport was designed essentially for tourist purposes, that there are inadequate storage facilities at the 
airport for pawpaw and other fresh produce, and that the day of the return flight to Auckland leads 
either to deterioration of the airfreighted fruit over the weekend before it reaches the shops on Monday, 
or requires the picking of fruit that are too green, shows that innovations are required that are not 
imposed from New Zealand but which meet local needs. And a review of the overall situation of 
Kiribati (Chapter 9) suggests the paramount importance for that country of its attempts to build up a 
tuna fishing industry, the coconut replanting campaign and a renewed family planning campaign. Aid 
in any of these three strategic areas, is likely to be much appreciated. However, with respect to the 
family planning campaign, aid designed according to pre-conceived ideas and other countries 
experience was a conspicuous failure when applied by the World Health Organisation whereas the 
earlier local campaign, which did not require the use of the European (instead of lunar) calendar and 
which was based on locally proven methods had been conspicuously successful. It is time that EAD 
based more of its aid policies on the lessons of experience, on an evolving corpus of solid fieldwork 
results and a deeper in-depth knowledge of its own South Pacific region.  
 
Of course New Zealand must always listen carefully to island requests and be flexible and responsive 
to their needs, but we suggest a more active partnership in a friendly informal way in assisting island 
governments to monitor their on-going developments, to analyse the functioning of the South Pacific 
macro economy, and the actual workings of each local island economy. Such joint, in-depth analyses 
would enable aid to be used in more functionally useful and appropriate ways, although the prime need 
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for the mirab economies, as indicated above will be predominantly social, to ensure the maintenance of 
living standards through continued budget support.  
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CHAPTER SEVENTEEN 
 
THE WIDER PACIFIC SCENE 
 
 
This report has been confined to five small Pacific states, but it is interesting to observe at the 
conclusion of the study, that parallel trends, similar to those identified above, appear to be occurring in 
a number of other Pacific island economies. There is much scattered evidence to suggest that the 
MIRAB economy does exist (and its consequences are thus to be expected) in several other larger 
South Pacific countries, undermining their economic autonomy and explaining in part, why 
"bootstraps' development has been so unsuccessful (Chapter 4). Table 16.3 (column 5) suggests, in a 
crude way, what a high proportion of the revenue base of these countries is contributed by external aid 
funding. Apart from aid flows the very substantial volume of remittances and the importance of other 
invisibles such as earnings from tourism and philatelic sales now appear to play a major role in the 
functioning of these island economies. In Western Samoa, for example, by 1973 money order transfers 
from New Zealand (exclusive of other forms of remittances) almost equalled the total of all agricultural 
exports combined.1 
 
In Tonga too, George Marcus has argued that a new kind of society based on a new kind of economy 
(that appears to be essentially MIRAB in type) has evolved in recent years. European penetration has 
added a larger dimension to an existing tendency for some local populations to view their social worlds 
in broad geographical terms and increased mobility and international dispersal of kin has furthered this 
process. Post contact elites became or remained elites by attending to this new horizon of social 
definition. Initially old elites had an advantage in assimilating and interpreting changes for their local 
populations. But as Marcus points out:2 
 
"....eventually their own character as elites also changed as their 
functions became defined by foreign derived political and 
economic institutions, which brought them into closer emulative 
and subordinate relations with colonial powers than the rest of 
their population."3 
 
While the nation state model and identity is the way that metropolitan or "core' states view the 
periphery, it is only one way amongst others that peripheral elites view their own conditions or position 
in the world.  
 
Given the lack of resources in the islands and the few opportunities that exist for creating income and 
improving status it is entirely understandable that there has been an "internationalisation' of Tongan 
culture since about 1965. By 1980 there were significant concentrations of Tongans in New Zealand 
(especially Auckland), Australia, Fiji and the United States (Hawaii, California and Utah), and a few in 
Britain. With the colonisation of niches of economic opportunity dispersed in different countries a 
Tongan kindred becomes truly multinational. Actual outcomes, of course, depend on how well 
individual migrants do and how strongly they maintain their ties with relatives at home. "Resources' in 
this international field of operations can be identified as jobs, property, positions, reputation and 
influence with local authorities. Up till now the main focus for the network of kinsmen has been 
primarily towards the homeland, but this could conceivably shift in the future to a metropolitan locale, 
or to an approximately equal balance between several locations.  
 - 403 -
  
 
 
 - 404 -
The broad geographical perspective of elites is, of course, nowhere better illustrated than the example 
of the King of Tonga, Tupou IV. In an attempt to gain leverage in a world of more powerful states he 
has conducted negotiations with private individuals and government representatives in the United 
States, Australia, New Zealand, Japan, India, Saudi Arabia, the USSR and Libya. The numerous 
negotiations  (and friendships appear to be designed to find a large investor to subsidise Tongan 
development and replace diffuse dependency perhaps by a narrower kind of clientage. Such a strategy 
obviously involves many risks as well as benefits.  
 
In general, the international dimension of networks of kinsmen enables elites to choose between 
various options of maximising resources, status and power. The broad based economic mobility gives 
the elites more leverage for their operations in peripheral societies. And those who do not migrate, but 
remain in the islands, are less likely to improve their position unless they forge links with migrant kin 
overseas.  
 
One of the most interesting examples of an island society maximising its options internationally is 
provided by the Banaba people, who were resettled from the phosphate-rich Ocean Island (Banaba) to 
Rabi Island in Fiji. The Banaba people have operated in several contexts to "touch' all their options 
without foreclosing any. Indeed deft handling by Banaban leaders has characterised their international 
relations (which included record breaking litigation in the Privy Council)4 while at the same time, they 
have maintained their identity both as a people under colonial rule in Fiji and as owners of their 
economically-rich homeland.5 
 
The extent to which the MIRAB economy exists in these other countries remains an interesting 
problem for future research, since it will have a critical bearing on the choice of policies. Two major 
trends - the migration of islanders throughout the Pacific Basin, and the continued penetration of island 
economies by metropolitan capitalist forces -   suggest a gradual decline of relatively autarchic island 
economies and growing interdependency with Pacific rim countries.  
 
In a recent series of studies on Pacific Islands' migration John Connell has pointed out that over 10 
percent of Pacific Islanders (with the exception of Papua New Guineans) now live in a metropolitan 
country of the Pacific rim   that is, Australia, New Zealand, the United States or Canada.6 Pacific 
migration has now reached a level that makes it very significant in historical or world terms, since it 
involves number which are much more significant to the populations remaining at home than the 
movement of almost any people, with the exception, perhaps, of the Irish at the time of the great potato 
famine. The map on migration patterns produced by Connell (Fig. 17.1) conveys some idea of the 
significance of this movement. As many as 40,000 Tongans now live in New Zealand, Australia, and 
the United States. By 1972 the authorities in Pago Pago (concluded that approximately 500 people 
were leaving American Samoa every year and that American Samoans already resident in Hawaii and 
the American mainland outnumbered those in their island home by almost two to one.7 Thousands of 
Fijians (mostly Indian) apply every year for resident visas in Canada, the United States and Australia. 
Auckland has the largest concentration of Polynesian people in the whole South Pacific. And 
Vancouver is now Fiji's third largest city, since 20,000 Fijians (90 percent of whom are Fiji Indians) 
now live there. It is interesting to learn that such characteristically Fijian names as "Lautoka' and 
"Sigatoka' are now appearing in the names of businesses on Vancouver streets.8 Increasingly the 
pastures outside the islands seem to be becoming greener to many hopeful, would be migrants. Only 
the many entry restrictions and immigration barriers in the metropolitan countries prevent this sizeable 
movement from becoming a flood.  
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CHAPTER EIGHTEEN 
 
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
 
In initiating the present study, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs suggested that “a comprehensive study 
be made of the economic and social problems and potential of selected South Pacific mini-states with 
a view to assessing costs, benefits, consistency and effectiveness of current New Zealand policies as 
these bear on these states and whether these policies need modification in order more effectively to 
achieve our national objective.” 
 
The national objective specified by the Ministry was “the promotion of stable, democratic and well-
disposed governments and societies within our neighbouring South Pacific States”; and the “mini-
states” selected for the study were Kiribati, Tuvalu, Niue, Tokelau and the Cook Islands. 
 
In carrying out such a wide ranging study within the limited space of seven months, January to July 
1984, the Institute of Policy Studies team has, of necessity, been selective in its coverage of topics, 
and a number of major issues have had to be passed over, especially in the area of defence priorities. 
Our focus has been on gaining a clearer understanding of the actual workings of the five societies 
chosen, and on using that understanding to review the broad lines of New Zealand policy in the areas 
of constitutional evolution, economic development and social policy. Our central conclusion is that 
the shortcomings of New Zealand policy lie mainly in the premises on which it has been based, 
especially during the past decade and a half. A number of recommendations follow from this. 
 
The policy assumptions which, in our view, need to be critically re-examined, are the following: 
 
1. That the natural course of constitutional evolution is towards independence, and that even 
limited steps towards political integration between the island mini states and New Zealand are 
to be seen as retrograde rather than progressive. 
 
2. That “economic development”, meaning the promotion of commodity production onshore in the 
island territories, should be a central goal of policy. 
 
3. That “development aid” is preferable to budgetary support   in other words, that there is a better 
case for subsidising investment in the islands than for subsidising consumption. 
 
4. That the viability or otherwise of island societies and economies should be assessed on the basis 
that the islands are autonomous, isolated entities rather than integral parts of a wider Pacific 
community including mainland New Zealand. 
 
Propositions advanced in the body of the report on these four areas may be summarised as follows: 
 
1. There is no doubt that the island peoples have welcomed, and benefited from, a greater degree 
of political autonomy; and it is clear that a sense of local identity is vital to the political 
cultures of the small island states. It does not follow that completely autonomous self 
government or sovereign independence are the proper goals for policy in the long run. Self 
government constitutions in the Cook Islands and Niue, continued dependent status for 
Tokelau, and independence in Tuvalu and Kiribati, need to be seen as experiments rather than 
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final answers.1 Avenues should therefore be kept open for these peoples to reassess their 
constitutional status in the future, and New Zealand policy makers should keep in mind that 
New Zealand and the United Kingdom bear a substantial part of the responsibility for the paths 
of constitutional evolution followed by their former colonial territories. In particular, New 
Zealand has been responsible in the past for closing off limited political integration as an 
option; this restriction should not be retained in future constitutional negotiations. These issues 
are canvassed at length in Chapter 3. 
 
2. Onshore commodity production in the island mini societies has very limited prospects for 
expansion under the prevailing regime of resource endowment and relative prices. The 
economies covered by this report are not export led, but are rather driven by current- account 
invisible flows, which to a large extent may be summarised as rent income: remittances, 
budgetary support, philatelic revenues and tourism earnings. Commodity imports greatly 
exceed commodity exports in value, but this trade deficit gives no indication of the overall 
balance-of-payments position, which is strong in all five of our cases. As usual in rent-driven 
economies (the OPEC countries are the best known examples), production of tradeable goods 
is unprofitable at prevailing relative prices; and prevailing relative prices are reinforced, not 
undermined, by the balance of payments position. The establishment of profitable capitalist 
productive enterprise on any significant scale would require a substantial reduction in the 
standard and quality of life in the village economy (since a low-wage proletariat would have to 
be created), and a radical re structuring of aid flows to provide permanent subsidies to the rate 
of profit. Both changes would tend to be subversive of the achievements of the past three 
decades in social and political terms, and would require changes in New Zealand policies on 
labour mobility which would be politically explosive in New Zealand itself. Economic and aid 
policy would better be directed towards maintenance and enhancement of a status quo which 
has a great deal to recommend it, and which is not unduly burdensome to New Zealand 
taxpayers (especially since a large body of those taxpayers are migrant islanders making a 
large contribution to New Zealand income and output.) These issues are canvassed in Chapters 
5, 6 and 7. 
 
3. Following from the preceding point, the case for assured and continuing subsidisation of living 
standards in the mini-states is much stronger than the case for so called “overseas development 
assistance” (ODA). The current practice of subsuming budgetary support under ODA is 
misguided and has led to the adoption of inappropriate procedures and priorities - notably the 
expectation that “development” should lead to a backing out of budgetary support over time, 
and a shift from three year forward programmes to a system of annual reviews of aid levels, 
which substantially reduces the real autonomy and flexibility of recipient governments. 
Standard of living subsidies are an intrinsic part of the “special relationship” between New 
Zealand and the Cook Islands, Niue and Tokelau. Those subsidies should be explicitly 
guaranteed and provided for, and should not be subject to erosion by so called “ODA”.  They 
should be approved and administered separately from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs' external 
aid vote, and the expenditure of the funds by recipient governments should be accounted for to 
the New Zealand Parliament by the authorities in the islands.  
 
The nature of New Zealand's relationship with Tuvalu is evolving in a direction which makes 
it appropriate to consider the possible establishment of a formal “free association” contract 
between the two countries, similar to those already established with Niue and the Cook 
Islands. Tuvalu is a small Polynesian country which already has strong and growing links with 
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New Zealand. The population of about 8,000 receive about $1,000 per capita of aid from 
various sources, and the central thrust of this aid is the maintenance of current consumption 
rather than the promotion of high yielding investment projects. It would not be too onerous for 
New Zealand to take a greater role in underwriting the well-being and security of this nation, 
and providing some greater opportunities for migrant labour than currently exist. The 
negotiation of some constitutional link to ensure proper discussion and accountability, and to 
provide Tuvalu with some direct input into New Zealand policy formation, would be useful in 
this case as in the cases of the Cook Islands and Niue. In all such cases, an obvious first step is 
the establishment of a select committee or similar body in the New Zealand Parliament as a 
standing committee concerned explicitly with monitoring, protecting, and if necessary 
renegotiating, the various contracts of free association. 
 
The historical responsibility for Kiribati and Tuvalu rests with the United Kingdom. New 
Zealand should continue to use diplomatic means to persuade the UK to maintain long-run 
financial support for both societies, even if the relationship between New Zealand and Tuvalu 
becomes a closer one as suggested in the preceding paragraph. It is assumed that Australia will 
play a larger role in the future in support for Kiribati. 
 
In operating a system of living-standards subsidies through budgetary support or other means, 
the levels of subsidy should be agreed for some years in advance, and should be inflation 
proofed by an agreed formula. Any reduction in the level of island reliance upon subsidies 
from New Zealand, once these have been agreed, should be the result either of island initiative, 
or explicit decisions by the New Zealand Parliament. New Zealand officials should cease 
pressuring island governments to reduce their aid dependence in aggregate terms. 
 
Insofar as the New Zealand Parliament and the island governments feel that productive 
commercial activity should be encouraged within the village economy, there is obvious scope 
for the flow of financial subsidies to be diverted in part from bureaucratic salaries towards 
producer price supports. This is already beginning to occur in Tokelau as a result of local 
initiative, through the Community Services Levy and the copra price support scheme; it is also 
implicitly the basis of the Aitutaki banana trade, which depends upon continuing subsidisation 
of the Joint Shipping Service. Such a switch in emphasis should not, however, be unilaterally 
imposed from Wellington, and it should be recognised that the goal pursued by such subsidies 
is basically a social one (relating to the structure of economic opportunities in island society) 
rather than the promotion of so-called “viable” economies. If island production or island 
generated revenue increases in any particular year, aid should not be reduced by the full 
amount of the increased local revenue as current policy tends to suggest. 
 
4. The assumption by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of responsibility for relations with the 
island mini societies has imposed strong lines of demarcation between islanders resident in the 
islands, and those resident in New Zealand. Island societies - especially those of Niue, the 
Cook Islands and Tokelau - need to be viewed as organic wholes, including all members of the 
island community wherever resident. The present strong separation in New Zealand policy 
between migrants and island residents is not conducive to good policy making, and should be 
reduced. In the field of social welfare, this implies serious consideration for measures such as 
portability of National Superannuation to those island societies with which a “special 
relationship” has been established. In the field of administration it suggests that there may be 
benefits from the establishment of an entity responsible for the overall affairs of the islander 
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communities. (The recent establishment of a Ministry of Pacific Affairs is a promising 
innovation in the right direction). The Ministry of Foreign Affairs should not, in our view, take 
an unsympathetic stand on initiatives of this sort. At the very least, the South Pacific Affairs 
division of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs should have more flexibility in dealing with island 
communities within New Zealand as well as abroad, and should explicitly be freed from any 
requirement to apply in the Pacific mini societies the guiding principles of foreign policy in 
New Zealand's relationships with large independent nations   including the larger nation states 
of the Pacific area. The mini societies are special cases and should be treated as such; the 
pursuit of appropriate policies should not be hindered by any need to pay lip service to 
fashionable dogmas drawn from elsewhere. In this connection, New Zealand may have an 
important role in shielding the mini societies from incursions by the large international 
agencies. 
 
The criteria for “viable societies” in the mini-states should take account of their integration 
with other political units in the region, and especially New Zealand. “Self sufficiency” is both 
an unrealistic and an inappropriate goal for policy in societies which have made a whole 
hearted commitment to the development of open economies. Far more important is to 
maximise the gains to both parties from the close integration between the islands and the 
metropolitan economies. Again, there appear to be arguments for incorporating Tuvalu into the 
same sort of economic integration with New Zealand as already exists with the Cook Islands, 
Niue and Tokelau; this would involve changes mainly in immigration policy, with very limited 
probable impact on the New Zealand labour market. 
 
 Some Other Conclusions. 
 
1. The objectives of aid policy, and the selection of appropriate aid “projects” or programmes, 
need to be based upon careful in-depth analysis of the political economies of individual 
recipient countries. This is especially true in the small Pacific societies covered by this report, 
because of the great weight of aid relative to other sources of local incomes and because of the 
close links with New Zealand (which make these societies the logical test cases for New 
Zealand's commitment to designing appropriate and effective aid packages). Although the 
existing External Aid Division is hard-working and competent, there may be a need for more 
fresh thinking, flexibility, in-depth analysis at both the micro level and the macro-economic 
level of aid impact in small economies. 
 
This report has challenged the application of the conventional “modernisation” model of 
development in the context of these small, unique cultures and environments. Many large 
development projects in the Pacific exhibit the ethnocentric and technocratic biasses of the 
international aid “establishment”, with a tendency to start from preconceived assumptions 
about local conditions, needs and responses. 
 
The Team believes that EAD could readily develop the skills, experience and concept to avoid 
these pitfalls, as it already has done to some extent. Effective aid for any one country requires 
the avoidance of stereotypes and a clear understanding of the local context. The in depth 
background knowledge, and accumulated experience, which this implies, can be acquired and 
deployed only if EAD is properly organised, with improved status relative to the diplomatic 
divisions of MFA, and a career structure which encourages professional specialisation in (for 
example) the South Pacific nations. 
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2. An important element in understanding the dynamics of present day island societies and 
economies is the emergence of the Pacific Basin economy as an integrated whole, within 
which island kin groups operate as transnational rather than national entities. Both labour and 
finance are highly mobile, but at the same time strong links between migrant family members 
and “home” seem likely to endure for at least the next generation or two. Migration remittance 
systems should therefore be viewed as persistent, rather than temporary, phenomena; and the 
implications of such systems need to be taken account of in designing policies at both national 
and regional levels. In particular, we would make the points that  
 
(a) None of the island societies, even the smallest ones, are likely to become totally 
depopulated on a voluntary basis, and policies encouraging depopulation would 
unavoidably require forced resettlement, which we assume to be unacceptable. 
Evacuation or abandonment are not, we therefore assume, realistic policy options. 
 
(b) The rapidly increasing migration-remittance links between the South Pacific and the 
west coast of North America (United States and Canada) is the major new element in 
the regional situation, and must imply an increasing orientation of Forum countries 
towards the United States. In fisheries negotiations and regional defence issues, 
therefore, consideration of migration-remittance links with the USA are likely to bulk 
larger in the future than trade links per se. 
 
(c) In general, it is the Polynesian societies (with which New Zealand is most closely 
involved) which have proceeded furthest down the migration-remittance path. 
 
(d) Island societies which lack migration outlets face the possible emergence of a reserve 
army of surplus labour if population growth is not checked; of our five Kiribati is the 
most likely candidate.  
 
3. Economic and social forces continue to run counter to political fragmentation in the region, 
and sovereign political independence, even where established, may not always prove 
sustainable in the long run. Nor is it clear that a “balkanisation” model, comprising a large 
number of individually weak “nation states” of doubtful viability, is a desirable objective for 
policy, despite the strong thrust of international diplomatic conventional wisdom. 
 
We have noted that in the last decade New Zealand's exports to the South Pacific islands have 
grown substantially. The trade “imbalance” which was two to one in New Zealand's favour 
before SPARTECA (designed to improve access to New Zealand and Australia for island 
exports) increased to three to one after it came into force in 1982-83. It seems abundantly clear 
that Australian exports to the region have grown dramatically too over the last two decades, 
while the number and activity of multinational corporations (often equivalent in power to 
medium sized countries) which have moved into the region have increased. More significantly, 
with the slowing down of the United States economy since the late 1960s, “global 
corporations” have emerged which have incorporated the South Pacific along with other 
regions in their field of activity2. 
 
Clearly these significant economic influences have had major political consequences. Recently 
Tony Hughes has argued in “Independence for Sale” that a combination of domestic and 
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external pressures will draw the independence of island states (whether achieved or aimed at) 
out into an international marketplace in which “freedom of government action, access to 
natural resources and military bases are traded for money, goods and various forms of politico   
military assistance”.  In this new situation the critical issues for the small states, he argues, are 
about3 
 
“... the amount of independence they are prepared to 
market, the terms they can get for it, and the extent to which 
they can perceive, and protect, a mutual interest in the 
South Pacific region beyond their narrower national 
concerns.” 
 
We have raised the significance of such issues as defence and fisheries which have 
international or geopolitical importance and which critically affect the independence of 
individual states, as well as raising the corollary issue of regionalism. Islanders have, of 
course, long since found out that the mere lowering and raising of flags have not led to 
financial or economic independence, and the ambivalence of development planning (section 
16.17) shows that islanders have found it necessary to follow a course of ideological 
pragmatism. We have indeed argued (section 5.8) that too much emphasis on the dangers of 
“dependency” is not very helpful in a South Pacific setting, for island governments have found 
themselves able to accommodate the facts of life in order to avoid drastic and unacceptable 
reduction in living standards. Perhaps a “Costa Rican” situation provides a model. Regional 
cooperation would be gradually strengthened and although “dependency” would persist, there 
is the prospect of maintaining peace, stability, a considerable degree of local identity, and 
reasonable living standards. 
 
It has been noted however that the comfortable, flexible conditions of the 1970s are now 
passing away   the period in which the metropolitan countries have been ready to 
accommodate elastic arrangements that met the island states' need to feel, and as far as 
possible be, politically independent. A harsher reality4 is, regrettably, more likely to ensue in 
the next decade: 
 
 
“We are probably witnessing the start of the second 
‘scramble for the Pacific’, just a hundred years after the first 
such carve up. This time populous and powerful Asian 
nations will join those of America and Europe, together with 
multinational corporations based around the world ... targeted 
on natural resource exploitation. At the same time the South 
Pacific peoples, rapidly increasing in number, bombarded by 
the communications media and bullied by the trades unions 
of metropolitan countries, have embraced aspirations that far 
outstrip the economic growth attainable from their own 
domestic resources. The South Pacific island states will be 
hard pressed to find the will power to resist the squeeze that 
will be exerted on them from all sides. It is quite possible that 
the next ten years will see most of the apparent political gains 
of the 1970s evaporating under economic and financial 
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pressures, and the emergence of a series of client states in the 
South Pacific, each beholden to one or more of the outside 
powers, just as effectively as they ever were in colonial 
days.”5 
 
Already, disputes over fisheries rights, French nuclear testing, the recognition of nuclear free 
zones, research into deepwater seabed resources, and independence in New Caledonia promise 
a difficult future. If the above prediction is at all accurate, it will be important for New 
Zealand to protect as far as it can the small Pacific States, to encourage regional initiatives that 
might build up collective strength, and to provide friendly assistance to them as they try to 
cope with insistent external pressures. Indeed this makes it even more imperative, as we 
argued in Chapter 1, for New Zealand to renew the task of “working out a relationship” with 
the peoples of the South Pacific. 
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APPENDIX ONE 
 
COCONUT REPLANTING IN TOKELAU 
 
 
Coconut palms reach maximum productivity at 20 to 40 years. It is estimated by the 
Director of Agriculture that up to 30 or 40 percent of the palms in Tokelau are 50 to 60 
years old and are steadily declining in yield. Nukunono is worst affected by senile palms 
and overcrowding of palms is characteristic. It is important that the numbers of palms 
that are becoming senile and declining in yield be replaced by at least an equal number of 
new plantings. Thus the Department of Agriculture has launched a programme to replant 
at least 2000 trees per year on each island at a total of $2000-3000 excluding wages. 
 
The Department has a team on each of the three islands, comprised of four staff members 
and several casual labourers. The intention is that the Department will establish the 
nurseries and layout and the land owners will dig the holes and do the actual planting. 
However in collecting seed nuts for the nurseries the people chose nuts from trees that 
bore a large number of small nuts, whereas the Department sought much larger nuts, even 
if the number per palm was less. The plan is to space the palms at 21 x 25 feet, or about 
80 trees per acre, on the assumption that this plantation model transposed from large 
islands would yield a larger supply of coconuts per unit area. 
 
On Atafu a lot of thinning of palms has occurred on the islet of Telaulahi which was 
overcrowded and some planting has been done. A good deal of planting has been carried 
out on the private land of Teoki islet. In all, over 1000 trees have been planted since 
1980. 
 
On Fakaofo, one communal islet, Fenatatu has been replanted and Mulifanua has been 
started. The Department's only agricultural extension officer is based on this atoll and he 
has had a big impact. For this reason the programme has gone well on Fakaofo and 
between 3000 and 3500 palms have been planted to date. 
 
On Nukunono only 500-600 trees have been replanted. The outboard motor on the new 
departmental boat has repeatedly broken down. The mechanic on the island could not 
repair it and after sending it to Apia for repair it continued to break down, requiring a 
new one to be purchased. This trouble involved a period of several months. However, the 
people of Nukunono have shown that "they are not interested' in replanting the communal 
lands. The Director of Agriculture appealed to the Village Council for support but 
"nothing has happened". 
 
The Village Council could assist by telling the land owners to work with the 
departmental team, or it could ask the aumaga to do the work. The Director of 
Agriculture didn't really know why they haven't helped. He pointed out that the typical 
Tokelauan is a fisherman rather than a planter: "He assumes that coconuts will grow 
anyway, so there is no need to have a replanting campaign'.  The Director also thought 
that suspicion of the TPS was another reason for the lack of assistance. 
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The replanting campaign illustrates precisely how public service activity is viewed by the 
islanders: except on Fakaofo where an influential extension officer was based, the people 
were apathetic: since it was a large public service programme it warranted little concern 
or effort on their part. The TPS and its activities are seen as a thing a part, almost as if it 
is a foreign institution, devised and directed by Wellington, rather than a service meant to 
serve a public in the islands. The different views between villagers and the Department 
on seed nuts also illustrates the division, yet most Tokelauans would agree on the 
desirability of replacing aged palms with new plantings. When it was suggested that a 
completely fresh approach might be worth contemplating - of appealing directly to the 
Fono and enlisting their interest and their direction to the task of replanting - it was 
agreed that such an approach would in all likelihood, be successful. Responsibility for the 
task would be accepted by the Fono, it would become their scheme, and they would ask 
the aumaga to carry out the work. In such a way it is more likely that the full energies of 
the neo traditional system would be brought to bear and the Department would merely 
assist with inputs and technical advice where required. 
 
It is possible however that scepticism by islanders of the Department's assumptions might 
not be ill founded. Thus while the wide, regular spacing of the replanted palms should 
give more nuts per palm, the much lower density of palms per hectare means that the 
total yield of nuts might be no greater than given by the large number of low yielding 
palms in typical village groves. Indeed the approach is not based on any trial plot 
experiments carried out in the Tokelaus. Indeed knowledge on ideal spacings and other 
aspects of coconut husbandry is extremely scanty on a Pacific wide basis and the Kiribati 
and Tuvalu coconut replanting programme has not led to an increase in yield from palms 
planted 12 years ago. It is argued convincingly by Trewren (1983) that nutritional 
deficiencies are a major limiting factor and that fertilisation with several nutrients would 
lead to a huge increase in yield. It is recommended that K. Trewren be invited to visit the 
Tokelaus to collect leaf material and soil samples for analysis and to advise the 
Department of Agriculture on replanting. With respect to replanting it is imperative that 
the Tokelauans avoid the many mistakes made in the ethnocentric, bureaucratic campaign 
carried out in Kiribati (see Section 9.10 above) and attempt to approach the problem by 
enlisting the interest of the Fono and working through the appropriate local institutions.  
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APPENDIX TWO 
 
IMPROVED COMMUNICATION: THE CONSTRUCTION OF AIRSTRIPS IN TOKELAU 
 
 
Improved communications has been seen as desirable in order to facilitate political 
development. Thus such a step as relocating the public service on the islands has been 
considered impracticable until communications are much better (Corner 1984: 27). It appears 
that the construction of three airstrips is contemplated for a land based air service. In 
November 1983 officials visited the three islands to undertake the necessary on-the-ground 
surveys and in the April 1984 Fono a debate was held on the proposal to go ahead with the 
airstrip construction. Only a brief note appeared in Te Vakai and the many considerations, both 
benefits and costs, of the proposals were not set out. It was, in fact, presented as an unmitigated 
blessing: 
 
"Obtaining an airstrip will be a tremendous era as it will provide 
instant contact of Tokelau to its people living abroad. So let us 
hope and pray that God will be executing this hope in the near 
future for Tokelau as a whole."* 
 
 
The issue was discussed on the radio link with the Faipule. Fakaofo was most concerned at the 
loss of coconut palms and wanted consideration of an alternative site. Atafu was also 
concerned with disadvantages over the loss of palms but on balance favoured an airstrip. Atafu 
and Nukunonu saw the advantages of improved communication, such as facilitating the 
movement of patients to hospital in Apia, and inter island meetings of politicians and public 
servants. 
 
However the unforeseen consequences of such a major innovation are likely to be great. While 
isolation might be a great handicap in many ways it has to date protected the islands from 
many undesirable influences. Once a regular air service is operating the islands will become 
part of the circuit of the international aid "experts' and have to cope with their preconceived 
schemes that are rarely designed for atoll environments. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
* Te Vakai, December 1983: 3 4. 
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CHAPTER SUMMARIES 
 
CHAPTER 1 
NEW ZEALAND IN THE SOUTH PACIFIC 
 
 
1. In 1962 Frank Corner argued for a major new basis and direction in New Zealand foreign 
policy, focussing more on the South Pacific. Twenty years later it is clear that the South 
Pacific should be one of the principal regions in the world requiring consistent in-depth 
analysis by New Zealand.  
 
2. Planning the constitutional or political development of island nations should not be done 
in a vacuum, or as an autonomous exercise carried on largely separately from the 
economic and social basis of island life.  
 
3. “Modernisation theory” was greatly boosted and given widespread credibility in the 
1950's and 1960's, the period of decolonisation. It was believed that new countries could 
advance equally rapidly on all fronts  -  politically, economically and socially. This view 
of underdevelopment was simplistic, and too little attention was paid to the pecularities 
of place, time and process, including the growing links between island societies and New 
Zealand.  
 
4. New Zealand was acutely conscious of international pressure, and very concerned that its 
image at the United Nations (as a colonial power setting its dependent territories on the 
right path to self-government or independence) should remain good.  
 
5. The evolution of a new kind of multinational society, with an economy based on 
reciptorcal relationships among the dispersed members of kin groups, is the main trend 
of the past couple of decades in the five small countries studied. We have labelled this 
the “MIRAB society” (migration-remittance-aid-bureaucracy.  New Zealand 
policymakers have not always appreciated the full implications of the existence of such 
societies. 
 
6. South Pacific regionalism is important, but is still a fragile creation. Since the pursuit of 
nationalism in a narrow parochial way can weaken regionalism, some balancing of 
national and regional interests is required. However, the establishment of stable and 
contented island societies must be the primary aim.  
 
7. The establishment of the South Pacific Forum in 1971 was a breakthrough in 
relationships that were often distorted by the old inequalities. The institution remains the 
best hope for effective regional action in the years ahead.  
 
8. Corner found that New Zealand's administering attitudes had often been “muddled”.  
Although New Zealand's record in Western Samoa had been, on the whole, good, Corner 
pointed to five basic weaknesses. It would appear that some of these basic weaknesses 
still characterise New Zealand policy to some extent, although improvements have 
clearly occurred.  
 
9. Work on island matters usually has low status in New Zealand government departments 
and is given low priority or done in an ad hoc way. A lack of continuity often still occurs. 
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Few staff in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs show long term commitment to South 
Pacific affairs, or desire to acquire a deep knowledge or linguistic ability. Many staff 
pass rapidly through a Pacific post to move on to “higher things” in more attractive 
postings in Europe or elsewhere. Persistence of dismissive attitudes in some Government 
departments suggests that New Zealanders continue to equate smallness with 
insignificance. It suggests that New Zealand does not fully accept that it is a part of the 
South Pacific or fully accept the requirements of its role in the region. It illustrates that 
New Zealand still has some way to go “in working out a relationship” in an effective way 
with South Pacific peoples.  
 
10. Nine objectives of New Zealand policy makers are identified. Of these, the stability of 
island states and security of the region are probably the most important.  
 
11. New Zealand has been most successful in the area of social policy. The social conditions 
established by New Zealand in the Cook Islands and Niue and since improved by the 
local administrations are unrivalled in the South Pacific.  
 
12. The key questions about the future of the South Pacific hinge on the place of the region 
in world power politics and its degree of strategic importance in the Pacific Basin as a 
whole. 
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CHAPTER 2 
POPULATION AND SOCIETY 
 
 
1. In 1981, there were 90,000 Pacific islanders residing in New Zealand. 
 
2. The populations of our five small states total 91,000, or 125,000 if the populations living 
in New Zealand are included. 71 percent of the total Niuean community live on the 
mainland compared to 57 percent of the Cook Islands community and 57 percent of the 
Tokelauans. Between 39 and 44 percent of the communities living in New Zealand were 
born on the mainland. 
 
3. All five of the small states are extremely small in land area; Tuvalu has only 24 km2 of 
land and Tokelau 12.2 km2. 
 
4. Three of the five small states are dispersed across vast ocean areas - Tuvalu covers 
900,000 km2 while the Cook Islands (1,830,000 km2) and Kiribati (3,550,000 km2) are 
the most widely dispersed countries in the world. This makes communication very 
difficult and sea transport very expensive. 
 
5. Three of the five small countries have very high population densities by world standards 
- about one hectare of land per capita or less. In Tuvalu there is only 0.29 hectares per 
capita. Population pressure is very high in a few of the islands in Kiribati. The Tuvalu 
population grew by 42 percent from 1972-81, and it is feared that the Kiribati population 
has recently grown substantially. 
 
6. Since World War II several island groups have been integrated more fully into the New 
Zealand economy and the main growth pole for the central South Pacific has been 
located in New Zealand. In this period the mobility of islanders has greatly increased; 
they have come to see that their old island no longer confines them, their new “island” is 
the whole South Pacific. 
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CHAPTER 3 
 
DECOLONISATION AND NATIONHOOD 
 
1. Decolonisation was only the latest of a series of externally inspired and directed 
processes of social engineering in the Pacific. The evolution of political institutions has 
not been closely related to, or based on, the underlying social and economic forces at 
work in the islands. Nor should we accept without severe qualification the suggestion 
that the modern constitutional order originated in “the freely expressed wishes of the 
Island people”, which it did not. 
 
2. The post colonial political order has nevertheless turned out rather different from some 
of the expectations held by New Zealand policymakers of the 1960s. There has been a 
mutual accommodation between Westminster institutions and Island realities; outside 
political reformers were usually content to change the forms of political life without 
mounting any parallel attack on the key elements of the social and economic “base”.  It is 
therefore inappropriate to see the Islands as passive or “dependent” victims of New 
Zealand's policy dictates. Political development has been an authentic feature of the past 
three decades. 
 
3. Strictly, “decolonisation' means merely the end of colonialism. In practice, however, it 
has meant the implementation of the nationalist programme developed by Asian and 
African liberation movements, and espoused from 1960 on by the United Nations 
General Assembly, particularly in Resolution 1514 of 1960. The more flexible 
Resolution 1541, passed at the same time, opened the way for the concept of “free 
association” as an alternative to full independence, but the winds of international 
diplomatic opinion strongly favoured the latter course. 
 
4. The New Zealand Government at an early stage set its sights on “free association” as the 
best answer to the decolonisation problem in the Cook Islands, Niue and Tokelau. Since 
1962, the aim of New Zealand officials has been to persuade the inhabitants of those 
territories to opt for this solution and to eschew alternatives. The argument has rested 
heavily upon the alleged unattractiveness of those alternatives: full independence, 
because of the loss of prized links to New Zealand; integration, because island identity 
would be submerged; and colonial status because of international hostility to 
colonialism. 
 
5. It has been common to conceive of the various options as lying along a single continuum, 
from “colonial” status to full independence, so that “free association” could be seen as a 
halfway house. An alternative way of viewing the choice is to treat the four main options 
as points of a political compass. This has two important corollaries. In the first place, 
each general alternative is recognised to cover a wide menu of possible specific 
outcomes. (For example, integration could take the form of a unitary state without local 
autonomy, or of a federal arrangement with substantial local governmental autonomy.) In 
the second place, a community which sets its political course towards “free association” 
is not thereby necessarily heading towards sovereign independence. This latter point has 
commonly been missed by New Zealand commentators, including many in the Ministry 
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of Foreign Affairs. There is a tendency in the MFA to treat freely associated states as 
though they were independent. 
 
6. “Free association” is nevertheless an ambiguous status, resting as it does upon a special 
relationship freely agreed between two communities, which can last only so long as both 
partners are willing. Either partner can unilaterally put an end to the association. 
 
7. Integration as an option for New Zealand's dependent territories has been ruled out 
primarily by domestic New Zealand political considerations, and has never been 
seriously discussed with the Island countries, some or all of which could well have been 
interested in joining a loose federation with New Zealand. New Zealand officials have 
rendered integration unattractive by insisting on a narrow and extreme reading of the 
letter of UN Resolution 1541.  
 
Soundings taken in the Cook Islands, Niue and Tokelau in April-May 1984 indicate that 
integration should not be overlooked as a possibility for the future, although the Cook 
Islands elite, in particular, are currently pursuing a different course. 
 
8. During the decolonisation discussions of the 1960s and 1970s, rejection of full 
independence as an option was virtually unanimous in the New Zealand dependent 
territories. The reason was that the island communities wished to retain New Zealand 
citizenship and financial support. The limits to their freedom of action were therefore set 
by the limits of New Zealand's tolerance. As the dominant partner in the relationship, 
New Zealand has failed over the past decade to give clear signals as to where the limits 
of that tolerance actually lie, and has ostentatiously refrained from putting any obstacle 
in the way of a transition to full sovereign independence for the island communities. 
 
9. The transfer of responsibility for relations with freely associated countries and dependent 
territories from the Department of Island Territories to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 
1974 was a major pre-emptive change in the constitutional status of those communities, 
undertaken as the result of discussions between the New Zealand Prime Minister and 
Premier Albert Henry of the Cook Islands. The other two communities affected   Niue 
and Tokelau   appear not to have been consulted on the change, nor were their 
reservations about it given much attention. The main problem with the change was that it 
amounted to a unilateral abrogation by New Zealand of assurances given over the 
preceding fifteen years, that “special relationships” would remain “special”, and that 
freely associated states would not be treated as fully independent from New Zealand. 
 
10. The administrative change of 1974 was accompanied by a change in the declared nature 
of New Zealand budgetary support. Instead of an ongoing assured subsidy to island 
living standards (which had been the original thrust of this financial assistance) it was 
now relabelled “development aid”, and New Zealand officials began to promote the idea 
of it eventually withering away, as island economies became “self-reliant”.  This clearly-
expressed shift in New Zealand expectations placed upon the governments of the Cook 
Islands and Niue tasks which they were ill-equipped to perform, under conditions which 
rendered “self-reliance” a quite unrealistic goal in any case. 
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11. The essence of “self-government in free association” is the ambiguity of the concept, 
which renders it flexible and enables both partners to evade the clear resolution of 
difficult issues. There is, however, a strong onus on New Zealand as the dominant 
partner to give clear signals as to where the limits are to be drawn, rather than waiting for 
one or other of the associated governments to overstep the mark.  
 
12. There is nothing written into the Constitutions of Niue or the Cook Islands which would 
serve to define the boundary between “free association” and sovereign independence. 
Proposals made by the original constitutional advisers for the inclusion of formal links 
between the island legislatures and the New Zealand Parliament, either by inclusion of 
Islands' members in the latter, or by the establishment of a special select committee to 
deal with island affairs, were overlooked or overruled in drawing up the constitutions. 
The special relationship is thus an informal contract. The 1973 Exchange of Letters 
between New Zealand and the Cook Islands provides only the most loose and unspecific 
ground-rules. 
 
13. Case studies of some issues on which New Zealand and the Cook Islands have clashed 
recently - Taiwanese fishing deals, ACP-Lomé, and the International Coffee Agreement - 
indicate the ongoing reality of the special relationship as a discretionary power held by 
New Zealand to reign in the Cook Islands Government on international affairs issues. 
The key issue, clearly, is not whether or not the Cook Islandsmay acquire a distinctive 
personality of its own. The question is whether that personality is one New Zealand feels 
able to live with in a special relationship. Parallels (though not exact ones) may be drawn 
with the United States attitude to small nations in Central America under the Monroe 
Doctrine. In the Cook Islands case, thus, the concept of free association is evolving 
rapidly towards de facto full independence. 
 
14. It would be helpful if there existed a direct link between Island governments and 
legislatures in “freely associated” states, and the New Zealand Parliament. This could be 
done by establishing a special Select Committee to deal with Islands affairs. The aim of 
the change would be to give Island countries in free association some clear formal status 
in the formation of New Zealand policy on relevant issues, and at the same time to give 
New Zealand legislators clear rights (and the opportunity) to enquire into events in the 
associated states. 
 
15. In designing and implementing any such change, it will be important to recognise the 
major differences among the small states. Tokelau, for example, cannot be treated as 
identical to the Cook Islands. Similarly, if a decision were made to bring Tuvalu into the 
group of states “freely associated” with New Zealand, the constitutional underpinnings 
should be negotiated and agreed at an early stage. 
 
16. New Zealand has a poor record in the field of constitutional innovation. The 
decolonisation experiments have been hindered by inflexible and uncreative attitudes 
among those responsible for drafting constitutions and establishing institutions. US 
officials in Micronesia, and Australia in the case of the Cocos Islands, have shown both 
more aptitude and (given the different constitutional settings) more scope for lateral 
thinking. 
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17. Inflexible and inappropriate New Zealand attitudes are most clearly seen in Tokelau, 
where they have come up against sustained opposition from the local leaders. New 
Zealand reluctance to address radical restructuring of the Tokelau Public Service, and 
insistence on the doctrine of separation of powers in a community of 1,700 people, seem 
to flow from a preconception that Tokelau will follow Niue into “self government in free 
association”.  The signs are, however, that this is not the desire of the Tokelauans. 
 
18. Niueans, having insisted in the 1960s and early 1970s that “self government in free 
association” should not be allowed to slide across into full independence, were unable to 
make much impact on the institutional design of their new state, but did succeed in 
obtaining constitutional status for the economic base of their MIRAB society. This 
second best solution now effectively ties the hands of policymakers in relation to public 
finance and public sector employment levels. 
 
19. The Cook Islands elite have identified and occupied a niche in the murky zone between 
“self government in free association” and “sovereign independence”.  The label 
“independence in free association” is appropriate. The key historical moment was the 
1973 Exchange of Letters between Prime Minister Kirk and Premier Henry. The 
Exchange is notable for the vagueness with which Cook Islands freedom of action in 
international affairs is confirmed. Two obvious gaps in the agreement relate to the 
possibility of diplomatic posts of other countries in Rarotonga, and the question of 
overseas borrowing by the Cook Islands Government. 
 
20. If New Zealand does not stand ready to underwrite large-scale, and possibly 
unsustainable, foreign borrowing by the Cook Islands, this needs to be spelt out clearly 
and publicly, since assurances given by New Zealand spokesmen during the 
decolonisation phase included a willingness to bail out the Cook Islands in the event of 
major problems arising. 
 
21. Rather than reliance upon supposedly universal doctrines, what is needed in New 
Zealand policy towards its associated states is a quest for appropriate policies for the 
special case. New Zealand's national self interest certainly must enter into that quest; but 
since the Island peoples involved are New Zealanders, there is no necessary 
contradiction. Indeed, far from “dependence” being a pathological condition, it could be 
said that it is policies aimed at reducing “dependence” which have posed the most 
immediate threat to the interests of these peoples. 
 
22. Neither Tokelau nor Niue fulfill the minimum conditions for viable nation states. New 
Zealand support for balkanisation in the Pacific has been ill-advised, especially in these 
two cases. However, before Tokelauans or Niueans are pushed to redefine their 
constitutional situations, there needs to be a decision by New Zealand whether political 
integration, even on a limited and flexible scale, is on or off the agenda for debate. 
 
23. There is no provision in the Cook Islands or Niue constitutions for any constitutional 
review after some specified period of experience with the new order. Nor is there any 
provision giving New Zealand the right to initiate, or participate in, such a review. The 
reality, however is clearly that Island leaders would respond positively to a declared New 
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Zealand interest in reviewing the social contract of free association, provided that New 
Zealand was not seeking unilaterally to abolish it. 
 
24. Tuvalu's move to full independence in 1978 resulted from three main forces : the British 
desire for decolonisation, the Tuvaluan expectation that an independent state could 
secure more aid than a colony, and the strong self interested push of a small political 
elite. Experience since 1978 suggests that free association may prove a more sustainable 
long run status than independence, and New Zealand should consider the possibility of 
offering Tuvalu similar status to that now enjoyed by the Cook Islands. 
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CHAPTER 4 
 
AGRICULTURE AND THE VILLAGE MODE OF PRODUCTION 
 
 
1. The performance of agriculture in the whole South Pacific region in the last two decades 
is typical of aid and remittance led economies   per capita agricultural exports have 
stagnated or declined for most countries, and the range of products produced has 
narrowed rather than diversified.  
 
2. The declining value of agricultural exports (and rising food imports) are symptoms rather 
than causes of fundamental changes in island economies. Rather than blaming such 
trends on the failure of agriculture, it is necessary to view agriculture and rural 
development as part of a much broader economic structure.  
 
3. The apparent lack of effort by islanders sometimes leads to crude ethnocentric 
allegations that “the Islander is lazy” - a charge that is untrue and unfair. The problem 
lies in the alternative choices facing the villager and the broad economic environment in 
which he now lives.  
 
4. The failure of agriculture is not primarily an agronomic or marketing problem. It is 
primarily a production problem that is essentially economic.  
 
5. Pacific Islanders can be characterised by “subsistence affluence” - i.e. they can produce 
as much as they can consume of their normal (staple foods with the employment of only 
a small part of their total land and labour resources. This production may only require 
about 3 hours input per day or a little more to produce a cash crop or a surplus for sale. 
The level of subsistence affluence is such that village producers will give up production 
of a cash crop if the price falls below the minimum deemed acceptable.  
 
6. The characteristics and problems of modernising the “village mode of production” are 
identified. The main concern of people in the village mode of production is security and 
market production is only one of a number of competing goals. The production system is 
enmeshed in many socio-cultural factors, inhibiting efforts to lift production.  
 
7. A more powerful explanation for the stagnation or fall of agricultural production than 
subsistence affluence, or the village mode of production, can be attributed to the 
evolution of mirab economies with the substantial flows of capital, labour, skill and 
enterprise moving between the islands and metropolitan countries. In this changing 
economic environment, autonomous economic growth has become steadily more 
difficult as greater priority has been attached to the flow of aid moneys, remittances, the 
growth of  (tourism and other invisibles and as the pole of economic growth has been 
seen ever more clearly as lying not in the islands but in the metropolitan country.  
 
8. The South Pacific Agricultural Survey recommends the plantation mode of production as 
the most promising for the future in order to avoid the low motivation of individual 
households in the village mode of production. This involves plantation management, to 
achieve economies of scale, but the mode can include smallholders as in a public 
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corporation, or a nucleus estate etc. An “emerging smallholder plantation mode” that 
could bring modern management to groups of smallholders in units of say 50 hectares 
might be possible  in areas like Rarotonga. The better Maori Land Incorporations also 
provide an interesting model. The plantation mode must, however, be shorn of its 
colonial origins and ownership pattern.  
 
9. The needs of governments and of individual households often differ markedly. In open 
mirab economies the success of governments in carrying out an agreed “development” 
policy - even if the political will exists - is very slight. A big difference remains between 
development policy and the development process as it actually occurs.  
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CHAPTER 5 
 
DEVELOPMENT, DEPENDENCE AND VIABILITY 
 
1. The small countries studied have most unusual economies characterised by : (1) 
“subsistence affluence”, with a floor on real incomes provided by an integrated, non-
capitalist form of natural economy; (2) non-capitalist family enterprises which dominate 
the economic structure and are diversified on a transnational basis mainly through labour 
migration and the substantial flow of remittances; (3) the small states have moved from 
“self-sufficiency” to “import dependence” over the past three decades; (4) the islands are 
an unsuitable seedbed for capitalism because of small size, openness, strength of the 
natural economy and the relative-price situation. 
 
2. New Zealand policy which has been based on economic analysis of geographically-
bounded political units has had an unsound foundation. 
 
3. Policies of “economic development” aimed at growth and diversification of GDP by 
promoting “viable” projects have misunderstood the nature of the economy in the 
islands, leading often to failure of the projects. The Team believes that this is not the 
correct objective for economic policy. 
 
4. Currently two strong sets of disincentives to increasing commercial production, 
characteristic of rent-led economies, prevail: increases in productive income in the 
islands can lead to reduced levels of aid from the donor; and the prevailing relative-price 
regime makes onshore commercial production activity in the islands unprofitable 
compared to the mainland. 
 
5. Large-scale commercial ventures are now promoted by bureaucrats, not by capitalists in 
search of profits. Moreover the resulting economic activities have relied for their 
profitability upon high levels of government subsidy and intervention, and have failed 
when official support was not sustained. 
 
6. Policy making is often based on false stereotypes of Pacific Islanders. The islander as an 
economic agent is extremely flexible and adaptable, sometimes depending on many 
different sources of income and accustomed to performing a wide range of social, 
economic and cultural roles. With rapidly diminishing returns specialisation to and 
division of labour, the multi-role individual thrives. 
 
7. In the last 30 years ideas of the “modernisation school” have dominated thinking on 
development. This school believes that advances can and should occur on several fronts, 
economically, socially and politically. But real-world experience suggests that (i) 
increased commodity production, (ii) standard of living, (iii) political advances in the 
working of democracy, (iv) social cohesion, (v) diversification of the economy and 
society and (vi) protection or improvement of the environment are not necessarily all 
enhanced at the same time: progress on one or two of these fronts may be made at the 
expense of some of the others. Choice of policy depends on which of these goals have 
greatest priority, given that trade offs will often occur among them. 
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8. New Zealand's policies in the Cook Islands and Niue have been a successful example of 
“colonisation by the welfare state” as a result of the operation of a set of paternalistic 
(hopefully now “fraternalistic”) policies. Commodity production has had lower priority 
than maintaining high standards of welfare, political “modernisation”, social cohesion, 
economic and social diversification and environmental protection. 
 
9. Growth of commodity production on any scale could only be achieved at the expense of 
social cohesion, individual freedoms and probably environmental degradation. The goal 
of self-sufficiency is policy unrealistic. Once self-sufficiency is admitted to be 
unattainable the goals of policy become social rather than economic -  a point of view 
taken in the Belshaw Stace Report of 1955. 
 
10. It is wrong to use a nationalist model to analyse a Pacific small state's development when 
it is clearly a variant of the mirab economy. Geographically restricted definitions of 
development make sense only if we are promoting a closed economy (with a kind of 
“Berlin Wall” around it). Maintenance of New Zealand citizenship and free movement of 
labour from the islands to the mainland run counter to the nationalist model of 
development fostering “self-reliance”. 
 
11. All five countries exhibit large commodity trade deficits in the early 1980s, varying from 
77 percent for Kiribati in 1980-83, and up to 96 percent for Tuvalu in 1979-82. 
 
12. There is no crisis of trade dependence in the islands. The “widening of the jaws” between 
imports and commodity exports in Figs. 5.2 - 5.10 is driven not by fiscal expansion based 
on overseas borrowing, but by the growing wedge of invisible current account inflows on 
the balance of payments - essentially overseas aid, remittances and tourism. 
 
13. Seen from 1984 the situation is that commodity export earnings can never “catch up” 
with imports unless aid remittances and tourism disappear. 
 
14. The evolution of mirab economies has in fact involved drastic restructuring, with 
resources being reallocated from less efficient uses (in the islands) to more efficient uses 
(on the mainland). The New Zealand policy response has been to attempt to revive dying 
sectors and attract reallocated resources back to less profitable activities. 
 
15. The thrust of much aid policy in recent years has been to argue for increasing island 
commodity exports, in the teeth of hostile market forces, largely to reduce the New 
Zealand Government's deficit by cuts to the aid vote or to permit aid moneys to be 
reallocated elsewhere. The Team questions the logic and wisdom of this policy. 
 
16. The most promising economic strategies for mirab economies are: (i) promotion of 
philatelic-type sources of rent (or “hiring out” the identity of the country to a world 
market); (ii) access to offshore labour markets for migrants with freedom to transmit 
remittances; and (iii) increased levels of direct consumption subsidies from donor 
economies. 
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17.  Niue appears to be a society whose current cash needs are over-financed relative to 
absorptive capacity, since private sector savings are transferred to the mainland. (It is a 
MIAB rather than a MIRAB economy). 
 
18. In the Cook Islands, the invisible categories philatelic, tourism, remittances and “aid” 
come to four times the income from commodity exports. On Niue the ratio is ten times; 
in Kiribati four times, in Tokelau seven times, and in Tuvalu 45 times. 
 
19. Aid to the mirab societies should be renamed “subsidies”.  There is a fundamental 
distinction between the use of subsidies to maintain an otherwise unsustainable economic 
structure, for reasons of social policy, and the injection of “development aid” in the form 
of investment projects to establish new ventures which are thereafter supposed to pay 
their way. The danger is that this distinction will not be recognised. 
 
20. Policies designed to “reduce dependency” in the Pacific small states are as misplaced as 
“modernisation” approaches. There are many positive features of “dependent 
development”.  The nationalist argument that the key to improvement is to abandon or 
modify the linkages to the metropolitan power in order to reduce dependence is false for 
the five states studied; indeed they derive very substantial benefits from these linkages as 
the popularity of New Zealand citizenship indicates. 
 
21. The Cook Islands and Niue have an extremely high standard of services and social 
infrastructure and a high quality of life for their populations. These are societies in which 
onshore production has been almost static over the long run, yet there has been a huge 
leap in living standards over the last 30 years, thanks to close integration economically 
and socially with the New Zealand economy, and the benefits of the “special 
relationship”.  Indeed there is little sense in using the word “underdeveloped” to apply to 
these societies. 
 
22. Hayes' data on islanders' earnings, remittances and taxation in the period 1967-76 show 
that Cook Islanders as a community more or less “pay their way” - they are not a burden 
on the New Zealand taxpayer. The main beneficiaries of any process of “reducing 
dependence” in the islands are not the islanders, but the New Zealand taxpayers. 
 
23. There are substantial advantages in shifting the flow of financial assistance from the 
present channels into producer subsidies, but this merely changes the form, rather than 
the substance, of so-called aid “dependence” -  it does not relate to any goal of “self-
reliance”. 
 
24. Dependency does not matter for the small states. The benefits flowing from dependency 
(aid, remittances, security of market access, migration opportunities) outweigh any 
disadvantages of the feedback onto local production. Just as Costa Rica is an example of 
successful dependent development (producing reasonable living standards, peace, 
stability, democratic government and personal freedom) unlike other Central American 
dependent economies, the mirab economies of the South Pacific are also successful 
examples of dependent development. 
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25. It would be possible to sacrifice living standards through the single-minded pursuit of 
autonomous development and self-sufficiency by eliminating or reducing aid (the 
possible Tuvalu experience). In practice, this would not however be politically feasible 
and it would greatly lift out-migration to the mainland where this is possible. 
 
26. While the elimination of dependence is neither desirable nor feasible, one line of 
thinking suggests that the benefits of dependence can be retained while some economic 
restructuring, providing additional benefits, are added on. Another alternative is to 
restructure the links of dependence so that more aid comes into the dependent economy 
via producer subsidies and less via bureaucratic salaries (i.e. transform the society from a 
mirab to a MIRASP basis, with subsidised producers replacing bureaucrats). This has 
considerable appeal for both Niue and Tokelau (in the latter case a beginning has been 
made with the Community Services Levy). Dependence upon producer subsidies is felt 
to be preferable to dependence upon public service salary supplements, partly since 
producers are more “socially useful” than bureaucrats, and partly because increased 
commodity exports, while subsidised, take some strain off New Zealand taxpayers. 
 
27. The history of the Pacific Islands Industrial Development Scheme (PIIDS) shows that 
while it has provided New Zealand with good political propaganda, the islands' 
economies have shown their very limited capital absorption capacity. In over seven years 
of sustained promotion it has been possible to spend only $1.3 million, since few 
commercial “winners” in the mirab economies have been identified. The Cook Islands 
and Niue have absorbed only $209,000 and Tokelau and Tuvalu have attracted no 
projects at all. 
 
28. New Zealand policies towards the islands are designed within the framework of a 
prevailing official culture within which solutions are sought to policy dilemmas. This 
body of conventional wisdom makes use of many prevailing international dogmas about 
“development”, “self-reliance”, “viability”, “dependence”.  Officials communicate more 
with themselves than with outsiders who see the world in different ways and lean 
towards policy proposals which to the official mind are “not on”. 
 
29. Throughout the Pacific there are two essentially different conceptions of “development”.  
The first, the dualist approach, seeks to build a superior modern sector which expands 
and transforms society while the inferior traditional sector in theory is meant to wither 
away. Unfortunately in reality many small Pacific Islands states are too small or 
unattractive from a capitalist viewpoint to enable the establishment of a vigorous modern 
sector. It does not expand and dualism becomes entrenched, with the traditional not 
withering away (e.g. Tuvalu). Moreover in some circumstances the “modern” may be 
inferior to the “traditional”. 
 
The second approach sees the existing village economy as the permanent core of island 
life, and “developmental” activities are judged by the extent to which they contribute to 
supporting and enriching village life. 
 
Many development approaches fail to distinguish between the two and confuse and mix 
the two. 
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30. Apart from Papua New Guinea, the Solomons and perhaps Fiji, the Pacific states appear 
to be too small for the dualist approach to work, via displacement of the village economy 
by large scale commercial projects in a setting where commodity production is inherently 
unprofitable. In practice the New Zealand-linked mirab economies have established the 
“modern sector” of their dual economy on the New Zealand mainland rather than in the 
islands. 
 
31. There is a risk in such small economies with so many responsibilities and powers placed 
on their governments that ambitious bureaucrats and politicians aided by international 
aid agencies will push these countries into large scale commercial ventures which turn 
out to be permanent loss makers (e.g. Tuvalu tuna fishing schemes of 1980-82, and the 
current Cook Islands wood fuel electricity scheme). 
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CHAPTER 6 
 
THE COOK ISLANDS 
 
 
1. The dominant characteristic of the community is its close and organic integration with 
New Zealand; top priority is accorded to the retention of these social and economic links. 
New Zealand Government policy, faithfully echoed in the islands, has paid lip service to 
this close integration but has failed in practice to recognise its real consequences and 
implications. 
 
2. New Zealand has tended to assume that there is no durable identity of interest between 
Cook Islanders in New Zealand and those in the islands. No institutional or policy 
structure exists in New Zealand to encompass the interests and issues of Cook Islands 
society as an organic whole, as one community. 
 
3. Since the Second World War the most pronounced characteristic of Cook Islands society 
has been its extreme mobility and its progressive proletarianisation, mainly via migration 
to New Zealand. 
 
4. Cook Islanders affirm strongly the indissoluble nature of the link with New Zealand. Any 
political or economic policies which were believed to threaten the link would be rejected 
out of hand. 
 
5. A great flow of resources, reaching over $4 million in 1983, comes back to the islands as 
remittances, together with equipment, trucks and the like. Islanders expressed their side 
of the reciprocity relationship with food, flowers, tere parties, visiting, and in other ways. 
The reciprocity relationship represents an investment both in the islands and in New 
Zealand and a “transnational corporation of kin” has evolved maintaining long-distance 
relationships of production, income, investment and resource allocation. 
 
6. In recent times, the earlier “hyphenated culture” of people shaped by “native trader 
mission official” culture has evolved into a “MIRAB society”, shaped by the MIRAB 
economy. This society and economy has quite distinctive characteristics of its own and 
its economy behaves in quite a different way from a classic colonial export economy. 
 
7. From at least the 1920s to 1974, successive New Zealand Ministers of Island Territories 
took it for granted that the achievements of the welfare state in New Zealand should be 
extended to the peoples of the New Zealand dependent territories. The Cook Islands (and 
Niue and Tokelau) were “colonised by the welfare state”. 
 
8. The Cook Islands MIRAB economy has thus been able, through the link with New 
Zealand, to “leapfrog” the classic “stages of development” almost to the “stage of high 
mass consumption”.  Thus the society of the Cook Islands does not exhibit (and cannot 
be expected to exhibit) most of the familiar characteristics of “underdevelopment”.  In 
effect the Cook Islands are an off-shore New Zealand province and continue to share in 
the values and expectations of their mainland-dwelling fellow citizens. 
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9. Following the great migration process of the 1960s and early 1970s involving 
demographic transition and labour export, the present situation is one of stable 
equilibrium, partly reflecting the global recession and absence of employment 
opportunities on the mainland. If economic growth were to resume in New Zealand there 
could well be a resumption of in-migration. There are presently 24,000 ethnic Cook 
Islanders in New Zealand, of whom 14,000 were born in the Islands. The 1981 
population of the Islands was 16,435. 
 
10. In the context of the New Zealand economy of which the Islands form an integral part, 
local productive activities generally suffer from absolute disadvantage and hence are 
unable to offer employment on terms which might have been attractive to skilled Cook 
Islanders. Hence migration and declining production are the two faces of the one coin; it 
is not possible to assert that either “caused” the other. 
 
11. Increasingly in the last three decades the thrust of official policies on economic 
development has been to encourage commercial onshore production. The consistent 
failure of “development” conceived of in this way has led to official perceptions of the 
economy as “fragile” and “unstable”.  Since the conception has been inappropriate 
neither of these terms applies to economic reality in the Cook Islands. 
 
12. Transport modes and schedules are adapted to the encouragement of tourism and imports 
rather than commodity exports, and transport bottlenecks play a large part in leading to 
the pessimistic expectations of export producers or serving as a disincentive to potential 
exporters. 
 
13. Although private sector unions have been almost entirely suppressed, the low-wage 
environment does little to assist achieving good profit margins in the private sector, since 
there is an absence of a reserve army of labour, with only unskilled and relatively low-
calibre workers available for recruitment. 
 
14. Commercial activity is mainly concerned with trading activities, tourism services, and 
exploitation of short-run, short-lived opportunities offered by recurring cycles of export 
production from the agricultural sector. The latter is the basis for the emergence of a 
small class of full-time horticulturists, but their numbers are small and there is no 
prospect of a wide agricultural transformation. 
 
15. The overall economic and social picture is thoroughly satisfying: living standards are 
comfortable and very good by comparison with other South Pacific countries; 
subsistence agriculture has remained sound; destitution is virtually unknown; standards 
of education and health are somewhat lower than in mainland New Zealand, but are 
generally satisfactory. The value system is still strong and the local culture has largely 
escaped the fate of the money swamped societies of French Polynesia or Nauru. Self 
government has succeeded in providing a functioning and locally directed 
administration. 
 
16. The main local problems - political factionalism, Air New Zealand obduracy, 
competition from Asian canned pineapple and the rather lagged impact of the New 
Zealand inflation rate - are rather minor compared to the impressive achievements. 
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17. The present economic system rests on three main pillars - New Zealand citizenship, New 
Zealand aid, and tourism. All appear solid and sustainable. The first two cushion the 
Cook Islands from the instability which is characteristic of a number of other Pacific 
economies. 
 
18. A great deal of attention is paid by policymakers and observers to one of the less 
important and least successful sectors of the economy - export agriculture. Its 
performance is usually incorrectly misread as an indicator of the “health” of the overall 
economy. 
 
19. Between 1945 and 1971 there has been a structural transition from a “producing” to a 
“service” employment structure. Since 1971 there has been stability in the share of 
tertiary employment. 
 
20. In terms of regional economic disparities within the Cook Islands, or Rarotonga 
compared to the outer islands, there has been no change over the last decade. Rarotonga 
has about 54 percent of the total population. 
 
21. The Cook Islands no more suffers from any foreign exchange deficit in its dealings with 
New Zealand than do Masterton or Kaitaia in their dealings with the rest of New 
Zealand. 
 
22. At the end of the 1960s, commodity exports dropped out of the group of leading sectors 
driving the Cooks Islands economy, leaving the economy to be driven through a further 
decade of rapidly rising living standards by government spending, remittances, and a 
new source of “invisible” earnings, tourism. 
 
23. The Cook Islands economy is now in a state of stable equilibrium, which can be 
sustained for as long as the five props of material living standards - subsistence 
agriculture, commodity exports, tourism, remittances and government transfers - remain. 
 
Changes in any of these would induce a series of adjustments in the economy. The main 
adjustment mechanisms of concern to policy makers are: 
 
(a) Out migration 
 (b) Decline of subsistence agriculture 
 (c)  Further decline in export performance 
(d) Financial crises for Cook Islands Government if its attempts to stem (a) (b) and 
(c) outrun the willingness of the New Zealand Government to pay the additional 
sums required. 
 
In all four cases the adjustment is also reversible. 
 
24. Following the opening of the new airport in 1974 there has been a considerable increase 
in the airfreighted export of fresh fruit and vegetables. 
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25 .There has been reasonable success in the development of the apparel industry which 
depends essentially on a combination of New Zealand Government policy and the 
marketing strategies of a few large New Zealand companies. Firms such as 
Woolworths/McKenzies operate a “putting out” system of production in Rarotonga. The 
keys to profitability in the clothing industry are the landed cost of cloth in the Cook 
Islands and labour costs (substantially below those on the mainland). The apparel 
industry has a 1983 export value of $2.5 million which translates to roughly $650,000 
retained in the Islands. Restrictive practices in New Zealand and distance are the limits 
on the market for Cook Island producers. 
 
26. The peak level of export earnings achieved round 1965-1970 of around $10 million in 
1982 dollars is probably the maximum attainable from the country's natural resource-
based production, in the absence of radical changes in land tenure and technology. It is 
unrealistic to think of export earnings rising anywhere near the current level of imports 
(roughly $30 million). 
 
27. The characteristics of the mirab economy have undercut interest in and sustained 
motivation toward agricultural production. Part-time agriculture is characteristic on the 
major islands. There has been limited availability of long-term credit. There has been a 
heavy dependence in the past on bulky perishable agricultural products, often products 
that deteriorate with handling and poor shipping services, leading to waste and the 
expectation of waste on the part of growers. 
 
28. Heavy subsidies on freight costs have resulted in economic distortions, such as growing 
crops whose prices do not even cover true transport costs. 
 
29. The Citrus Replanting Scheme laid the basis for heavy involvement by Government in 
production and marketing and left for the future the important question of how and when 
the grower was to assume actual control. 
 
30. The Cook Islands have come only a poor fourth in pineapple imports to New Zealand, 
being unable to compete with other countries because of lack of economies of scale and 
the persistent transport problem. The debacle of the Kia Orana processing factory, the 
successor to Greggs, has been due to low throughput, low quality fruit and high transport 
costs. 
 
31. Estimates for pineapple production give a net profit of only $85 per acre annually. Non-
subsidised production of fruit for processing would produce an annual loss of $120. Yet 
in a regional sense pineapple production is important for the islands of Mangaia and 
Atiu. 
 
32. Banana production depends on maintaining a delicate balance with New Zealand imports 
from the Philippines and Ecuador. The excellent phosphate-rich soils of Aitutaki are 
ideal for production but the absence of a harbour is a major problem, together with the 
lack of consistent, long-term encouragement by the New Zealand market. A bumper 
harvest of fruit leads to a great increase in wastage in loading vessels. A considerable 
degree of subsidy is built into the banana industry. 
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33. In recent years there has been an encouraging rapid development in air freighted export 
of pawpaw and winter vegetables. When the 747 jet replaced the 737 the volume 
exported doubled. Although the quality of the pawpaw is excellent the flight to New 
Zealand is on an inappropriate day, leading to deterioration of the fruit, or the picking of 
green fruit. Without the weekend delay fruit would fetch $16-$20 per carton instead of 
the present $10-$12. 
 
34. It is believed that Air New Zealand flights are planned to suit the interests of the airline. 
Little account appears to be taken of the needs of agricultural producers and much waste 
can occur. Rarotonga airport was built solely with tourism in mind; thus cargo space is 
grossly inadequate for handling trailer loads of pawpaw. Trailers of fruit lie may in the 
sun for hours; fumigation and cargo storage should be under one roof. 
 
35. There appears to be room for considerable expansion yet of air freighted produce. Closer 
evaluation of the need and the economics of alternative available transport planes is 
required. 
 
36. Processing technologies are needed for very small volumes of input of fruit, probably 
produced almost entirely on Rarotonga. 
 
37. Often “bench scientists” have been sent to the Cook Islands to do a broad spectrum 
advisory job. There has been a serious omission in the area of agricultural economics, 
and misleading estimates of likely rates of return have resulted. 
 
38. The massive importance of social factors and the ability of Cook Islanders to achieve 
great savings for community purposes is illustrated by the current construction of a huge 
hall in Amuri village Aitutaki, costing $100,000. $75,000 came from donations from 
relatives in New Zealand and $25,000 from the local community of 300 (about $500 per 
household). 
 
39. Government expenditure in real terms increased five-fold in the 20 years after the 
Second World War, reaching a peak in 1965. Since then there has been no further 
expansion of government expenditure. This stagnation is due to the limited local revenue 
base and steady decline from 1970 in the real value of New Zealand budgetary support 
grants. 
 
40. The drive of Cook Islands governments of both parties to reduce so-called “dependence” 
upon New Zealand grants has had the remarkable result (in view of the fall of export 
income and emigration of productive age groups) of raising local revenue from 44% of 
expenditure in 1966-70 to 63% in 1981-84. 
 
41. New Zealand policy provides no incentive for a continuing drive for self-reliance, in that 
the record suggests that New Zealand in effect subtracts a dollar from the grant for each 
additional dollar of revenue raised by the Cook Islands Government. 
 
42. Since incomes derived from government expenditure have not risen over the last two 
decades, the rapid rise in imports in the 1970s must have been powered by private sector 
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incomes, not public sector ones. Government has thus been a lagging rather than a 
leading sector in real income growth during self government. 
 
43. In nominal dollar terms Cook Islands Government expenditure has risen nine-fold 
between 1964-84, while the New Zealand grant has increased five-fold, from $1.5 
million to $8.4 million. This is the basis for attributing crises in the cash flow of the 
Cook Islands Government to extravagance, and for New Zealand finding it easy 
politically to reduce its subsidy. But in real terms Cook Islands Government spending 
has not increased and New Zealand budgetary assistance in the second half of the 1970s 
has fallen. 
 
44. The Cook Islands public service expanded rapidly in the last years of the New Zealand 
administration and then was cut back significantly in Albert Henry's early government 
years. From 1967-81 there has been a slow overall increase of 10 percent over 14 years. 
 
45. Real export earnings in total until recently have been remarkably stable, while the 
relative importance of individual products changes rapidly. It would appear that changes 
in resource allocation as relative opportunities shift play a major part in the rapid 
changes of fortune of different export products. Considerable importance is attributed to 
changes in government policy and priorities in promoting commercial activity. 
 
46. Visible trade statistics are quite inadequate as analytical tools in the modern Cook 
Islands economy. Three “invisibles” of balance-of-payments inflow (remittances, 
philatelic revenues and tourism) largely explain the rapidly increasing import demand of 
the 1970s. Available data suggest that by the 1980s remittances financed of 14% of total 
imports, tourism 27%, philatelic revenues 3%, and New Zealand financial assistance 
37%. Visible exports had sunk to a level that financed only 20% of imports. 
 
47. In the late 1940s “aid” and remittances already financed half of the group's imports and 
other debts. This proportion still holds in the early 1980s. After 1959 the leading sector 
of commodity exports began to decline steadily, dropping from a level of 52 percent of 
“financing” the balance of payments in 1955-59 to 19 percent in 1980-83. Remittances 
have remained steady at 12-14%, New Zealand “aid” has dropped back from 44-46% in 
the 1960s to 37% in 1980-83, while the dynamic new source of financing has been 
tourism (rising from 2% to 27% in 1965-69 to 1980-83). 
 
48. The Cook Islands economy is not confronted by any pressing economic crisis, and would 
only be faced with a crisis if the link with New Zealand were broken. Much official 
thinking on both sides is dominated by concern for the dependence of the Cook Islands 
on New Zealand and the necessity to reduce that dependence. But reduction of 
dependence could only be achieved without the special relationship and this would 
involve a harsh reduction of living standards below the level that would be considered 
acceptable. 
 
49. In its steady advocacy for “development”, New Zealand leaves itself open to the charge 
that the possibility of abrogating the special relationship is being kept open as a 
permanent policy option. 
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50. A community permanently under threat of losing the key to its livelihood (migration 
outlets, unhindered ability to transfer funds, assured revenue support) will be 
characterised by uncertainty; and long run planning under uncertainty will be dominated 
more by survival calculations and taking out of insurance rather than by systematic and 
constructive investment. 
 
51. It would appear that New Zealand's “developmental” approach has been adopted to 
secure domestic political legitimacy for the special relationship with the Cook Islands. It 
seems to have been felt that to ask the New Zealand taxpayer to provide some fixed level 
of budget support in perpetuity would be unacceptable; but that if financial transfers are 
presented as “promoting development” and therefore ultimately self-liquidating, this 
would be politically more acceptable. The flaw in this policy approach is that a degree of 
deception is involved, and in the long run this could be profoundly subversive of the 
special relationship, and hence destabilising for the Cook Islands society and economy. 
 
52. New Zealand budget support should be removed from the context of “development aid” 
and relabelled, placing it where it belongs - as an assured on-going commitment by New 
Zealand to underwrite the viability of the existing economy. 
 
53. There is a need to rethink the terms of the special relationship. There is, for example, a 
need to require the Cook Islands Government to consult with New Zealand on the broad 
outlines of its expenditure policies. Alternatively, any residual New Zealand 
responsibility for underwriting the security of international loans to the Cook Islands 
Government could be removed. 
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CHAPTER 7 
NIUE 
 
1. Niue lacks the strength and stability of the Cook Islands society and economy. There has 
never been a process of export-led growth. Export performance merely repeats one 
commodity cycle after another, with a brief boom followed by a collapse. Remittance 
inflows are much weaker than in the Cook Islands. 
 
2. The island suffers from what can be termed as the “Niuean malaise”.  Morale appears to 
be low and out-migration has proceeded to the point where the island is acutely 
depopulated. 
 
3. Niue's import economy is almost entirely driven by New Zealand budget support. Its 
resource base promises little in the way of increased commercial export potential. 
 
4. The public service is grotesquely large relative to the society to be administered. It can 
be said that the public service has, in effect, “swallowed” the private sector. 
 
5. The agricultural potential of the soils is good, given wise decision-making and sound 
management. The main limitations are physical - craggy coral outcrops which lead to 
patchy crop intensity, plus some chemical deficiencies. Discing shallow soils has a 
detrimental effect. 
 
6. The climate is not always stable and droughts are not uncommon. Over the last 26 years 
Niue has experienced four severe hurricanes. The hurricane of 1959 destroyed 180 
houses and severely affected agricultural production. 
 
7. Lack of water has acted as a constraint on agriculture as there is no running water on the 
island. While caution is needed in ecological matters, it should be safe to use up 6000m3 
a day of artesian water from 300 bores. 
 
8. The Niuean environment gives poor returns to intensive land use and extensive 
operations are more appropriate. Traditional “bush garden” agriculture is of the shifting 
slash-and-burn variety and only a few tree crops (coconuts and limes) have been 
successfully established on a permanent basis. 
 
9. Agriculture does not have a solid foundation, due to the hazards of handling and shipping 
a product to a distant and often uncertain market, to the economic process of “backwash” 
from the New Zealand mainland, the great shortage of labour and its high cost (most 
farming is part-time) and frequent reallocations of resources. 
 
10. Commercial agriculture is usually a Niuean's third occupation, the first being work in the 
public service, and the second taro growing and fishing. Thus it has low priority with 
little time available for it. 
 
11. The kumara weevil incident indicated that with crop diseases, access to the New Zealand 
market is not always easy. When trading with perishable produce, great efforts have to be 
made to arrange freezer capacity, deck containers on ships, and schedules such that ships 
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call sufficiently frequently. However although marketing problems can be difficult, in 
the main we are faced with a production problem. 
 
12. Even at 4.5 tonnes of passionfruit production per acre (twice the average yield) it was 
doubtful if the crop was profitable. High labour and other costs for only mediocre 
harvests caused a decline of interest by growers - the amount of time needed for hand 
pollinating and weeding had been underestimated. Inefficient pollination, a disease 
problem, a drought in 1976, hurricane Ofa in 1979, and the need to replant vines every 
few years at a very considerable cost were the causes of failure of the passionfruit 
industry, in spite of excellent market conditions. 
 
13. Niue has experienced too many foreign “experts” whose promises turn out to be false, 
since their analysis has been faulty. 
 
14. There is a small niche for island products in the New Zealand market provided the crop 
is not too large or noticeable. “The export of kumaras is controlled as much as possible 
to ensure that it does not interfere with the New Zealand potato and kumara crops since 
the Niuean prices depended on these prices”, to quote a 1959 report. 
 
15. The future of agriculture is not at all promising. A two-fold strategy seems appropriate: 
(1) encourage ¼ acre “backyard” gardens adjacent to dwellings for the part time growers; 
(2) large-scale extensive farming, of the “plantation” or estate kind. The most promising 
possibilities appear to be beef production on improved pasture (green panic and other 
grasses) since there is a dry season; and cattle under coconuts. However such a scheme 
would best be run by Niueans as European control would be resented, and the whole 
project would depend on improved relations between villagers and the management of 
such a ranch. The quality of management would also be crucial. It is doubtful if any 
suitably trained Niuean manager is available. 
 
16. The island cannot afford to be without a competent agricultural economist. In the past on 
several occasions, crops have been promoted as commercially promising without 
establishing, with even a moderate degree of success, the likely net return to the grower. 
 
17. It is vital to maintain records of proven agricultural practices and to emphasise continuity 
in agricultural policy. The breakdown of improved pastures carefully built up over a 
period of years, and their reversion to weeds is a case in point. 
 
18. The island's present “success” with exports of lime juice and coconut cream owes less to 
any inherent comparative advantage than to the fact that Niue has “captured” a capable 
individual enterpreneur able to hold his own at least in the short term. It remains to be 
seen whether Niuean coconut cream is competitive in the long run against low wage 
competition from elsewhere in the Pacific. Niuean limes are of excellent quality and are 
disease free, so they have good chances of holding a permanent niche in the New 
Zealand and possible Australian market, but there is little prospect of a large scale 
expansion in future. 
 
19. In the context of the New Zealand economy, Niue is an area of marginal land, the 
commercial exploitation of which can be sustained only by permanent subsidy. It follows 
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that productive activity on the island must be promoted, if at all, not for commercial 
reasons but for reasons of social and strategic policy. 
 
20. In view of Niue's massive depopulation, resettlement by surplus population from nearby 
Tonga is a distinct possibility for the future. This is essentially a political problem, for 
Niueans would probably agree to large scale Tongan settlement only if they are 
guaranteed the status of a ruling unproductive elite on the Nauru model. New Zealand 
labour organisations would not doubt strongly oppose free entry to the New Zealand 
market for competitively-priced goods from Niue under such conditions. 
 
21. The basic reason for laxity in the public service management of finance is the absence of 
useful activities to occupy staff time. It is difficult to ensure high standards of propriety 
in the management of public moneys when all participants can see much expenditure 
going straight to waste - indeed the public service has been designed to promote this 
process. The existing system of channelling subsidies mainly in the form of public 
service salaries has little to recommend it, but would be hard to change. 
 
22. The case for rechannelling New Zealand financial assistance to support performance-
related activities is strong. This implies a substantial rethinking of the existing 
constitutional relationship with New Zealand, and recognition that political reintegration 
of Niue into New Zealand, on appropriately designed terms, has to be taken seriously. 
 
23. Between 1971 and 1981 Niue's population fell by one third. The 1981 census showed a 
population of 3278; of 609 houses enumerated, 169 were unoccupied (mostly in the 
“back” villages). 
 
24. The Niuean has always been accustomed to mobility. Most of the 1984 residents 
interviewed in Niue had made at least one, and usually several visits to New Zealand to 
visit relatives. A more relevant question than “why do people migrate?” is “why do 
people stay?”  The correlation between the mass exodus of the 1970s and the onset of 
self-government seems too strong to ignore, since constitutional change occurred in a 
climate of considerable uncertainty and insecurity over the maintenance of the prized 
links with New Zealand. Rapid social change has also been unsettling as many people 
who are in good positions or are better educated leave; there is a feeling that the island is 
“too small to hold them”. 
 
25. The average growth rate of Niuean export earnings in real terms over the past 80 years 
has been zero. This suggests that a “ceiling”  exists on export production, presumably 
related to the island's natural resource endowment and capacity to yield an exportable 
surplus under prevailing conditions of land tenure and agricultural technique. 
 
26. After the Second World War there was a “take off” of commodity imports. The real 
driving force behind import growth has always been the inflow of New Zealand financial 
subsidies, which flow back out to pay for the rising imports. 
 
27. With the availability of New Zealand aid finance which is used to pay for imports there 
is no room for economic adjustments toward more productive activity - i.e. productive 
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activity is crowded out by “aid” in this case, which is the classic “Dutch disease” 
syndrome. 
 
If aid were to be withdrawn, the economic adjustments would be: out-migration, 
increased productive activity by those remaining, and a shift to permanently lower levels 
of real income. 
 
28. There is no apparent reason why Niue's gross revenues from the sale of stamps should be 
only half those of the Cook Islands. Questions asked in the Auditor General's reports 
have gone unanswered since 1978 and there appears to have been only one occasion in 
recent years when the accounts for the gross revenue were inspected.  The Assembly 
appears to neglect its constitutional duty of holding the executive to account for all 
revenues received and expenditures made on behalf of the Niuean Government. 
 
29. Eighty percent of the economically active population work for the Government, for 
salaries and wages that total around $4.5 million. The public service expanded greatly in 
the 1960s and 1970s to conduct a large scale investment programme in building up the 
infrastructure. Now that all the main infrastructure projects have been completed and a 
substantial proportion of the population has moved out, there is considerable excess 
capacity. 
 
30. Given the over-capacity of government to meet new investment needs it has moved in to 
a number of activities pre-empting work that might have been done by private operators. 
 
31. The 1974 Niue Constitution Act underpinned the position of the inflated public service, 
by requiring it not only to provide services efficiently but also to provide Niueans with 
employment. Thus the island has an unusual form of “surplus labour”.  Unfortunately 
however no new projects that make economic sense appear to be in sight, on which this 
excess capacity could be profitably utilised. The apparent outward drain of financial 
savings reflects this lack of promising opportunities. 
 
32. A policy of increased taxation to finance uneconomic activities would be inappropriate. 
It is likely to induce increased out migration. Niue is not realising an “economic surplus” 
- the proper basis for taxation. 
 
33. Since there is no prospect under present conditions of realising an economic surplus, 
self-sufficiency is not a realistic goal. The Development Plan therefore is mistaken in 
suggesting that the trade deficit is the problem: it is merely the symptom of the problem. 
 
34. With respect to constitutional development there was considerable support for the 
“colonial” status quo when self-government was proposed in the mid 1960s. Integration 
or independence were never seriously raised (almost no one favoured the latter). By the 
time they were seriously considered the island was “already over half way down the 
track” toward self-government. 
 
35. Since the prevailing view was that Niue didn't want any change, self-government was 
seen as being bought by those who wanted it, and New Zealand and the United Nations 
were seen as the main beneficiaries. In return certain concessions had to be made, 
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especially maximum protection for the civil service. Thus the constitution solidified the 
public service and fixed its role in the Niue economy and society. 
 
36. Socially, a new breed of people have emerged in Niue in the last 20 years who believe 
there has been a total shift from subsistence to a market economy. But in fact the shift is 
not total, but perhaps to a “permanently transitional” society rather than one based on the 
market economy - to a mirab society nurtured by aid, the growth of the bureaucracy and 
closely tied, economically and socially to New Zealand. The Public Service Association 
has become quite militant. 
 
37. In Niue as in other small states there are problems and temptations involved in 
administering large sums of aid moneys. New Zealand must not play a paternalist, neo-
colonial role and there is much to be said for guaranteeing a certain acceptable flow of 
subsidy, inflation proof, for say a 10 year period. But New Zealand would probably 
assume that the ways in which the moneys are spent would conform to New Zealand's 
ethical standards. Niue's version of the Westminster system has not produced checks and 
balances and mechanisms within the political structure to hold the executive accountable 
for revenues received and expenditures made. 
 
38. In view of New Zealand concern over the size and competence of the Public Service a 
number of innovations have been made in late 1983 and 1984, including a strengthening 
of the financial management. If these new changes are successful, preservation of the 
status quo remains one option, although the logic for considerable further changes 
proposed in this chapter is persuasive. The Niue Government has agreed to a thorough 
review of the Public Service and has also set up a select committee to enquire into 
possible constitutional change. 
 
39. It may be that a Select Committee comprising both Niuean and New Zealand members 
and chaired by a mutually respected figure could provide a mechanism for the friendly 
sharing of problems and discussion of major issues. Since it is difficult to anticipate 
future eventualities, there might be a need for a carefully thought out compact (as well as 
a constitution for Niue) to cover the less clear cut spirit of the relationship. 
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CHAPTER 8 
TOKELAU 
 
 
1. Three of the four islands of Tokelau (Atafu, Fakaofo and Nukunonu) came under New 
Zealand control in 1925; the fourth island (Olohega) was annexed to American Samoa. 
The Tokelauan claim to Olohega remains an issue despite the 1980 treaty, signed by the 
Tokelauan elders under pressure from New Zealand, which extinguished any legal claim. 
 
2. Small size, limited resources, and remoteness have meant very limited room for 
manouevre in economic and social matters. Social and cultural cohesion have benefited 
from the fact that commercial development on any scale was obviously impractical. 
 
3. Local resource endowments suffice to provide subsistence affluence for a population of 
up to 2,000, with a margin of surplus productive capacity in normal years to insure 
against natural disasters. The potential exportable surplus of copra from the village 
economy has probably remained steady at around 400 tons annually throughout the 
twentieth century, although actual export production has been in the region of 200 tons 
or so in recent years. There is no tradition of wage labour or plantation organisation in 
agriculture. 
 
4. Tokelau was separated administratively from Western Samoa in 1948, and in 1950 a 
substantial expansion of government-financed investment and services began. The 
growth of the public service gathered pace in the 1960s, and threatened to swamp the 
neo-traditional social order in the 1970s. 
 
5. Tokelau, as represented by the elders, has been fairly successful in resisting outside 
initiatives by New Zealand and the United Nations, aimed at moving the islands away 
from their status as a dependent territory of New Zealand. The community has been less 
successful in coping with the internal divisive impact of the cash economy. 
 
6. From a low of under 400 in the 1870s, population had grown to 1,900 by 1966 when a 
mass resettlement scheme began moving families to New Zealand. The scheme ended in 
1971-72. Since 1973 natural increase and out-migration have cancelled each other out, 
with population remaining stable at about 1,580. By 1981 there were 2,277 persons of 
Tokelauan ethnic origin resident in New Zealand, and 1,281 of Tokelauan birth. 
 
7. Strong links of kinship, culture and awareness exist between the New Zealand resident 
and the Tokelau-resident communities. The former group in particular have criticised the 
New Zealand official view which emphasises the separation between the two. 
 
8. Private-sector commercial firms abandoned Tokelau by 1950, leaving transport and 
trading arrangement entirely in the hands of the Administration. In 1977 trading 
operations were transferred to cooperative village stores. There is no commercial private 
sector. 
 
9. Following the Korean boom years of 1950-51 came a decade of stagnation or decline of 
the local cash economy. Up to 1962 store-goods imports remained below the total value 
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of exports, with both on a declining trend in real terms. Thereafter imports rose 
dramatically with rising government expenditure in the territory; by the first half of the 
1970s imports were over four times export earnings, and by 1981-84 the ratio was nearly 
eight times. 
 
10. The limited available information on cash incomes in the islands indicates that over 70% 
is derived from public service wages and salaries. Remittances and export earnings 
account for most of the rest. Production of copra and handcrafts for export accounts for 
well under 10% of total cash incomes. 
 
11. The quality of published statistics on Tokelau has declined sharply since the 1975 
transfer of the administration to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. This applies especially 
to trade data. Foreign Affairs officials have given low priority to economic and social 
questions; their main interest has been in constitutional evolution. 
 
12. The annual budget documents presented to the Fono are designed for the benefit of the 
donor, not the recipient community. In particular, no breakdown is provided of the 
allocation of expenditure among Tokelau, Apia and elsewhere. Yet the configuration of 
the Administration's spending has important implications for local society, which the 
Fono can be expected to pursue. 
 
13 .The 1974-75 transfer of Tokelauan administration to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
involved the Ministry in a task quite unlike its mainstream activities, and the resulting 
conflicts were only partially resolved by the 1980 separation of the post of Administrator 
from that of Secretary of Foreign Affairs. The 1975 Foreign Affairs takeover is probably 
best understood as part of a series of pre emptive moves by Wellington to “decolonise” 
Tokelau. 
 
14. Certainly the thrust of Foreign Affairs administration was directed toward decolonisation 
as conceived in Wellington. The public service was strengthened and consolidated on 
New Zealand lines; the Fono was moulded into an embryonic Parliament with a Budget 
Committee which was to become eventually a Cabinet; and successive Official 
Secretaries lectured the Fono on the advantages of “political modernisation”.  All of 
these developments encountered substantial local resistance. 
 
15. New Zealand officials have tended to discount local views and to adhere to New Zealand 
ways of doing things. This has been particularly evident in the field of public works, 
although recent experiments with the use of voluntary village labour (e.g. the electricity 
reticulation programme of 1982) have shown some softening of attitudes on the New 
Zealand side. Especially during the 1970s, New Zealand tended to begin with 
predetermined plans for Tokelau and to resist possibilities of accommodating to local 
ways. The organisation of the public service has been the most obvious example. 
 
16. Foreign Affairs hoped to persuade Tokelauans to undertake an “act of self-
determination” in 1979, and policy innovations during the mid and late 1970s were 
aimed to this end. By the time of the 1981 United Nations mission, however, Tokelau 
had made clear its opposition to Niue-type self-government, and Wellington was obliged 
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to accept a slower timetable. The lon-run goals set by Wellington for political “progress” 
nevertheless remain unaltered. 
 
17. The separation-of-powers doctrine, which prevents public servants from functioning as 
elders within the local community, is inappropriate in Tokelauan conditions, especially 
in the absence of any decision to opt for self-government. Under the status quo, public 
servants are responsible ultimately to Wellington, not to the Fono; the Fono is therefore 
not able to call upon their expertise and experience in any conflict between the Fono and 
the Administrator. The most significant example to date has been the Olohega debate. 
Wellington’s insistence on separation of powers seems to have been another example of 
the pre-emptive assumption that Tokelau is to move to self-government. 
 
18. The events surrounding the Olohega treaty of 1980 crystallised the problems inherent in 
the status quo. The decision to negotiate a treaty formally renouncing the Olohega claim 
reflected New Zealand, not Tokelauan, priorities; and the pace of the decision-making 
reflected New Zealand impatience to secure fisheries licence fees as a supplement to 
local revenues, which took precedence over any attempt to deal with the issue in 
Tokelauan terms. Consequently, the treaty has caused substantial local resentment and 
has certainly not closed the issue in Tokelauan eyes. 
 
19. Currently there is a need for a pause in political and constitutional development and to 
establish full communication in an unhurried way between New Zealand and the Tokelau 
people. 
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CHAPTER 9 
KIRIBATI 
 
 
1. Kiribati appears to have a high population growth rate. The country has a high rate of 
infant mortality for the Pacific Islands. In Fiji people live on average 10 years longer and 
in developed countries 20 years longer. 
 
2. At its present growth rate, if the population doubles again in 30 years, there will be less 
than half an acre per capita in the whole group - and this is land with exceptionally low 
soil fertility by world standards. 
 
3. The huge increase in export earnings from phosphates in the late 1960s and early 1970s 
had no impact on the rate of growth of import demand - this low leverage of export 
earnings on aggregate demand is a standard symptom of mineral exporting economies of 
“enclave” structure. 
 
4. An important economic strategy followed by Kiribati in the years prior to independence 
in 1979 was to pay phosphate earnings into the Revenue Equalisation Reserve Fund 
(:RERF) which had an investment portfolio of about A$86 million at the end of 1983. 
 
5. With the cessation of phosphate mining in 1979, Kiribati lost 90 percent of its exports - a 
fate probably unparalleled for countries in modern times quite apart from the two oil 
shocks of 1973 and 1979. A trade surplus of A$11.9 million was converted into a deficit 
of A$15 million. Current account surpluses were eliminated and overseas reserves 
protected only by a brief surge of capital inflow in 1980-81 and a doubling of grant aid in 
1982. The drop in export earnings did not fall primarily upon living standards, but rather 
as a fall in government revenue. 
 
6. In the absence of a migration outlet living standards in terms of importable goods and 
services will depend in the forseeable future directly on the volume of aid inflow. It 
should be considered as a matter of the highest priority for New Zealand to urge the 
United Kingdom to maintain the level of its commitment to Kiribati (and Tuvalu) and not 
to withdraw from the Western Pacific after 1986. 
 
7. Independence on the basis of the present resource endowment and migration position is 
attainable only at living standards substantially below those now prevailing, especially 
on the cash-oriented island of Tarawa. Per capita GDP fell in 1980 from U.S.$737 to 
U.S.$398. The future for Kiribati could be a retreat into subsistence. 
 
8. It seems likely that in Kiribati far greater returns in terms of real disposable incomes 
could be gained from overseas labour market penetration than from the current strategy 
of attempting autonomous development onshore in pursuit of “self reliance”.  At present 
the country's development strategy is dictated by aid donors, who are willing to finance 
onshore projects but not to sponsor programmes of offshore labour-market penetration. 
 
9. In terms of consumption over the period of 1970-81 there was a drop in the import of 
diesel fuel, little change in many foods and only a moderate increase in imports of beer, 
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sugar, tea, fresh and frozen meat. There was however, a large increase in imports of 
tobacco and cigarettes while rice imports tripled. 
 
10. It has been exceptionally difficult to diversify the production base. Philatelic sales and 
fishing have grown in recent years and might broaden the export base a little. Copra has 
grown only very slightly over the last 12 years. 
 
11. It has been suggested that some deficiency of micro nutrients causes malnutrition 
amongst 25 percent or more of the population and that this might have worsened in 
recent years. 
 
12. In the 1978 Census less than 14 percent of the total population was in formal 
employment; since then unemployment has grown. It seems that 85 to 90% are destined 
for a largely subsistence livelihood in the village environment. Eighty percent of wage 
employment is in the public service. Manufacturing is confined to 20 small firms. 
 
13. The contrast between the core of Tarawa and the periphery of the outer islands is 
probably the most pronounced in the whole South Pacific. By 1982 South Tarawa had a 
population of about 20,000 or one third of the national total. A battery of policies is 
needed at macro and micro levels to enhance in relative terms the attractions of outer 
island living, to reduce wage dualism, to encourage import substitution, to increase the 
costs and lessen the benefits of urban living and to bring effective town planning policies 
into operation. 
 
14. The Coconut Replanting and Improvement Schemes achieved very limited success over 
the period of 1970-83 for reasons stated. However in a country in which the population is 
so dependent on the coconut palm both for subsistence and on copra as the major export 
product, there is a major need to relaunch a coconut replanting campaign. 
 
15. Recent research results suggest that Kiribati soils have amongst the lowest levels of five 
nutrients ever recorded (nitrogen, potassium, iron, manganese and zinc). While 
fertilisation would be expensive, some fertilisation of groves near villages during 
replanting would appear to be well worthwhile. 
 
16. The primary policy options to increase copra production should be aimed at maintaining 
a satisfactory price level, and increasing the incentive to cut copra by providing more 
buying points and better transport means (bicycles, handcarts, tractors, trailers or boats). 
 
17. A Coconut Replanting Programme might become marginally economic if a market for 
coconut timber can be created. A market for Millionaire's salad would be a bonus. 
 
18. The successful New Zealand aid project on coconut timber milling has been hampered by 
the failure of Government to develop an effective marketing strategy. Much work is 
needed to overcome local consumer resistance. In the short term coconut timber could 
substitute for 45 percent of timber requirements and in the longer term for 80 percent. On 
islands where milling occurs it is important to fell senile palms from the lands of all 
villages. Timber milling should be built into a renewed Coconut Replanting Scheme. 
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19. Tuna fishing represents the most promising option for the future with potential catch 
rates likely to be good. The country plans to expand its tuna fleet from 4 vessels to 8 and 
then ultimately 12 vessels. Purse seiners are however expensive at A$2-12 million each, 
together with costly shore facilities needed. Kiribati has one of the most clearly thought-
out fisheries development plans of any South Pacific country, but it is difficult at this 
stage to determine whether its projections are unduly optimistic. 
 
20. It appears that after Independence some of the cardinal principles of management of the 
Cooperative movement might have been overlooked; many societies in outer islands are 
in poor shape, many cases of malpractice have occurred and some societies that formerly 
had healthy profits have now become only marginally profitable. There is a need to 
return to “tried and true” principles with newcomers having to “reinvent the wheel” 
again. 
 
21. There would appear to be much truth in the view that in a semi-subsistence country of 
only 60,000 people, the volume of merchandise is too small to warrant two major 
wholesaling enterprises. The narrow commercial focus of the Abamakoro Company 
could endanger the profitability of the KCWS and prevent it from adopting a wider, more 
socially desirable role. There is a real need for promotion of nutritionally desirable items 
and valuable capital goods rather than concentrating on fast flowing but nutritionally 
inferior foods. A fresh review of the wholesaling and retail field appears to be needed. 
 
22. The installation of a modern system of telecommunications brings some benefits to 
Kiribati, though at some cost and with the requirement to train staff in new skills. It is 
not clear however how the “information revolution” meets the real needs of 99% of the 
Kiribati people, compared to the one percent in finance, business or banking. 
Unfortunately the cult associated with the global information and “telematic” revolution 
carries with it the danger of ignoring or rejecting most of the small scale appropriate 
technologies of the Schumacher type. 
 
23. Islanders are rational opportunists who are very situation bound in their response to 
conditions, depending often on two, three or four sources of income. They are “part-
peasant”, “part-proletarian”, part-time traders, partly dependent on remittances from 
relatives and partly dependent on subsistence gardening, gathering and fishing. 
 
24. The acquisition of money incomes has done little to enhance human welfare (except 
perhaps spending on school fees) and has been accompanied by a decline in nutrition. 
 
25. Interference by an international organisation and the introduction of an approach that 
was not appropriate to Kiribati conditions helped to cause the failure of the Family 
Planning Campaign. A new revived Family Planning Campaign should be a high 
priority; it would be well advised to model itself on the successful organisation and 
techniques of the 1969-73 campaign. 
 
26. Resettlement by planned colonisation is best considered, if at all, as a possible adjunct to, 
rather than a substitute for a family planning programme. Even if ecological conditions 
prove to be satisfactory, the greatest difficulty is the extreme isolation of Fanning and 
Washing Islands 2000 miles away from Tarawa and from shipping lanes. 
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27. Overseas aid has tended to “muck up” Kiribati in introducing inappropriate innovations, 
ones with high recurrent costs, or weakening the old socio-economic structures. However 
paternalistic British colonialism has protected many skills needed for survival on an 
atoll, in sharp contrast to the nearby dependent and transformed “juke-box” culture of 
American Micronesia. 
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CHAPTER 10 
TUVALU 
 
1. The granting of independence to Tuvalu was a very bold decision for a country of 8000 
people living in an area of less than 10 square miles in nine islands scattered over an EEZ 
area of 900,000 km2. 
 
2. The nine tiny islands offer only the most limited and bleak prospects of agricultural 
production and many soils suffer serious mineral deficiency. Only Funafuti and Nukufetau 
have lagoons that are navigable by ocean-going vessels. Water, one of the most important 
resources, is often scarce. Moreover the economy manifests the “mirab” characteristics of 
being aid- and remittance-led which is not conducive to motivation toward cash cropping. 
 
3. Population densities are amongst the highest in the Pacific, varying in 1979 from 156 to 405 
per km2 on the outer islands and averaging 307 per km2. 
 
4. There has been a lack of continuity in public service positions; frequently heads of 
government departments have been replaced. However there is no shortage of skill in many 
positions. 
 
5. The process of political development was extremely rapid - the country was required to 
compress “50 years of history into five” - the period from separation from the Gilberts to 
independence. It was also perhaps unfortunate that the Governor-General's powers as set out 
by the Constitutional Committee were subsequently reduced and those of the Chief Minister 
increased. 
  
6. Tuvalu is likely to be characterised by political stability. People are loyal to their leaders and 
tolerant of their actions, so that there is a remarkable constancy in political life. 
 
7. It is probably unfortunate that Britain did not agree to granting aid as a lump sum at 
independence to be invested as a reserve fund rather than providing periodic budgetary aid. 
This would have given the country more financial as well as political independence. 
 
8. The implications of creating a machine-age twentieth century “oasis” in a remote atoll 
economy were not fully thought-out. The rapid development of infrastructure on Funafuti 
has created a situation where recurrent costs are becoming a major problem. 
 
9. The contrast between the “core” of Funafuti and the “periphery” of the outer islands is great. 
The former has 31 percent of the total population (a density of 1640 per km2 on Fongafale 
islet), and A$763 per capita GDP compared to $209 for the outer islands. This regional 
disparity has been a major factor in the abortive attempts at political secession by two 
islands. An over concentration on the development of Funafuti was seen as a reason for the 
defeat of the last Government. 
10. It is vitally important that overseas aid does not disturb or threaten the delicate adaptation of 
populations to the fragile atoll environment. The question of scale is highly important in aid  
 
11. The recent acceleration in the rate of growth of the population (now over 2%) is most 
disturbing. Crucial importance is thus attached to the Family Planning Programme. 
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12. The economy is extremely open, indicating the very small control that Government can 
normally exert on it. External factors over which Government has little or no control are 
vital - the volume of foreign aid, variability of international prices for fish and copra, 
overseas employment opportunities. 
 
13. Any increase in money incomes is almost immediately translated into a heavier import bill 
(for each extra dollar earned at least 80 cents is spent on imported goods). Thus the domestic 
multiplier is very low with most spending “leaking” out of the economy through the 
purchase of imports. 
 
14. Imports vastly exceed commodity exports and the two bear little relationship to each other. 
This pattern has major implications for shipping. There is no apparent commercial basis for 
providing shipping services to Tuvalu. 
 
15. Production in the “mirab economy” is largely unrelated to the level of cash activity or 
income, given the large aid flow, substantial remittances and wages and salaries provided by 
public service employment. 
 
16. If the national goal of “self-reliance” is to be taken seriously, the country needs to generate 
an additional $3 million or so of foreign exchange income per year. This is equivalent to 
three times the main income source - the sale of stamps - or five times the income from 
migrant remittances (or 100 times the existing level of commodity exports). Clearly the goal 
of self reliance cannot at present be taken seriously - it is a rhetorical device to maintain 
credibility in the world of so-called “development aid”. 
 
17. Unfortunately the external labour market has been closing in on Tuvalu rather than opening 
out. 
 
18. Austere financial management has meant that the percentage of recurrent revenue financed 
from local sources has risen from 65 to 73 percent in 1979-81 to 1982-84. 
 
19 It is difficult to gauge the abundance of tuna resources in Tuvalu waters, though they might 
be reasonable. The country's one tuna fishing vessel, given by Japan, is however too large 
(170 gross tonnes) and yields a large operating loss. A smaller vessel of about 50 tonnes 
would be more suitable and much cheaper to operate. The country has not adopted a 
particularly effective strategy to develop its fisheries. Many technical needs are lacking. 
Even if commercial quantities of fish are caught the transport bottleneck will make it 
difficult to market them overseas. 
 
20. Tuvaluans, who depend more fully on off island sources of income than Kiribati people, cut 
on average only 42 kgms of copra per head each year compared to 125 kgms per head in 
Kiribati. People usually only make copra when they need “target income” and money is not 
available from some other source. 
 
21. Motivation to raise money is much greater if a campaign is launched which the Ekalesia can 
support and if the element of competition can be introduced. 
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22. Recent research has shown that reasonable yields of sweet potatoes can be grown following 
fertilisation with trace elements followed by a dressing of major nutrients. Good prospects 
exist for local cash crop gardens of sweet potatoes. 
 
23. The conversion of senile coconut palms into charcoal for use as household fuel on Funafuti 
is an interesting possibility. 
 
24. In a mirab economy like Tuvalu a major source of revenue is likely to come from special 
stamp issues. The prospects of sponsorship by a large overseas company using the Tuvalu 
name in cornflakes promotion etc are of interest. 
 
25. Only 13 percent of the population is in full time employment and 62 percent of all jobs are 
public service. 
 
26. There is a feeling of national solidarity, of the necessity for austerity, of struggle and even of 
sacrifice in the face of the country's precarious economic situation. Tuvalu deserves firmer 
assurances of economic security from her major donors (primarily the United Kingdom). 
 
27. The Fusi (Cooperative movement) inculcates a business sense, provides services and the 
opportunity to earn a dividend. However its broader social role must be questioned with the 
increasing trend toward “consumerism”, of greater dependence on a poor quality diet of 
“European” foods. The Fusi should be more active in promoting the sale of nutritious foods 
and capital goods on outer islands. 
 
28. Uncoordinated, fragmented procurement has been carried out by the TCS and GSK with 
small quantities and high shipping costs raising the cost of imports. Moreover quotations 
have not been sought from competing companies in order to obtain the most economical or 
best source of supply. 
 
29. The frequency of visits by ships from Australia and New Zealand is about the same (4 to 5 
visits a year). The Pacific Forum Line service is greatly appreciated and the Moanaraoi (392 
tonnes) is about the right size for the Funafuti run. In April 1984 there was the threat of 
suspension of some of the sailings of the Karlander Line vessels to Tuvalu in view of 
inadequate cargoes available. Freight rates from New Zealand are a little cheaper than from 
Australia for general cargo and much cheaper for cement. 
 
30. A reasonable basic health service exists. Diarrhoea and influenza are the main causes of 
death. However there is a steady increase in diseases and illnesses induced by a poor diet - 
the classic diseases of Westernisation of the lifestyle (obesity, hypertension and diabetes). 
The question of the effects of urbanisation on Polynesian and Micronesian populations needs 
to be studied in depth. 
 
31. The United Kingdom Government cut its budgetary aid by $25,000 to $925,000 in 1984 and 
wanted half of the current budget surplus for 1984 to be paid into the Development Fund as 
opposed to reducing its budgetary aid by this sum. Such an action shows little understanding 
of the functioning of a mirab economy and indeed reduces the Tuvalu incentive to make a 
surplus. 
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32. Overseas aid represents a surprisingly small proportion of total revenue (26 percent 1984) or 
anything from 50 to over 120 percent of GDP. In 1982 Tuvalu received A$8 million in all 
forms of aid, or $1000 per head. Some donors do at times exert unfair leverage on the 
Tuvalu Government. Leaders are critical of overseas “experts” who only come to Tuvalu for 
a week or two, and who make little effort to get to know the country in depth. There is a 
major need for forms of aid which help to take the pressure off the recurrent budget. Almost 
all aid is regarded as tied in some ways, not all aid is good, and many projects bear costs not 
always forseen. 
 
33. The cancellation of the internal air service (costing about $400,000 annually) by the 
Government in 1983 was a most painful political decision to take. The shipping service, 
depending on the decrepit Nivaga, is most unsatisfactory (operating only 41% of the time 
and requiring a subsidy of $100,000 annually). Tuvalu has escaped the financial millstone of 
a costly seaplane service only at the price of increased isolation. The cessation of the Air 
Pacific Fiji-Tuvalu air link in 1982 with only two month's notice was most unfortunate. 
 
34. The introduction of new technology must not outrun the capacity of the local society to 
operate and service it efficiently. The functioning of the Funafuti power station illustrates the 
importance of the training function becoming self sustaining as operators train their own 
new staff. 
 
35. New Zealand aid is appreciated for being quicker in arriving and less bureaucratic than that 
from other major donors. The Small Projects Funds is a most valuable and flexible form of 
aid, being appropriate to local small-scale conditions. Key empirical questions that are posed 
must be answered if aid is to become more effective. New Zealand needs to ensure that a 
greater proportion of its aid is spent in outer islands. 
 
36. There appears to be a good case for budgetary aid which would serve to enhance sound 
financial management. 
 
37. The liberal policies of aid donors just before Independence and the general optimism of the 
time fanned unrealistic hopes that were later doomed to be dashed. Perhaps the best aid in 
the long run is assistance which does not fan implausible hopes and unrealistic goals. The 
establishment of a Reserve Fund of say A$20 to 30 million, if it could be built up by all 
donors acting in concert, would give Tuvalu the assurance of a dependable long term source 
of revenue. 
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CHAPTER 11 
 
POLITICAL AFFAIRS 
 
 
1. There have been many positive achievements in the political life of the Cook Islands. 
The country is basically stable but there has been some political uncertainty in 1983-84 
with the two major parties almost equal in representation. The rivalry between the 
personalities of a few leading politician dominates the scene. 
 
2. Traditionally, in Niue egalitarianism and individualism were important, with decision-
making being by consensus. This consensus basis has led to pronounced political 
stability over the last two decades.  
 
In recent years Sir Robert Rex's authority has increased and has been largely 
unchallenged. 
 
3. In Tokelau the village structure and institutions still remain largely intact, stubbornly 
resisting further change until current problems can be worked through, in spite of 
persistent New Zealand efforts to accelerate the pace of political and constitutional 
change. A large Western-style public service remains separate and unassimilated into 
the neo-traditional structure. 
 
4. In Kiribati, local government has always been weak, with the local concept of 
government unfortunately often being that of an external, arbitrary and dictatorial 
power. At the national level, a Westminister-type system has been adopted but there has 
been a reassertion of the traditional emphasis on egalitarianism and a maneaba style 
consensus approach to decision-making.  
 
5. In Tuvalu the political system is characterised by the loyal support and respect for the 
leaders, emphasis on service to the community, proud conformity and social solidarity, 
and sharing in accordance with Tuvalu's values and the principles of the Ekalesia. It too 
is a highly stable system. 
 
6. Even in large African or Asian ex-colonies where economic growth is possible, there 
have been many examples since World War II of the failure of economic growth based 
on liberal, capitalist lines to promote democratic political modernisation on the British 
or United States models. In mirab economies where growth has been impossible to 
achieve, a different kind of society again has emerged. Politics is managed in a 
distinctive way by a small political elite. 
 
7. While societies are still predominantly homogeneous and unified, they have become 
more class-structured over time. Power has belonged to the dominant personalities and 
the social group who were created by and who best understood the new forces at work - 
the aid and remittance flows, the link with New Zealand, the working of the expanded 
bureaucracy, and the formation of other organised groups that were the basis of 
political life. 
 
 xxxix
8. The expansion of administrative structures on top of near-subsistence economies and 
the almost total absence of a private sector apart from a few trading firms, has meant 
that the new elite has had considerable experience of public sector activity, visiting aid 
missions and the like, but little experience of industry, commerce or modern 
agriculture. 
 
9. The power of the elite in small, remote island societies hinges on the ability to persuade 
and manipulate the village populations. All politicians who wish to be elected promise 
security, through safeguarding New Zealand citizenship in the case of Niue and the 
Cook Islands, and access to the New Zealand labour market for migrants. 
 
10. One major political strategy is to emphasise the small country's “client-state” role, its 
loyalty, perhaps even its forlornness and dependency as part of an international tactic, 
receiving New Zealand aid grants and protection in return. 
 
11. The alternative political strategy, since autonomous development is usually expected, is 
to seek new resources offshore. Since few prospects for foreign investment occur, this 
can lead to links with foreign millionaires or various forms of international 
“brinkmanship”  (such as Tonga successfully employed in 1976 with the threat of 
granting access to the USSR for a fishing base in order to extract more aid from New 
Zealand). 
 
12. The constraints of orthodox development strategies and the impossibility of achieving 
much through “bootstrap” development can lead to deep frustration and feelings of 
national impotence. Some novel strategies, such as philatelic or coin sales have been 
well worthwhile. With limited “room for manoeuvre” however, some leaders have 
indulged in political adventurism (“Henryesque behaviour”) or fallen for instant 
solutions offered by dubious foreign businessmen. Such a case is the Sidney Gross 
affair. It is important for metropolitan countries to understand the long-term 
predicament of the small states and ensure their economic security by undertaking to 
provide subsidies at appropriate levels for a substantial period of time. 
 
13. The accountability of government (for revenues received and expenditures made) to the 
local population is essential, as part of the evaluation by the electorate of the 
government's programme and performance. The accountability of governments - 
whether consensus ones or “Westminister”-type ones that don't perform as they are 
meant to -  is a crucial and unresolved question. 
 
14. Consensus systems of government are highly appropriate in Pacific settings and have 
many strong advantages. Three problems remain however - (i) ways of ensuring 
accountability; (ii) the danger of nepotism, bias, bribery and treating, in small scale 
bonded societies due to the importance of kinship and reciprocity; and (iii) while 
usually successful at village and island level, consensus decision-making still has to 
prove itself at national level, when faced with novel issues and broader questions. 
 
15. Since 1975 the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has accorded the Cook Islands the status, in 
effect, of a full sovereign nation. This attitude of mutual respect between equals is 
admirable, but the question arises of whether New Zealand has fully thought through 
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the implications of this new relationship in which the islands are acting as fully free 
agents. Current issues which are disturbing, especially in a constitutional sense, and 
which could sorely test the relationship include: 
 
(a) The wood fuel project in Rarotonga; 
(b) Philatelic revenue in Niue; 
(c) The proposals to raise salaries and allowances by approximately 100 
percent in the Cook Islands; 
(d) The Niue Assembly Members Superannuation Bill, 1984. 
 
16. It is suggested that a Select Committee be appointed in each case to deal with the 
relationship respectively with Niue and the Cook Islands. 
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CHAPTER 12 
DEFENCE 
 
1. After World War II New Zealand felt that some dependable relationship with the United 
States was essential for the country's long term security. The ANZUS alliance has been the 
cornerstone of New Zealand's security and defence policies for over 30 years. Dependence 
on and close alliance with the United States and Australia have been the paramount 
factors.  
 
2. The accession of the Fourth Labour Government to power raises the possibility of change 
through its nuclear-free South Pacific policy.  
 
3. In recent years there has been a deterioration in superpower relationships and a continued 
failure of internationalism has been apparent. With the deployment of intermediate range 
nuclear missiles by both superpowers there is growing cynicism on the part of public 
opinion in many countries. There is a feeling that the world is trapped and helpless in the 
face of events. Rather than a continuation of stable deterrence we appear to be witnessing 
yet another round of the nuclear arms race. 
 
4. New Zealand's defence policy has always involved support for collective security and 
forward defence. The nation has always been ready to pay a painful price by fighting in 
other people's wars in the attempt to earn the regard of a powerful ally (Britain, then 
latterly the United States) which might accept the role of protector.  
 
5. Following the Nixon (Guam) Doctrine calling for greater regional self reliance, New 
Zealand adopted a new “close to home” policy in 1978. While not completely abandoning 
forward defence and continuing to maintain a European or Western perspective, New 
Zealand has accepted a greater regional role for defence in the South Pacific.  
 
6. In the 1980's the view has grown that there is no manifest external threat to New Zealand's 
security.  
 
7. At the same time, there has been disquiet at a rapidly escalating defence budget that 
reached over $700 million in 1984, coming at a time of economic recession. 
Disillusionment at the nuclear arms race and the superpower impasse has also grown.  
 
8. In 1980-81 and 1981-82 there were substantial increases in defence spending in real terms. 
However New Zealand's defence spending (1.53 to 2.2% of GDP) is small in comparison 
to most countries. Living “at the edge of the world”, many New Zealanders don't feel 
greatly threatened.  
 
9. Doubts have been expressed recently about the cost-effectiveness of present defence 
spending, given New Zealand's rather ambivalent defence posture (combining forward 
defence with regional self-reliance). More concentration on specialist, relatively small-
scale equipment suited to anti-submarine, anti-ship and fisheries protection operations 
might be appropriate.  
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10. The implementation of the Ready Reaction Regular Force (R3F) does seem a logical 
development in the context of regional self-reliance. 
 
11. It can be argued that for a good part of the 40 years since the last war a situation of stable 
nuclear deterrence has existed.  However, for the last 20 years both superpowers have 
possessed arsenals far larger than could be justified by any rational strategy of deterrence. 
The whole concept of relative advantage seems to be illusory. The arms race occurs 
because neither of the superpowers appears willing to take the slightest risk of having a 
“window of vulnerability”.  Their deterrence postures are governed by the fear that any 
weakness might possibly be exploited by their adversary.  
 
12. Arms control and disarmament, perhaps through a policy of progressive mutual “build 
down”, are just as important as defence policy for ensuring security or even survival in 
today's world.  
 
13. Reaction from American authorities to the announcement by the Labour Government that 
all nuclear weapon systems would be excluded from New Zealand and its territorial waters 
has been that the denial of port facilities to nuclear armed or powered vessels might mean 
the end of the ANZUS Treaty.  
 
14. The establishment of a nuclear weapon-free zone in the South Pacific, if enforceable, 
would prevent the further spread of nuclear weapons and serve as a regional measure of 
arms control. It might also act as an example that will advance the cause of disarmament 
in other areas of the world.  
 
However, to be effective, the five nuclear powers must be willing over a period of to 
accept restraint on their existing freedom to introduce nuclear weapons into the zone.  
Moreover the superpowers will not accept zone proposals which restrict the exercise of 
their high seas freedoms, which would restrict the right of zone states to give transit 
privileges to their vessels and aircraft, which were unverifiable, or which disturbed 
existing security arrangements.  
 
15.  American Policy in the South Pacific 
United States interests are overwhelmingly concerned with security. Americans view 
defence treaties in an interlocking way. ANZUS is seen as an integral part of a global 
system of alliances.  
 
16. The USSR now have an ability to interdict shipping through the South China Sea from 
their Vietnam bases and to close the Indonesian straits and Strait of Malacca with mines. If 
this occurred in any regional or global war, Pacific lines of communication would move 
south from the North Pacific to the South Pacific, the Tasman Sea, Bass Strait and Great 
Australian Bight to the Indian Ocean.  
 
17. Most current threats to peace or stability in the Pacific Basin appear to be of small or only 
moderate scale mostly arising from internal affairs - e.g. an internal challenge to Marcos in 
the Philippines border disputes between West Irian and Papua New Guinea and the 
independence movement in New Caledonia.  
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Perhaps the biggest threat could come from trouble between the superpowers in the Indian 
Ocean.  
 
18. ANZUS - the case against.  
 
1. The ANZUS treaty was negotiated to deal with a situation which no longer exists, and 
does not obviously have relevance to present day needs.  
 
2. The treaty has very narrow scope and imposes obligations of uncertain strength on the 
USA to defend the other partners.  
 
3. The treaty now appears to function mainly as an umbrella under which the United States 
conducts intelligence operations and deploys its nuclear as well as conventional forces. 
ANZUS has helped to legitimate the contuining growth of US nuclear weapons capability 
in the Pacific. If the treaty cannot now be disentangled from its nuclear dimension, its 
value in the eyes of New Zealanders will be substantially reduced.  
 
19. ANZUS -  the case for.  
 
1. New Zealand cannot defend itself alone against a major aggressor; collective security is 
the only possible defence, and ANZUS may be the only such deal on offer. 
 
2. The Falklands War illustrated the willingness of the US to assist allies in localised wars, in 
areas such as ordnance, intelligence and communications.  
 
3. ANZUS brings important practical benefits to the New Zealand armed forces in terms of 
training, exercise and intelligence.  
 
4. The alliance provides the structure within which all issues bearing on the relations among 
the partners are addressed. It has been seen as an invaluable means by which New Zealand 
can gain the ear of a superpower patron.  
 
5. Even without the treaty in its present form, relations among New Zealand, Australia and 
the USA would have to be conducted in some way. Adherence by New Zealand to its 
present “nuclear free” stance will probably have costs in other areas such as trade.  
 
20. On balance, the past decisions of successive New Zealand Governments to keep ANZUS 
were probably wise. Collective defence still seems to be essential for New Zealand's 
security, but it should prove possible to strip ANZUS of its nuclear trappings, or replace it 
with a new treaty on a more acceptable basis. 
 
21. The essence of the problem is for New Zealand to find ways of reciprocity with the United 
States and Australia that are real and valuable yet still enable New Zealand to work 
actively for nuclear disarmament and arms control in the South Pacific.  
 
22. New Zealand security role in the South Pacific  
New Zealand has been involved formany decades in the defence of its vital interests in the 
South Pacific. (In addition to action in World War 1 and II, this has included a riot in 
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Rarotonga in 1919, a serious strike in Fiji in 1920 and the unfortunate over-reaction of 
military forces against the Mau movement in Western Samoa in 1929).  
 
The islands have been seen as the outer perimeter of New Zealand's defensive system - a 
kind of buffer zone through which any invading force would first have to penetrate. 
Strategic denial is an important element of the policy.  
 
23. Since the War New Zealand has assisted Fiji and Tonga with training their military forces. 
Certain forms of trade training are also provided. Surveillance and protection are provided 
for the other island groups which do not have military forces.  
 
24. This role calls for a wide ranging capacity for New Zealand's military forces, which might 
be required to operate over vast areas in very different island societies. The development 
of the R3F as a flexible, highly mobile group is an attempt to respond immediately to all 
kinds of problems in the region. Its role will also apply to civic disasters.  
 
25. The Mutual Assistance Programme (MAP) is aimed at strengthening bilateral relations in 
defence with partner countries. MAP is maintained with 8 Pacific and ASEAN countries - 
Fiji, Indonesia, Malaysia, Papua New Guinea, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and 
Tonga.  
  
New Zealand's military forces contribute effectively to civil action in the South Pacific in 
numerous peaceful ways.  
 
26. Just as New Zealand seeks to avoid abject dependence or sycophantic clientism in its 
defence and economic policies, so it is equally important that the small states should not 
have to play the same kind of role vis-a-vis New Zealand.  
 
27. The fact that New Zealand “belongs to two worlds” introduces a schizophrenic or 
ambivalent character into its defence and foreign policies. This could lead to a lack of 
decisiveness about the precise role and nature of New Zealand's defence forces in the 
future and the weaponry that would accordingly be most appropriate. However, the 
security of citizens of New Zealand and the South Pacific require dual policies, 
emphasising disarmament and arms control as well as defence through collective security.  
 
28. An encouraging start has been made by the Fourth Labour Government in stating an 
independent yet moderate and reasonable position.  
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CHAPTER 13 
SHIPPING, INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT AND TRADE ACCESS 
 
1. The Pacific Forum Line, Sparteca agreement and Pacific Islands Industrial Development 
Scheme were all products of a particular vision of the development process, which stressed 
industrial development as an employment creator and export production as the desirable 
leading sector.  
 
2. The scope for these “development-promoting” reforms is far less however in these five small 
states, because the prospects for “development” of this type are slender, and because three of 
them already enjoyed special status in shipping and market access to New Zealand.  
 
3. In one industrial activity which has shown real “viability” in the long run - clothing 
manufacture on Rarotonga - the financing of the necessary investment also has never been a 
constraint. The existence of PIIDS moreover did nothing in this area of first issue earning to 
offset the harsh reality of economic decline.  
 
4. In Tuvalu and Kiribati, the function of the PFL/PIIDs/SPARTECA package was to turn the 
economies of those two countries increasingly towards New Zealand; there has been a rise in 
New Zealand's share of imports to these countries.  
 
5. The real targets of the PFL/PIIDs/SPARTECA package have not been the small states 
covered by this survey, but the larger Pacific nations - Western Samoa, Fiji, Tonga or Papua 
New Guinea - and the improvement of the New Zealand Government's political image in the 
forums of the region and the world.  
 
6. Shipping costs between Apia and Tokelau have seldom been less than 25 percent of the 
value of trade carried and since the oil shocks of the 1970's it has been at least 40 percent.  
 
7. Since the institution of the Joint Shipping Service the earlier dissatisfaction of Islanders over 
inadequate shipping schedules has been replaced by anxiety that the present subsidy level 
might not be politically sustainable in the long term.  
 
8. In current terms the operating cost on the Cook Islands-Niue joint service (JSS) had risen to 
$5.2 million by 1983/84. It appears that well over 80% of the subsidy required in most 
operating losses on the JSS corresponds to the extra costs incurred through applying New 
Zealand award manning scales.  
 
9. The Fletcher Report noted that the north-to-south-bound ratio of island trade is 4 to 1, thus 
causing a severe trade imbalance. The Report found the JSS in 1982 technically deficient, 
operationally obsolete, financially disastrous, politically inadequate, but commerically 
acceptable, since it met the required level of service and consumer satisfaction.  
 
10. Continuation of the existing subsidy by the New Zealand Government to the Joint Shipping 
Service brings real political returns in island goodwill and industrial peace with the maritime 
unions. However the JSS has been more of a political than a commercial venture. For a 
subsidy of $4 million or more, the greatest beneficiaries are New Zealand exporters selling 
in Niue, the Cook Islands and French Polynesia; island consumers and New Zealand 
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crewmen also benefit via imports and salaries respectively. Total exports form the islands to 
New Zealand are around $5 million FOB, more or less equal to the subsidy required to run 
the shipping service on the present basis.  
 
11. The Pacific Forum Line has been an important symbol of New Zealand's regional 
commitment to the South Pacific. Political factors have always taken precedence over 
commerical and technical problems and New Zealand seems to have begun from the 
unproven assumption that a regional shipping line was the answer to the perceived problem 
of high freight rates and irregular service, and that only strong political commitment was 
needed to make the venture a success. This position has implied willingness to subsidise 
operating losses, and also to proceed even if expert recommendations on type of ships and 
schedules could not be met.  
 
12. The New Zealand subsidy to the PFL accounted for $3.8 million in 1983/84 (less than the 
subsidy on the Cook Islands-Niue Joint service). The PFL service has substantially improved 
shipping to Tuvalu and Kiribati and has assisted the recent rapid expansion of New Zealand 
exports to Tuvalu.  
 
13. It is clear that the provision of regular shipping services to the five small states will have to 
remain subsidised for the foreseeable future, with the degree of subsidy a matter for political 
negotiation between the New Zealand Government and the beneficiaries - the island 
communities, the New Zealand Maritime unions and the New Zealand exporters.  
 
14. The economic rationale for promoting industrialisation in the islands was that rapid and 
successful “economic development” in the islands would, it was hoped, mop up this labour 
force and thus dampen the incentives to migrate to New Zealand.  
 
15. The PIIDs scheme is a demonstration of New Zealand's commitment to regional 
development and cooperation.  
 
16. The advantages of low wage rates in the islands were more than offset by the disadvantages 
of distance, low productivity and smallness of scale. The PIIDs scheme rested crucially upon 
investment subsidies and assistance with productivity. The scheme was based on the 
assumption that commercial viability could be attained simply by reducing setting up costs 
and on-going level of overheads. No statistical work was done to establish the realism of this 
assumption. PIIDs incentives to locate in the islands were similar to regional development 
incentives already available to manufacturers within New Zealand itself, so island locations 
had to be preferable to areas in New Zealand where regional development incentives 
applied.  
 
17. New Zealand export incentives could be claimed on goods produced in New Zealand and 
exported to island markets, which substantially undercut the attractiveness of the PIIDs 
incentives. Moreover export incentives were ongoing subsidies to manufacturers' 
profitability whereas the PIIDs incentives were restricted to setting-up costs.  
 
18. The official figures for the number of operating ventures and the number of jobs created are 
open to serious question. It seems unlikely that ventures assisted under PIIDs have created 
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more than half the direct jobs claimed, and the net contribution of PIIDs would be 
considerably lower than this.  
 
19. It appears that on many cases, entrepreneurs have treated PIIDs as a source of concessionary 
finance after they have already decided to embark on a venture.  
 
20. On the basis of our analysis of Mirab economies, the PIIDs scheme has some advantages - it 
facilities low level diversification of this village economy, it provides a useful barometer of 
the existence or otherwise of profitable investment opportunities in the islands. They are far 
below the “threshold” of project size for mainstream aid programmes of most donors and 
they are, almost without exception, marginal to the local economy. 
 
21. The PIIDs scheme has been a most remarkable cost-effective public relations exercise. At a 
fraction of the cost, for example of New Zealand's support to the Pacific Forum Line, 
goodwill has been built up in several Pacific nations.  
 
22. The original motivation and continuing rationale for the programme are New Zealand's 
political goals rather than any clearly-defined Islands goals. And it would be incorrect to 
portray the scheme's design as a passive New Zealand response to Island Government's 
wishes.  
 
23. It is not clear that the Department of Trade and Industry had built up enough specialised 
expertise in the South Pacific to enable officials to respond creatively to the specific 
problems of the region. Rather, PIIDs transferred industrial assistance measures designed for 
New Zealand regions to the very different setting of small island economies. In the final 
analysis the power, finance and initiative reside in Wellington, and will continue to do.  
 
24. The main contribution of SPARTECA to policy analysis of South Pacific trade and 
development problems has been to remove a red herring - namely the notion that restricted 
market access was the key explanation for trade imbalances in the region. Having disposed 
of this, Forum countries can now confront the more fundamental causes for these trade 
deficits.  
 
25. It appears that Fiji has been the major beneficiary of SPARTECA, followed by Papua New 
Guinea, Tonga and the Solomon Islands.  
 
26. SPARTECA has been beneficial in perfoming a trade-creating role. There are real gains to 
several island economies, but they are not sufficient to make much of an inroad into the 
perceived problem - the trade deficits of island countries with the large economies. Before 
SPARTECA in 1978/79 the trade imbalance was two to one in favour of New Zealand 
compared to the islands; in 1982/83 (after SPARTECA) the imbalance in favour of New 
Zealand was three to one.  
 
27. The existence of SPARTECA has not in itself generated growth; and it can scarcely be 
claimed that it was necessary for economic growth in the islands. But it is helpful overall. 
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CHAPTER 14 
 
FISHERIES 
 
1. The recorded catches by island countries in the SPC area are miniscule, despite a 
37% increase in reported catches by SPC countries over 1975-82. The island 
countries share of the Central Pacific total catch remains about 1.2 to 1.5%. 
 
Fiji and the Solomon Islands have experienced the most rapid expansion of their 
fish catches in the past decade; of the five small states only Kiribati figures as a 
significant fishing nation.  
 
2. The Central Pacific, is however, of major world importance in tuna fishing. Nearly 
half the total world tuna catch now comes from the central Pacific compared to 
only a quarter in the 1960s. The central Pacific tuna catch doubled in volume 
between 1970 and 1982.  
 
3. A rough valuation of fish catch (basically tuna) for Kiribati waters in the early 
1980s at an FOB value of A$1,000 a tonne is over A$30 million, comparable to the 
value of peak exports of phosphate in mid 1970s. However the stock is widely 
dispersed over a vast area, difficult and expensive to police and the international 
industry and market are highly competitive. Fish accounted for $700,000 of 
Kiribati's total exports of nearly $4 million in 1981, while fishing licence fees 
brought in $1.3 million of government revenue - nearly 5% of a $30 million value 
of the total catch.  
 
4. Tuna fishery development might at best reach on internal rate of return of 16% in 
Kiribati with gross surpluses before depreciation rising to $1.8 million annually in 
the late 1980s. This would be comparable or a little above, the earnings of copra. 
This would be a valuable gain but in no sense would it make the economy “self 
reliant”.  
 
5. The disappointing experience of Te Tautai in Tuvalu has dampened earlier 
excessive hopes. Prospects are hard to judge, but at best are probably only 
moderate. Revenue from fishing fees for 1983 is estimated at $200,000 while the 
value of fish caught by Te Tautai (in Fijian waters) is another $200,000. 
 
6. In the Cook Islands the local tuna catch is insignificant, and the foreign catch 
appears to be well below the potential level.  
 
Niue and the Cook Islands are located too far from Japan to have attracted 
intensive fishing effort and are still unproven in terms of sustainable catch.  
 
In Niue tuna fisheries appear to have little potential; catches by foreign vessels 
were only 100-200 tonnes annually in the first half of the 1970s. 
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7. The Tokelau EEZ is technically feasible for purse seine fishing and it is located 
near the Pago Pago canneries. However only 6 vessels are licensed at mid 1984, 
with likely revenues of not more than $5000 for the year.  
 
8. It is unlikely that the net returns to Niue, the Cook Islands and Tokelau from 
licensing will be sufficient to offset the costs of surveillance in their extensive 
EEZs and that surveillance must therefore be justified at least partly on region-
wide grounds.  
 
9. There do not yet appear to exist any thorough studies of the extent of taxable rents 
being generated in tuna fishing within the Forum EEZs, nor any systematic 
licensing regime to take account of the great differences from country to country in 
productivity per km of EEZ, distance from processing plants and markets, and 
ratio of local to foreign fishing activity.  
 
10. At this stage the fisheries issue is more a political one - involving the recognition 
and definition of regional common interests, and the strengthening of regional 
institutions and co operation  - than strictly an economic one.  
 
11. New Zealand has an important role to perform at the level of diplomacy and 
international law e.g. Problems exist currently because two of the major 
participants in the tuna fisheries are countries with which it is difficult to secure 
satisfactory negotiated agreements : Taiwan and the United States.  
 
(i) New Zealand does not recognise the government of Taiwan and refuses to 
contemplate direct dealings with Taipei by New Zealand associated small 
states.  
 
(ii) The United States refuses to sign the Law of the Sea treaty and is 
unwilling either to police the fishing activities of tis nationals or to 
tolerate such policing by other sovereign states.  
 
12. The problem of Taiwan is dealt with by tacit agreement to operate negotiations 
through non-governmental channels. Ultimately, if any substantial development of 
the Cook Islands and Niue EEZs is carried out, Taiwanese and South Korean 
vessels are likely to play a leading role.  
 
13. The Danica incident of 1982 in Papua New Guinea and the current Solomon 
Islands arrest of a US vessel illustrate that what might have been routine policing 
issues became international incidents because of the United States Government's 
willingness to enter into political confrontations with Pacific states in defence of 
the rights claimed by the American Tunaboat Association. A diplomatic role 
appears to exist for New Zealand to mediate on behalf of Forum countries, to 
defend their interests and to attempt to defuse the seriousness of such incidents.  
 
14. Small Pacific states must carefully weigh the potential costs of offending the 
United States Government (by impounding unlicensed fishing vessels) against the 
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increasingly heavy losses resulting from closing of United States markets and any 
tightening up of migration access to the United States.  
 
15. Since there are obviously narrow limits on the Forum's ability to sustain on 
outright confrontation with the United States over the fisheries issue, the 
importance of establishing and sustaining a regional position in international law is 
increased. New Zealand has contributed substantially in this area, and should 
continue to do so in the future.  
 
16. There seems to have been inadequate research work to date on the political 
economy of the tuna fisheries of the central Pacific, yet decisions on licensing 
regimes and regional investment options hinge on the economies of fisheries 
operations at least as much as on the scientific issues of the size and migratory 
habits of the tuna stock.  
 
17. It would be valuable for New Zealand to encourage at least one appropriate 
international agency to research and publish substantial in-depth analysis of the 
regional economics of fisheries development, and further to ensure that the results 
of such research are critically evaluated and interpreted. It is essential that this 
research be of a high calibre.  
 
18. New Zealand can also play a role in the design and implementation of cost-
effective means of maritime surveillance. The extent to which regionally-owned 
and operated vessels would be delegated a an enforcement role vis-a-vis Deep 
Water Fishing Nation's vessels is obviously a ticklish issue, and must be explored 
with caution.  
 
19. It may well be just as appropriate for New Zealand to demonstrate a willingness to 
maintain some rapidly-deployable fisheries enforcement capability as it is to 
maintain a rapid deployment force to cope with threats to political stability in the 
South Pacific.  
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CHAPTER 15 
 
EDUCATION 
 
 
1. The Beeby Report led in 1946 to the establishment of the Islands Education section 
of the Department of Education, the reintroduction of vernacular in the early years 
of schooling, a more culturally based curriculum, the establishment of secondary 
schools and teacher training and the reintroduction of a Scholarship Training 
Scheme. 
 
2. Attempts to provide schools with more practical curricula (as in Junior High 
Schools on the outer islands in the Cook Islands) or for high schools to provide 
education for future administrators could never succeed, as with migration to New 
Zealand the group was not a closed society. The Junior high Schools failed, as 
parents, under self-government, wanted equal opportunity for their children and 
demanded courses leading to New Zealand School Certificate, refusal of which by 
the Government would have been political suicide. Again attempts in Niue to run 
practical courses for the less able in the upper primary classes failed, and parential 
pressure and the economies of scale led in the early 1970s to consolidation of all 
pupils of Form 1 and above in the High School, where a wider variety of better 
quality courses could be supplied. 
 
3. The education system of Tokelau was neglected until 1969 and standards have 
always been low. The reversal of New Zealand Government policy to resettle the 
people in New Zealand led to a change of education policy - syllabuses were 
developed with strong atoll orientation which contained a basis which could be 
applied in New Zealand for those who migrated. 
 
4. New Zealand's present educational assistance is broad in scope. Its policy is to 
respond to requests for assistance. As a small country and a multi-cultural society, 
New Zealand is uniquely placed to provide a wide range of educational 
consultancy. 
 
5. In the Cook Islands there is still a critical situation in teacher supply at all levels. 
There is a tendency for the best primary teachers to be posted to lower secondary 
levels thus denuding the primary schools and lowering the level of achievement. 
Many students trained as teachers are lured into government jobs as these can be 
more financially rewarding. There seems no likelihood of complete localisation in 
the Cook Islands for many years and at best 15 New Zealand teachers are likely to 
be required on Government to Government contracts. As many as 25% of the total 
200 secondary teachers are from overseas. 
 
6. In the five small states, many of the students gaining School Certificate or 
University Entrance prefer to take up more popular training awards, so that few 
well-qualified students enter teachers' college. Teaching also has rather low status 
and only mediocre salary levels.  
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7. New Zealand has been assisting in the Cook Islands. Niue and Tokelau for many 
years to produce structured curricular and teaching materials. Counterpart use has 
featured prominently but often the benefits are lost as success by the counterpart 
leads to promotion outside the curriculum field. New Zealand has always believed 
in a broad, culturally-based curriculum, including not only core subjects such as 
the vernacular, English, mathematics, science, social science, physical education, 
arts and crafts but also agricultural and technical subjects. 
 
8. Historically the success of practical, technical and agricultural courses has waxed 
and waned with teacher expertise and motivation. 
 
9. There appears to be an erosion of the vernacular in the countries concerned due to 
the absence of a clear language policy and the vernacular not being an examination 
subject except in the Cook Islands School Certificate. 
 
10. The Tate Oral English programme, originally designed and prepared in New 
Zealand is now widespread in the Pacific. Designed for teachers whose own grasp 
of English is insecure it has greatly contributed to the teaching of the language. 
Many are of the view that it has now outlived its usefulness but there is a lack of a 
suitable replacement. 
 
11. Localisation of teachers over recent years the withdrawal of native English 
speakers, as models, and the use of travelling advisers has led to a marked decline 
of primary school pupils' English. The products of those schools, some illiterate in 
both English and the vernacular, appear in the secondary schools and the amount 
of remedial work required is much too great. 
 
12. In examinations and assessment since 1976 prescriptions have been made more 
relevant for Islands candidates for School Certificate and University Entrance by 
the development of South Pacific Option prescriptions and papers. It is hoped that 
Pacific Island “national” examinations might eventually be incorporated into the 
validating function of the South Pacific Board for Educational Assessment, a body 
which New Zealand helped to establish in the expectation that it would enable 
Pacific countries to disengage from reliance on New Zealand examinations. 
However this is unlikely to happen in the Cook Islands or Niue where the New 
Zealand “ticket” is a sought after job qualification within New Zealand. Ironically, 
the provision of School Certificate South Pacific Options rather than causing 
disengagement, led to Kiribati and Tuvalu taking up the New Zealand 
examination. 
 
13. School libraries in Tokelau and at Niue and Cook Island secondary schools were 
previously very well stocked and maintained. With local allocation of funds less is 
being spent on these libraries. 
 
14. Scholarship schemes have often had mixed success, for amongst Islanders who are 
New Zealand citizens, many “scholarshippers” have failed to return home, or if 
they did they remained for only a short period. The Tokelau scholarship scheme 
has not been successful partly because of low primary standards in Tokelau, the 
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initial culture shock experienced in New Zealand and no compulsion for students 
to return to Tokelau after training. 
 
15. New Zealand has strongly supported the University of the South Pacific since its 
establishment in 1968. It has made possible higher level education in a South 
Pacific setting and cultural environment, minimising the alienation and manpower 
loss that is often associated with prolonged study in a metropolitan country. Apart 
from the two main campuses in Suva and Apia, Extension Centres in almost all 
countries underpin university education. 
 
Recently it has become evident that in spite of the USP's range of sub-degree as 
well as degree courses, and its wish to be flexible and responsive, priorities in the 
region do not always coincide and there is an increasing tendency to consider 
establishing national institutions for lower and middle tertiary training. The 
university, nevertheless remains a big resource in South Pacific education. 
 
16. Special forms of education. Two islanders were trained in New Zealand for 
treating the deaf and undertaking hearing surveys. However shortly after their 
return to the Cook Islands both were promoted, leaving the situation in schools as 
it was before the training. This is a classic example of the problem of training and 
subsequently retaining specialists. 
 
17. In view of New Zealand's many links with the South Pacific, its multi cultural and 
especially Polynesian character, New Zealand should welcome the opportunity for 
its teachers and other educationists to work in the Pacific. It has two-way benefits; 
they can assist technically, can be forced to do some basic educational rethinking, 
can perhaps act as ambassadors, and, on return have much to contribute to the New 
Zealand system and institutions supporting the education of Pacific Islanders in 
New Zealand. New Zealand should continue to be responsive to island states' 
needs within the limit of resources available.  
 
18. At present Tuvalu and Kiribati do not have an emigration outlet and education can 
be directed more towards internal development. But Cook Islanders, Nuieans and 
Tokelauns, being New Zealanders, must have a education which assists with local 
development as well as living in New Zealand. 
 
Education per se cannot prevent migration. Life on a small isolated island can be 
limiting. One must start from the premise that, given the preference of rural youth, 
the terms of trade are weighted in favour of urban Rarotonga or Auckland. Any 
attempt to deal with the problem must begin with efforts to shift the terms of trade 
in favour of the rural small islands (which would be very difficult and enormously 
expensive) and not simply with attempts to provide a rural or technical curriculum. 
 
19. Tokelau presents a special problem. There is obviously something wrong with its 
education system. It is reflected in the low achievement at secondary level. The 
quality of teaching in Tokelau schools reduces through the class levels as subject 
matter becomes wider and deeper than the teachers can handle. It is likely that the 
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older the scholarship children are, the further behind their peers they will be on 
entering New Zealand schools and the greater the culture shock. 
 
20. The curriculum for Tokelau should be broad based, related to and meaningful in 
the environment. It should be rooted in local traditions but giving a reasoned 
pathway to other choices and visions. 
 
21. In all the small states there is a shortage of teachers of science mathematics and 
English. There is no need for a lingua franca except with the outside world and in 
remote islands this rarely happens. English is an artificial and difficult language in 
isolation. The official argument about bi-lingualism continues but without firm 
directions. 
 
22. Science concepts, particularly in physical science, are difficult to achieve in a 
limited technological environment where sound science knowledge and 
imagination are required to create, explain and discover. Much effort has gone into 
attempts to strengthen science teaching, but the problem persists. Since the demand 
is likely to continue, New Zealand might well fund research into this problem of 
science motivation and learning and also the funding of science teacher training 
awards. 
 
23. Educational management has been characterised in the small states by a lack of 
continuity in personnel. Lack of continuity in management means a short official 
“memory”.  The “wheel” is reinvented many times, and there is the possibility of 
the repetition of past mistakes. 
 
24. New Zealand's aid in the immediate future would seem most useful in the 
provision of teachers and specialists in English, science and mathematics, 
scholarship training programmes; teacher training including technical; curriculum 
and resource development; training in educational management; non-formal 
education. Greater input at the primary level of schooling is needed. 
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CHAPTER 16 
 
AID IN DEVELOPMENT 
 
 
1. Aid in the South Pacific has in general been a mere extension of the approaches 
taken in other parts of the world. The conventional, institutional approaches used 
in Africa or Asia have been applied uncritically to unique Pacific conditions. 
 
2. There is a conflict in New Zealand's national interest between the promotion of 
exports to the South Pacific (which have grown rapidly in recent years) and aid 
designed to assist autonomous development and self-reliance. While this report 
argues that closer integration with New Zealand rather than autonomous 
development is the better policy for the Cook Islands, Niue, Tokelau (and 
hopefully Tuvalu), for some large South Pacific countries where autonomous 
development might be feasible, trade-offs are required between New Zealand's 
exporting interests and aid policies designed to assist self-reliance. 
 
3. The pattern of New Zealand aid spending in the Pacific reinforces the view that the 
overall objective is the maintenance of stability in the region. The pattern does not 
change greatly over time. 
 
4. The proportion of New Zealand bilateral aid spent in the South Pacific reached 77 
percent in 1982-83 while the Cook Islands, Niue and Tokelau, in spite of their 
smallness, received about 33% of all bilateral aid in 1983/84. Budgetary support to 
those three took 75% of their BAP allocation, or 25% of the total New Zealand 
bilateral aid vote. 
 
5. In the Pacific region as a whole the most aid-dependent countries are the smallest 
and most remote island groups and also those territories which are consciously 
more integrated with metropolitan countries (United States, France or New 
Zealand). Niue and Tokelau have the highest per capita aid figures, a situation 
which is unavoidable and Tuvalu is also now in this category. Unless great 
hardship is to be avoided it seems inevitable that substantial aid to Kiribati must be 
maintained. The two last - Tuvalu and Kiribati - are politically independent. 
 
6. In 1983 the amount of aid per head in the five small states was: 
 
  Niue  $2000 
  Tokelau  $1800 
  Cook Islands  $ 726 
  Tuvalu  $1000 
  Kiribati A$ 99 
 
7. Large international organisations often work on the basis of preconceived ideas 
and fail to adapt to local conditions. At times they are arrogant in their approach 
and communication with local staff is sometimes poor, leading to 
misunderstandings and poor results. 
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8. The great power possessed by aid donors, including New Zealand, overshadows 
economic, social and political affairs in the island states. Even if it is not exercised, 
latent power remains a threat. Great care must therefore be taken not to abuse this 
situation, to respect the local authorities and to work constructively with them. 
 
9. Throughout the South Pacific overseas aid has achieved very limited success in the 
last 30 years in overcoming perceived problems. The reasons are many, including 
failure to diagnose the distinctive qualities of mirab economies, socio-cultural 
obstacles and a lack of political will, but much overseas aid is wrongly conceived 
and is inappropriate. However “aid” is valuable in the form of subsidies in 
maintaining living standards and stability. 
 
For instance most of the largest development schemes in Kiribati in the 1970s were 
at least partially unsound in conception, organisation and management, 
manifesting many of the usual ethnocentric and technocratic faults of foreign aid. 
They were based on preconceived assumptions about local conditions and how 
local people would respond rather than being based on knowledge of actual 
conditions and involving them in planning the scheme. (17.8) 
 
10. We challenge the conventional view of the western or “dualist” model }of 
development that the modern sector can expand to absorb virtually the entire 
population and that this can be done in a fairly short period of time. Overseas 
advisers usually promote economic dualism with all its faults and impose foreign 
models, philosophies or policies uncritically on to a unique culture and 
environment. (17.8) 
 
11. A strong case exists both for aid playing a strategic economic role where it is 
adjusted to the particular conditions of each country (including the “mirab 
economy effect”) and for “aid” as subsidies (essentially for budget support) to 
maintain living standards in the New Zealand-linked states. (17.11) 
 
12. Although the public services in several of the island states are proportionately very 
large and in some cases perhaps could be pruned (if it is decided to subsidise 
producers rather than bureaucrats) it should be remembered that they are primarily 
the creatures of the aid process and are therefore, in the main. 
 
13. New Zealand aid has not been particularly successful in transferring temperate, 
capitalist agricultural technology overseas to “post-tribal” or peasant societies in 
the hot, wet tropics. On the other hand a great deal more success has been achieved 
in the area of forestry. It is suggested that a proportionately greater role be 
accorded to the Forest Service and to the Department of Education in New 
Zealand's ODA programmes. (17.13) 
 
14. The essence of effective aid is understanding of the local context in order to know 
what is appropriate and relevant - whether the innovation, like a shoe, will “fit”.  In 
practice many innovations are ineffective, as they do not fit or the understanding of 
the local economy or society is deficient. Hence resources are wasted. (17.14) 
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15. Effective aid requires a plurality of policies often within the one country (e.g. the 
example of the Kwaio of Malaita, Solomons). 
 
16. The implementation of ODA programmes in host countries is not a simple process 
of responding to local government's requests, as is widely believed. The illusions 
and delusions of development planners need to be understood. Development plans 
are written by planners and involve little political involvement or commitment. 
While a properly thought out plan is of major use to a country, the politicians seem 
to realise that the development process is in no way determined by development 
planning. (17.17) 
 
17. The usual aid approaches of Western countries lead to very uneven delivery of the 
aid assistance, because of the unequal access of different regions and classes. Thus 
aid serves to widen class, urban-rural and regional disparities. It is important to 
target aid through specific programmes to the particular locations and 
circumstances of the lower classes and more isolated regions well beyond the 
major islands, “beyond the tarmac road.” (17.18) 
 
18. The work of the Aid Advisory Committee is commended but it is proposed that 
more means be provided (especially in the provision of up-to-date information) to 
enable it to monitor official ODA more effectively. (17.19) 
 
19. Although there is a high standard of professionalism in the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs and Economic Aid Division, the low priority of aid within the overall role 
of the Ministry is to be regretted. 
 
20. It is proposed that creating a career-structure on South Pacific affairs is an 
essential prerequisite for building a highly professional, skilled South Pacific 
division and that the present practice of large numbers of staff serving merely one 
term ofyears before moving on to other countries be discontinued (at least for a 
proportion of staff). Much greater continuity is required and the in-depth 
acquisition of specialised linguistic, socio-cultural and economic competence on 
the various island groups. Employment of sensitive people with considerable 
empathy for island life is of course essential. The appointment of one or two able 
economists is needed by the MFA to improve the quality of macro economic 
analysis. 
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CHAPTER SEVENTEEN 
 
THE WIDER PACIFIC SCENE 
 
1. Parallel trends, similar to those identified in the five and small states studies, appear 
to be occurring in a number of the Pacific Island economies. It appears that the 
MIRAB economy and its consequences does exist elsewhere, explaining why 
autonomous bootstrap development and conventional policies have been so singularly 
unsuccessful.  
 
2. For example, it appears that the “internationalisation” of Tongan culture began about 
1965. By 1980 there was significant concentrations of Tongans in New Zealand, 
Australia, Fiji and the United States and a few in Britain. The Tongan kindred has 
become truly multi-national with the colonisation of niches of economic opportunity 
in several countries. “Resources” in this international setting can be identified as jobs, 
property, positions, reputation and influence in local authorities.  
 
3. The King of Tonga provides a good illustration of the broad geographical perspective 
of elites. In a world of more powerful states he has attempted to gain leverage by 
conducting negotiations with individuals or government representatives in the United 
States, Australia, New Zealand, Japan, India, Saudi Arabia, the USSR and Libya. He 
appears to wish to find a large investor who will subsidise Tonga development and 
replace diverse dependency perhaps by a narrower kind of clientage.  
 
4. Operating in an international dimension of networks of kinsmen, elites are able to 
choose between various options of maximising resources, status and power. These 
elites are often closely linked with metropolitan economic and political institutions 
and their horizon is not limited by the nation-state model.  
 
5. Banaba society provides one of the most interesting examples of an island society 
maximising etc options internationally. Banabans have operated in several context to 
“touch” all their options without foreclosing any. Thus they were resettled from their 
phosphate-rich island to Rabi Island in Fiji, and they have conducted record breaking 
litigation in the Privy Council to redress grievances and secure adequate 
compensation. At the same time they have maintained their identity both as a people 
under colonial rule in Fiji and as owners of their economically rich though devasted 
homeland.  
 
6. Over 10 percent of all Pacific Islanders/excluding Papua New Guineans) now live in a 
metropolitan country of the Pacific rim - Australia, New Zealand, the United States or 
Canada. Pacific migration has now reached a level that makes it very significant in 
historical or world terms. For example by 1972 American Samoans already resident 
in Hawaii or the American homeland outnumbered those in their island home by 
almost two to one. And now Vancouver is Fiji's third largest city. Only the many 
entry restrictions and immigration barriers in metropolitan countries prevent the 
sizeable migration of Pacific Islanders to Pacific countries from becoming a flood. 
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